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ABSTRACT
 
This thesis concentrates upon a new field of research in South African accounting 
scholarship – this being, in general terms, accounting history and more specifically an 
analysis of the origins of the Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ Board as watch-dog in 
relation to: 
 
● the South African economy in the period 1913–1940; and 
● the changing political framework (also in the period 1913–1940). 
 
The integration of economy, politics and personal ambition on the part of early 20th 
Century accounting societies, led to a variety of responses, counter proposals, 
stalemates and unfocused activity which caused the process of accountants’ registration 
to extend over 38 years in South Africa. This confusion was in strong contrast to the 
process of speedy registration of accountants in New Zealand and Australia. The final 
unification of South African accounting societies in 1951 created the Public 
Accountants’ and Auditors’ Board. Its creation, at long last, suggested an overarching 
control and regulation which was mirrored in the final political unification and 
economic stability of a South Africa dominated by Afrikaner Nationalists. 
 
One further element was interwoven into the fabric of the thesis – this being the 
application of institutional economic theory and its impact upon the accounting 
concepts of “material irregularity” and “reportable irregularity”. 
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Mining; Politics (Language,  Flag, South Africa First); South African Political Parties; 
The Companies Act of 1926; The Chartered Accountants’ Designation (Private) Act 
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PREFACE 
 
The genesis of this thesis lies in my recognition (in about 2006) of a research lacuna in 
South African accounting history, and a subsequent general awakening of interest in 
this field. 
 
While this field has been extensively researched in the United States of America, in 
South Africa it is still in its infancy. This growing interest in South African accounting 
history has been assisted by two events of importance: firstly, the establishment (in 
2010) of the South African Accounting History Centre at the University of 
Johannesburg; and secondly, the recognition afforded by the South African Accounting 
Association to accounting history in its recent call for papers on the topic at its Biennial 
Conference held in June 2013. 
 
South Africa enacted the Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ Act of 1951 with the 
purpose of registering public accountants and auditors, and for the regulation of their 
training. This was necessary to provide for the skilled manpower needed to audit 
companies, mines and other economic entitities, and secure foreign investment.  
 
Fellow dominions within the British Commonwealth, New Zealand and Australia, 
legislated the creation of their accounting professions in 1908 and 1928 respectively. 
This thesis explores the reasons for South Africa’s tardiness in passing similar 
legislation and pays close attention to the stimuli, both negative and positive, of South 
African politics and the country’s economy. Extensive use is made of parliamentary 
records, and an approach for institutional economic analysis is suggested. Also, detailed 
analysis is made of critical and successful legislative enactments, such as the 
Companies Act of 1926, the Chartered Accountants’ Designation (Private) Act of 1927, 
together with legislative failures, such as Pocock’s Bill of 1938. The thesis explores 
concepts such as “material irregularity” and “reportable irregularity” and how these 
impact upon institutional economics or vice versa. A broad overview is also given of 
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the present-day profession and its antecedents in the United Kingdom and the United 
States of America, and their impact on the South African profession. 
 
Conclusions drawn include the following. 
 
 In the period under review, South Africa emerges as a dysfunctional society, 
warped by the Anglo-Boer War, shaped by the residual bitterness between English 
and Afrikaner, and given political substance by Union in 1910.  
 The above social divisions were compounded by extensive, lucrative and foreign-
controlled mining activities whose insatiable demands for cheap labour reinforced 
and extended the inequalities between White and Black. 
 Against this background, Milner’s social engineering in the Transvaal, and Natal’s 
prescience in forming its own separate accounting framework, before Union, saw 
these future provinces establish their own accounting societies through legislation. 
This engendered unequal levels of influence among South African accounting 
societies. And this weakness led to the domination of the profession in the Union by 
the Transvaal and Natal societies. 
 This societal imbalance caused the Transvaal and its allies in Natal, the Cape and 
the Orange Free State (the Four Societies) to introduce new legislation – intended 
for their own advantage – to register accountants nationally. A government 
reluctant to force what was still a private issue, was equally determined not to 
permit inequality within a nascent profession. Thus, the process was stalemated for 
long periods. 
 The logjam created in the period 1913–40 was finally broken after World War II by 
a Nationalist government prepared to use its influence. This government’s 
willingness to do so was a direct result of the sustained economic growth South 
Africa experienced from 1940 onwards. Watch-dogs for the economy were needed. 
 And finally, the process of analysis resulting from the above abstract saw an 
application of the theory of institutional economics as espoused by North. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
THE THESIS IN THE CONTEXT OF RESEARCH 
 
AUDITING AND RESEARCH 
In their ground breaking 1961 work, The Philosophy of Auditing, Mautz and Sharaf 
emphasised the paucity of professional literature dealing with auditing theory when 
compared to “the wealth of material one finds on accounting theory” (1961: 2). They 
then sketched a methodology of auditing which drew upon first principles, which they 
described as the postulates of auditing, these generally being assumptions that form a 
basis for inference and a foundation for further investigation (1961: 37). Being “at the 
bedrock”, postulates were difficult to verify. Mautz and Sharaf isolated eight 
“tentative” postulates of auditing (1961: 42) which, in the main, underpin modern 
auditing. They are:  
 
1. Financial statements and financial data are verifiable. 
2. There is no necessary conflict of interest between the auditor and the 
management of the enterprise under audit. 
3. The financial statements and other information submitted for verification are 
free from collusive and other unusual irregularities. [This has been modified 
since by International Standard on Auditing 240A30 which describes the risks 
of fraud in revenue recognition as a rebuttable presumption.] 
4. The existence of a satisfactory system of internal control eliminates the 
probability [my italics] of irregularities. 
5. Consistent application of generally accepted principles of accounting results in 
the fair presentation of financial position and the results of operations. 
6. In the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, what has held true in the past 
for the enterprise under examination will hold true in the future. 
7. When examining financial data for the purpose of expressing an independent 
opinion thereof, the auditor acts exclusively in the capacity of an auditor. 
8. The professional status of the independent auditor imposes commensurate 
professional obligations. 
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To round off their philosophy of Auditing, Mautz and Sharaf proposed a number of key 
concepts in auditing theory, these being evidence, due audit care, fair presentation, 
independence and ethical conduct (1961: 67). Today all auditors recognise these as the 
fundamental principles of professional conduct. 
 
In essence, Mautz and Sharaf bridged the divide between the “trace, vouch, verify” 
methodology of early practitioners like Dicksee and Montgomery, to the more 
sophisticated system-based audit detailed by Fraser and Aiken (1981: 133) whereby 
indirect evidence is acquired through evaluation of the accounting system and its 
internal controls – and the assertions approach of Taylor and Glezan (1997). In this 
latter process, auditing is defined as “a systematic process of objectively obtaining and 
evaluating evidence regarding assertions about economic actions and events to 
ascertain the degree of correspondence between these assertions and established criteria 
and communicating the results to interested users” (Taylor and Glezen, 1997: 3). 
 
In auditing, “assertions” are the representations made by management and embodied in 
the financial statements with regard, for example, to the value of inventory or the 
accuracy of records and the operating effectiveness of systems. More recent literature 
emphasises the importance of an initial assessment of materiality and audit risk (Crous 
and Lamprecht, 2012: 13). 
 
Mautz and Sharaf’s completed monograph was published under the aegis of the 
American Accounting Association which had been established in 1916 (then as the 
American Association of University Instructors in Accounting). The objective, amongst 
others, was to encourage and sponsor accounting research and publish its results 
(Personal communication: GJ Previts, December 2013). This was later extended to 
auditing through the creation of the quarterly publication Auditing: A Journal of 
Practice and Theory. The proclaimed purpose of this Journal is to improve practice and 
theory, encourage communication and influence developments in auditing education 
(American Accounting Association, 2011). 
 
It is widely accepted (Trotman, 2010) that American research into auditing came of age 
with Ashton’s 1974 article on internal control judgements, thereby introducing a new 
field of research – that of judgement and decision making research, which led to many 
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similar studies in the 1970s and 1980s. Audit literature was greatly influenced and 
enhanced by “a theory-based research paradigm” (Trotman, 2010). The same cannot be 
said of auditing research in the United Kingdom (the UK). There, for example, 
Hopwood, Bromwich and Shaw believed audit research should be concerned with 
“public expectation to the real capabilities of the audit profession”, “technical 
competence” and “audit independence” (1982: 5). 
 
David Gwilliam pointed out in his 1987 survey that while interest in audit research was 
increasing in the UK, it was not matched by a similar increase in research output, 
particularly of an empirical nature (1987: 1). This contrasted poorly with the “surge” in 
research then being experienced in the United States of America (the USA). 
Admittedly, much of the professional interest in Britain was in the direct benefits of 
research to the audit process. This was still the case in 1997 when Power (1997: xii) 
wrote: “auditing remains an unfashionable research specialism”. Mark Bunting is more 
severe. In the May 2013 edition of Accountancy SA, he notes that academic research 
“as a knowledge production mechanism has a secure place in many disciplines” (2013: 
15). Knowledge production of this sort is seldom possible in accounting, where the 
discipline “has a long history of taking a normative rather than a positive approach to 
solving its problems”. This shortcoming has resulted in standard-setting organisations 
solving problems through applied research in the politicised public arena, unfettered by 
concepts of academic freedom. 
 
Since the publication of Gwilliams’ survey, research output in the UK has increased, as 
evidenced on the ICAEW (Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales) 
website. Predictably, little of it was of the non-technical kind or the kind espoused by 
Stephen A Zeff, Professor of Accounting at Rice University in Houston, Texas. 
 
Zeff has been a prolific author on a wide range of accounting topics (Zeff, 2011) 
including topics in accounting history. This has resulted in his being one of the few 
two-time recipients – once in 1973 and again in 2001 – of the Academy of Accounting 
Historians’ Hourglass Award. Basil Yamey is another double recipient. The Award is 
presented annually to people who have made significant contributions to research and 
related publications in accounting history. The objective of the Academy itself is to 
encourage research, publication in all aspects of accounting history as well as its 
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interrelationship with business and economic history (Academy of Accounting 
Historians, 2011). 
 
While the early emphasis on research was into technical matters in accounting and 
auditing, the results Gwilliams’ survey were not unexpected. In his watershed 1954 
book, Nicholas Stacey opined that the accountancy profession in England was 
undermined by its “preoccupation with the present” (1954: xii), its ignorance of the 
past, and its weak anticipation of the future, but by 2004 the situation had changed, as 
the accountancy profession began to appreciate the usefulness of historical research to 
better understand the profession at an organisational level. In explanation of the change, 
Stephen P Walker of the Cardiff Business School, and himself a recipient of Scottish 
research funding, pointed out that in the 1990s the Scottish Committee on Accounting 
History of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS) had funded 
research into several topics. The focus of one of these projects was a response to the 
continuing weakness in British accounting practice in terms of its organisation and, 
consequently, its professionalism. Another project sought to explain, in historical terms, 
why several attempts to rationalise the profession had failed.  
 
Brian P West at the University of Ballarat in Victoria, Australia, expounded upon the 
professionalism of accounting and reviewed the state of historical research and its 
implications in an article for Accounting History (1996). 
 
Freidson (quoted in Larson, 1977: xii) believed that ‘a profession is distinct from other 
occupations in that it has been given the right to control its own work’. Abbott (1988) 
saw a profession as simply a division of expert labour.  
 
One conclusion reached by West (1996: 99) was the challenge to accounting’s 
conventional professional status, its closed nature, and its importance in the ‘vocational 
continuum’. The challenge comprised socio-political factors such as social class, 
gender and politics. One constant appears to have been what Chua and Poullaos (2002) 
described as ‘the classic emblem’, the designation of chartered accountants which 
denoted both ‘elite status and acceptance…’ (2002: 411). Chartered accountant 
societies throughout the English-speaking world went to much trouble ‘to protect this 
arbitrary and increasingly weighty signifier of professionalism’ (2002: 411).  
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Chua and Poullaos (2002: 411) identified three groups of competitors: first, the 
unqualified men open to opportunity but lacking in qualification and scruple; secondly, 
those who were members of ‘inferior non-chartered associations’ (2002: 412); and 
thirdly, those who sought to contest ‘the same geographical space’ (2002: 412). 
 
All these competitors functioned within an early globalisation triggered by the creation 
of the British Empire. Trade followed – and sometimes preceded – the flag and in a 
mundane world, needed to be accounted for by a Western (albeit colonial) accounting 
system of debit, credit, balance sheet and financial statement. Early globalisation has 
been dealt with by Belich (2009), and Magee and Thompson (2010). The latter authors 
consider the problems raised by globalisation, particularly the need to balance 
successful commercial transactions against the inevitability of complex racial 
relationships embedded in social interaction. 
 
Belich notes that it was ‘settlement not empire, that had the spread and staying power in 
the history of expansion…’ (2009: 23). With European settlements came European 
systems of accounting, organisation and professionalism. In their book, Accountancy 
and Empire, Poullaos and Sian (2010) edited the contributions of experts in profession-
state engagements between Britain, on the one side, and its colonies and dominions on 
the other (notably, Canada, South Africa, Australia, Nigeria, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, 
Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, India and Kenya). 
 
Accounting history is an acknowledged branch of history. Until recently in South 
Africa, this type of research was neglected with few proponents despite the fact that in 
the March 1954 edition of The South African Chartered Accountant, GE Noyce had 
flighted a short overview article entitled, “The History of the Profession in South 
Africa” in the hope of stimulating interest. However, it was encouraging to see that the 
first call for papers for the June 2013 International Biennial Conference of the Southern 
African Accounting Association included Accounting History as a discrete field of 
research. Another early exemplar of this type of writing in South Africa was Williard E 
Stone who believed journals and ledgers provided “accurate and reliable information 
about social and economic conditions of earlier times” (1975: 409–25). Stone 
concluded by stating that research of this type helped in the study of the role of 
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accounting in the development of South Africa. This is an important conclusion as it 
links the profession to key elements like the economy. 
 
The American economist, Douglas C North, has stated that “history matters” (North, 
1990: vii). The question to this must be “why” and one of the answers must be that if 
people are not willing to learn from past mistakes, they are likely to make the same 
mistakes in the future. The standard example cited for this point of view is the defeat of 
Hitler’s drive on Moscow in late 1941 by “Generals” Winter and Mud, in the same way 
these elements caused the defeat of Napoleon in the Russian campaign of 1812, some 
129 years earlier. 
 
In an interesting observation, Habermas (in Ryan, Scapens and Theobald, 2002: 33) 
believes social growth evolves as a result of instrumental and communicative action. 
Further, 
 
“through instrumental action individuals attempt to manipulate their 
environment to satisfy their needs and wants, and through communicative action 
they attempt to control their world through the institutionalisation of rules and 
norms”. 
 
There is thus a potential link between this idea and North’s idea of institutions being 
‘the rules of the game’ (1990: 6). 
 
At a meeting with accounting colleagues recently, the author had reason to refer to what 
were previously known in the accounting profession as “articles of clerkship”, now 
described as traineeships, and their invaluable nature in providing practical experience 
of auditing and accounting to the novice accountant. The same issue was debated in the 
South African House of Assembly in 1924–5 during the prolonged and ultimately 
unsuccessful attempt by elements within the accounting profession to have the South 
African Society of Accountants (Private) Bill passed. One of the reasons for the Bill’s 
failure was the Society’s stubborn stance upon the need for practical experience, which 
ultimately found legislative approval and exposition in Section 24 of the Public 
Accountants and Auditors Act No. 51 of 1951 (the PAA Act, 1951). This section of the 
Act provided for a period of five years of articles, reduced at the discretion of the Board 
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in the case of graduates and those who had “obtained satisfactory practical training and 
experience by way of service under articles outside the Union” (PAA Act, 1951: 
s24(3)). 
 
North’s view is simple: history is important because past, present and future are linked 
by the progression of society’s institutions and an understanding of how institutions 
evolve is an important element in the development of economic theory and history. 
Current and future decisions are influenced by a past which is best understood from the 
perspective of institutional development. “Integrating institutions into economic theory 
and economic history is an essential step in improving that theory and history” (North, 
1990: vii). North’s view has implications for economic performance and this was 
clearly one factor in the lengthy process through which South African accountants and 
auditors secured statutory recognition and status for their profession. In the end, 
economic growth forced the establishment of an independent regulation of the 
accounting profession. 
 
Leedy and Ormrod (2005: 161) have an equally simple view of historical research as 
 
“looking at a string of seemingly random events, the historical research 
develops a rational explanation for their sequence, speculates about cause-and-
effect relationships among them, and draws inferences about the effects of 
events on individuals and the society in which they lived.” 
 
North’s point of view echoes the sentiment expressed by the historian, Lord Acton, on 
the occasion of his Inaugural Lecture, delivered at Cambridge in June 1895, in which 
he declared history to be a subject with no beginning nor end; no beginning because 
man’s past was a “dense web … woven without a void” and because “in society as in 
nature, the structure is continuous”. There was no end because “history made and 
history making are scientifically inseparable and separately unmeaning” (Acton, 1969: 
17). 
 
In answering the question posed by the book entitled What is History?, EH Carr, one-
time Senior Research Fellow at Trinity College, Cambridge, pointed out that the answer 
would, consciously or unconsciously reflect the observer’s position in time. For some, 
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like the positivists, it was important to obtain the facts of a situation before coming to a 
conclusion. In the process, facts impinge upon observers from outside and are 
independent of their consciousness. “History consists of a corpus of ascertained facts … 
available to the historian in documents … like fish on a slab. The historian collects 
them, takes them home and cooks and serves them in whatever style appeals to him” 
(Carr, 1961: 3). The process is dispassionate. 
 
This point of view has been challenged by, amongst others, Beverley Southgate, Reader 
Emeritus, University of Hertfordshire. He wrote that “traditional approaches to the role 
of history in education (particularly regarding the desirability of “objectivity” and 
“detachment”) can be positively sinister, in the sense of fostering a dispassionate 
disengagement from what is going on” (Southgate, 2000: xi). He continued by saying 
that post-modern history is important in challenging “existing structures and values”, 
thereby giving “history an ultimately moral role; for history is needed to underpin our 
future and the definition of that future thereby becomes the responsibility of individual 
historians. It is they themselves who must define why we should bother with the 
subject” (Southgate, 2000: xi). 
 
Ryan, Scapens and Theobald point out that objective criticism is impossible. Instead, 
for them, rational reconstruction techniques provided an alternative point of departure 
and were pioneered by Lakatos (1970) and Popper (1959) who believed that “social 
scientific historical explanation” had two levels – internal and external. They continue:  
 
“Internal explanation relates to that component of history that can be explained 
within the terms of a particular methodology. External explanation relates to 
that component of history that is inexplicable in terms of that methodology. 
External history is idiosyncratic history in that it lies outside the scope of 
explanation by the chosen methodology. Any methodology can generate 
explanation although there are certain parameters that govern usefulness in this 
respect” (Ryan et al., 2001: 182). 
 
Southgate’s comment about the limitless scope of history has some commonality with 
what the aforementioned Stephen A Zeff, currently a researcher into the international 
history of standard setting for company financial reporting, said at an informal lecture 
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to the staff of the Department of Accounting at Rhodes University in May 2007. His 
contention was that in the accounting profession there were many non-technical 
avenues for research into its personalities and its social and administrative past, but he 
also pointed out that such research needed to be done quickly before the profession’s 
pensioners – possessing a vast institutional knowledge – died and its haphazardly 
archived paper-based records were shredded to make room for digital records. 
 
Some professional accounting bodies have an awareness of their past and show a 
willingness, at least in part, to record aspects of that past. To mark its golden jubilee in 
1978, the Australian Institute of Chartered Accountants published a history of its first 
50 years (Malkovic, 2009) while the South African Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ 
Board produced something similar for its fiftieth anniversary in 2001 (Lockley, 2001). 
Arguably more promotional than historical in their presentation, both publications give 
a useful historical overview of their respective organisations. The Australian Institute 
announced its intention to produce an updated history towards the end of 2009 and in 
March of that year the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants circulated a 
Request for Proposal to write a history of the South African chartered accountancy 
profession (Terry, 2009). The Request listed a number of key requirements, among 
them, presentation “in a style that is interesting and easy to read” and of interest to the 
“layman who has an interest in business issues and people” (Terry, 2009: 4). In 
particular, the Request also stated that as the South African Institute of Chartered 
Accountants (SAICA) was a membership body, the history “should tell the members’ 
stories and highlight the characters and their achievements” (Terry, 2009: 4). The 
Request also noted that a full history of the profession had never been attempted before 
and that while the SAICA head office and regional offices had “some material of 
historical significance, much of it [had] been lost and what was available was likely to 
be in the hands of individual members and firms” (Terry, 2009: 2). This incompleteness 
of source material hinders effective research, but Verhoef (2013: 164) notes the recent 
“systematic exploration” of material previously unavailable to the researcher. 
 
The history envisaged by the Proposal is similar to that produced in July 2006 by 
Deloitte Southern Africa. Colloquially known as the “Deloitte book” and formally 
entitled Of Ledgers and Legends – the Story of Deloitte Southern Africa, the authors 
acknowledge that it is not a history “in the strictest sense, but a collection of insights 
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into the evolution of the profession [the] firm and some of the incredible people who 
contributed to our success today” [http://www.deloitte.com. Accessed 27/06/2013]. 
 
While a magnificent publication, with many photographs and anecdotes stretching from 
the 1890s to more recent events, such as what it was like auditing during the Rhodesian 
Bush War, and detailing the sporting prowess of many members of the firm, the book 
contributes little to an understanding of the events between 1913 and 1940 which deal 
with the move towards unifying the profession. For Deloitte, it was very much a time of 
internal growth and “business as usual”. As one of the oldest firms in the profession, 
the story of Deloitte’s growth through amalgamation with other firms and deliberate 
expansion emphasises the dynamics of a successful accounting firm in South Africa 
and the world. It is also a subtle form of advertising. 
 
The historical reality is different. The South African Accounting History Centre 
(SAAHC), which is staffed by professional historians and attached to the Department of 
Accountancy at the University of Johannesburg, was formally opened in 2010. The 
SAAHC won the SAICA tender to write a history of the development of the 
Accounting profession in South Africa. 
 
Amongst other important topics, the project envisages the investigation of the 
emergence of accounting societies in the four former British colonies – the Cape, 
Transvaal, Natal and Orange Free State. The project also details the interaction between 
state (dubbed by Verhoef, 2013, as the reluctant ally) and accounting societies in South 
Africa over a prolonged period of time which led finally to the Public Accountants and 
Auditors Act of 1951. In addition, the Director of the Centre, Professor Grietjie 
Verhoef, has emphasised the importance in their research focus of 
 
“the dynamic relationship between the accounting profession, business 
development and economic development of South Africa” (Verhoef, 2013: 
LinkedIn [accessed 08/07/2013]). 
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This research focus extends to 
 
“the regulatory environment in South Africa [and] also with other accounting 
environments such as other Commonwealth countries, Britain and the 
international professional community” (Verhoef, 2013: LinkedIn [accessed 
08/07/2013]). 
 
As such the Centre is set to revitalise research into South African accounting history 
(http://www.uj.ac.za [accessed 08/07/2013]). 
 
As a footnote to the above – in conversation with Professor Alex van der Watt, Head of 
the Department of Accountancy at the University of Johannesburg, it became apparent 
that one of SAICA’s requirements remains a popular history of the accounting 
profession in South Africa (Private Communication, 13/08/2013). 
 
In Great Britain and the United States of America, there is a long tradition of business 
and accounting history, its first hundred years being celebrated by Miranti, Previts and 
Flesher’s article ‘The First Century of the CPA’ (1996). Such history has been 
described as “simply that branch of economic history that finds its source material 
primarily in company records and takes as its starting point the entrepreneur and the 
firm rather than anything else” (Payne, PL, 1967, quoted in Allen et al., 1978: 7). 
 
A firm supporter of the development of economic history, FE Hyde was one-time 
Chaddock Professor of Economics at the University of Liverpool and later, of 
Economic History at the same institution. In his research into the potential links 
between economic theory and business history, he became critical of what he perceived 
to be a simplification of the behaviour of entrepreneurs by theorists and his conclusion 
was twofold; firstly “the economic theorist ought, by studying the facts presented by 
business historians, to leaven the argument and, where necessary continue the process 
of re-defining the theory”, and secondly, “by the use of theory the historian will escape 
from the dullness of mere description and make his studies lively and worthwhile” 
(Hyde, FE, 1962, quoted in Allen et al., 1978: 8). 
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An interesting approach to the importance of history was taken by Tony Malkovic in 
his article entitled, “History holds the key to the future” – in this case, the future of the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia (Malkovic, 2009). The article’s point of 
departure was the Australia 2020 Summit held in April 2008 in Canberra, an event 
billed as generating the best ideas to carry Australia through the challenges of the early 
21st Century. One of the key concepts discussed was that of sustainability – that is: the 
ability “to meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs” (WCED, 1987: 43). Malkovic’s article details 
how the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia has grown in numbers since its 
golden jubilee in 1978 and the way it dealt with a variety of challenges and pressures 
by, for example, revising its statement on independence, introducing Continuous 
Professional Development (CPD) for its members, involving itself in international 
accounting initiatives like the establishment in the 1970s of the International Federation 
of Accountants and the International Accounting Standards Committee, which became 
the International Accounting Standards Board. In addition, the Institute has had a strong 
interest in tax reform and the creation of indirect taxation in preference to increased 
direct taxation. 
 
The main thrust of Malkovic’s article is that in the past the Australian Institute has 
remained consistently relevant to its members, users, Government and the profession 
internationally by responding appropriately to the challenges of the times. In continuing 
this form of “future proofing”, based on past history coupled with a keen sense of the 
entity’s social and ethical responsibilities, the Institute remains relevant into the 21st 
Century. 
 
People with as diverse backgrounds as the members of the Australian Institute and Mac 
Maharaj, member of the African National Congress (ANC) and one-time South African 
Minister of Transport, agree that history is important. While the Institute hopes to use 
its success in the past as a springboard to a successful future, Maharaj’s concern is that 
South Africans are not doing enough to develop their history, particularly with regard 
to recording the memories of key (and other) people. In an article entitled “Mine the 
precious asset of history”, Maharaj writes:  
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“Our knowledge about ourselves – our identity as a nation – depends on our 
understanding of our past and how others see us. It is worrisome that the study 
of our history takes such a low priority in our educational institutions” 
(Maharaj, 2009). 
 
Perhaps the final word should be that of Marc Bloch. Bloch was the foremost French 
medieval scholar of his day and met his death while working for the French Resistance 
in 1944. He wrote:  
 
 “The unquestionable fascination of history requires us to pause and reflect. 
 
It’s [sic] role, both as the germ and, later, as the spur to action, has been and 
remains paramount. Simple liking precedes the yearning for knowledge … 
Readers of Alexander Dumas may well be potential historians who lack only 
training to find the purer and, to my way of thinking, the keener pleasure of true 
research. 
 
Moreover, this chain will be far from diminished once methodical inquiry, with 
all its necessary austerities, has begun. On the contrary, all true historians will 
bear witness that the fascination then gains in both scope and intensity” (Bloch, 
1954: 7–8). 
 
The brief survey presented above indicates that history is important to people. 
 
THE HISTORY OF ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The history of accounting and auditing stretches far back into human civilization, but 
that of the modern period in South Africa begins in 1894 with the establishment in the 
Transvaal of the first professional accounting body created by South Africans – The 
Institute of Accountants and Auditors in the South African Republic. The history of the 
Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ Board and ultimately that of the accounting 
profession in South Africa is best considered in three successive stages:  
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1. 1894–1913, a period which saw the creation in South Africa of organised bodies 
of accountants and which ended in the first attempt to steer the Accountants’ 
Registration (Private) Bill through the new Union Parliament. 
 
2. 1919–40, the period between the World Wars in which a second unsuccessful 
attempt was made to create legislation for the regulation and registration of 
accountants in South Africa by means of the South African Society of 
Accountants (Private) Bill. There were also a number of other unsuccessful 
attempts to pass private members’ bills to facilitate the registration of 
accountants throughout the Union. In 1934 and 1936, Dr Hjalmar Reitz 
introduced bills which did not even get beyond their first readings. Also in 
1934, the then South African Minister of Finance, NC Havenga, provided for 
the creation of the Accounting Profession Commission. While the Commission 
made some positive recommendations, the Government of the day – the Fusion 
of the South African Party and Hertzog’s National Party – did not act upon them 
and it was left to a Member of Parliament, PV Pocock, to use the Commission’s 
recommendation as the basis for another Private Bill to be presented to 
Parliament in August 1938 – the Accounting Bill. The Bill was unfortunately 
timed and the outbreak of the Second World War put paid to any chance of 
success it might have had in the 1940 session. On the positive side, this period 
also saw the successful passage of two Union-wide Acts, these being the 
Companies Act of 1926 and the Chartered Accountants’ Designation (Private) 
Act of 1927.  
 
3. 1940–51, a period which culminated in 1951 in the creation of the Public 
Accountants’ and Auditors’ Board (PAAB) by means of the Public Accountants 
and Auditors Act. This Act provided for statutory uniformity in that only 
individuals registered with the PAAB could hold themselves out to the public as 
accountants and auditors in public practice. This legislation had been preceded 
by a number of important extra-parliamentary steps, notably the creation on 
1 January 1946 of the Joint Council of the Societies of Chartered Accountants 
of South Africa, the revival of the recommendations of the 1934 Commission 
and a conference in Bloemfontein in April 1947 at which representatives of 
accounting bodies met and produced a draft Bill based on the 1934 
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recommendations. The newly elected Government of the day, the National 
Party, at the beginning of four decades in power, did not believe the Bill 
provided sufficient protection for the public and countered with the draft 
Auditing Act of November 1949. According to one source, this legislation 
“would have placed control in the hands of Government officials and put the 
auditor in the position of informer and destroyed the fiduciary relationship 
between the auditor and the client” (Puttick and Van Esch, 2007: 6). Further 
discussions among the accounting societies on the one hand, and between 
representatives of these societies and the Government on the other, produced a 
compromise solution at a final conference in November 1950 and a draft Bill 
which followed the designated route through Parliament and emerged as the 
Accountants and Auditors Act (Act No. 51 of 1951). This Act, amended on a 
number of occasions, remained in force until 2005 when it was replaced by the 
Auditing Profession Act, 2005 (Act No. 26 of 2005). 
 
THE THESIS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PROFESSION 
 
A PROFESSION IN TRANSITION 
As regulated by the Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors (IRBA), formerly the 
Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ Board, the accounting and auditing profession in 
South Africa has been in a state of transition in the early 21st Century. This was clearly 
underlined in the Report to the Minister of Finance, dated 30 September 2003, from the 
Ministerial Panel for the Review of the Draft Accountancy Profession Bill (Ministerial 
Panel, 2004). The largely self-regulatory nature of the profession has been curtailed 
subsequently in the new Auditing Profession Act which resulted from that Bill.  
 
A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE 
The reevaluation of the PAAB and its activities resulted from a crisis of confidence in 
the profession which had been fuelled by a succession of corporate failures, both 
internationally and in South Africa. In many instances, a significant element in that 
failure was fraud – that is: an intentional misstatement of financial records and 
statements to cover theft or the misuse of corporate assets, coupled with an apparent 
inability by the auditors to uncover these acts.  
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In his national budget speech on 20 February 2002, the then South African Minister of 
Finance, Trevor Manuel, highlighted a number of common elements in these failures, 
including the non-existence of a culture of corporate governance, negligent and reckless 
management of corporate entities, ineffective auditing and questionable audit 
independence arising from a lack of separation of audit and consultancy services 
provided to the same client (Manuel, 2002: 23). 
 
The American Independence Standards Board has defined independence as the 
“historic soul of the auditing profession” (1998). Questioning the quality of its 
independence is thus a severe, if not the severest, criticism of the profession. But a 
scrutiny of many corporate failures shows the independence of their auditors was 
fatally compromised in a number of ways, including the acceptance of inappropriate 
accounting policies which converted losses into gains and the signing of unqualified 
audit reports upon financial statements which were known to be significantly flawed 
(Naidoo, 2002: 114).  
 
In an interesting reflection of the complexity of the issue, Reuters reported on 8 July 
2013:  
 
“in a rare show of bipartisan unity, the US House of Representatives voted on 
Monday to block an auditor industry watch-dog from forcing companies to 
switch auditors, a regulatory move that could break up some business 
relationships over a century old … Dozens of US companies have had the same 
auditor for 25 years or more. Conglomerate General Electric Co has had the 
same auditor since 1909, consumer goods maker Procter and Gamble Co, since 
1890.”  
(http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/09/house-auditbill-
idUSL1N0FE1YW20130709 [accessed 01/08/2013]). 
 
In South Africa, the new Companies Act has required auditor rotation from its effective 
date of 1 May 2011. 
 
The most notable failures to date in South Africa have been Masterbond in the early 
1990s, Macmed in 1999, LeisureNet in 2000, Regal Treasury Bank in 2001 (Naidoo, 
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2002: 111) and Fidentia Asset Management in 2006–7. In the latter case, the entity’s 
auditor conspired actively with top management to commit theft, money laundering and 
a variety of other crimes to defraud its investors of millions of rands (Yeld, 2008). In all 
cases, ordinary investors and employees were amongst those who suffered significant 
financial loss.  
 
A further concern is the inherent tension that exists in the situation where company 
directors may be indirectly involved in the appointment of its auditors, although the 
true audit clients are the company’s shareholders (Wixley and Everingham, 2005: 103). 
In reality, the auditor could have little contact with these owners, other than at the 
annual general meeting. Even then, there may be so many shareholders that 
communicating with them all at a single meeting is problematic. In South Africa, the 
appointment of the auditor in terms of the new Companies Act of 2008 (effective from 
1 May 2011) is the purview of the small but critical sub-committee of the board – the 
audit committee – populated and chaired by independent non-executive directors (Stein, 
2011: 145). 
 
The cumulative result of these shortcomings and sensational exposés has been a waning 
of public confidence in the auditing profession and in the reliability of audited financial 
statements (Nel Commission, 2001). The Nel Commission report came just before the 
news broke in 2002 of the Enron-Andersen debacle in the United States of America. 
The concerns about auditors’ independence are thus not unique to South Africa and are 
apparent elsewhere in the world (Monks and Minnow, 2004: 47). Understandably, this 
loss of public confidence is an ongoing worry to the profession as well as to its 
professional regulators. 
 
THE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
In terms of Douglass C North’s analysis of institutions and institutional change as 
presented in his book Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance 
(1990), institutions represent society’s “rules of the game” and a way to reduce 
uncertainty by giving an accepted framework to economic and other human interactions 
(North, 1990: 3). North makes a number of observations which can be applied to 
entities like the IRBA. The first is that organisations and economic constraints, such as 
time and other limited resources like expertise, determine the opportunities in a society 
  19 
 
(here, the need to provide cost-effective audits). As a result, organisations, such as 
accounting and auditing firms, arise to take advantage of those opportunities. As 
organisations develop and interact with their clients and regulators, what they do and 
how they do it (with regard, for example, to evidence of financial irregularity) impacts 
upon norms, causing them to evolve, and this changes the “rules of the game”. 
Secondly, knowledge is asymmetrical with one party in a transaction (for example, the 
audit client) knowing more about the financial and other transactions underlying a set 
of financial statements than the auditors do.  
 
And finally, the cost of information (the audit report produced by a registered auditor, 
for example) is key to the costs of transacting, which in turn comprise the costs of 
measuring the valuable attributes of what is being exchanged as well as the cost of 
protecting rights and policing and enforcing agreements. A “clean” audit report should 
send a strong signal to the market as to the financial probity, and hence value, of the 
entity to which the report applies as well as the stewardship of the directors in 
protecting the economic rights and property of investors, creditors, employees and other 
interested parties. “These measurement and enforcement costs are the sources of social, 
political and economic institutions” (North, 1990: 27).  
 
North’s idea of “the rules of the game” is important and includes both “formal” and 
“informal” constraints. In South Africa, the latter was carried forward in the idea of 
corporate governance informed by ideas of “participation and inclusiveness” (King, 
2002: 108). Adherence to the principles of corporate governance, as detailed in the 
King Report of 2002, was not a legal requirement in South Africa (Wixley and 
Everingham, 2005: 8) but the Corporate Laws Amendment Act (Act No. 26 of 2006) 
saw the inclusion of some significant elements of governance, most notably the 
establishment of audit committees as part of the board structure in “widely held 
companies”. The new Companies Act (2008) does away with the concepts of “widely 
held” and “limited interest” companies in favour of “profit” and “non-profit” 
companies. The former are categorised as either state-owned, public, private, or 
personal liability companies. In terms of Companies Regulation 28 of the new 
Companies Act, state-owned and public companies must be audited and must establish 
audit committees. Companies that achieve a certain public interest score are also 
required to be audited. Other companies can choose whether or not to be audited and 
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set up such committees. Inevitably, this will mean a decreased number of audit 
engagements, though not as few as initially anticipated. 
 
While a third King Report was completed in 2009, its recommendations have not been 
adopted completely into law, despite the statement that “King III applies to all entities 
regardless of the manner and form of incorporation or establishment” (King, 2009: 19). 
While King III is not law, the process of Corporate Law Reform in South Africa, which 
produced the new Companies Act, bound itself to promoting compliance with the Bill 
of Rights as well as “encouraging transparency and high standards of corporate 
governance” (Companies Act, 2008: s7). In addition, the obvious “bottom line” benefits 
of good corporate governance will encourage entities to apply these principles. 
 
This idea of inclusiveness is not new. The 19th Century American economist and social 
commentator, Thorstein Veblen, wrote in 1899 in his book The Theory of the Leisure 
Class: an Economic Study of Institutions 
 
“Any community may be viewed as an industrial or economic institution, the 
structure of which is made up of what is called its economic institutions. These 
institutions are habitual methods of carrying on the life process of the 
community in contact with the material environment in which it lives” (1899: 
145). 
 
In 1978, Wilber and Harrison described the central idea of institutional economics in 
three parts: holistic – because it concentrated on the links between parts and the whole; 
systemic – because the parts make a coherent whole and need to be understood in that 
context; and evolutionary – because such is the nature of human society. This idea has 
been supported by other commentators. Samuels (1995), for example, emphasised the 
idea of an economy as a “correlative system of social control” and made the point that 
“business would not be business without the requisite legal and non-legal social 
controls”. 
 
Within this context, the auditor has a publically perceived responsibility, or as Gloeck 
and De Jager (Preface, 1993) put it, is “in an exceptional position in the business 
world”. 
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THE AUDITOR’S RESPONSIBILITY 
The nature of the auditor’s responsibility beyond the law has been widely interpreted. 
At the inaugural meeting of the Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ Board in October 
1951, the then South African Minister of Finance, NC Havenga, referred to the 
profession as a “brother keeper” (PAAB Archives, Board Minutes, 24 October 1951: 
B1–B4). Lancaster’s definition (1927: 3) of the auditor saw “an independent critic” 
whose task it was to determine either the accuracy or fallacy of a balance sheet at a 
particular point in time and hence the probity of an entity’s financial statements. Gloeck 
and de Jager (1993: 4–6) identified eight separate interpretations of the auditor’s role, 
among them the perception that the auditor is a “watch-dog”, a “tool” to ensure 
accountability and a “reviewer” of the underlying agency relationship in a company 
where shareholders, as principals, appoint directors as their agents to manage their 
company. In a foreshadowing of the establishment of corporate governance, Sherer and 
Kent (1983: 93) suggested that audits should test the efficiency of an entity’s 
operations, the quality of its management information systems and its social behaviour. 
Along the same line, Tinker (1985: 205) theorised that auditors should adjudicate social 
conflicts between corporate entities and the communities within which such entities 
operate. Lee (1993: 13) saw the audit function in a state of crisis as a result of the 
“expectation gap” – that is: the difference between the professional (and legal) point of 
view and that of the public at large. Stobie (1974: 169) outlined the new, yet growing, 
body of literature dealing with the accountant’s social responsibility towards 
environmental issues, such as pollution. Power (1997: xii), however, points to the 
danger of over-auditing where auditing is used as a “robust policy tool” but one which 
often fails. 
 
THE DEFINITION OF “AUDIT” 
Neither the South African Companies Acts of 1926 and 1973 nor the old Public 
Accountants and Auditors Acts (1951 and 1991) defined either “auditor” or “audit”. 
The Cape Companies Act of 1892, as presented by H Tennant, similarly contained no 
definition of an auditor. Auditors themselves were allowed to be members of the 
company but this Act stated in Paragraph 85 of its Third Schedule that “no person is 
eligible as an auditor who is interested otherwise [my italics] than as a member in any 
transaction of the company” (Tennant, 1894: 117). In present-day terms, a direct 
financial interest in an audit client would represent a self-interest threat to the auditor’s 
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independence and require disposal of the shareholding (Code of Professional Conduct, 
2010: ET 290.100–6). The 1973 Companies Act did, however, at Section 300, list 10 
duties the auditor had to fulfil with regard to the “annual financial statements and other 
matters”. The previous statutory body charged with the safeguarding of the financial 
interests of South Africans through regulating the services provided by registered 
accountants and auditors – the Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ Board – accepted a 
narrowly defined objective of an audit as a process “to enable the auditor to express an 
opinion as to whether or not the financial statements fairly present in all material 
respects the financial position of the entity at a specific date” (South African Auditing 
Statement, The Objective of and General Principles Governing an Audit of Financial 
Statements, SAAS 200, 1996: 200.02). 
 
This professional definition is different from those suggested by the authors quoted 
above and helps to explain the “expectation gap”. This “gap” is the difference between 
what the auditor is required to do in terms of law and professional standards and what 
ordinary members of the public expect of the auditor, usually to uncover fraud (Gloeck 
and de Jager, 1993: 48). Often the difficulty for the auditor is to differentiate between 
fraud (deliberate) and error (mistake), and with regard to both, their extent and hence 
materiality as fraudulent activities are often carefully concealed. Fraud, by its nature, 
must always be qualitatively material and its consideration at that level and 
quantitatively is key to the audit process in the period post 2002. 
 
Sometimes accounting misrepresentation is difficult and complex to determine. This 
arises from the concept of “creative accounting”, a term that was first coined in about 
1986 and used in a book by Ian Griffiths called Creative Accounting (1986). While 
popular as a term, there is considerable debate as to what “creative accounting” actually 
means. For MJ Jones, editor of Creative Accounting, Fraud and International 
Accounting Scandals (2011), creative accounting means the exploitation of the pliant 
nature of accounting in the preparation of financial statements within a regulatory 
system, for the benefit of the preparers instead of the users of these statements. Creative 
accounting thus works within the system and is not illegal (Jones, 2011: 5). 
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He points out: “It is able to do this because of the fundamental need for financial 
reports to be flexible so as to give a true and fair view of accounts. All companies are 
different and operate in different environments”. 
 
Jones illustrates this point in a table which shows the progressive “decline in 
accounting from no flexibility to flexibility to give a true and fair view, to flexibility to 
give a creative view, to flexibility to give a fraudulent view” (2011: 6). At one end of 
the table, a rigorous regulatory framework eliminates accounting flexibility, while at 
the other a complete lack of an acknowledgement of the framework gives rise to 
fraudulent activity. Creative accounting lies between the two and is insidious as it 
operates within the regulatory framework. 
 
TABLE 1.1 
THE ROUTE TO FRAUDULENT ACCOUNTING 
 
No 
flexibility  
Flexibility to 
give a “true 
and fair” view 
 
Flexibility 
to give a 
creative 
view 
 
Flexibility to 
give a 
fraudulent 
view 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regulatory 
framework 
eliminates 
accounting choice 
Working within 
regulatory framework 
to serve users’ interests 
Working within 
regulatory framework 
to serve preparers’ 
interests 
Working outside 
regulatory 
framework 
  
Within regulatory framework 
Outside regulatory 
framework 
 
 
Fraud is a criminal activity determinable in a court of law. 
 
The Auditing Profession Act of 2005 has defined an “audit” in such a way that factors 
other than materiality are considered. In terms of Section 1 of this Act, an audit 
 
“means the examination of, in accordance with prescribed or applicable auditing 
standards  
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(a) financial statements with the objective of expressing an opinion as to their 
fairness or compliance with an identified financial reporting network and any 
applicable statutory requirements; or 
(b) financial and other information, prepared in accordance with suitable criteria 
with the objective of expressing an opinion on the financial and other 
information.” 
 
This is not to suggest that materiality no longer has a role after 2005. It has an 
important one to fulfil, but it is an elusive concept and, quantitatively, differs from one 
audit client to another. An audit client with a turnover of R100 million will be less 
concerned with an error of R1000 than a client with a turnover of R1 million. The 
concept of materiality is usually defined as information, which by its omission or 
misstatement could influence the economic decisions of users taken on the basis of the 
financial statements (A Guide through International Financial Reporting Standards, 
2012: The Conceptual Framework, QC11). 
 
MATERIAL VERSUS REPORTABLE IRREGULARITY 
Previously, the materiality of potential errors or deliberate misstatements defined the 
responsibility of the auditor. It is at the point where the occurrence of what was 
previously known as a “material irregularity” is a probability, that audit independence 
and a responsibility to the public on one hand have the potential to collide with the 
opinions of a company directorate concerned with self-interest on the other hand. The 
reason for this is simple. In terms of previous legislation, the client’s failure to correct a 
material misstatement to the auditor’s satisfaction, required the auditor to report the 
issue to the Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ Board. In terms of Section 20(5)(c) of 
the Public Accountants and Auditors Act, 1991, the Board had a wide discretion as to 
how the information was managed and disseminated thereafter. A critical point to 
understand here is that the auditor had no obligation to report, such report being 
dependent upon the auditor’s assessment of the materiality of the irregularity. Such an 
assessment could be heavily influenced by subjective issues, such as retaining the audit. 
 
The new Auditing Profession Act has replaced the concept of a “material irregularity” 
with that of a “reportable irregularity”. The elements of the two forms of irregularity 
are similar, but in the latter the auditor has no discretion; an immediate report to the 
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Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors is mandatory where the irregularity 
involves fraud or theft at management level, regardless of its level of materiality. As 
von Wielligh states,  
 
“All irregularities of this nature have to be reported, even if no financial loss 
was or could be suffered by any party. Similarly, a material breach of a 
fiduciary duty has to be reported, even if no consequential financial loss 
occurred or is likely to occur” (von Wielligh, 2006: 10).  
 
(The word “material” is not defined in the Act but “reportable irregularity” is.) The 
Regulatory Board has no discretion and in terms of Section 45(4) of the Auditing 
Profession Act “must… notify any appropriate regulator in writing of the details of the 
reportable irregularity”. 
 
In terms of Section 52(3) of this Act, the penalty for an auditor who fails to report a 
reportable irregularity and is found guilty of such misconduct is a severe fine or 
imprisonment “for a term not exceeding 10 years or to both a fine and such 
imprisonment”. In such circumstances, most auditors are conservative in their 
interpretation of what constitutes a reportable irregularity and would rather report 
anything suspicious than not do so. As predicted by von Wielligh (2006: 11), the IRBA 
received a flood of such reports; in the period 25 July to 14 November 2006, it received 
347 reports from registered auditors (Personal Communication: B Agulhas, November 
2006). As shown in the following extract from the IRBA Annual Report for 2012 (2012: 
02), the number of reports has stabilised to about 800 per annum:  
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TABLE 1.2 
REPORTABLE IRREGULARTIES: 2008–12 
 
Reportable Irregularities  
received 
2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 
Total RIs received (first reports) 
• Second reports – continuing 
• Second reports – not continuing 
• Second reports – did not exist 
• Second reports – other  
814 
491 
312 
11 
- 
806 
468 
328 
7 
3 
1 108 
674 
340 
11 
83 
1 125 
669 
407 
22 
27 
780 
424 
316 
19 
21 
 
One of the concerns of the period 1949–50 leading up to the creation of the PAAB and 
highlighted by Puttick and Van Esch, was that a heavy handed approach would lead to 
the perception of the auditor as an “informer” and destroy the “fiduciary relationship 
between the auditor and the client” (2009: 6). As Von Wielligh notes (2007: 20), prior 
to the new Auditing Profession Act of 2005, auditors only needed to report 
irregularities to the regulator 30 days after the auditor had reported them to 
management and management had failed to allay the auditor’s concerns within that 
time frame. With the new Act – and where the auditor believes a reportable irregularity 
is taking place – the obligation is to report this immediately to the regulator. “This 
change in reporting requirements can place strain on auditor/client relationships, 
particularly where the auditor was under a mistaken impression that a RI (Reportable 
Irregularity) was taking place whilst this was not actually the case and consequently 
reported it directly to the IRBA” (Von Wielligh, 2007: 20). It is probable that the Act 
intended to weaken potentially unhealthy auditor-client relationships. One must also 
question whether the auditor-client relationship was ever intended to be a fiduciary one 
or, in the modern period at least, one based upon statutory necessity. This needs further 
research. Vermaak did some original work in 1976 – which is discussed in the 
conclusion – but it needs revision. 
 
The profession, both in the United States of America and South Africa, has been quick 
to separate the audit from the advisory function, thereby limiting the auditor’s exposure 
to potential “non-independent” situations. Codes of conduct, too, have been revised to 
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detail a variety of threats to independence, among them self-interest, self-review, 
advocacy, familiarity and intimidation (SAICA Code of Professional Conduct, 2010: 
ET10). In addition, the issue of updated and upgraded auditing standards has enhanced 
the quality of audits and the potential for discovering irregularities has increased by a 
careful process of risk assessment. 
 
But the anticipated costs were high – some preliminary estimates suggested as much as 
a 45% increase in audit fees would be needed to meet the increase in time spent on the 
audit implementation of the new standards (Personal Communication: P Austin, 
Registered Auditor with a “Big Four” Firm, 2004). Understandably, firms have been 
reluctant to divulge actual amounts. Moreover, there are still concerns as to how the 
profession can be regulated closely in practice to prevent ineffective audits and 
collusion with, or dominance by, directors in situations where potential irregularities 
exist. The intention is always to offer enhanced protection to shareholders and other 
stakeholders. While corporate governance is one avenue, no quick or easy solution is 
apparent and the issues are likely to keep the profession and its regulators focussed 
upon them for some time to come. 
  
OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
 
PRIMARY OBJECTIVE 
The thesis’ broad primary objective is an examination of the process and progress (or 
lack of it) made in Parliament in the period 1913–40 towards the creation of the Public 
Accountants’ and Auditors’ Board (PAAB). It is not meant to be a history of South 
Africa. But the process took place against a backdrop of political and economic events 
of considerable importance and which inevitably impacted upon that process. At a 
Presidential address made in September 1965 at the Australian National University, 
Canberra, WK Hancock made the famous comment: “South Africa is microcosmic. Its 
history contains all the conflicts of our time” (Hancock, 1965: 1). 
 
Krüger declared the period from 1910–48 as “one of the most significant in the history 
of South Africa” (Krüger, 1958: Introduction). Events since 1990 suggest otherwise, 
but in Krüger’s day the events that contributed to this significance included the union of 
former British Colonies and Boer Republics, who were former enemies, the 
  28 
 
development of constitutional independence, an expanding economy and the increasing 
importance of the mines to that economy and the rise of both Afrikaner and Black 
nationalism. 
 
Thus, the fundamental approach taken in this thesis has been – as far as is possible – to 
combine the three strands – politics, economics and parliamentary process into a flow 
of events and interpretation. 
 
The South African Regulatory Board for Auditors (IRBA) and its predecessor, the 
Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ Board (PAAB), were established by Parliament with 
the purpose of regulating public accountants in practice. Accountants are important in 
any economy, both for accurate recording and presentation of financial information, 
and as auditors, for reporting upon the probity of such information in a corporate 
context. 
 
In a paragraph attached to its e-mails to members and others, the IRBA 
(communications@irba.co.za, 2 June 2011]) interprets its responsibility as being 
 
“to endeavour to protect the financial interests of the South African public and 
international investors in South Africa through the effective and appropriate 
regulation of audits conducted by registered auditors, in accordance with 
internationally recognised standards and process. The CFAS [Committee for 
Auditing Standards] assists the IRBA to develop and maintain auditing 
pronouncements which are internationally comparable”. 
 
The significance of the auditor in the economic wellbeing of the nation is thus well 
established. 
 
The accounting profession shoulders a political and social responsibility delegated by 
Parliament and functions within an economic framework. 
 
SECONDARY OBJECTIVE 
The present period of transition from the PAAB to the IRBA offers an opportunity as a 
minor secondary objective, to go back to an earlier period of organisational change 
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through an examination of the minutes of the debates (and related reports) in the House 
of Assembly of the Union Parliament in the period 1913–40 to determine how the game 
was played by its participants or organisations, both in the literal sense of parliamentary 
rules and regulations, and in the sense of North’s institutional economics. For North, 
organisations are groups formed for specific purposes and may play by the rules, 
outside of the rules or on the edges of the rules to achieve those purposes – that is: 
usually to win the game “by a combination of skills, strategy and coordination; by fair 
means and sometimes by foul means” (North, 1990: 5). 
 
In the context of this thesis, Parliament made the rules and, in 1951, devolved some of 
this authority to regulate the profession to the Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ 
Board. The accounting societies are the organisations, created by individuals, with a 
twofold purpose: firstly, to take advantage of the opportunity the economy provides and 
offer businesses – such as companies, partnerships, trusts and sole proprietors – their 
practical skills of accounting and auditing for a fee; secondly, to ensure that they 
influence – to their advantage if possible – any establishment of a centralised entity by 
Parliament to register members of the profession and to regulate their activities. 
 
Answers will be sought to the following questions:  
 
(i) Why did the process take nearly 40 years to complete when South Africa’s 
brother dominions of Australia and New Zealand completed the unification of 
their accounting societies within a short period of time? 
(ii) What was the impact on the process of landmark legislative enactments such as 
the Companies Act of 1926 and the Chartered Accountants’ Designation 
(Private) Act of 1927? 
(iii) How did the prevailing economic and political environment impact upon the 
process of unification? For example, it appears that the promoters of the Society 
of South African Accountants (Private) Bill of 1924 were unfortunate in the 
timing of the passage of the Bill through Parliament. They began their attempt 
in February 1924 when the South African Party was in control of both the 
Senate and the House of Assembly and after fits and starts saw it flounder 20 
months later in September 1925 when the reality of a new Labour-National 
Party Pact Government impacted significantly upon the parliamentary debate. 
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(iv) Who were the “winners” and the “losers” in the process to 1940? 
(v) Is it possible to discern in the process any of the major elements of North’s 
institutional economics? 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
OBJECTIVE 1 
The methodology used in writing this thesis was qualitative critical analysis to develop 
a broad and general South African political and economic background, using generally 
accepted secondary source material recorded in the Reference List. The research then 
progressed to a detailed review of primary material – the minutes and proceedings of 
the various parliamentary select committees – and the one commission – established in 
the period 1913–40 to investigate the unification of the accounting profession. As select 
committees were appointed by, and adopted to, the House of Assembly as part of the 
process of parliamentary consideration of nascent legislation, it was also necessary to 
place the select committees in context and detail and analyse the debates they generated 
in the House. 
 
Inevitably, a narrative style interlinks the analysis. As Tom Holland points out in the 
preface to his popular history of the Roman Republic, Rubicon:  
 
“Following a lengthy spell in the doghouse, narrative history is now squarely 
back in fashion – and even if, as many have argued, it can only function by 
imposing upon the random events of the past an artificial pattern, then that in 
itself need be no drawback” (Holland, 2003: xxvii). 
 
Indeed, some notable texts on South African history combine narrative with analysis of 
varying depths. This was George Cory’s approach in his five-volume The Rise of South 
Africa, from Earliest Times to 1853 as well as the style apparent in Frank Welsh’s A 
History of South Africa published by Harper Collins in 2000. One of the most 
prominent exponents of the narrative-analytical style of South African history is TRH 
Davenport whose South Africa: A Modern History has run to six editions – 1977, 1978, 
1987, 1991 and 2000 (in addition, the 1978 edition went through four printings in that 
year alone). 
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South African history has an undeniable attraction and has resulted in the continuous 
publication of general texts, such as Robert Ross’ A Concise History of South Africa 
(1999), the Reader’s Digest Illustrated History of South Africa: The Real Story (1995), 
Omer-Cooper’s History of Southern Africa (1988) and Maylam’s A History of the 
African People of South Africa: From the Early Iron Age to the 1970’s (1986), all of 
which satisfied a need for a “quick” history before the advent of Wikipedia. 
 
Post Wikipedia, the process continues with New History of South Africa (2007) edited 
by Giliomee and Mbenga, and Volume 1 of The Cambridge History of South Africa 
(2010). The latter is an ambitious project to cover in two volumes the history of South 
Africa from 2000 years ago to 1994. 
 
Economic historians, too, have contributed to the continued interest in South Africa 
with the publication in 2007 of Charles Feinstein’s An Economic History of South 
Africa: Conquest, Discrimination and Development. In economic history, analysis is 
greatly facilitated by the availability of an increasing volume of quantitative data that 
lends itself to such analysis through the application of statistical tools. One only has to 
refer to that invaluable mine of data that many have quarried beneficially – Union 
Statistics for Fifty Years, 1910–1960. The existence of this valuable primary data is also 
testimony to the growing sophistication of the South African state after Union in the 
period 1910–40. 
 
But, while statistical tools and quantitative methods have a definitive role to play in 
economic history, Hicks (1969: 1) points out that the further back the past, the less 
reliable the data, and that the economic aspects of life then were less differentiated than 
they are today. 
 
Hicks alludes to the view that economic history is seen as a process of specialisation 
and points out 
 
“the specialisation is not only a specialisation among economic activities, it is 
also a specialisation of economic activities (what are becoming economic 
activities) from activities of other sorts. This is a specialisation which is not yet 
complete and can never be complete; but it has gone far enough for us to imitate 
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it in our studies. We contract the boundaries of our subjects, and of our sub-
subjects, to make them more manageable; and we are enabled to do this because 
our academic specialisation corresponds to something which is in fact 
happening in the “real world”. But it is not all that is happening in the world; we 
suffer, and we know that we suffer, by getting so far apart. A major function of 
economic history, as I see it, is to be a forum where economists and political 
scientists, lawyers, sociologists, and historians – historians of events and of 
ideas and of technologies – can meet and talk to one another” (Hicks, 1969: 1–
2). 
 
On the other hand, Rider (1995) espouses the traditional view of economic history, 
shedding light on the concepts, theories and conceptual analysis that the study of 
economics uses to determine human behaviour and create explanatory theories to 
explain that behaviour. There are five important elements for Rider in the study of 
economic history. Firstly, economic history places reliance on written sources and 
unwritten aspects. With regard to the latter, aspects of importance comprise elements 
such as farming practices, diets, household arrangements and other facts dealing with 
day to day living. 
 
Secondly, economic history is important in social and political contexts. Rider writes 
“historical experience [is] a developmental process occasionally interrupted by non-
evolutionary shocks and events, both natural and man-made. No economy can be 
separated from the society in which it is located” (Rider, 1995: xi). Thirdly, the reality 
is that some decisions improve the quality of life for some, while others result in a 
decline in the quality of life. Fourthly, industrialisation has followed different patterns 
in different countries and has done more to increase open commerce, “material 
productivity” … than any other behavioural or organisational change. Finally, 
industrialisation and the market system have come to dominate economic activity. 
 
OBJECTIVE 2 
The methodology used in pursuit of objective 2 comprised identification of 
recognisable elements in institutional economics and by analysis and interpretation to 
understand them in the context of this thesis. In particular, any evidence was sought of 
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an evolutionary trend in the procedures and rules of the Union Parliament in its 
dealings with the Accountants Bills in the period 1913–40. 
 
Institutions fulfil a major role by establishing a level of stability (but not efficiency) in 
human interactions (North, 1990: 6). The uncertainty in exchange results from 
transaction costs and especially the cost of information acquisition. As a representative 
body, Parliament, through its third-party enforcement, provides the stability for 
economic growth. The critical role of institutions in ensuring stability is reflected in the 
administrative certainty that underpinned the development of the accounting profession. 
 
In the watershed paper, “The Problem of Social Cost”, Coase (1960: 22) proposed that 
when it is costless to transact, the efficient neoclassical equilibrium will be obtained. 
Institutions are thus a means of efficient economic exchange, given the presence of 
transaction costs, and thus play no independent role in economic performance. North’s 
response to this approach disregards the fact that institutions are not always established 
to be efficient. Formal rules are often created to serve the interests of those with the 
bargaining power or sufficient incentive to devise them (North, 1990: 16). 
 
North argued that the role and influence of interest groups is related to the degree to 
which institutions have integrated the price of voicing opinions (North, 1990: 111). 
Parliament in 1913 priced the introduction of private bills to strengthen its role in the 
process. 
 
What is important is the historical progress of change and the interaction between 
organisations and institutions. The institutional environment determines which 
organisations come into existence and how they progress. In turn, the organisations that 
are created, through pursuing their objectives, influence how the institutional 
framework evolves (North, 1990: 5). 
 
The use of institutions as tools for economic analysis has been criticised for its lack of a 
theoretical foundation. The main empirical methodology of institutional economics is 
the study of actual institutions and how they function within a societal framework. 
Instead of an analysis of the static models of a perfectly functioning market, an 
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institutional economics inquiry determines how a network of institutions arises 
endogenously to regulate market transactions (North, 1990: 11). 
 
SOURCE MATERIAL 
There were five providers of the primary source material used in developing this thesis. 
The Cory Library at Rhodes University in Grahamstown provided both primary and 
secondary sources, while primary material was made available both by the National 
Library in Cape Town and the archives of the former Public Accountants’ and 
Auditors’ Board (now the Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors) at Emerald 
Boulevard, Modderfontein, Johannesburg. The Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
Australia and the New Zealand Institute of Accountants provided access to 
documentation like the Royal Charter of 1928 as well as various enactments and 
histories. 
 
The Cory Library has copies of the minutes and proceedings of the appropriate 
committees and the single commission that were printed, on instruction, by the 
Government Printer of the day. In addition, Cory Library has a complete set of the 
Debates of the House of Assembly of the Union Parliament for the period 1913–40 as 
well as a copy of the Transvaal Ordinance of 1904, which together with the Natal Act 
of 1909 were considered by many at the time as model pieces of legislation in the 
regulation of the accountancy profession in those two provinces that should serve as the 
foundation for Union-wide legislation. The Ordinance was made available by the 
Dictionary Unit for South African English. The minutes of the select committees, 
commissions and Assembly debates contain almost verbatim reporting of the 
proceedings and, as such, present valuable insights into the motivations of the 
individuals involved. 
 
The National Library in Cape Town provided copies of key (and rare) documents which 
Cory did not possess, in particular the Private Bill of 1913 and the Natal Act of 1909 
and a variety of other primary source documents which are listed in the reference 
section. 
 
The archives of the Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ Board contain much information 
post-1951 – in particular, minutes of Board and Executive Council meetings – but 
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inevitably with much reference to the period prior to the enactment. These early 
meetings were minuted verbatim as seems to have been the practice of the period and 
contain a veritable treasure trove of information worthy of facilitating research on a 
number of topics. 
 
It should be noted that an initial survey of possible primary material revealed little of it 
had survived the passage of time. The most complete materials available were the 
records of select committees, parliamentary debates, bills and acts. The research was 
developed with this in mind. However, a new archival depository was established 
recently – the South African Accounting History Centre (SAAHC). Much of its 
material has still to be catalogued, but a visit in September 2013 revealed Council 
Minutes of Meetings of the:  
 
• Cape Society of Accountants – from 1907–64; 
• Transvaal Society of Accountants – from 1916–66 (with gaps); 
• Natal Society of Accountants – from 1946–95 (which is beyond the scope of this 
thesis). 
 
Any Minutes for the Orange Free State Society had still to be catalogued and were not 
yet available. 
 
The approach thus adopted has been to include primary material acquired from the 
SAAHC, where appropriate, in the main body of the thesis. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In the period 1951–2005, the profession was regulated by the Public Accountants’ and 
Auditors’ Board established by an Act of the Union Parliament. The creation of this 
Board was the result of nearly four decades of effort on the part of individual groups of 
accountants on the margin, by their provincial societies and finally the state itself. The 
passage of the new Act in 2005 which transformed the PAAB into the Independent 
Regulatory Board for Auditors (IRBA) was largely a state-sponsored initiative, but one 
which was initiated in response to the loss of public confidence in the ability of the 
profession in South Africa to conduct effective audits. More specifically, it could be 
argued that the public was concerned that the profession had lost sight of an important 
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responsibility first established in Section 21(1)(h) of the old 1951 Act. This section 
required the PAAB “to take any steps which it may consider expedient for the 
maintenance of the integrity, the enhancement of the status and the improvement of the 
standards of professional qualifications of accountants and auditors”.  
 
The period chosen for examination begins in 1913, the year in which the four main 
provincial accountants societies attempted unsuccessfully to have the Accountants’ 
Registration (Private) Bill put through Parliament. It ends in 1940 with the failure of 
Pocock’s attempt to have the Accounting Bill finalised before the outbreak of the 
Second World War captured the imagination and resources of South Africa and 
changed the Union forever. To be able to do this effectively, it is necessary to consider 
the South African political and economic background in the period 1913–40 as well as 
the “rules of the game” – that is: the South African parliamentary procedure of the time. 
But before doing this, it makes sense to consider the 1951 Public Accountants and 
Auditors Act (Act No. 51 of 1951) because that is where the process finally ended. 
More importantly, the Act succeeded, navigating the shoals of public opinion, 
Government approval and procedure. It is thus possible to use the Act as the benchmark 
against which to measure those pieces of legislation which failed. In so doing, the 
reasons for that failure can be determined and analysed. Motive may thus be exposed 
and other hidden elements may be forced to the fore. 
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CHAPTER 2: EPILOGUE AS PROLOGUE: THE ACT OF 1951 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In a thesis describing the development of a process which ended in the promulgation of 
a single Act, it is unusual to describe and analyse that Act in detail in Chapter 2 of a 13-
chapter thesis – in effect, to give away the plot or denouement before the story has 
properly begun. The reason for this is simple: to have applied the same research 
methodology to the period 1940–51 that has been applied to the period 1910–40 would 
have extended this work significantly and far beyond the academic requirements placed 
upon length. Hence the need for this chapter. Many of its topics, such as “articles” and 
“public practice”, will be used consistently throughout the rest of this thesis. Detailed 
reference to them now will lead to a better understanding of the remaining 11 chapters. 
 
Another objective of this Chapter is to use it as a link between the beginning of the 
process of unifying the accounting profession in South Africa and its final successful 
conclusion in 1951. The fact that the 1951 Act succeeded makes it different from the 
failures that litter the scene in 1913, 1924–5, 1936 and 1938. The Act was the result of 
hard experience and compromise. As such, it represents the benchmark of not only 
what was acceptable but also what was desirable. This Chapter describes and analyses 
some of the strengths and key elements of the 1951 Act and some of the weaknesses of 
the Bills of 1913 and 1924. The 1924 Bill formed the basis of all attempts prior to 1940 
to pass similar legislation through parliament. It is thus a key document. The Chapter 
also seeks to introduce reading early on to some of the complexities of the legislation 
and the motives underlying it. Issues such as admissions, articles, examination, by-
laws, fees and discipline are common and enduring topics through the years. The 1951 
Act was amended many times in its long life of 40 years to 1991. The version used in 
this thesis is the original Act No. 51 of 1951. 
 
It should be noted that Verhoef, in late 2013, has produced a new article on the 
statutory regulation of accountants in the period 1904–51. This article contains 
extensive analysis of the 1951 Act which she describes as “an important concession the 
‘Chartered’ Societies had to make to secure a form of professional closure” (Verhoef, 
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2013: 179). This latter term indicates the longstanding need for professional unification 
in South Africa. 
 
There are 38 years and some few months between the final assent to the Public 
Accountants and Auditors Act of 1951 and the failure of the promoters of the 1913 
Private Bill to prove its Preamble to the Parliamentary Select Committee convened to 
consider the Bill’s rectitude. 
 
OBJECTIVES AND PROVISIONAL COMMITTEES 
Both Act and Bill had, as an objective, the registration of accountants and auditors in 
the Union and their governance thereafter but they also had significant differences. 
 
Similar objectives had been achieved by accountants in New Zealand in 1908 and were 
to be achieved in Australia in 1928 by the creation respectively, of the New Zealand 
Society of Accountants and the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia. These 
events have a commonality in time (but not method) and will be paired – New Zealand 
experience with the 1913 South African Private Bill and that of Australia with the 1924 
South African Private Bill – for later consideration. 
 
Whereas the Private Bill envisaged the initial process being controlled by a provisional 
committee consisting of men chosen by its promoters (AB, 1913: s56), the Act 
provided for the establishment of a Board and an Accountants’ Registration Advisory 
Committee (Act, 1951: s13(1)), the latter comprising five members appointed by the 
Minister of Finance. The Committee was charged with investigating and making 
recommendations to the Board upon all applications for admission under the Act 
referred to it by that Board. 
 
The Bill’s provisional council would cease to exist 12 months after the Bill’s 
promulgation (AB, 1913: s14) while the Act’s advisory committee would be abolished 
on a date fixed in consultation with the Minister, but not later than 18 months after the 
commencement of the Act. 
 
Again, while the Bill provided for a Council consisting of the promoters’ nominees, the 
Act allowed for a more representative (but ultimately Government influenced) board of 
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12 members – four selected by the Minister of Finance from a list of senior civil 
servants, such as: the Commissioner of Inland Revenue and the Registrars of Banks and 
Companies; two selected by the Minister from a list of nominees of the faculties of 
commerce at universities in the Union; one nominee from each of the four Provincial 
Societies which had promoted the private bills of 1913 and 1924; one nominee of the 
branches established in the Union by the Society of Incorporated Accountants and 
Auditors; and one nominee each of the South African branch of the Association of 
Certified and Corporate Accountants, the Institute of Accountants of South Africa 
Limited and the Association of Practising Accountants of South Africa (Act, 1951: s3). 
In terms of Sections 2–6 of the Act, membership of the Board was modified in a 
number of ways; for example, the Society of Incorporated Accountants and Auditors 
lost its right to nominate a member to the Board when the number of its members – 
who were also registered with the Board – fell to below 40. The number of Board 
members would then be reduced by one. Also, where the faculties of commerce failed 
to make nominations, the Minister could make an appointment. Despite the Minister’s 
power in the process of constituting the Board, the net result was a more balanced and 
representative body than envisaged by the Bill. As membership in terms of the Bill was 
limited to the Four Societies and mainly United Kingdom chartered accountants, so too 
was the pool of possible candidates for the proposed provisional council and (later) 
permanent council. In effect, the pool comprised the Four Societies (AB, 1913: s6(14)), 
and this fact was defended on the grounds that the Bill was a private one with limited 
goals. In this, there was precedent in the private Transvaal Ordinance of 1904 and the 
Natal Act of 1909. These two pieces of legislation were to be deployed often as 
stumbling blocks to attempts to an inclusive registration. 
 
The differences between the 1913 Bill and the 1951 Act are thus significant. Equally 
significant is the persistence of certain fundamental themes from 1913 onwards, such as 
who was to be admitted to the proposed new society, what were to be considered 
acceptable qualifications – including articled service – and how members were to be 
disciplined for improper conduct. Also of note is that the final creation of the Public 
Accountants’ and Auditors’ Board was a singular success for the then Minister of 
Finance, NC Havenga. He represented continuity and Government’s determination in 
the process as his long political career stretched back to the 1924 attempt to form a 
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statutory society of accountants and he had also played a prominent role in the 
establishment of the 1934 Accounting Commission. 
 
The South African experience of failure has parallels with the attempts in England to 
form a single united profession in the late 19th and early 20th centuries but is contrasted 
by the process in New Zealand and Australia where unity was largely achieved in 1908 
and 1928 respectively. In his 2004 monograph concerning the unification of the 
accountancy bodies in England between 1870–1880, Stephen P. Walker details issues 
that have a commonality with the South African process of unification. In South Africa, 
the profession was dominated by the Four Societies; in England the profession was 
dominated by accountants in large cities such as London, Liverpool and Manchester. 
Both groups had an aversion to non-members who were perceived to be unqualified and 
a threat, both to the public and to their professional interests. Both groups came to the 
conclusion that the only solution to the problem was to unify the profession in their 
respective countries and to regulate the quality of its membership. It took ten years to 
unify the English accountants under a single Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales. In South Africa, the unification process took 38 years to complete, 
whilst unification in Scotland, where lived the progenitors of the chartered societies, 
took nearly 150 years to achieve (Walker, 2004: foreword). 
 
Ultimately, every experience is unique and this exploration of the South African 
experience begins with an analysis of the 1951 Act – for this legislation was enacted by 
a Parliament concerned with equity as far as it was achievable, and represents the 
standard against which the attempts of 1913, 1924, 1934, 1936 and 1939 need to be 
measured to determine the reasons for their failure. 
 
THE 1951 ACT 
 
DEFINITIONS 
The 1951 Act contained a list of definitions of key words used in it. This was not the 
case with the 1913 or the 1924 Bills. The 1951 list was important in that it strove for 
clarity in an area that had seen much dispute and disagreement since 1913. The most 
important included “articles of clerkship” defined as a written contract under which an 
articled clerk was legally bound to serve “another for a specified period”, (Act, 1951: 
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s1(iii)), in return for training as a public accountant and auditor; a “public accountant” 
was succinctly defined as “a person … engaged in public practice”, which in turn was 
more fully described as the occupation of an accountant and auditor who “places his 
services at the disposal of the public for reward” (Act, 1951: s1(ix)). This definition 
specifically excluded “services which [were] substantially at the command of any one 
person or the State” (Act, 1951: s1(ix)). It finally put paid to the unrealistic demands of 
civil and municipal accountants to be admitted to the new society on the basis of their 
work experience. These demands, coupled with their further demand to be excused 
service under articles, contributed to the sinking of the Private Bill of 1924. 
 
Of equal significance was the definition of “society” as being any one of the Transvaal 
Society Accountants, the Cape Society of Accountants and Auditors, the Natal Society 
of Accountants and the Society of Accountants and Auditors in the Orange Free State, 
all collectively referred to in the Act as “the four societies” (Act, 1951: s1(x)). This was 
important in that it accorded further recognition to the societies that had, in 1913, 
initiated the process of unifying the South African accounting profession and had 
pioneered the principles and practice of examining aspirant applicants to the profession. 
In so doing, they had established a standard. The Four Societies together had founded a 
General Examining Board for this purpose and it had created the beginning of a 
uniform examination process across the four South African Provinces. The Act 
specifically recognised this in its definition of “examining board” to mean the South 
African Accountants Societies General Examining Board “established in pursuance of 
an agreement entered into between the four societies” (Act, 1951: s1(v)). 
 
THE BOARD 
At the heart of the Act was the creation of the Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ Board 
(PAAB) as a body corporate to implement the objectives of the Act and to perform such 
functions and duties as were required by the Act. 
 
The general powers of the Board were detailed in Section 21 of the Act and included 
the ability to levy registration and annual fees upon its members. The 1913 and 1924 
Private Bills had reserved by-laws to incoming councils to pass, citing the cumbersome 
parliamentary process needed to change the Act should amendments be needed. The 
deferral of the creation of by-laws to elected councils was also the case in New Zealand 
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(Act 211, 1908: s20(1)) and Australia (Charter, 1928: 24). The issue of fees was always 
contentious in South Africa as many thought the projected fee of 5 guineas in 1913 to 
be too high in relation to expected expenses. Any resulting surplus would be reviewed 
as “sharp practice”. This attitude persisted until 1951. The two colonial pieces of 
accountants’ legislation in South Africa – the Transvaal Ordinance of 1904 and the 
Natal Act of 1909 which was based on the Transvaal enactment – required their 
respective provincial councils “forthwith to prepare draft by-laws for the Society”, such 
by-laws to be considered by the membership within six months of the date of the 
legislation (Ordinance, 1904: s19; Act, 1909: s20). Other powers enabled the Board to 
conduct examinations for articled clerks “or other persons” (Act, 1951: s21(1)) as well 
as to assist in the provision of educational facilities for such persons; to prescribe the 
qualifications that would allow people exemption from any requirements set for 
registration as accountants and auditors; to detail what constituted unprofessional 
conduct for its members, to investigate allegations of such conduct and to determine 
and apply appropriate punishment. 
 
This was a vast improvement over the Private Bills of 1913 and 1924 which envisaged 
misconduct – as compared to criminal activity – being investigated and punished 
through the courts of the land. The content of Section 21(1)(h) of the 1951 Act has a 
surprisingly modern ring to it as it authorised the Board to:  
 
“take any steps which it may consider expedient for the maintenance of the 
integrity, the enhancement of the status and the improvement of the standards of 
professional qualifications of accountants and auditors and to encourage 
research in connection with problems relating to any matter affecting the 
accounting profession” (Act, 1951: s21(1)(h)). 
 
The Board’s specific activities in 1951 were twofold – to register existing accountants 
and auditors who qualified and to provide for future members through an integrated 
system of clerkship and examination. With regard to current registrations, the Board’s 
solution to a potentially difficult problem was simple. In terms of Section 23, it invited 
people wishing to register to lodge a written application accompanied by the prescribed 
fee and such other information as was needed. After consideration of the application 
and, providing applicants were not less than 21, ordinarily resident in the Union, and, 
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“except to the extent to which [they had] been exempted therefrom in terms of this Act” 
(Act, 1951: s23(1)(b)), had served articles, passed the prescribed examination and had 
not been convicted of theft, fraud, forgery or perjury, the Board would register them as 
accountants and auditors. Upon registration, they were entitled to describe themselves 
as registered accountants and auditors and to practice anywhere in the Union of South 
Africa. But registration did not include the use of the designation “Chartered 
Accountant” which remained within the preserve of the Four Societies as detailed in the 
Chartered Accountants’ Designation Act, No. 13 of 1927. 
 
THE ELEMENTS OF CONTROL 
Central to the effective operation of the Board were three interlinked groups of 
elements:  
 
 Articles of clerkship, examinations (and exemptions) and committees; 
 An auditor’s powers and liability (and material irregularities); and 
 The power to discipline members of the profession. 
 
The first element enabled the Board to ensure a steady stream of qualified and 
technically competent people into the ranks of the profession. The second element 
concerned liability. Lawrence R Dicksee distinguished between criminal and civil 
liability, the former resulting from criminal acts and involving legal punishment while 
the latter arose from negligence (Dicksee, 1933: 330, 338). The 1951 Act attempted to 
limit the auditor’s liability and this is discussed later in the chapter. The third element 
allowed misconduct to be investigated and punished, thereby ensuring the maintenance 
of the profession’s reputation. Sections 24 and 25 of the Act dealt with the first element 
while Section 26 was concerned with the auditors’ powers, duties and liability. The 
disciplinary powers of the Board and its related ability to initiate enquiries were 
covered in Sections 27 and 28 while penalties and offences were listed in Section 30. 
The three elements are now considered in detail. 
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ARTICLES OF CLERKSHIP, EXAMINATIONS (AND EXEMPTIONS) AND 
COMMITTEES 
 
ARTICLES 
Articles of clerkship represented periods of apprenticeship that aspirant accountants 
needed to complete under the tutelage of qualified and experienced accountants in 
public practice. 
 
From 1924, the Four Societies had pressed the need for both the successful completion 
of articles and examinations to be necessary prerequisites to admission. This was 
strongly recognised by the 1951 Act. 
 
For articles to be recognised, the clerk needed to be registered with the Board. The 
issue of articled clerks had bedevilled the process of unification from about 1920 as 
they were essentially a source of cheap labour and the more a principal had, the greater 
the number of hours worked and billed would be. After 1951, to counter the worst 
excesses, registration was only possible after confirmation of the following:  
 
1. the clerk’s principal needed to prove active engagement in public practice in the 
Union and then to have been given prior permission by the Board to engage an 
articled clerk; and 
2. the clerk needed to provide evidence of his date of birth and the successful 
completion of the matriculation examination of the Joint Matriculation Board; 
and finally, 
3. the principal’s public practice needed to be of sufficient size to allow the clerk a 
“wide and general practical training and experience” (Act, 1951: s24 1(c)(ii)). 
 
The Act limited the number of clerks articled to any one principal to four. This could be 
changed and the principal could accept a clerk already under articles but unable to 
complete it under his original principal. In return, clerks needed to complete a period of 
five years with a principal. This could be reduced in the case of clerks in possession of 
a university degree or having completed satisfactory service “under articles outside the 
Union” (Act, 1951: s24(3)(b)). While the Act did not specify the period of remission, it 
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was generally accepted as two years, thereby giving a total service of three years 
required of such individuals. 
 
The Act also prohibited principals from accepting money or anything else in 
consideration for taking on an articled clerk. This practice had been commonplace in 
England in the 19th and early 20th Century where clerks were expected to pay a 
“premium” to their principal. The better the firm’s reputation, the higher the premium 
paid (SC7, 1924: Q280–2; Brooks, 1973: 439–40). 
 
In 1913 and particularly 1924 – when serving articles was more commonplace in South 
Africa – the normal path to registration in one of the Four Societies was by means of 
completed articles and successfully passed examinations. Suggested exemptions to this 
process had created heated debate in 1924, both in committee and in the House of 
Assembly. 
 
Nevertheless, a number of exemptions to the normal requirements for registration were 
permitted as a compromise in 1951. These included membership in good standing, or 
qualification at 1 January 1950, of the Society of Incorporated Accountants and 
Auditors in the Union, the South African branch of the Association of Certified and 
Incorporated Accountants of South Africa Limited or the Association of Practising 
Accountants of South Africa (Act, 1951: s23(3)(a)). Most of these organisations have 
disappeared with time as the primacy of the PAAB took effect. Some of them had 
overseas links but residence in the Union of members was essential as the idea of 
“South Africa First” remained current. Other exemptions allowed for the recognition of 
similar examinations “of a high standard” conducted by organised accounting and 
auditor bodies and “not less than five years” practical experience in the practice of a 
public accountant. 
 
The 1924 Bill at Section 21 guaranteed the rights clerks enjoyed prior to the Bill. This 
was fair play. 
 
With regard to those in the pipeline in 1951, provision was also made to accept for 
registration those who had completed their articles of clerkship or were serving them 
with any of the exempt Societies listed above – providing they, the clerks, “satisfied the 
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requirements for admission” to those societies in accordance with their by-laws in force 
on 1 January 1950. A number of other permutations served to throw the net as wide as 
possible to include clerks who were in service at the date of the Act. The idea of 
inclusiveness was thus fostered and reinforced. 
 
In terms of Section 23, the 1951 Act envisaged a period of six months to complete the 
registration process, but allowed the Board further time if needed “in any particular 
case”. Thereafter the Act prohibited anyone not registered with the Board from 
engaging in public practice as an accountant and auditor. Most importantly, the Act 
specifically prohibited unregistered people from accepting any audit required by law. 
This meant, for example, that in terms of the Companies Act of 1926 only registered 
accountants and auditors could audit companies. While the economic impact is difficult 
to isolate and quantify, it is common cause that the early regulation of the profession 
had a positive influence; but its failure in the 1980s and 1990s produced a significant 
backlash as detailed in Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
 
Section 23 provided for a number of exclusions, namely that those employed for a 
salary and not carrying on a business for their own account, could call themselves 
accountants or internal auditors in relation to the work they performed. Also, members 
of clubs or associations not for profit could audit such entities, provided they received 
no reward for the task. Further, officers in the Public Service could appoint, as an 
auditor of any entity for which they were responsible in law, an unregistered person in 
situations where registered auditors were unavailable or circumstances made it 
necessary. This exemption was intended to cover, for example, the audit of small, 
remote municipalities. 
 
EXAMINATION (AND EXEMPTIONS) 
As well as practical experience in the profession, articled clerks were also expected to 
acquire a satisfactory theoretical knowledge. This knowledge was tested in a series of 
examinations as in the English chartered system – an intermediate examination half-
way through the candidate’s articles and the final examination towards the end of the 
articles (Brooks, 1973: 438–40). The Act did not deal with the detail of the process of 
examination, leaving it to be framed in later by-laws and regulations. 
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The Act at Section 25 empowered the Board to:  
 
1. examine any candidate admitted under Section 23(3) and give credit for any 
corresponding examination passed under the aegis of the examining board 
established by the Four Societies. As this exemption did not necessarily include 
the final board examination in those early days, the Board or its Executive 
Committee considered individual (or group) cases of request for exemption 
(PAAB Archives, Board Minutes, Vol. 1, 24/10/1951–17/2/1954: B 75–B92 and 
Appendix thereto – the First Report to the Minister of Finance, dated 
18/3/1953); 
 
2. accept from the existing examining board all documents relating to 
examinations together with full future responsibility for the conduct of 
examinations. While the Board could delegate the actual process and 
administration of examination, it could not transfer its ultimate responsibility for 
examinations; and 
 
3. exempt from examination anyone outside the Union who had passed any 
examination or degree approved by the Board or a diploma in accountancy 
awarded by the Institute of Administration and Commerce of South Africa. 
Why the Institute was so favoured is difficult to understand as it was not one of 
the South African societies recognised in terms of Section 23(3) of the Act. In 
some instances, the exemption would not be for all examinations but only some 
of them, thereby requiring the candidate to write the final Board examination to 
gain full exemption and hence status. 
 
COMMITTEES 
The management of these exemptions absorbed much of the Board’s attention in the 
early years of its existence despite the fact that the Act allowed the Board to establish 
committees to assist it in the performance of its duties (Act, 1951: s10). One of these 
was an Executive Committee to help with the day-to-day routine and to make 
recommendations of how to resolve particular problems. 
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The following formal powers were delegated in February 1952 to a newly created 
Executive Committee:  
 
 the hiring of staff and office accommodation, furnishings etc., and the approval of 
associated expenditure; 
 the registration with the Board of 
 (i) candidates who qualified in terms of the regulations; 
 (ii) articles of clerkship; 
 dealing with contraventions of the Act by non-registered persons; 
 instituting legal action for the recovery of debt; 
 considering requests from members to publish in the lay press. 
(PAAB Archives, Board Minutes, Vol. 1, 24/10/1951: B22). 
 
The last power is interesting and was clearly an early attempt to ensure the newly 
created entity spoke professionally with a uniform voice or at least one which did not 
undermine its fledging reputation. 
 
Although the Board did not transfer its final authority to such committees, they became 
de facto influential in the management of the Board’s activities. The matter of Moses 
Hasses is a case in point. 
 
An insolvent under law, Hasses applied for registration with the Board in early 1952 
and was recommended for acceptance by the Registration Advisory Committee on the 
grounds that he was in public practice and had applied to the court for rehabilitation. 
The Executive Committee advised Hasses that upon the successful granting of his 
application to the court, the Chairman of the Executive Committee would be authorised 
to register him. At its meeting on 18 August 1952, the Chairman of the Committee 
reported that the court order had been received and Hasses “registered under No. 1411” 
(PAAB Archives, Exco Minutes Vol. 1, 24/10/1951 – 13/5/1954: E35, E41). The Board 
was informed of the successful resolution. This incident highlighted three points – 
firstly the effectiveness of the process of registration; secondly the number of members 
registered in just over a year – in excess of 1411 – and finally the Committee’s 
independent but authorised action, the Board being informed of its action after the 
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decision. The Board retained the power to review any Committee decision, but they 
could prove difficult to reverse. 
 
THE AUDITOR’S POWERS AND LIABILITY (AND MATERIAL 
IRREGULARITY) 
An auditor’s powers and duties were detailed in Section 26 of the Act and prevented the 
auditor from issuing an unqualified audit certificate unless a number of conditions had 
been met. Amongst these conditions were the conduct of an audit unrestricted in any 
way by those being audited, the existence of proper books and accounts and the 
availability of all required information, vouchers and documents. In addition, auditors 
needed to have complied with all laws relating to the audit, satisfied themselves as to 
the existence of all assets and liabilities shown in the balance sheet, and determined the 
correctness in any data presented “as far as reasonably practicable” (Act, 1951: 
s26(1)(f)). When compared to the basic features of an early 20th Century audit (see, for 
example, Taylor and Perry, 1929), these 1951 duties reveal a level of sophistication 
which indicated that the profession was coming of age in South Africa and understood 
its responsibilities. Their timeless quality is supported by the fact that these duties are 
repeated in Section 44 of the Auditing Profession Act of 2005. 
 
In an early attempt to enforce “auditor-client” independence, Section 26 also prohibited 
auditors, their partners and staff from writing up any of the client’s books except to the 
extent of making closing entries or preparing the frame of the balance sheet (Act, 1951: 
Section 26(1)(g)). 
 
A new duty given to the auditor in 1951 and one related to auditor independence was 
contained in Section 26(3) and required auditors to report to management “any material 
irregularity of which he has cause to complain in his capacity as auditor” and failing its 
satisfactory resolution, to report it to the Board in writing. The Act did not define what 
was meant by “material irregularity”, and despite the cumulative weight of many legal 
opinions and a number of amendments to Section 26(3) over the years, the requirement 
remained elusive in its definition and practical enforcement. It was replaced in the 2005 
Auditing Profession Act by the more accessible concept of a “reportable irregularity” 
which was carefully defined in the 2005 Act (see Chapter 1). 
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Verhoef (2011: 36–8) gives extensive analysis of the Public Accountants and Auditors 
Act of 1951. While she recognises the importance of Section 26(3) of the Act (Verhoef, 
2011: 38) and the concept of a “material irregularity”, she does not analyse its 
underlying shortcomings. Similarly, while recognising the importance of Section 29 of 
the Act (Verhoef 2011: 37), she overlooks the loophole in Section 29(3) which enabled 
the four Provincial Societies to control the designation “Chartered Accountant (SA)”. It 
is difficult to determine whether the loophole was intentional or the result of poor 
draftsmanship, but it was nevertheless exploited.  
 
An auditor’s liability formed the subject matter of Section 26(4) and (5) of the 1951 
Act. These sections allowed the Board to consider a case of improper conduct against 
auditors criminally charged, or convicted of negligence, or failing to perform their 
duties with the “care and skill” that could be reasonably expected of them. However, 
auditors could not be punished by the Board where they expressed an opinion in good 
faith, or declined to make an opinion in a situation where they “could not reasonably 
have been expected to express an authoritative opinion” (Act, 1951: s26(4)). 
 
Section 26(5) gave additional protection to the auditor and stated no action could be 
taken against registered accountants and auditors under this Act [my italics] who 
expressed an opinion in good faith in the performance of their duties, unless it was 
proved the opinion was given “maliciously or negligently”. In large measure, the 
principles of “malice”, “negligence” and “good faith” established by this section have 
lasted until the present day, but aggrieved clients clearly had other options in law as the 
following indicates. 
 
In its June 1970 edition, The South African Chartered Accountant detailed in the 
regular “Notes and Comments” column the case of a Sydney firm of chartered 
accountants. The firm had been ordered by the Supreme Court of New South Wales to 
pay a former client an amount of $1.5 million (AUD). The accountants had failed to 
verify certain major transactions which, had they done so, would have indicated 
fraudulent activities. The Court concluded the auditors were “liable for negligence in 
breach of their audit contract” (1970, 6(6): 241). A 1976 article on professional 
indemnity insurance by RW Bennetto, one time director of CT Bowring and Associates 
SA (Pty) Ltd, made three significant points [my bullets]:  
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 “claims against accountants in the United States of America and Australia were 
increasing; it would happen in South Africa. 
 indemnity insurance for accountants in South Africa was not popular among 
insurance companies. This was because of the small market and the resultant 
limited fees that could be charged. 
 most claims in South Africa were settled out of court, their existence and 
settlement value being largely unknown to and thus unreported in the press” 
(1976: 317–8). 
 
The significance of the many corporate failures in recent times coupled increasingly 
with auditors being targeted in civil suits, has led the IRBA to reconsider the nature of 
audit liability. The ultimate goal is to change to limited auditor liability with liability 
being shared by the directors of failed companies (Agulhas, CEO, IRBA: verbal 
communication, 19 August 2009). This is the case in the United Kingdom where the 
Companies Act of 2006 allows auditors to enter into “limited liability agreements to 
reduce the value of damages paid by lawyers and their insurance companies” (Cosserat 
and Rodda, 2009: 12). Auditors’ liability to third parties in the United Kingdom and 
South Africa has been influenced strongly by the 1990 watershed case of Caparo 
Industries PLC vs Dickman and Others [1990] UKHL, 2. This case established the 
principle that auditors had no duty of care to third parties, such as potential investors, 
unless they specifically indicated to such parties that reliance could be placed upon the 
audited financial statements. 
 
THE POWER TO DISCIPLINE MEMBERS OF THE PROFESSION 
Following the logical progression of sections dealing with the other elements of control, 
Section 27 of the 1951 Act gave the Board the responsibility to discipline and control 
its members “for misconduct or unprofessional conduct”. Disciplinary rules detailing 
unprofessional conduct on the part of registered accountants and auditors, punishments 
therefor and methods of inquiry were gazetted on 4 January 1957 (Langhout, 1961: 4). 
The straightforward and simple use of language in the Act underlined the unequivocal 
nature of the power given to the Board and was in strong contrast to the uncertain legal 
claims made in the Private Acts of 1913 and 1924 and their involvement of public law 
structures ab initio in any dispute between society and member. 
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The actual 1951 process of convening and running a disciplinary enquiry was detailed 
in Section 28 and a summons to appear before the Board would be “served in the same 
manner as a subpoena in a criminal case issued by a magistrate’s court”. This latter 
requirement derived from the 1924 Bill which sought to mitigate the 1913 Bill’s idea of 
allowing disciplinary appeals by members to the Supreme Court itself, an expensive 
and time consuming practice. The 1951 Act envisaged no appeal within the PAAB 
structure beyond the Board (Act, 1951: s27). Individuals believing themselves to be 
unjustly convicted could obviously seek redress in the civil courts of the Union but 
would need to be reasonably sure of success before incurring legal costs. 
 
Any conviction in terms of Section 28 in 1951 attracted a maximum fine of £50. As to 
what constituted “misconduct or unprofessional conduct” was detailed in Section 30 of 
the Act and codified in the Disciplinary Rules, including a prohibition from employing 
any person suspended from public practice, the sharing of “professional fees” or the 
profits from practice with individuals not registered with the Board or practising under 
a firm name which included the name of a person not ordinarily resident in the Union 
during his lifetime. This latter provision was clearly aimed at boosting the profession 
locally and preventing its domination by foreign partnerships, a common theme in the 
period under review. 
 
Many of the prohibitions contained in Section 30 have stood the test of time and in 
subsequent years have been moved from the Act to Codes of Professional Conduct 
within the profession. 
 
Two other prohibitions are important – the one established the principle that auditors 
could not sign off on any work which indicated they had done it unless they had 
actually done it or the work had been performed under their direct supervision, or that 
of partners – fellow registered accountants and auditors – or foreign accountants 
authorised by the Board. The second prohibition outlawed professional work connected 
with a dispute or litigation where payment for such work was dependent upon the 
successful outcome of the dispute or litigation. These prohibitions remain relevant in 
2013.  
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As an interim measure, the sharing of profits with unregistered people – who were 
nevertheless members of approved foreign professional societies – was permitted for a 
period of five years after the commencement of the Act. 
 
The final sub-clause in Section 30 prescribed a fine of not more than £100 for a 
conviction of a failure to comply with any provisions of the Act. 
 
PRESERVATION OF THE STATUS QUO 
One final section of the 1951 Act needs to be considered – Section 29 – which dealt 
with “Admission to Societies”. The Chartered Accountants’ Designation Act of 1927 
had given the four Provincial Societies the right to use the description “Chartered 
Accountant (South Africa)”. The Board did not have this power and a link was needed 
between “Society” and “Board”; Section 29 provided it. Persons who were registered 
by the Board as accountants and auditors, had passed the final qualifying examination 
and had either completed six years’ practical experience in the office of a public 
practising accountant, or had been exempt this service in terms of Section 23(2)(b), 
were entitled to apply for admission to any of the Four Societies. The Societies 
themselves were permitted to set other requirements for admission they believed 
necessary. Further, any member of one of the Four Societies could apply for admission 
to any of the other three Societies. But the Act was careful to specify in Section 29(3) 
that persons registered as public accountants and auditors in terms of Section 23(3) of 
the Act – that is: the special cases – could not use the fact that they had been exempted 
from practical experience to claim membership of one of the Four Societies. 
 
The implications were clear. The Four Societies could require, for example, actual 
practical experience in an accountant’s office as a necessity for admission to their 
membership – being a registered accountant and auditor in terms of the 1951 Act did 
not mean automatic entry to the Societies nor the automatic award of the coveted 
description “Chartered Accountant”. Clearly as time passed and the Act and its 
requirements became entrenched, anomalies like a lack of professional experience, 
would fall away. 
 
The South African Society of Accountants (Private) Bill of 1924 had tried at Section 
29(1) to establish the right of all registered accountants to the designation “Chartered 
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Accountant (South Africa)”. The failure of this Bill meant the loss of the designation to 
many and opened the door to the Four Societies to promote their own interests through 
the Designation Act. 
 
Thus was the great compromise achieved; accountants could be registered in terms of 
the 1951 Act and thus achieve the status of an officially sanctioned accountant through 
the use of the title “Registered Accountant and Auditor”. The Four Societies had won 
their point that a period of practical professional experience was an essential 
prerequisite for the designation “Chartered Accountant”, a position they had steadfastly 
held since 1913. For the Four Societies, the passage of the 1951 Act delineated their 
powers and duties as for any other registered accountant and auditor and it took many 
years for them to reassert their position. 
 
This conclusion is supported by the editorial in the first edition in January 1965 of The 
South African Chartered Accountant in its role as the “Official Journal of the Joint 
Council of the Societies of Chartered Accountants of South Africa”. This Journal – 
entitled previously as The South African Accountant had, since 1954, been the “official 
organ” of the Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ Board and its handover to the Joint 
Council signalled the resurgence of the four Provincial Societies. As explained in the 
first editorial written by future Chairman at the National (previously Joint) Council, 
Douglas Vieler:  
 
“When the Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ Board was established in 1951, 
there were many who feared for the future of the Provincial Societies, seeing 
little for these bodies to do but to nominate their representatives to the Board 
and to limit their operations to areas somewhat hazily described as ‘the 
maintenance and development of professional standards’. But to believe this 
was to fail to distinguish between, on one hand, statutory registration in the 
public interest of the practising members of the profession and, on the other 
hand, the distinctive character of accountancy as a profession in itself. 
 
With the passing of time, and as the Board has settled down to its allotted tasks, 
the profession – as organised in the Provincial Societies – has reorganised itself 
in the context of the changed conditions. The most important stage in this 
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reorganisation has been the delegation by the Provincial Societies of additional 
powers to Joint Council, thus enabling that body, with its specialist committees, 
to operate authoritatively and responsibly on behalf of the profession as a 
whole. 
 
The aims and objects of Joint Council are to promote the unity, the standards 
and the prestige of the profession, and the action of Joint Council, in sponsoring 
this journal, is entirely consistent with those aims and objects. Thus the journal 
is dedicated to the service of the profession and to maintaining and developing 
its ‘public image’, based on the special skills of its members and its all-
important characteristics of independence and integrity” (The South African 
Chartered Accountant, 1(1): 3). 
 
The core fact is that the Act of 1951 established a regulatory body, not a society nor an 
accounting association which essentially is what the four Provincial Societies were. 
 
As a postscript, the 1951 Act was amended on many occasions until being replaced in 
1991 by an updated Public Accountants and Auditors Act which itself was replaced in 
2005 by the Auditing Profession Act. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Verhoef (2011) has outlined the political events that led up to the Act of 1951 in which 
the Four Societies were obliged to compromise. Three points are important –  
 
 In the 1930s, the Government of the day made it known that they would not 
interfere in the accounting profession’s “organisational matters” (2011: 32). 
 Smuts’ post-war Government changed the tune which Malan and his Afrikaner 
nationalists picked up and increased the tempo. As Verhoef notes, “An observer and 
adjudicator role of the 1930s was replaced by a more interventionist state, desirous 
to effect professional closure in an optimally inclusive manner” (2011: 32). 
 What Verhoef does not mention is the fact that since the early days of Hertzog’s 
rule, capable and imaginative Afrikaners, using that ability and the incentives 
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provided by the Governments of the 1930s, had begun a quiet programme of 
commercial development. 
 
In 1942, for example, Die Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut was established to coordinate the 
process and move Afrikaners into the mines in great numbers through the creation of 
Federale Mynbou (1953) and into investment and banking fields through Volkskas 
(1935) Federale Volksbeleggings (1939) and the Trust Bank (1955). As Davenport 
notes, quoting Giliomee “it was a remarkable case of what Giliomee has called ‘ethnic 
mobilisation’ for economic ends, under the blanket of protective political power” 
(Davenport, 1987: 513). 
 
Primed by this development, the huge economic demands made by the Allies in the 
Second World War ignited the South African economy, a process which Malan’s 
National Party were careful to keep running and growing after 1948. In this 
environment, it was of paramount importance to have a unified and equitable 
accounting profession able to audit economic entities and to provide the level of 
assurance required. 
 
The 1951 Act was the product of a complicated, highly formalised and technical system 
of presentation, review and decision of potential to enact by Parliament in the pursuit of 
the governance of the Union of South Africa. Much of the “spade work” that turned a 
Bill into an Act was done outside (extra) Parliament by eliciting public support, 
lobbying the support of influential politicians and seeking the advice of specialist 
parliamentary agents. Also, the cost of supporting private and public bills through the 
various parliamentary stages (intra) could be high so a probability of success was 
needed. 
 
Much reference is made in this thesis to various parliamentary procedures. This is 
inevitable as much of the source material is drawn from select committees, debates in 
the House, and Bills. Appendices 1 and 2 summarise the relevant procedures. 
Parliamentary procedure and “getting it right” were so important that Grocott’s Penny 
Mail of 4 March 1924 nearly 1000 kilometres distant from Parliament in Cape Town 
reported to Grahamstown’s citizens upon the activities of the Select Committee on 
Standing Rules and Orders. For a small city newspaper, Grocott’s Penny Mail was at 
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pains to keep its readers informed, having a subscription to “Reuters Special 
Parliamentary Service” (Grocott’s Penny Mail, 31/1/1924). The news was not always 
of national significance, however; for instance, Grocott’s Penny Mail of 13 February 
1924 reported on the state of elevators in the Parliament building. 
 
Chapter 3 deals with aspects of intra- and extra-parliamentary activities as they relate to 
the process of accounting unification in South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 3: INTRA- AND EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY ACTIVITY, 
AND SOME RULES OF THE GAME 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this Chapter is to give a summary of a number of key topics, all 
important for an understanding of the background to the process of unifying the 
profession. Some detail is also given about appropriate parliamentary procedures as 
these regulated the speed, direction and ultimate success or failure of a bill. Strict 
adherence to procedure ensured fair play for all. The Chapter continues to thread key 
ideas – such as rules, unification of accountants, South Africa in the early 20th Century, 
accountants and their interaction with society and the economy – through the analysis. 
 
AN OVERVIEW OF PARLIAMENTARY EVENTS AS THEY RELATE TO THE 
PROFESSION: 1913–40 
In the period under review, 1913–40, there were a number of sustained and expensive 
attempts to pass private bills through the Parliament of the Union of South Africa, each 
dealing with public accountants and each, as was the parliamentary requirement of the 
day, referred to a select committee for careful and thorough consideration and reporting 
back to the House of Assembly. 
 
The first private bill was presented to the House in early 1913. Its short title was to 
“Provide for the Registration of Accountants in the Union” (AB, 1913) while the Select 
Committee appointed to investigate the Bill referred to it as “Accountants’ Registration 
(Private) Bill” (SC3, 1913). The second private bill presented to Parliament in early 
1924, was more comprehensive in its short title – that is: it intended to “provide for the 
establishment and incorporation of the South African Society of Accountants and 
further to provide for the constitution, rights, powers, privileges and duties of that 
society and members thereof” (AB, 1924). Its Select Committee referred to this bill as 
the “South African Society of Accountants (Private) Bill” (SC7, 1924). Two private 
bills introduced by National Party Member of Parliament for Jeppe, Dr Hjalmar Reitz, 
in 1934 and 1936 came to naught early in the process – at their first readings. The 
fourth bill introduced in mid-1938 by PV Pocock, Esq., South African Party MP for 
Pretoria Central, was intended to “provide for the registration qualification, designation 
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and control of accountants and auditors and for matters incidental thereto” (AB, 1938); 
to its Select Committee, it was known simply as “subject of Accountancy Bill” (SC8, 
1939). In addition, a Commission – known as the Accountancy Profession 
Commission, 1934 – was appointed by the Government in that year to determine two 
things:  
 
1. whether the accounting and auditing profession in the Union should be unified 
“by the incorporation of a representative body having control over the whole 
profession” (UG49, 1934) together with a register of qualified members; and, if 
so 
2. how the register was to be established and controlled.  
 
The basic bone of contention over this period was that the four Provincial Societies 
wanted a qualified admission to the new organisation, preferably by successful 
examination and articled experience. Others wanted a more open policy with a 
relaxation of formal qualifications as had been the case in New Zealand in 1908. 
 
The Four Societies – after 1927 and the passage of the Designation Act – had a vested 
interest in maintaining the status quo. The Designation Act gave them a very definite 
professional edge which only chartered accountants from the United Kingdom could 
trump, in part explaining why these foreign accountants received membership in the 
Four Societies and why the Societies drew much criticism from native South Africans 
denied similar membership for lack of appropriate qualification and experience. 
 
PARLIAMENTARY SANCTION 
The desire to achieve parliamentary sanction for a professional body in the Union post 
1910 was not unusual as the new nation set about the organisation of its professional 
and economic affairs. The architects, for example, went through a similar but more 
successful process in 1927 to emerge with the Architects and Surveyors (Private) Act 
(see SC10, 1926). The medical profession, too, sought statutory recognition in a 
process which began in 1925 and ended with Act No. 13 of 1928 and the creation of the 
South African Medical and Dental Council to regulate the health profession. What was 
unusual was the length of the process as it relates to accountants. There are 38 years 
between the first parliamentary excursion in 1913 and the final passage of the Public 
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Accountants and Auditors Act in 1951. Part of the reason for this delay lay in the 
strength of what became known as the “four Provincial Societies” or “the South African 
Societies” or the Four Societies (UG49, 1934: 7). These were: the Transvaal Society of 
Accountants, established by Transvaal Ordinance No. 3 (Private) of 1904; the Cape 
Society of Accountants, established in 1907 under the general limited liability offered 
by the Cape Companies Act, 1892 (Tennant, 1894: 2, 30); the Natal Society of 
Accountants, established in terms of Natal Act No. 35 of 1909; and the Society of 
Accountants and Auditors in the Orange Free State, established in 1907. 
 
Together, these Four Societies represented a formidable pressure group, adept at 
protecting their own interests. The strength of the Transvaal and Natal Societies lay in 
the fact that their respective colonial legislatures (the Transvaal was controlled directly 
by the British in 1904) had sanctioned the associations’ creation by their respective 
legislatures. These laws also restricted the practice of public accountancy in their 
respective colonies to members of those Societies. The Cape and Orange Free State 
Societies could not restrict the practice of public accountancy to the membership of the 
Societies in their respective provinces due to the voluntary nature of their membership 
and the fact that their associations had been established in terms of common law and 
not statute. 
 
Another reason for the lengthy process of unification was that the Provincial Societies 
were not adverse to working at the “margins” – that is: by using extra-parliamentary 
activities within society to influence opinion and events to their own advantage (see 
below). North has characterised such organisations as “purposive entities designed by 
their creators to maximise wealth, income, or other objectives defined by the 
opportunities afforded by the institutional structure of the society” (North, 1990: 73). 
He also makes the point that institutional change is incremental, by which he means it 
happens bit by bit, but with growing momentum, over time (North, 1990: 89). While 
the political character of the House of Assembly changed dramatically in the period 
1913–40 (see Appendix 3), it was only in 1934 with the Accounting Profession 
Commission appointed by the “Fusion Government” of that period, that Government 
signalled its willingness to sanction, by statute, the devolution of some of its regulatory 
powers upon a unified and Union-wide public accountancy profession. This signal 
hardened into resolve in the post-1945 period and unification became a necessity in the 
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eyes of Parliament. Argument can also be made for Parliament hindering the process of 
unification by allowing the passage, in 1927, of the Designation Act, which was a 
private Act sponsored by the Four Societies. An argument can thus clearly be made for 
incremental institutional change as a result of the process of unification. The reason is 
not hard to find. The 1933 resurrection of the gold mining industry led to “an 
unprecedented boom” in the economy (Yudelman, 1983: 257). In these circumstances, 
a disorganised accounting profession with variable standards was a distinct 
disadvantage politically. Part of the Government response had been the passage of the 
Companies Act of 1926 (Act 26 of 1926). 
 
THE FOUR PROVINCIAL SOCIETIES: EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY ACTIVITIES, 
1919 ONWARDS 
In the period 1911–3, the Four Societies held a number of conferences from which 
emerged the 1913 Bill and the determination to work through Parliament. Its failure and 
the subsequent outbreak of World War I in August 1914, led to a lull in coordinated, 
joint activities, which only resumed in 1919. Before this date, each of the Four 
Societies had their own admissions criteria for membership and conducted their own 
examinations. In 1921, they came to an agreement, which included the Rhodesia 
Society of Accountants, and established common admission requirements (UG49, 
1934: 7). In terms of the South African Societies’ General Examining Board 
Agreement, candidates for admission to each of the Societies needed to have completed 
four years under articles, or six years without, with a practising member of one of the 
South African Societies. They also needed to have passed the intermediate and final 
examinations conducted by the General Examining Board. This meant candidates for 
admission to each Society, wrote the same examination (UG49, 1934: 7). In addition, 
the Cape and Orange Free State Societies had pursued a policy of recognising the 
service of non-articled clerks with accountants in public practice where such 
accountants, however, were not members of either of their Societies. This continued 
practice was recognised in the Agreement of 1921, subject to the “satisfaction of the 
Councils of the Societies” (UG49, 1934: 7). This meant that whereas previously the 
Councils, in theory, would consider each case presented in support of membership on 
its individual merits, the Agreement as part of a general tightening up process, now 
required a Council to recognise such service, unless there was some significant reason 
for not doing so. This changed again in 1934 and clerks who had not been articled, 
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were no longer eligible for admission to the South African Societies. This was clearly 
unfair and was ameliorated in the 1951 Act. In addition, the length of articled service 
was increased to five years but kept at three years for university graduates. These 
changes were necessary to bring the South African Societies in line with the United 
Kingdom Chartered Societies (UG49, 1934: 7) and an indication of the influence of 
these overseas Societies. 
 
By the 1920s, too, South African universities had come of age and were producing 
Bachelor of Commerce graduates who could be employed within the profession. 
Rhodes University College for example, had been established in Grahamstown in the 
Eastern Cape in 1904 as a constituent college of the University of South Africa. By 
1927, it was offering two consecutive years of auditing tuition in years two and three of 
a general three-year Commerce degree as well as courses in accounting, business 
management, mercantile law and theory of finance – and all for an annual registration 
fee of £1 (Rhodes University College Calendar, 1927: 51). Admission to the university 
was a pass in the Matriculation Examination. An examination of the 1927 auditing 
syllabus reveals the following:  
 
1. The first course in auditing comprised one paper which examined 
 
“The procedure and requisites in the audit of books and profit and loss 
accounts and balance-sheets, including those of public bodies, 
companies, and partnerships, etc.; consideration of the duties and 
responsibilities of auditors under the Companies and other Acts; 
investigations” (Rhodes University College Calendar, 1927: 126). 
 
2. The second course in auditing dealt with 
 
“The subjects enumerated in the first course, including general 
principles more fully treated; proving of postings in single and double 
entry; sectional balancing; vouching; examination of securities; duty 
with regard to profit and loss and balance-sheet items; legal decisions 
affecting auditors; special points in various audits; form of auditor’s 
report” (Rhodes University College Calendar, 1927: 126). 
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However, Rhodes was an exception; academic teaching was concentrated at the 
Universities of the Witwatersrand and Cape Town. 
 
ANGLO-SOUTH AFRICAN PROFESSIONAL RELATIONS 
The South African Societies were careful to forge bonds with their British counterparts. 
For example, by 1913 the members of the Chartered Societies in Scotland, England and 
Ireland as well as the Incorporated Society in England were permitted by the South 
African Societies to claim equivalency of qualification in South Africa. The proposed 
Accountants Bill of 1913 allowed 10 categories of entitled registration – six of these 
related to United Kingdom Chartered Societies. This was an important concession as it 
enabled qualified British accountants to practise as public accountants throughout the 
Union with a significant degree of status. In 1924, this policy was subsequently 
modified to a more rigorous general admission for foreigners to membership. To be so 
admitted, the foreigners needed to prove articled experience outside South Africa 
equivalent to those of South African clerks, or at least nine unbroken years as a public 
accountant. They also needed to have passed examinations, which in the opinion of the 
Council of the South African Society concerned, were equivalent to the South African 
Societies’ examinations (UG49, 1934: 7). In effect, the admission of United Kingdom 
chartered accountants remained unhindered as they had met these requirements for 
admission to the United Kingdom Societies. 
 
However, there were limits and the South African Societies were quick to defend their 
turf when necessary. In particular, they objected when the Incorporated Society in 
England conducted examinations in South Africa and on that basis admitted people to 
their membership. Such individuals could then claim admission to one of the South 
African Societies. A solution was brokered whereby the Incorporated Society agreed 
not to hold examinations in South Africa and to recognise the examinations of the 
South African Societies. Candidates who wished membership of the Incorporated 
Society as well, wrote and passed an amended final examination for that Society 
(UG49, 1934: 8). 
 
It is unlikely that many would want dual membership. The basis of the Societies’ 
objection rested upon a concern as to the quality of the Incorporated Society’s 
examinations. Before the 1924 Select Committee, NS Wood of the Cape Society had 
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voiced this concern when describing the Incorporated Society as “a slightly inferior 
body” (SC7, 1924: Q1456). But there was more to this concern and it centred upon the 
fact that the Incorporated Society had a significant membership, and thus influence, in 
the Transvaal at the time of the Ordinance of 1904 (SC7, 1924: Q250). Their members, 
who were also chartered accountants Union-wide in 1924, were nearly four times 
greater in number than their rivals.      
 
TABLE 3.1 
COMPARISON OF CHARTERED MEMBERSHIP: 
INCORPORATED VIS-À-VIS THE FOUR SOCIETIES 
 
 Chartered Members 
Incorporated 
Chartered Members 
Four Societies 
Cape 67 7 
Natal 21 2 
Orange Free State 3 1 
Transvaal 16 18 
TOTAL: 107 28 
Source: SC7, 1924: Q1933. 
 
The comparative figure for the Four Societies is given in the second column (SC7, 
1924: Q1925–8). The logic in their admission of United Kingdom chartered 
accountants becomes clear – not only did the Societies gain qualified members but they 
also neutralised potential competition. 
 
During the period under review, overseas accounting societies opened branches in 
South Africa and posed varying degrees of competitive challenge; most faded quickly. 
The Commission of 1934 listed three who gave evidence; a study of the reports issued 
by the Select Committees of 1913 and 1924 reveals many more who made submissions 
before these Committees. The three listed by the Commission were the Corporation of 
Accountants Limited, the London Association of Certified Accountants and the 
International Accountants Corporation (UG49, 1934: 8). The South African Societies 
recognised few, if any, of these foreign societies on the grounds that the admission 
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criteria to these societies were below those set by the South Africans (UG49, 1934: 8). 
From a reading of the minutes of the Select Committees of 1913 and 1924 it is clear 
that the Four Societies were often at loggerheads with other societies over a variety of 
issues, principally membership and its two concomitants – examination and articles – 
both of which were used to restrict membership. 
 
While cooperating outside of Parliament secured substantial benefits for the South 
African Societies as illustrated above, it was the parliamentary route that offered the 
best avenue to a successful unification of the profession with a single register of 
members. New Zealand had achieved this in 1908 through its Parliament (Graham, 
1960: 22–4) so the prospects for South Africa seemed encouraging. Before launching 
into a study of the process, some knowledge of South African parliamentary procedures 
– the rules of the game – is necessary. 
 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN PARLIAMENT 
The South Africa Act of 1909 placed legislative power into the hands of the Parliament 
of the Union of South Africa. Parliament comprised the British King, the South African 
Senate and House of Assembly. The role of the British Parliament in this arrangement 
was unclear. This arrangement lasted until the Statute of Westminster of 1931 was 
passed by the British Parliament and recognised in South Africa by the Status Act of 
1934. As a result of these enactments, the South African Parliament was recognised as 
the sovereign legislative authority in the Union. The Acts also vested executive power 
directly in the King’s person or, as delegated by him, to his representative, the 
Governor-General. The British King was thus King of the Union of South Africa. The 
British Parliament had no legal standing in this revised arrangement and the previous 
uncertainty was thus resolved (Breitenbach et al., 1974: 353–4). 
 
The South Africa Act located the new South African Parliament in Cape Town, the 
home of the old Cape Parliament from 1854, the year of its first meeting to its 
supersession by the Union Parliament. This Union Parliament drew its rules and 
precedents mainly from those of the old Cape Parliament which in turn had been 
influenced by the United Kingdom House of Commons. 
 
 
  68 
 
PUBLIC BILLS AND PRIVATE BILLS 
In the period under review, an Act of the South African Parliament represented its 
considered will and the exercise of its sovereign power upon a particular issue. A bill 
represented a draft act of Parliament – that is: the working document which the House 
and Senate moulded to reflect their considered will or rejected as inadequate for 
whatever reason. According to Ralph Kilpin, an authority on parliamentary procedure 
in the Union of this period as his service extended from 1918 – when he was a Second 
Clerk Assistant – to 1946 when he had attained the rank of Clerk of the House of 
Assembly, bills introduced to Parliament could be either public or private bills. The 
purpose of the former was to “alter the general law on a question of public policy” 
(Kilpin, 1946: 3), while the purpose of the latter was to “confer benefits upon, or to 
advance the interests of, particular individuals or localities” (Kilpin, 1946: 19). The 
procedures adopted for private bills were necessarily rigorous as the benefits they 
conferred could affect the rights of others. This was a major concern with the 
accounting bills in the period 1913–40 and one reason why the Parliament of the day 
did not enact them. 
 
The passage of a private bill through Parliament (as detailed in Appendix 1) was a 
cumbersome, expensive and time consuming process which Kilpin described as a 
“sieve” (1946: 28) and which he acknowledged to be finer than that needed in 
processing public bills. Thus, when it became apparent that a private bill could not be 
completed within a current session of Parliament, the convention at the end of the 
session was usually to permit the member in charge of a private bill to move for the 
suspension of the process and its resumption at the beginning of the next session of 
Parliament. This convention held true in the event of the normal dissolution of 
Parliament or its early dissolution due to a snap general election (Kilpin, 1946: 28) of 
which there were three in the period under review: in February 1921, June 1924 and 
May 1933. If the member’s motion was supported, it was taken to be a notice to all 
concerned and no further public notice was needed. If the motion failed, the Bill 
“dropped” at the end of the session and its promoters needed to begin the process from 
the beginning if they wanted Parliament’s approval. 
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KILPIN ON PRIVATE BILLS: SOME CONCLUDING POINTS 
Kilpin made some interesting comments (1946: 29–30) in the conclusion to his section 
on private bills. Firstly, suits at law were expensive and secondly, a private bill was the 
approach by suitors to obtain new rights, usually in addition to established old rights. 
The converse was that those whose rights were perceived as being threatened by private 
bills, needed to incur costs to preserve such rights. Parliament’s response was that 
where either the promoters or opponents of a private bill had been “vexatiously 
subjected to expense” as a result of the other’s actions, costs could be awarded against 
the offending party (Kilpin, 1946: 29). 
 
Although “cumbersome”, the parliamentary approach to private bills conformed to the 
rules of “elementary justice” – that is: they needed to “be on all fours” with the 
principles applied in the law courts (Kilpin, 1946: 29). In addition, by insisting on 
adequate advertising of the Bill in the press, Parliament ensured that such notice – as 
far as possible in the early 20th Century – gave opponents the knowledge upon which to 
base their opposition, thereby providing for the principle that no one could be denied a 
right without first being heard. Also, by considering the membership of select 
committees carefully, the procedures ensured that none could “judge in a cause in 
which [they were] interested” (Kilpin, 1946: 29), and, while allowing Government and 
others to put their views before select committees, the principle that the public welfare 
needed to be carefully considered was emphasised. Kilpin saw the greatest advantage of 
the system as the removal from the process of the cancer of patronage where members 
of Parliament sought the interests of their constituents to the detriment of Parliament’s 
reputation and of the public’s welfare (Kilpin, 1946: 30). 
 
WHY THE PARLIAMENTARY ROUTE? 
From Kilpin’s careful analysis of parliamentary procedures in the period under review, 
it is clear that the process of devising a private bill and guiding it through the 
parliamentary process was expensive, arduous and by no means certain as to the final 
result. The question that then arises is why the four Provincial Societies persevered in 
their quest. The answer must be that the rewards for them outweighed all other factors, 
including major setbacks in Parliament in 1913 and 1924. They wanted a unified 
profession in which they held a significant, if not dominant, role. To a large extent, they 
achieved the latter as a result of the Chartered Accountants’ Designation (Private) Act 
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of 1927. Once given the sole prerogative to the designation “Chartered Accountant 
(South Africa)”, the idea of a unified profession became less important to the Four 
Societies and the initiative shifted to the Government. The 1934 Commission was 
largely the result of Finance Minister Havenga’s initiatives and Reitz and Pocock’s 
attempts in 1934, 1936, and 1938 were variations upon the Commission’s theme. All 
failed for a number of reasons, the most important being, firstly the lack of inclusivity 
in the Bills – too many people were left out when they appeared to have a justifiable 
right to admission – and secondly, the Bills placed too much power in the hands of the 
Four Societies. It is interesting to note that of the Four Societies, only the Cape Society 
registered its vote against the national registration of accountants before the 
Commission of 1934 (UG49, 1934: 19). The remaining three Provincial Societies 
approved of some form of registration, providing it did not clash with their interests. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has dealt with a number of topics intended to link it to the unification 
process that is described later on in the thesis. It also acts as an introduction to Chapter 
4 which deals with early developments of the profession in the United Kingdom and 
South Africa. The link between the metropolitan centre and South Africa at the 
periphery of empire was mirrored by the influence the UK-trained accountants had 
within South Africa. This influence was also felt in the impact of British company 
legislation upon South African company legislation. In effect, the South African system 
was modelled on the United Kingdom system. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROFESSION 
WITH REFERENCE TO THE UNITED KINGDOM, SOUTH AFRICA 
AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The process in South Africa which culminated in the creation of the Public 
Accountants’ and Auditors’ Board in 1951 had its origins in the United Kingdom 
almost a century before. There were two English colonies in South Africa in the late 
19th Century and what happened in the metropolitan centre had an impact, even at the 
periphery of empire, accounting for the tremendous impact the United Kingdom and its 
chartered societies had upon the South African profession. 
 
In 1854, a group of Scottish accountants received formal recognition of their 
professional status and were incorporated through a Royal Charter as the Society of 
Accountants in Edinburgh. They became the first to adopt the designation “chartered 
accountant” and their organisation – which became the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Scotland (ICAS) in 1951 – survives as the oldest professional body of 
accountants in the English-speaking world. The grant of a Royal Charter gave status to 
the fledging Society and official recognition of the difference between a bookkeeper 
and an accountant; the former recorded the financial transactions of the entity in 
ledgers, using the double entry principle and prepared the trial balance. If it was in 
balance, then the principle had been correctly applied. This result did not necessarily 
translate into accuracy as amounts might have been posted to inappropriate ledger 
accounts. The accountant, on the other hand, took the data as recorded in the books of 
account and extracted an income statement and balance sheet to give an understandable 
“snapshot” of the affairs of the entity at a specific point in time. From this simple 
beginning, a gradual specialisation developed in the field of accountancy (Littleton, 
1933: 296). 
 
THE AUDIT, THE AUDITOR, REASONABLE CARE AND FRAUD: AN 
OVERVIEW FROM THE LATE 19th TO THE EARLY 21st CENTURY 
In a process parallel to the growth of the role of the accountant, the auditor gained a 
more prominent role as commercial transactions grew in volume and complexity and as 
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the need grew to verify the probity of an entity’s financial statements and hence 
profitability. In 1929, Taylor and Perry described the primary function of an audit as 
 
“an investigation into a set of books, and into the documentary evidence from 
which such books have been written up, as will enable an Auditor to make a 
report on the Balance Sheet and/or other statements which have been extracted 
therefrom, to those to whom he is appointed to report” (Taylor and Perry, 1929: 
4). 
 
The secondary objectives were the detection and prevention of “errors and fraud”; 
others, however, saw things differently. 
 
Dicksee’s seminal 1892 publication, Auditing: A Practical Manual for Auditors, 
crystallised the objectives of an audit as being the detection of:  
 
1. Fraud; 
2. technical errors; and 
3. errors of principle. 
 
In this he was supported by Lancaster who stated:  
 
“The detection of fraud constitutes the most important purpose of an audit. 
Shareholders and proprietors alike frequently regard the employment of an 
auditor as the only possible means for the detection and prevention of fraud” 
(Lancaster, 1927: 62–3). 
 
As late as 1961, authors of auditing texts emphasised the importance of, as Langhout 
expressed it, “the audit [bringing] to light any error or fraud which the auditor can and 
should discover by exercising reasonable care and skill” (1961: 5). 
 
These emphatic points of view are tempered by the legal opinion of Lord Justice Lopes 
in the case re Kingston Cotton Mill Ltd, (1896: 2 CA 279). In this case, Justice Lopes 
made the oft quoted observation that the auditor “is a watch dog, but not a 
bloodhound”, and pointed out that the auditor was “not bound” to approach an audit 
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with suspicion or a preconceived idea that there was “something wrong”. Providing 
reasonable care was taken, the auditor could accept the representations of “tried 
servants of the company” (Lopes quoted in Lancaster, 1927: 5). An interesting and 
modern parallel to this is Section 76(4)(b) of the South African Companies Act of 2008 
in terms of which company directors are permitted to rely upon the performance of 
competent employees and contracted professionals, such as legal counsel. 
 
Of course, the challenge was to define “reasonable care”. Dicksee saw it as derived 
from common and statute law as well as something he defined as “the rules of 
professional etiquette” (15th edn, 1933: 310), both written and unwritten. A breach of 
the written rules of etiquette laid the defaulter open to sanction from within the 
profession while the same was true in the case of a breach of statute law, only the 
sanction involved the state as well. 
 
Cosserat and Rodda (2009: 6) point out that case law in the United Kingdom supports 
the view that the current definition includes not only a careful application of auditing 
standards and “professional etiquette”, but also a careful consideration of the possibility 
of fraud followed by a careful investigation where the circumstances suggest its 
necessity. Cosserat and Rodda also point out that the courts in the United Kingdom 
continuously assess the appropriateness of auditing standards in a fast changing 
environment and thus what reasonable care means in a given situation. 
 
The current International Federation of Accountants’ Code of Professional Conduct is 
endorsed by the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants (SAICA Handbook, 
2012). At Section 130 – where it deals with “Professional Competence and Due Care” – 
it states that due care is, in part, achieved through a process of maintaining “a 
continuous awareness and an understanding of relevant technical, professional and 
business developments” (SAICA Handbook: Code of Professional Conduct, 2010: 
130.3). The other part is diligence – that is: acting carefully, thoroughly and in a timely 
fashion to the needs of the work (SAICA Handbook: Code of Professional Conduct, 
2010: 130.4). 
 
Justice Lopez’s judgement was supported by South African authors Taylor and 
Kritzinger (1975: 7) who took the view in the mid-1970s that the detection of errors 
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made “innocently or fraudulently” was “incidental to the auditor’s main duty of 
verifying the financial statements”. Another South African author, KC Dickinson, was 
uncompromising in the simplicity of his view that neither detecting nor preventing error 
and fraud were the responsibilities of an auditor (1978: 15). 
 
THE CURRENT POSITION CIRCA 2012 
There has been a clear move in the view of an audit from being concerned principally 
with a negative – fraud – through a positive – the examination of “all the records and 
documents” sufficient to support the auditor’s view that the financial statement audited 
“fairly presents the facts” (Taylor and Kritzinger, 1975: 6) – to the present state of 
equilibrium, being a combination of fraud awareness and concern for an appropriate 
audit opinion. This view is supported by Cosserat and Rodda who extend it by pointing 
out that a successful audit gives credence to financial information, thereby supporting 
the activities of “an effective capital market” (2009: 6). These elements are important in 
a profession recovering after a slew of disastrous corporate failures – such as Enron in 
2001 – underlined dramatically the failure of a methodology based upon a linear 
concept of the “fairness” of financial statements which has been unable to counter a 
deliberate management intent to produce fraudulent financial statements (Cosserat and 
Rodda, 2009: 11). 
 
In part, the profession’s response to these events has been to tighten up auditing 
standards with the introduction of detailed quality control criteria as well as the use of 
carefully crafted terminology to avoid ambiguity. In addition, auditors, now, are 
required to review the effectiveness of a client’s risk management process in preventing 
error and fraud, technically described as material “misstatements” (Puttick and van 
Esch, 2007: 976–82). 
 
The current auditing standards require auditors also to consider, actively, the risk of 
fraud being perpetrated, both by the entity and within the entity. Much of the detail is 
encapsulated in International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 240 entitled The auditor’s 
responsibilities relating to fraud in an audit of financial statements and which was 
effective for audits beginning on or after 15 December 2009. Of particular interest is 
Paragraph A30 of the Standard which requires the auditor – as a rebuttable presumption 
– to presume that there are risks of fraudulent activity in the entity’s revenue 
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recognition criteria. But as Davia (2000: 49) points out, there is a difference between 
normal auditing and “proactive fraud specific auditing”. Whereas the former seeks to 
verify that which is known, the latter tries to establish that which is unknown and “may 
not be” (2000: 49). 
 
The question arises as to what is “fraud”? Bologna and Lindquist (1995: 10) describe 
many forms of fraud but define it, basically, as an intentional strategy “to achieve a 
personal or organisational goal or to satisfy a human need” usually the need to survive 
– economically, socially or politically. The crux of the matter is that these needs can 
also be achieved by honest means but dishonesty surfaces where “competitive survival” 
becomes an issue. The authors cite, as an example, an American insurance company 
which had overstated its revenue by $200 million. This overstatement was covered up 
by hundreds of employees who colluded in generating thousands of bogus policies to 
create paper profits for the company so they could keep their employment for a little 
longer and hence survive economically (Bologna and Lindquist, 1995: 11). 
 
Fraud is omnipresent. While the Van Wyk de Vries Commission Report on the South 
African Companies Act of April 1970 (1970, 8: 13.03) noted the existence of common 
law theft and fraud, it also noted that a survey of South African business since 1950 
suggested a “relatively high order” of ethics and an absence of “serious offences 
concerning prospectuses and the offering of shares to the public”. 
 
The 43 years since the Report was made have seen the perpetration on the public of 
some sophisticated frauds. As early as 1976, Williard E Stone warned of what was to 
come as well as the deliberate misleading of the auditor by the collusive activities of 
management. The risk of failing to uncover the fraud exposed the auditor to charges of 
negligence. 
 
While perspicacious in his concerns, Stone’s characterisation of the profession’s future 
as “clear and cheerful” was way off-target and failed to anticipate its inadequate 
response to the shortcomings of business activities in the period 1980–2005. 
 
The auditor in the 21st Century faces many challenges in an environment where 
auditing has been described by Cosserat and Rodda (2009: 11) as a “shifting paradigm” 
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and with auditors moving from the conventional role of providing an opinion on the 
fairness of financial statements to providing “value added services” on governance 
issues, internal control weaknesses, pinpointing business risks and many other areas. 
 
AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
Auditor independence has always been a concern, the fundamental question being how 
possible it is to be independent of an entity which pays the auditor to audit its financial 
statements. One answer, of course, is that the auditor, in theory, reports on the results of 
the audit to the entity’s owners – its shareholders – and not to its managers. In an article 
entitled “The Human Element” (1976), Wilfred Levitt pointed to the need to rotate 
auditors, describing the relationship otherwise between audit and client staff as 
“intimate almost incestuous” and a “slow poison to complete freedom of action and to 
absolute independence”. The Arthur Andersen debacle of 2000 proved Levitt’s case. 
 
The current framework for dealing with issues of an auditor’s independence is 
concerned with preventing auditors from completing non-audit (or “value added”) 
services for audit clients. These are perceived to be the point of greatest conflict with 
clients. In the United States, the Enron debacle resulted in the passage of the Sarbanes 
Oxley legislation to prohibit auditors from performing such services for their audit 
clients (Monks and Minnow, 2004: 248). But as Cosserat and Rodda point out (2009: 
12), such legislation has disregarded a number of key facts, principally the complexity 
of commercial environments, a corresponding complexity in audit practices, the great 
competition for clients evident in the auditing and accounting profession and perhaps, 
fundamentally, the public interest. This has resulted in the United Kingdom and other 
countries stopping short of actual legislation to regulate the issues, preferring instead to 
appoint independent regulators (instead of professional societies) to develop codes of 
conduct, to regulate non-audit services. 
 
In South Africa, the response has been to introduce new legislation which created a new 
and enhanced regulatory authority responsible for controlling the auditing profession 
and, amongst other things, developing a code of professional auditor conduct. In the 
interim, in April 2006, the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants adopted 
the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants issued by the International Federation 
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of Accountants (SAICA Handbook, 2009/10, Vol. 3: ET3). In the 2009 Manual of 
Information, the new South African regulator – the Independent Regulatory Board for 
Auditors (IRBA) – pointed out the usefulness of the SAICA Code. It also argued for the 
retention of its predecessor Board’s Code as a transitional provision until such time as 
the newly constituted Committee for Auditor Ethics developed the regulator’s code. As 
an indication of the rapid pace of change, in 2010, both SAICA and IRBA adopted 
revised and updated Codes (see the SAICA Handbook, 2010/1, Vols 2–3), the latter 
event marking the end of the transition from the PAAB to the IRBA. 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN AUDITING AND ACCOUNTING IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM 
 
AUDITING 
The idea of an audit stretches far back into antiquity. In ancient times, wealthy men 
would employ stewards to take daily care of their wealth in the form of cattle, land, 
slaves and produce. At intervals, stewards would be required to give an oral accounting 
of their charges and the master would listen to this recital and ask such questions as he 
believed necessary. From this practice sprang the word “audit” derived from the Latin 
“audire” meaning “to hear” and, acquiring over time, an additional meaning as “one 
who satisfies himself as to the truth of the accounting of another” (Puttick and van 
Esch, 2007: 2). In auditing’s infancy, the most important qualifications for the position 
of auditor were a man’s “reputation … integrity and independence of mind” (Woolf, 
1997: 2). Accounting technicalities were a lesser concern, but auditors became 
increasingly reliant upon accountants for some form of numerical interpretation. There 
were three long-term results which arose from this situation – the audit function became 
dominated by accountants, auditors became accountants, and the two professions 
became synonymous (Woolf, 1997: 2). 
 
The idea of an audit was well established in England (Chatfield, 1977: 111–3). A 
succession of company acts in the period 1844–1928 moved the concept of an audit 
from an accounting exercise to a more sophisticated “instrument of stockholder 
control” (Chatfield, 1977: 119) over the tasks delegated to their employees who 
managed the companies. Thus, during this early modern period, the main objectives of 
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an audit were “the verification of managerial stewardship and the detection of fraud” 
(Chatfield, 1977: 119), as has been demonstrated earlier. 
 
Early audit work procedure was comprised primarily of:  
 
(i) an examination of every transaction recorded by the entity’s bookkeeper; 
(ii) a comparison of journal entries made by the bookkeeper with their underlying 
documentation; and 
(iii) the tracing of the postings from the journal to the ledger – which was recast in 
total – and then comparing the ledger to the trial balance and balance sheet 
(Chatfield, 1977: 119). Some of the bookkeeping concepts, such as the trial 
balance and the journal entry, dated back prior to the era of Pacioli’s seminal 
codification, Summa, in 1494 (Peragallo, 215: 1956). 
 
These three elements remain to the present day on the auditors’ list of bookkeeping 
tasks to check. But while in the mid-to-late 19th Century, checking these fundamental 
procedures may have been sufficient to enable the auditor to form an opinion, they 
needed to be supplemented in modern times by more sophisticated audit tests. 
Moreover, such basic audit procedures could not detect deliberate misstatement in the 
form of fraud where the correct accounting form masked the dishonest activity. Taylor 
and Glezen (1997: 12–3) are critical of early “shareholder audits” where meetings 
would be called with shareholders who could then compare amounts in the balance 
sheet against the books of prime entry and agree that each entry had a supporting 
document. Audit independence was negligible and often auditors were required by the 
company’s articles to own stock in the companies they audited. But the logic of the 
three procedures remains – as the balance sheet is made up of summaries of accounting 
data detailed in the entity’s books of entry, proof that this data was correct “seemed a 
logical basis for an auditor’s opinion on the resulting financial statement” (Chatfield, 
1977: 120). 
 
The continued widespread nature of basic audit techniques at this time is evidenced by 
an amusing exchange reported in the Grahamstown publication, the Grocott’s Penny 
Mail of 11 November 1912. In response to the criticism of a Councillor Whiteside that 
the Municipality’s auditors had only checked account balances – the implication being 
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that they wished to save on work and hence expense – the auditors, Ben B Attwell and 
Arthur Jubb, responded: “there is not a book in the Town Office from receipt book to 
ledger and all between that does not bear marks of our scrutiny and inspection”. 
 
The shortcoming of the three elements detailed above was that while all transactions 
could be summarised and journalised and the balance sheet agreed to the trial balance, 
errors in judgement and principle could exist, such as the incorrect calculation of 
provisions and estimates, thereby undermining the value of proper record keeping. 
 
As early as the 1880s English auditors were adopting more sophisticated audit 
techniques. These included reviewing debtors for their existence and the recoverability 
of their debt by obtaining independent confirmation of debtors’ account balances from 
them in the mail and then providing for the non-payment of estimated bad debts. In 
addition, audit work on inventory concentrated upon its existence and value with stock 
count sheets being signed off by those actually responsible for the inventory’s receipt, 
storage and issue. As Chatfield has pointed out (1977: 120), further sophisticated audit 
procedures were created 
 
 to ensure fixed assets were recorded at cost, that capital items had not been 
expensed and that the assets had then been depreciated in terms of an existing and 
uniform policy; 
 to ensure dividend payments had not been paid out of the company’s capital 
account; 
 to ensure the company’s directors had not exceeded their power to borrow money, 
encumber assets or any of the other duties and responsibilities entrusted to them by 
the company’s shareholders by means of the company’s articles and memorandum 
of association; and lastly 
 to compare shares listed in the share register with share issue documentation and 
cash received. 
 
One purpose of these procedures was to make certain that the concept of capital 
maintenance remained intact. In terms of this concept, a company’s creditors could rely 
upon the fact that a company had assets equal to its issued share capital and this 
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represented a fund sufficient to meet the claims of creditors in the event of need (Van 
Der Merwe, 1995: 3–8; Cilliers, 2000: 322). 
 
These types of procedures needed an expertise and experience beyond “the ability to 
backtrack a company bookkeeper and the history of auditing from the 1890s is one of 
upgrading analysis and de-emphasising routine verification” (Chatfield, 1977: 120). 
They also required a change in attitude, particularly amongst shareholders who still 
believed they had appointed the auditor to seek out fraud. 
 
The positive development in audit practice was paralleled by an equal development of 
the accounting profession and the growth of common accounting standards. This 
development, together with the wide publicity given to dubious management profit 
reports prepared for shareholders, began to limit a previously “wide area of accounting 
discretion in accounting to shareholders” (Yamey, 1977: 28). 
 
In an increasingly sophisticated commercial environment, a new challenge for the 
auditor was to review management’s stewardship of the entity with less attention to the 
routine detail and greater focus upon the “scope of audit analysis” (Chatfield, 1977: 
120). Until the late 19th Century, management saw little point in spending money 
establishing systems of internal control – that is: accounting controls introduced by the 
entity itself to control, prove and resubmit incorrect items to ensure the maintenance of 
accurate records, prompt financial reporting and the protection of the entity’s assets 
(Dickinson, 1978: 38). Also, whilst statistical sampling techniques were known to be 
effective in use and in reducing time spent in auditing, they were only used by auditors 
when their clients were prepared to pay the cost incurred in setting up and executing 
such techniques. Experts were often employed and their use also increased the cost of 
the audit. 
 
With experience, audit strategy changed as the advantages of sampling techniques 
began to out-weigh their cost, and as the need to determine the client’s system of 
internal control became a preliminary audit procedure. Chatfield quotes (1977: 120) 
from a 1910 text by authors Spicer and Pegler entitled Audit Programmes where it was 
stated that the first audit consideration when beginning an audit was to “ascertain the 
system of internal control”. Chatfield believes the acceptance of the importance of the 
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client’s internal controls and the use of sampling techniques “allowed audit emphasis to 
shift from the detection of fraud and clerical errors toward a more refined scrutiny of 
reporting fairness” (Chatfield, 1977: 120). This point of view has lasted until the 
numerous financial frauds of the late 20th and early 21st Centuries indicated that a 
greater emphasis on risk assessment was needed in the course of an audit. 
 
The growth of companies in Britain and the related legislation that developed to control 
them resulted in auditing becoming a specialised function. The creation in 1880 of the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales led to an examination 
requirement for admission and the examinations included questions on auditing, “which 
soon became one of the major subject areas for professional preparation” (Chatfield, 
1977: 121). 
 
Coupled with this growing sense of professionalism was the development of a 
specialised literature in the United Kingdom. This was evidenced by the creation of the 
profession’s journal entitled The Accountant which often included articles on audit 
procedures and similar topics, and texts like FW Pixley’s Auditors, Their Duties and 
Responsibilities (1881) and Lawrence R Dicksee’s Auditing: A Practical Manual for 
Auditors (1892). The first edition of the former text dealt with the basic aspects in detail 
– the requirements of the Company’s Act, bookkeeping, the forms of accounts and the 
duties and responsibilities of auditor and Dicksee’s book rapidly became the standard 
text with over 35 000 copies sold in the period 1892–1933. It held this position until at 
least 1969 when its eighteenth edition was published (Chatfield, 1977: 121). By then, 
Dicksee was long dead and the task of maintaining the text had fallen to others, 
principally Stanley W Rowland, one-time Senior Lecturer in Accounting at the London 
School of Economics and Political Science, University of London, and a partner in the 
London firm of Sellars, Dicksee and Co. 
 
Dicksee’s text has been superseded by more modern books on audit theory. In 
particular, a former colleague of his in America – Robert H Montgomery – in 1912 
published an American edition of Dicksee’s book. He claimed the American text 
contained “radical departures” from those detailed by Dicksee in response to the fact 
that “more is now expected of the auditor” (1912: v). Yet Dicksee had a great and 
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continued impact upon accountancy and his 1905 edition is still available as a reprint 
from Amazon.com [Accessed 9/11/2011]. 
 
ACCOUNTING 
At the beginning it should be noted that auditing and accounting are not mutually 
exclusive and auditors are usually skilled accountants. Indeed, to audit in public 
practice in South Africa to date has required the incumbent to be a chartered 
accountant. 
 
The original creation of the Society of Accountants in Edinburgh in the 1850s was, in 
part, a result of the extensive commercial activity unleashed by the growing maturity of 
the industrial revolution in England begun over a century before, as well as the 
concomitant of that revolution, the creation of colonies throughout the world. The 
commercial ventures needed to be recorded in monetary terms but there was also a need 
for other expert financial services. Bookkeeping was a well established practice but 
many bookkeepers were employed by lawyers rather than practising as independent 
professionals (Littleton, 1933: 265). There was also a limit as to what bookkeepers 
could or should do. Thus, the growth in the complexity of financial transactions 
contributed to the creation of the more specialised field of accountancy. But some link 
was retained to those early days of the profession as practising accountants were 
sometimes members of the solicitors’ societies. Chatfield (1977: 82) has developed a 
compelling argument for another reason in the growth of accountancy – the idea of a 
dynamic going concern. Whereas the basis for bookkeeping was historical (in that it 
recorded past events), commercial activity was continuous and present-and future-
oriented. Thus, the value of an entity’s assets was linked to its ability to create a 
constant profit stream rather than to what they could fetch upon the break-up of the 
entity or its liquidation. 
 
These ideas in turn influenced the concept of capital maintenance as “both limited 
liability and the economic need for permanent investments require that paid-in capital 
be kept in the business” (Chatfield (1977: 82); Webb (1997: 378) has shown, that, with 
regard to Scottish banks and those in the Cape colony, limited liability entities 
  84 
 
ultimately dominated because of their ability to attract a wide shareholding and thus a 
large capital base. 
 
Between 1811 and 1847 in London, the number of accountants listed in the directories 
of the day increased from 24 to 186; from then, the increase to 1883 was slower but still 
grew more than fourfold to 840 accountants (Littleton, 1933: 268). Thus, within a 
single lifetime of 70 years “there had developed a body of independent practitioners 
offering skilled services to the public” (Littleton, 1933: 270). As Edey and Panitpakdi 
(1956: 356) have shown, in the mid-19th Century, the need to regulate a burgeoning in 
commercial affairs more closely than in the past, saw the introduction in England of the 
principle of general incorporation of companies by registration, but with unlimited 
liability. This was made possible by the passage of the Joint Stock Companies Act of 
1844. 
 
The joint stock company was a forerunner of the present-day company and had been a 
vehicle for commercial ventures in Europe since the medieval period (Littleton, 1933: 
208). In exchange for a “share” in the company and the profits it achieved, 
“shareholders” contributed towards a common capital called “stock”. The shareholding 
of an individual indicated the degree of interest and decision-making influence in the 
company. Apart from spreading the risk of any corporate venture, shares were easily 
transferable without the consent of other shareholders. But without limited liability, a 
joint stock venture could bankrupt investors beyond their holding in the company. 
 
The 1844 Act had, amongst its objectives, the reform of the unsophisticated laws 
dealing with large joint-stock companies, weaknesses in which had seen the 
perpetration of much fraudulent activity. In fact, the great frauds of the early 18th 
Century had so impacted upon the national psyche in the British Isles that company 
formation had been discouraged for over a hundred years (Littleton, 1933: 288). 
 
BUBBLES AND PYRAMID SCHEMES 
One of the most notorious of these schemes was the “South Sea Bubble” or the “Great 
Swindle” of 1720 (Cowles, 1960). Some detail of the event is given in Appendix 3 as it 
foreshadowed the necessary rise of the accountant and auditor and the creation of 
limited liability companies. The previous occurrence of such “scams”, however, is not 
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enough to prevent similar debacles as events in the recent past have shown, with 
members of the accounting profession actively colluding with their clients to mislead 
the public, the cases of Enron and WorldCom being amongst some of the most 
significant modern examples (Monks and Minow, 2004: 510–1). 
 
The South Sea scheme displayed the characteristics of a modern pyramid scheme – a 
non-sustainable business involving the payment of money with little of real value being 
received in return and drawing in significantly greater numbers of people as the scheme 
gains momentum. The general characteristics of such a scheme have been identified by 
Niall Ferguson (2009: 123) as:  
 
1. “Displacement” whereby unscrupulous and dishonest people see a questionable 
economic opportunity; 
2. “Euphoria” in which apparent profits lead to increased values in the commodity 
which is the subject of the opportunity; 
3. “Mania”, the stage at which believing investors are drawn into the scheme; 
4. “Distress” or the point at which the authors of the scheme realise that growth 
cannot continue and sell out to maximise their profits; 
5. “Revulsion” or disintegration where prices of the commodity fall, investors 
panic and the bubble bursts with considerable loss to those unable to get out of 
the scheme in time. 
 
Ferguson (2009: 113) identifies three further factors that contribute to the “mania”:  
 
 the authors of the scheme use their asymmetrical knowledge to their 
unscrupulous advantage, (that is: the inside knowledge available to them only 
and which gives them an economic edge over other investors); 
 experienced speculators – but without the relevant inside knowledge – can act 
rationally and profit from the scheme before it collapses; and finally 
 easy access to credit is not only available but a necessity. 
 
Legislators are well aware of the linked concepts of moral hazard and asymmetrical 
knowledge, the former relating to the different behaviour of a party insulated against 
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risk while the latter describes a situation where one party knows more than another, 
thereby creating an imbalance. In commenting on the United Kingdom Companies Act 
of 1900, Lapp pointed out that 
 
“the legislature cannot supply the people with prudence, judgement or business 
habits … yet it must be generally acknowledged that a person who is invited to 
subscribe to a new undertaking has practically no opportunity of making an 
independent inquiry” (Lapp, 1908: 256) 
 
and were thus easy targets for unscrupulous agents. 
 
Despite legal safeguards and the existence of accountants, auditors and other 
professionals to conduct feasibility studies, “bubbles”, or, in modern parlance, “Ponzi 
schemes” continue to rob incautious investors. In South Africa, the recent Tannenbaum 
scandal mirrors Bernie Madoff’s fraudulent schemes in the United States, giving rise to 
sensational press headlines, such as Rob Rose’s in the Sunday Times of 1 November 
2009: “Lawyer loses $825m in SA’s biggest Ponzi scam”. In the immortal phrase 
attributed to American showman PT Barnum (1810–91), “There’s a sucker born every 
minute” (Quotations, 1979: 34). 
 
The impact of 1720 underlined the dangers of unlimited liability, unless covered by 
royal charter, and restricted effective economic progress by delaying the emergence of 
large joint stock companies and hence the need for qualified accountants and auditors. 
In the period preceding 1825, there was a heavy restriction placed upon the 
incorporation of companies as well as upon the legal acceptance of limited liability. As 
Webb has pointed out, the concept of limited liability “offers protection to the 
uninformed creditor of the organisation” (1997: 173). This was applied as a 
fundamental principle for the British banking system until 1825. In that year, the 
Bubble Act of 1720 was repealed in favour of a system of Crown charters and letters 
patent which specified the degree of liability for company indebtedness assumed by its 
shareholders. A uniform, compulsory system of limited liability had to wait 30 years 
until 1855. In terms of the concept of limited liability, the extent of the shareholders’ 
loss in a failed company was limited to the amount invested by those shareholders in 
the company, leaving their personal assets untouched. Limited liability was an 
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important element in the industrialisation of the 19th Century as it allowed 
entrepreneurs access to significant amounts of capital from a large spectrum of 
investors who did not wish to risk anything beyond their capital contribution. 
 
In South Africa, the importance of limited liability was recognised. In the Transvaal, 
Law No. 5 of 1874 limited the liability of members of certain companies and made 
possible the receipt of a certificate of [company] registration with limited liability from 
the Registrar of Deeds of the South African Republic. This issue was strictly regulated 
by the law but allowed inspection of the documentation at a rate of 1 shilling each per 
inspection and 9 pence for each page or copy extracted (Nathan, 1905: 86–93). 
 
In the Cape, the Companies Act No. 25 of 1892 recognised both a limited company and 
an unlimited company. With respect to the former, the Act defined liability “of the 
members of which … by their registered memorandum of association [is] limited to the 
amount, if any, unpaid in the shares respectively held by them or by the operation of 
any Act of Parliament” (Tennant, 1894: 8). 
 
COMPANY LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
The development of company legislation in the United Kingdom in the 19th Century is 
important in South Africa in that it was used as a basis for regulating commercial 
activity first in the British Colonies of Natal and the Cape, and later in the Union. Both 
the Cape Companies Act of 1892 and the first Union-wide Companies Act of 1926 
were heavily reliant upon company legislation in the United Kingdom for their content 
and form. 
 
The Select Committee on Joint Stock Companies, whose investigations in 1841–4 
preceded the Act, concluded that while financial statements might not mean much to 
inexperienced people, the existence of accounting and auditing requirements in the 
legislation – which set certain standards of disclosure – would force company directors 
to exercise care “so that, at least, the ignorant may not be so misled” (Edey and 
Panitpakdi, 1956: 357). 
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THE 1844 UNITED KINGDOM COMPANIES ACT 
The Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 was important in that it gave legal sanction to 
the incorporation of joint stock companies, but those in which the investors still carried 
unlimited liability. Nevertheless, the Act reflected a degree of modernity in the growing 
desire to protect investors through disclosure of information by the company’s 
directors. For example, a “full and fair” balance sheet was to be made available for 
every ordinary meeting of shareholders, auditors were to be appointed and allowed 
complete access to the company’s books and they were required to read their report on 
the balance sheet at the annual meeting of the company. A copy of the audited balance 
sheet was to be lodged with the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies and to be available 
for public inspection. However, in a backward step, the auditors required by the Act did 
not need to be professional accountants as well. Edey and Panitpakdi (1956: 357) 
speculate that it was expected the auditors would employ accountants to assist them on 
audits, but it was questionable as to whether auditors without detailed accounting 
knowledge would be able to achieve the goals of the Act. It also indicated that the 
profession had a way to go before its members were equally competent and versed as 
accountants and auditors. 
 
The reality, of course, was that accounting practices were in the early stage of 
development and the idea of “a professionally qualified accountant” was only 
beginning to take root. As TA Lee notes (1978: 238), these early attempts at control 
“were of little help to the company investor in his decision-making activities, and the 
quality of the accounting information available to him [was] questionable”. But it was a 
start. 
 
The thrust of the new 1844 legislation was thus twofold: public registration of 
companies (and hence official knowledge and scrutiny of the proposed enterprise 
before it began) and control over the activities of company promoters and directors 
whose fraudulent and unchecked actions had caused much financial loss and social 
dislocation in the past. A later revision of the 1844 Act required the auditor to have at 
least one share in the company being audited (later dropped in the Act of 1856) but not 
to hold any office in it or to be interested in its affairs other than as a shareholder (and 
of course, auditor) (Littleton, 1933: 289). Parliament’s intention was clear – the auditor 
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was to be the representative of the stockholders and responsible to them, not the 
directors. 
 
Compulsory company registration with limited liability was introduced in England for 
the first time in 1855 by the Limited Liability Act and applied to companies of more 
than 25 shareholders. 
 
THE 1856 UNITED KINGDOM COMPANIES ACT 
In 1856, a new Joint Companies Act replaced the 1844 Act and in a retrograde step, 
repealed the compulsory accounting and audit requirements of the previous legislation. 
This state of affairs was to continue until 1900. Again Edey and Panitpakdi (1956: 361) 
speculate that the loss of these requirements was attributable to a belief that accounting 
affairs should be the subject of a private contract between the shareholders and their 
company directors, as well as a perceived inability to enforce the provisions of the 1844 
Act. This, clearly, was a step back in the process of enforcing responsible accounting, 
but the chartering of the Scottish accountants two years before in 1854 had given the 
process of good governance a momentum that would not be diverted easily. 
 
The 1856 Act was also significant for the reason that it introduced a set of model 
articles to be adopted by those companies who did not wish to devise their own articles. 
The concepts established in the set of model articles were more advanced than those in 
the 1844 Act. For example, auditors were to be elected by the company in general 
meeting, their remuneration was to be fixed at the time of their appointment, they were 
to be eligible for reappointment and they were required to state:  
 
“In their Opinion, the Balance Sheet is a full and fair Balance Sheet, containing 
the Particulars required by these Regulations, and properly drawn up so as to 
exhibit a true and correct View of the State of the Company’s Affairs, and in 
case they have called for Explanations or Information, whether such 
Explanations or Information have been given by the Directors” (Edey and 
Panitpakdi, 1956: 364). 
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THE 1900 UNITED KINGDOM COMPANIES ACT 
It was the 1900 Companies Act that first made the audit of companies in the United 
Kingdom compulsory. The information to be audited was that contained in the balance 
sheet and the auditor was given access to a company’s books, records and information 
and explanations from its directors. Prior to this blanket cover for all companies, only 
certain incorporated commercial activities had to be audited compulsorily. These 
included railways (1868), gas (1871), banks (1879) and electricity (1882) (Cosserat and 
Rodda, 2009: 2). 
 
THE GROWTH OF THE PROFESSION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
This regulation of commercial activity by successive Acts of Parliament of the United 
Kingdom was paralleled by a growth in the number of associations representing the 
interests of accounting professionals who grew in number with the increased need by 
new and existing companies for people “to devise systems of accounts and methods of 
control” (UG49, 1935: 6). 
 
The 1854 chartering of the Scottish accountants was followed in 1855 by the formation 
of the Institute of Accountants and Actuaries in Glasgow and in turn was followed by 
the formation in 1867 of the Society of Accountants in Aberdeen. Both were 
incorporated by Royal Charter (UG49, 1935: 6). In 1870, the Institute of Accountants 
was formed in London and 10 years later, in 1880, it received a Royal Charter when 
many accountants societies and institutes then in existence in England were 
incorporated into the new Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. A 
measure of limited unification in the English profession was thus achieved within 36 
years of the passage of the Joint Stock Act of 1844. A national registration of members, 
however, remained elusive and as late as the 1930s there were no specific statutory 
restrictions on any person practising as a public accountant and auditor in the British 
Isles (UG49, 1935: 6). Cosserat and Rodda (2009: 4) point out that by 1948 most 
auditors in the United Kingdom were professionally qualified. A Board of Trade 
Committee appointed in 1930 reported against registration by legislation, preferring 
instead to allow regulation by the profession. This was clearly different from the South 
African experience and the drive towards a uniform, national process of registration. 
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THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 
While focus of this thesis is on the United Kingdom and its dominions of South Africa, 
Australia and New Zealand, it is useful to consider the American accounting 
experience. Albeit the largest English-speaking nation in the world, when one considers 
the vast size of the United States of America, the loose nature of its federal system and 
the strength of the rights of individual states, the American experience had significant 
differences to those in metropolitan Britain and its dominions. However, it should be 
noted that British chartered accountants played a significant role in developing the 
American accounting system (Previts and Merino, 1979: 98). 
 
Towards the end of the 19th Century, America was beginning to flex its economic 
muscle. This was reflected in the growth of practising accountants. The city directories 
of New York, Chicago and Philadelphia, for example, experienced a quick increase in 
the numbers of public accountants from 81 in 1884 to 322 in 1889 (Previts and Merino, 
1979: 90). 
 
Of significance is the brewer’s boom of the 1880s, which attracted not only British 
capital, but also British accountants and auditors as brewing companies required audits 
of great detail. This is because the inadequacies of many American accounting practices 
– the notorious “back parlour” practices – caused concern to investors and the public 
about “the quality, ability and character of early native accountants” (Previts and 
Merino, 1979: 90). Thus, the British chartered accountant found a role in the American 
economy as he had done on the South African mines. 
 
As with the final “clean-up” of accounting practices on the South African mines in the 
1920s, so too in America. In America in the 1890s, the demand for quality service led 
to the establishment of at least three national public accounting firms and the 
recognition and establishment of the title “Certified Public Accountant” in the state of 
New York. The need for financial probity resulted in an influx of British auditors who 
were instrumental in the establishment of the American Association of Public 
Accountants (AAPA) which ultimately became the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants. In the early days, the AAPA did not have formal legal recognition 
of its public practice. In a process similar to the South African attempts through 
Parliament, the AAPA found it difficult to get a bill passed by the state of New York. 
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The draft Bill sought to prevent public practice by accountants who had not been 
licensed by the University of the State of New York. The Bill also required CPAs to be 
citizens of the United States and provided that only registered CPAs in New York State 
could act as expert accountants or paid auditors by state, county or municipal offices 
(Previts and Merino, 1979: 97). Audit techniques in this period comprised vouching all 
cash payments, checking footings and postings and following through trial balance and 
financial statements. As much as 75 per cent of the audit time was spent on footings 
and postings, but experience indicated that three-quarters of fraudulent activity was 
deliberately covered up by failing to account for cash receipts (Previts and Merino, 
1979: 92). 
 
After much lobbying, debate and compromise, the Bill was passed in 1896. One of the 
biggest changes was to waive the need to be an American citizen. This was possibly the 
result of a lack of skilled manpower. In the period 1896–7, 129 CPA certificates were 
issued and in December 1896 (see Flesher et al., 1996), the first CPA examinations in 
the state of New York were written with only four passes. The Transvaal Society 
similarly had poor examination results in its early years, and the parallel results, while 
interesting, are difficult to explain. 
 
The state of New York’s CPA legislation soon led to other states passing similar 
legislation – Pennsylvania in 1899, Maryland in 1900, California in 1901, Washington 
and Illinois in 1903, until by 1921, all states were covered by a CPA law (Previts and 
Merino, 1979: 100). This was a significant achievement, given the fractious nature of 
American politics. The process indicates clearly that informed opinion believed 
accountants needed to be regulated in the interests of the public good. It will be 
remembered that New Zealand achieved this goal in 1908, Australia in 1928 and South 
Africa finally in 1951. 
 
While increased commercial activity was the primary spur to the development of the 
profession in the United Kingdom and the United States of America, what was the 
catalyst in South Africa? To be able to answer the question, some understanding of the 
political and economic situation in South Africa is needed. And, inevitably, as the 
process played out over the years 1913–51, sometimes there was a mutually influential 
interaction between the process and the political and economic development of South 
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Africa. As Thomson puts it, “the interplay between conditions, events, personalities and 
ideas as well as the interconnections between events themselves” (1972: vii). 
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CHAPTER 5: EARLY DAYS AND LEGISLATED RIGHTS 
IN A CHANGING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT: 
THE PROFESSION IN SOUTH AFRICA IN 1913 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter links back to Chapter 3 and presents a snapshot of South Africa in 1913. 
As the Union progressed, economically and politically, so too did the profession of 
accountancy. Where previously the profession had been parochial, isolated and 
province-bound, the opportunities offered through parliamentary recognition and 
approval after 1910, transformed it into a national profession, ultimately a worthy 
competitor of the United Kingdom’s chartered societies. 
 
To understand the profession’s development, it is necessary to consider it in its 
temporal context. South Africa in 1913 was the product of many complex and inter-
related events, among them the discovery of mineral wealth, first in the form of 
diamonds, along the Orange River in 1867, and later in 1870 in the area that became 
known as Kimberley, and then the main discovery in 1886 of the Witwatersrand main 
gold reef. The increasing sophistication of geological survey methods and mining 
techniques led to the discovery of new gold reefs to the south-west of the 
Witwatersrand in 1930 (Saunders and Southey, 2001: 56, 78). 
 
As Davenport (1987: 192) has pointed out, the diamond fields became the confluence 
of an agrarian society with the beginning of an industrial community, complicated by 
the “emergence of black-white confrontation in a new sphere”. Horwitz (1967: 17) 
characterised it as the beginning of “the pull and the push off the land” with land and 
labour beginning their “market-moves and market-motivations”, and all becoming 
sources of conflict. In addition to these elements, heavy investment in the mines and a 
Cape Government-sponsored programme of railway construction along the Cape’s 
borders with the two Boer Republics, all contributed to the beginnings of a rudimentary 
infrastructure. Jean van der Poel detailed the development of railways throughout South 
Africa in the period 1885–1910 and concluded their existence, coupled with “high duty 
ports and valuable markets concentrated inland”, (1933, Preface) were important 
elements in the political development of South Africa. There were significant economic 
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benefits, such as increased employment of people needed to operate and maintain an 
extensive, distributed rail system and its infrastructure. By the 1930s, it appeared the 
Government of the day had solved the “Poor White” problem (discussed later) and the 
railways had contributed to this situation (Feinstein, 2005: 86). 
 
Such developments did much to stimulate the local economy by creating or extending 
commercial entities which required the services of bookkeepers, accountants and 
auditors. There was and remains a difference between the former and the latter two. 
Before the Parliamentary Select Committee in 1913, when asked to define a 
bookkeeper, the Secretary to Stuttaford and Company Ltd of Cape Town, a large 
mercantile concern with an initial capitalisation of £400 000, Mr JH Lowe replied: “I 
call a bookkeeper a man who posts a private or nominal ledger, takes out trial balances, 
expense accounts and so on” (SC3, 1913: Q3845). An earlier witness before the 
Committee – JR Leisk, the Secretary for Finance in the fledgling Union Government – 
stated that, in his opinion, the many and varied tasks requiring the attention of an 
accountant precluded any easy definition. Among the tasks he listed were “arbitrations, 
references and curatories” (SC3, 1913: Q2996). The Accountants’ Registration 
(Private) Bill of that year limited its definition of an accountant to those people who 
“by virtue of their knowledge and past experience in the business of an accountant” 
carried on the activities of an accountant (1913: s9(5)). 
 
The probable intention of this definition was to allow members of the four South 
African Provincial Societies easy registration; the careful determination of what 
constituted “past experience” could be used to exclude others. It is clear that the 
development of mining – principally of gold – was paralleled by the development of the 
accounting profession which was significantly influenced by the British profession at 
the metropolitan centre. It was no accidental occurrence that the first accounting society 
in South Africa to be established by statute was situated in the Transvaal, the centre of 
the gold mining industry in South Africa and at the time a British colony. Joint stock 
companies with a broad shareholding and a liability limited to that shareholding 
proliferated on the Witwatersrand in the late 19th Century. The directors of such 
companies would need to account for their stewardship of the company to the 
shareholders. Mining companies on the Witwatersrand, with predominantly 
international shareholders, called for good accounting and auditing procedures to 
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ensure the vital capital inflow to the capital intensive industry. Due to the poor, if 
regular, quality of the gold-bearing ore (Omer Cooper, 1988: 127), huge capital 
investment in opening up underground levels and steps was needed to extract ore on a 
scale which would make mining profitable (Personal communication: ACM Webb, 11 
November 2011). 
 
Other significant events included the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902 and the 
unification in May 1910 of the Cape, Natal, the Orange Free State (renamed in 1900 for 
a short period as the “Orange River Colony”) and the Transvaal into a Union whose 
constitution was based upon the British experience of a sovereign Parliament and a 
flexible constitution, both of which were inimical to a long-term, political solution in 
South Africa. The reasons for this were the lack of homogeneity in the South African 
population, a “colour consciousness of most of the whites and the national 
exclusiveness of most of the Afrikaners” (Thompson, 1960: 483) strong enough to 
neutralise any idea of compromise and fair dealing with others. The prevalent concern 
was that should Afrikaners obtain a unified political majority, they would control the 
South African Parliament and use it to the detriment of other groups as a “flexible 
constitution provide[d] no legal safeguards against arbitrary government” (Thompson, 
1960: 483). But this was not the case with the mainly English-speaking accounting 
profession and there is evidence to suggest support of the Bill in 1924 by senior 
Afrikaner politicians. Certainly, the 1951 Act was guided through the process by a 
senior Afrikaner cabinet minister – Havenga – and was passed into law by an Afrikaner 
parliamentary majority. With the exception of the inevitable and reprehensible 
exclusion of “other races”, the Act of 1951 was a sound piece of legislation which 
recognised the rights of practising accountants and set the profession on a sound 
footing. The reality was that by 1950, Afrikaner penetration of business was a reality 
and was reflected in the establishment of insurance and investment giant Sanlam and 
the Rembrant Corporation (Feinstein, 2005: 178–9). There were other developments as 
well, for example, an emerging petty bourgeoisie of Afrikaner shopkeepers taking over 
from English predecessors. Also important was the agricultural cooperative movement 
in which Afrikaner farmers dominated. All these initiatives needed the services of a 
competent accounting and auditing profession (Personal communication: ACM Webb, 
11 November 2011). 
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THE MILNER PERIOD AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY: 1901–5 
At the conclusion of the Anglo-Boer War with the Treaty of Vereeniging on 31 May 
1902, Sir Alfred Milner, British High Commissioner for South Africa and Governor of 
the Cape (1897–1905) as well as Governor of the conquered Boer Republics, sought to 
establish a united South Africa as a self-governing dominion within the British Empire. 
To this end, he worked tirelessly, creating an inter-colonial council with responsibility 
for new organisations common to both former Republics, notably the Central South 
African Railways and the South African Constabulary. In addition, the council had 
responsibility for the repatriation of former Boer prisoners and the reopening of 
schools. 
 
The thrust of Milner’s policy was to neutralise “the provincial spirit” (Davenport and 
Saunders, 2000: 236). The task he had set himself was a formidable one, given the 
strong republican sentiment in the former Boer Republics and the fact that “the self-
governing institutions of Natal and the Cape Colony placed them beyond the control the 
British Government exercised over the Transvaal and the Orange Free State” (De 
Kiewiet, 1941: 144). This spirit often manifested itself later in debates in the House of 
Assembly. The passage of the 1926 Companies Act is a case in point. There was much 
debate and jockeying as to where the Registrar’s office should be located (see, for 
example, USA, Debates, 26/2/1926: 977–81). 
 
Milner realised that to achieve his political goals he needed to achieve economic 
recovery within the former Republics. To this end he initiated a period of 
reconstruction, making the resurrection of the mines a key element in his policy. Part of 
the process of recovery was the passage of the statutory requirement that all publically 
practising accountants in the Transvaal needed to be registered. The purpose of this 
registration was twofold – the Ordinance, firstly, set a standard for the profession and 
secondly, it thereby gave investors a degree of confidence in the existence of a 
managed economy, in so far as that was possible. By 1904, gold mining had returned to 
its pre-war levels, reaching production worth £32 million in 1910 (Davenport and 
Saunders, 2000: 237). 
 
Documentation in the SAAHC archives points to a high level of political involvement 
in the passage of the Transvaal Ordinance. Alexander Bruce, the ninth Earl of Elgin, 
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and Secretary of State for the Colonies from 1905–8, (Davenport, 1987: 241) oversaw 
the move to responsible government in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony and 
ensured that after it had been passed, the Ordinance was kept on track by encouraging 
professional interaction between the Institute of Chartered Accountants (Moorgate 
Place, London, United Kingdom) and the Transvaal Society of Accountants (123 
Exploration Buildings, Johannesburg, Transvaal) (SAAHC, TSA Legislation and 
Communication of Incorporation, 1906–60. Tvl Ord. 18b, 59/5). 
 
Undeterred by a serious labour shortage immediately after the end of the war, Milner 
introduced indentured Chinese labourers from 1904 with mixed success and the last 
labourers returned to China in 1910. In the intervening six years, the recruitment of 
Black labour from southern Africa increased and ensured a steady flow of mine 
workers that made economic recovery and expansion possible. Davenport and Saunders 
argue that the continuity of supply achieved in the period 1904–10 by using Chinese 
labour, enabled the mining companies to pay low wages and to establish a policy of job 
reservation (Davenport and Saunders, 2000: 237, 613). Whatever the long-term results, 
the Chinese labour did much to stabilise South Africa’s gold mining industry at a 
critical point in the country’s history and indicated the lengths the Government of the 
day went to to protect gold production (Hobart Houghton and Dagut, Vol. 2, 1972: 2). 
As Feinstein has shown, gold was the “export staple” for South Africa while the mining 
companies were mostly foreign-owned and reliant upon foreign capital (2007: 93). He 
has also pointed out that gold was “not just another commodity” but the foundation of 
the world’s money supply until 1971 when the Bretton Woods agreement collapsed. 
The impact of gold mining upon South Africa’s development was thus critical and 
revolved around two facts – mining was the greatest earner of foreign currency and 
source of capital and it was an investment dominated by foreign capital. 
 
While the Transvaal Ordinance of 1904 for the registration of accountants was a 
successful economic initiative, an unintended consequence of Milner’s drive to 
economic recovery materialised during the 1907 economic depression when members 
of the Transvaal Miners’ Association and other White trade unionists went on strike. 
The strike was broken within three months but during that period the mines were able 
to continue, partly due to the fact that skilled British workers remained at their work 
and partly due to the ability of the mines to hire unskilled platteland Afrikaners at low 
 100 
 
wages. “Thus began that invasion which was destined to Afrikanderise [sic] the 
Transvaal trade unions so markedly in the course of a single generation” (Walker, 
1957: 518). The immediate objective of White trade unionists was to stop the “flood of 
cheap white labour” (Walker, 1957: 518) by the creation of the South African Labour 
Party. Walker believed these events marked the beginning of the rise of Afrikaner 
influence in the Transvaal, the richest of the four colonies, within five years of the 
Treaty of Vereeniging. Yudelman perceived a more subtle relationship in which 
organised White labour was broken and then manipulated, as and when needed, by an 
opportunistic grouping of state and capital which, in time, became a “symbolic 
relationship” of White labour, state and capital (Yudelman, 1983: 4). 
 
A further plank in Milner’s policy of reconstruction was to ensure continued British 
domination, both politically and culturally in South Africa after the departure of the 
military. To this end, he sought men with farming experience and envisaged the 
settlement on the land of at least 10 000 English-speakers. The strategy failed for, 
amongst other reasons, a lack of funding to purchase land and a legal inability to 
expropriate it. In the end, the attempt resulted in the settlement of about 1 300 “heads of 
families” (Davenport and Saunders, 2000: 238–9). 
 
Milner also envisaged the Anglicisation of education. The plan here was to restrict the 
use of Dutch in schools by the teaching of English as the primary language; thereafter, 
to use the English so learnt to teach other subjects. Understandably, Afrikaners resented 
the deliberate side-lining of their language. Afrikaans in 1902 was still largely a spoken 
language with little written structure or literature (Thompson, 1960: 19). An earlier 
remedy to this situation and to unify the language, the Zuid-Afrikaanse Taalbond had 
been established in the 1870s, but divisions amongst Afrikaners meant little progress 
had been made. Nevertheless, spurred on by Milner’s programme of Anglicisation, the 
Volk responded favourably to the revival in 1903 of the Taalbond by one-time 
Afrikaner Bond leader in the Cape Parliament, Jan Hofmeyr. Afrikaners also supported 
the creation of alternative schools in the Transvaal as well as a Christelike Nasionale 
Onderwys (CNO) committee to coordinate local education committees and the quality 
of examinations. While the CNO was unable to displace Milner’s Government schools, 
it “stimulated national sentiment among the rising generation” (Walker, 1957: 513–4). 
As a final tactic, Milner proposed to deny political power to the whites in the former 
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Boer republics until British control was achieved (Davenport and Saunders, 2000: 239). 
This was doomed to fail, as was his entire ambitious plan of social engineering. 
 
With growing concern about Milner’s policies, the Afrikaners began to organise 
themselves politically. In the Cape, Jan Hofmeyr renamed his Afrikaner Bond the 
South African National Party (Welsh, 2000: 373) to attract moderate English speakers, 
while in the Transvaal, Louis Botha, one-time Boer general, organised and chaired the 
Het Volk party from 1904 and dedicated it to conciliation and self-government (Walker, 
1957: 514). By 1905, Milner had exhausted himself with his work and in April of that 
year he retired from South Africa where he was succeeded by Lord Selborne. Within a 
year of Milner’s retirement, it became obvious that the British alone could not arrange 
an acceptable future for the former Boer republics and that some form of greater 
consensus was needed. 
 
THE POST-MILNER PERIOD: 1905–8 
The impetus for a change in direction came with the fall of the Unionist Government in 
Britain in December 1905. The creation of a new Liberal Government led by Sir Henry 
Campbell-Bannerman put in power a man who was disposed to grant the Transvaal full 
responsible government (Davenport and Saunders, 2000: 252). In this, Campbell-
Bannerman had the support of Jan Smuts, one-time Boer general and future South 
African Prime Minister, when he dispatched a Committee of Inquiry led by Sir Joseph 
West Ridgeway to South Africa to test opinion. 
 
The Committee recommended a seating structure in the Transvaal legislature which 
appeared to favour British Transvalers but was basically flawed as a result of inaccurate 
information. In the 1907 General Election, the Afrikaner party, Het Volk, won the 
majority of seats in that province. 
 
Based upon the recommendations of the West Ridgeway Committee, the Transvaal 
constitutional structure comprised a 69 member Legislative Assembly and a Legislative 
Council of 15, the latter nominated in the first instance. The electorate was White, and, 
so as not to alienate White opinion in the Transvaal, Article 8 of the Treaty of 
Vereeniging was ignored. This Article provided for the enfranchisement of Blacks on 
the award of self-government, should the White majority so agree (Davenport and 
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Saunders, 2000: 240, 254–5). A similar constitution was granted to the Orange River 
Colony in 1907 and in the first election, in 1908, the local Afrikaner party, Orangia 
Unie, won the majority of seats in its Legislative Assembly. With the South African 
Party winning the General Election in the Cape, self-government country-wide by 1908 
was a reality. 
 
The next step was union. Where previously a federal system with the allocation of 
powers to its constituent states seemed the best system within which to accommodate 
cultural and regional differences, the newly empowered Afrikaner leaders favoured a 
unitary system. A National Convention was convened and first met in October 1908 in 
Durban; the strongest and most able proponents of federation – Hofmeyr and WP 
Schreiner, one-time Prime Minister of the Cape from 1890–1900 – were absent 
(Walker, 1957: 531). 
 
THE NATIONAL CONVENTION: 1908–9 
Davenport has stated that the National Convention was mainly concerned with the 
division of power and that this was illustrated by the distribution of delegates 
(Davenport and Saunders, 2000: 258). No Blacks, Coloureds or Asians were 
represented while the governments and their oppositions in the four colonies were 
represented equally. The Transvaal representatives were well prepared and Smuts, 
together with John X Merriman, Prime Minister of the Cape from 1908–10, put and 
carried the case for a unitary system within a legislative union under the British Crown 
represented by a Governor-General. In this arrangement, the four self-governing 
colonies were to be provinces, and Parliament was to be sovereign and central in terms 
of a written constitution, which could be amended by a simple majority in both the 
House of Assembly and the Senate. This excluded the provisions which entrenched the 
Coloured enfranchisement in the Cape and those which accorded equal status to the 
English and Dutch languages. Any proposed changes to these provisions needed a two-
thirds majority in a joint session of both Houses at the third reading (Davenport and 
Saunders, 2000: 259), (Davenport, 1987: 247). 
 
THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY 
The composition of the 40 member Senate – to sit for 10 years – caused little trouble 
with each province electing eight senators and the Governor-General nominating the 
 103 
 
balance, including four on the basis of their knowledge of “the reasonable wants and 
wishes of the coloured races” (Davenport, 1987: 247; Walker, 1957: 532). The 
membership of a proposed House of Assembly with a life of five years and an initial 
121 seats caused deadlock over the allocation of those seats to the provinces and Black 
representation. The latter problem was resolved by an agreement that the existing 
franchise arrangements in the provinces should remain but that no Black person should 
be elected to Parliament (Davenport, 1987: 248).  
 
Agreement was made on allocating seats on the basis of the White adult male 
population. On this basis the Cape took 51 seats, the Transvaal was allocated 36 and 
Natal and the Orange Free State each received 17 seats for 10 years or until the number 
of seats in the Assembly reached 150 (Davenport, 1987: 248). This clearly impacted 
upon votes available in the House. 
 
THE REDISTRIBUTION OF SEATS 
The Convention provided for future growth by adopting an Australian scheme of 
automatic redistribution whereby a Union quota was established initially by dividing 
the total of White male adults in the four colonies in 1904 by 121, the total number of 
seats in the first Union Assembly. If after the next census the number of White men in a 
province had increased by the number of the quota, that province would receive an 
additional seat in the Assembly; if the number had decreased by the quota a province 
would lose a seat (Walker, 1957: 534). In this scheme, the Cape stood to lose as in 1904 
its population had peaked due to an influx of refugees from the Transvaal and the 
attraction of a post-war boom. But now the Transvaal was benefiting from a new wave 
of immigrants and thus would gain more rapidly than the Cape over time (Walker, 
1957: 533–4) and therein lay the seeds of future friction. The agreement reached gave 
the Cape an average of 2791 votes per constituency, the Transvaal 2715, the Orange 
Free State 2131, and Natal 1647 (Davenport, 1987: 248). 
 
THE JUDICIARY 
With regard to the judiciary, the existing Supreme High Courts and their sub-divisions 
were merged into one Supreme Court with Provincial and Local Divisions. There was 
to be an appellate Division with no appeal to the Privy Council unless approved by the 
King-in-Council. 
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THE PROVINCIAL STRUCTURES 
The four new provinces – the Cape, Natal, Transvaal and the Orange Free State – were 
each to be administered by an administrator paid by and appointed for five years by the 
Union Government. In each province, there was to be a provincial council elected for a 
period of three years by the parliamentary voters in that province. The Natal and 
Orange Free State councils were to comprise 25 members each while those for the Cape 
and Transvaal were to be equal in number to their representation in the House of 
Assembly. An executive committee of four was to be elected for three years by 
proportional representation by each provincial council to assist their respective 
administrators. These provincial structures had no sovereign power and could only 
perform such duties as the South African Parliament required (Walker, 1957: 534–5). 
 
THE WORK OF THE CONVENTION 
During the period of its existence from October 1908 to February 1909, the Convention 
considered and resolved many issues. Some – like a coherent policy dealing with 
Blacks and a language policy for education – were ignored; others, like a carefully 
defined relationship between the provincial governments and a central Parliament, were 
only partially settled; while still others, like the sensitive issue of the site of a national 
capital city threatened to wreck the Convention. Parochialism was a consistent issue; in 
1926, the debate in the House of Assembly on the Companies Act spent much time on 
the issue of in which province the Registrar’s Office was to be situated (USA, Debates, 
26/2/1926: 977–87). A compromise saw Parliament sitting in Cape Town, the Appellate 
Division situated in Bloemfontein and the Executive placed in Pretoria in the nearly 
completed Union Buildings. This cumbersome compromise which involved much 
travelling by civil servants, parliamentarians and others has nevertheless shown a 
remarkable resilience and longevity. 
 
Once compromise had been achieved, a draft Union Bill was published, further 
amendments considered and resolved, and, finally the revised bill was accepted by the 
Cape, Transvaal and Orange Free State. In Natal, there had been concern as to the 
Province’s share of rail traffic to the Rand. A proposal to exclude railways and harbours 
from the general administration budget and to give these services their own budget 
handled “on business principles” (Walker, 1957: 535–6) was supported by a 
referendum in Natal. The resulting favourable majority there underlined the desire of 
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most Natalians to be part of the unification process and sidestep the probability of 
Durban losing trade to Lourenço Marques (now Maputo). 
 
The final step towards Union was for the Bill to be passed by the British Parliament. 
While there was serious criticism of the unitary nature of the proposed Union and its 
failure to resolve the inferior position in which the Bill placed Blacks, it passed and 
received the King’s assent in September 1909, becoming the South Africa Act. As 
Walker commented:  
 
“Thus did liberals in the United Kingdom enact and like-minded men of all 
colours in South Africa willy-nilly accept a state which they believed and 
prayed would lead to the victory of the Cape’s well-tried civilisation principles 
throughout the Union. It was a huge political gamble” (Walker, 1957: 537). 
 
It took less than a year to create the South African Union; the Australian Federation 
took 10 years to craft, that in Canada, three years (Davenport, 1987: 249). The 
Federations continue to exist much as they were formed, but the Union has long passed 
into history. 
 
The political events of 1909–10 overshadowed the passage in 1909 of what was later to 
be seen as an important piece of legislation, the Transvaal Companies Act which, 
together with the English Companies Act of 1909, was later to form the basis of the 
Union-wide Companies Act of 1926 (See Van Wyk de Vries Commission of Enquiry, 
1963–70, 45/1970: 5). This 1926 Act in turn represented an important milestone in 
South Africa’s commercial growth and is discussed in detail in a later Chapter. 
 
UNION: 1910 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
The first Prime Minister of the new Union of South Africa was Louis Botha, born in 
Natal, raised in the Transvaal, a former Boer General and “a representative of the 
dominant North” (Walker, 1957: 537). After a formal proclamation of Union he was 
confirmed in office by the first Governor-General, Lord Gladstone. Thus began what 
DW Krüger (1958: Introduction) dubbed the “Age of Generals” – Botha, Smuts and 
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Hertzog – which spanned the period 1910–48, years of great significance to South 
Africa’s future political, social and economic development. 
 
With the arrival of a new age in politics, political parties aligned themselves in the 
House of Assembly. Botha sought and obtained an amalgamation of Het Volk, Orangia 
Unie and the South African Party (including the Afrikaner Bond) into a new South 
African Party. This party lasted until 1934 when it amalgamated with Hertzog’s 
National Party to become the United Party (Saunders and Southey, 2001: 158). 
 
Shortly before the Union came into existence, Leander Starr Jameson, one-time friend 
of Cecil Rhodes and Prime Minister of the Cape from 1904–8, formed the Unionist 
Party. It consisted mainly of English-speakers from the Progressive Party of the pre-
Union Cape Colony and its objectives were to support the Union and to help Botha in 
limiting the extremists in his own Party (Walker, 1957: 538). Inevitably, Botha became 
increasingly reliant on Unionist support and the Party merged with the South African 
Party in 1920. The pro-British Dominion Party formed in 1934 assumed the Unionist 
role (Saunders and Southey, 2001: 182) while Natalians often stood as independents. A 
new force in Parliament in 1910 was the Labour Party led by FHP Creswell, one-time 
mine manager. Indeed, the Labour Party “punched above its weight” in the period 
1924–9 when it accepted an alliance with Hertzog’s National Party to create the 
majority Fusion Government. Labour made the most of its temporarily enhanced and 
elevated position in the House of Assembly to attack those provisions of the 
Accountants (Private) Bill of 1924 it found objectionable. Among these was the 
perceived wholesale exclusion of certain groups of accountants, such as those in 
municipal and Civil Service. 
 
THE FIRST GENERAL ELECTION 
In the first General Election held in September 1910, the 121 seats available in the 
House of Assembly were won as follows: Unionist Party, 39; South African Party, 67; 
Labour Party, four (which grew to 21 in the 1920 election); and Independents, 11 
(Davenport and Saunders, 2000: 710). While Botha had secured a majority, the 
expected Afrikaner opposition failed to present a unified front and it was the splitting of 
the English-speaking vote into three that ensured Botha’s majority (Walker, 1957: 538). 
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THE ECONOMY AND ACCOUNTING PRACTICES 
The political union stimulated the union of economic entities and professional bodies 
across the four Provinces. 
 
The economies of the four colonies consolidated into the Union in 1910 were based 
largely on mining in the north and agrarian activities throughout the country. This made 
them vulnerable to drought, a regular occurrence in southern Africa. The professions 
like architecture and accountancy were usually based in one province often with 
stronger ties to the United Kingdom than to their colleagues in another province. The 
passage of Union-wide legislation began to change this. 
 
The exploitation of the diamond fields in the north-east Cape following the discovery of 
diamonds in 1867, ultimately generated the initial capital that was used to fund early 
gold mining on the Witwatersrand (Webb, 1981: 2). The increasing costs involved in 
retrieving diamonds from depth after the surface had been cleared, made it a sensible 
proposition to consolidate mining claims (Webb, 1981: 8) and this became a business 
technique utilised by astute individuals like Cecil Rhodes (Webb, 1983: 170). Little 
capital was “put up” for the original establishment of small diamond mining companies. 
These companies were often joint stock companies formed with claim holders who 
received vendor stock in return for their land claims (Webb, 1983: 170). 
 
By 1889, the final, complete amalgamation of claims and hence consolidation of 
diamond mining in South Africa had been achieved with De Beers Consolidated Mines 
Limited at the ultimate apex, but at a cost – the loss of South African capital in the 
collapse of the first Johannesburg Stock Exchange gold boom of 1889. More 
significantly, Webb has pointed out that in the process of consolidation, “the strength of 
Kimberley’s capitalists was revealed, not so much in their own resources but in their 
access to international finance” (Webb, 1981: 23; 1983: 171). Thus began the 
domination of the gold mines by foreign capital, an increasingly unpopular practice as 
reflected in the tone of some debates in the House of Assembly in the 1920s and the 
adoption of the slogan “South Africa First”. 
 
The Kimberley mining experience also resulted in the creation of the labour compound 
system in 1889 which was to become a standard arrangement on the goldmines (Webb, 
 108 
 
1983: 172). But as Woolf (1997: 3) pointed out, the practice was not new or peculiar to 
South Africa. In order to obtain land and labour during the Industrial Revolution in 
England in the 18th and 19th Centuries, English industrialists had actively arranged – 
often by successive Enclosure Acts passed by the Westminster Parliament – for small 
landowners to lose their land. Destitute, the former landowners and their families were 
forced to work in unhealthy conditions and for low wages. Similar scenes were played 
out in South Africa (Omer-Cooper, 1988: 159). 
 
After the end of the Anglo-Boer War, gold production in the Transvaal increased every 
year until it reached pre-war totals of £16 million in 1904 and £32 million in 1910. The 
White population in the Transvaal increased as a result of immigration from 297 000 in 
1904 to 421 000 in 1911 (Thompson, 1960: 52). Immigrants were drawn largely by the 
opportunities available in mining and its spin-off activities. While revenue received by 
the Transvaal Government rose and fell in the period 1902–10, it still achieved a 
surplus in each of these years while the Central South African Railways in the 
Transvaal and the Orange River Colony benefited those two colonies with the 
significant profits they generated. In the latter Colony, the White population increased 
from 143 000 in 1904 to 175 000 in 1911 (Thompson, 1960: 53). 
 
In Natal, the White population only increased from 97 000 in 1904 to 98 000 in 1911 
and its Government consistently over-estimated its revenue, achieving deficits in five of 
six years 1902–7 (Thompson, 1960: 54). In the Cape, the reduction in 1907 of the 
extent of diamond mining centred on Kimberley impacted negatively on the Province’s 
exports. Similarly, its population increased only from 580 000 in 1904 to 582 000 in 
1911, and the Cape Government, too, overestimated its revenue base, achieving deficits 
in five of the six years 1904–9 to a total of £3.6 million (Thompson, 1960: 54). 
 
The governments of the two coastal colonies had limited sources of revenue. These 
were mainly customs charges on imports and railway dues, which in 1903 and 1909 
respectively comprised 32% and 48% of the Cape’s revenue, and 24% and 53% of 
Natal’s. The mining of large deposits of diamonds and gold in the interior stimulated 
the building of railways to link the ports to the mines and thus enabled the flow of 
essential materials – such as steel – to the mines and diggings. Prior to the discovery of 
gold, the Transvaal had been solely dependent on the coastal colonies for its imports. 
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These colonies had used this to their own advantage and had refused to share the dues 
collected on imports (De Kiewiet, 1941: 123–4). 
 
The discovery of gold in the Transvaal changed the dynamics of the situation. In 1887, 
the Transvaal proposed a union with the Orange Free State, the closing of their 
respective borders to railways from the coastal colonies and a railway line, instead, to 
Delagoa Bay in the Portuguese territory of Mozambique. However, the Free State 
preferred to deal with its British neighbours and a customs union was achieved with the 
Cape, but not Natal. Despite these differences, the building of railways went on rapidly 
– the Natal line reached the Transvaal border in 1891 and the Rand in 1895 while a line 
from Port Elizabeth to Bloemfontein reached the Rand in 1892. The first train from 
Pretoria to Delagoa Bay travelled there in 1894 (De Kiewiet, 1941: 125). The entire 
pre-war period was characterised by rivalries, and tariffs were used as weapons or 
incentives. 
 
The Anglo-Boer War changed the dynamics again and for a short period the colonial 
ports enjoyed a boom rooted in the increased military traffic. But in the immediate post-
war period, the need to stimulate recovery in the Transvaal meant the cheapest railway 
link made the most economic sense, particularly as Milner was able to factor into the 
situation an agreement with the Portuguese to allow the mines to recruit Black 
labourers in Mozambique. In 1908, the Cape’s share of the tonnage of traffic through 
the ports had fallen to 13% from a 1903 figure of 24% while that of Natal went from 
42% in 1903 to 24% in 1908. In the same period, Lourenço Marques increased its share 
from 34% to 63% (Thompson, 1960: 55). 
 
A Customs Union Convention in 1906 achieved little as the economics of the situation 
required high tariffs for the coastal colonies and low tariffs for the former republics 
while the politics of the situation required a different solution (Thompson, 1960: 60), 
which would only materialise with Union. With the South Africa Act, the ownership of 
the railways in the four colonies was given to the Union Government after the National 
Convention had resolved a number of issues. Among these was the separation of the 
administration and finance of the railways from the general administration of the 
Union; a financial mechanism to smooth rates charged throughout the country, 
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regardless of traffic fluctuations (Van Der Poel, 1933: 144). The reorganised railway 
system was to contribute to the booms in the economy in the 1920s and 1930s. 
 
In some economic activities, the news was consistently good. For example, the demand 
for sugar on the Witwatersrand grew after 1902. The period between 1910 and 1927 
saw the output of sugar treble until the industry in Natal was in the position of 
protecting a high domestic price while producing a surplus for export at a lower world 
price (Benians et al., 1963: 827). 
 
ACCOUNTING PRACTICES 
The increased economic activity in South Africa created by the diamond and gold 
mines resulted in a corresponding increase in the need to record the routine costs 
incurred by a mining company in purchasing explosives, drills and shovels, and to 
account for the more complex capital expenditure on stamps, mills, cyanide processing 
of crushed ore, the cutting of tunnels and, most importantly, the servicing of debt and 
the payment of dividends. So important were the latter payments that Consolidated 
Gold Fields – in the 43-year period between 1893 and 1936 – allowed only nine years 
to pass with no dividend being paid to investors. Of these, four years related to the 
period of enforced shutdown or minimal activity caused in the years 1899–1902 by the 
Anglo-Boer War. Dividend payments resumed promptly at year end in 1902 (The 
Goldfields, 1937: 132–3). 
 
Bookkeepers could manage the routine accounting work and accumulate the annual 
financial data to enable the more experienced accountants to determine whether a profit 
had been made and whether dividends could be paid. 
 
Charles Goldmann’s ambitious compendium of financial, statistical and historical data 
on gold “and other” companies on the Witwatersrand was published in 1892. The detail 
it provided was encyclopaedic. For example, the ore reserves at 30 September 1891 of 
the Witwatersrand Gold Mining Co. Ltd were estimated to be 20527 tons with a cost of 
milling and mining of 15s 6d per ton (1892: 64B). These were key facts for any 
investor, but little information is provided as to how the facts were calculated or, 
indeed, the reasoning underpinning the estimate. For the Crown Reef Gold Mine Co., 
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calculations were provided to support the half-year expenditure at 30 June 1891 on the 
capital account of £13 598 8s 9d (1892: 67B) 
 
Two points are clear – the calculations required a degree of skill and experience to 
conceptualise and effect, and secondly, by changing certain figures, significantly 
different results could be achieved. 
 
Webb (1981) has detailed the laissez-aller approach to accounting practice adopted by 
early mining companies on the Witwatersrand in the period 1886–94. For example, the 
development costs of some mines were expensed immediately, thereby reflecting heavy 
working costs (Webb, 1981: 79). A more carefully conceived practice was the use of a 
mine development and redemption account in terms of which development expenditure 
incurred to reach a certain underground level was matched to the estimated quantity of 
ore at that level. This expenditure was then expensed to working costs only when that 
ore was crushed and not when the development originally occurred (Webb, 1981: 175). 
Expenses could thus be deferred or even result in an asset should the ore estimate 
exceed the expense. The practice of estimation was, at best, an educated guess and 
impacted negatively upon the value of financial information. 
 
Another dubious practice was that of declaring dividends out of assets or loans (Webb, 
1981: 181–2) testifying to the intense need both to reward and retain capital investment. 
 
Inevitably, speculation and fraud flourished, the latter being corrected by hard 
economic reality (Webb, 1981: 10), the former by the appointment of auditors to 
determine how the fraud was perpetrated, to quantify the losses incurred (Webb, 1981: 
85) and to introduce mechanisms to prevent its recurrence. That the auditors were able 
to complete these tasks is testimony to the growing sophistication of the profession. 
 
South Africa’s early economy was not the only fledging economy that suffered from 
poor and erratic corporate financial reporting. In the United States, for example, 
railroad securities (similarly, gold and diamonds in South Africa) controlled the capital 
market to the extent that by 1900 there were more than one million American investors 
owning stock (Previts and Merino, 1979: 80). In such a “get rich quick” environment, it 
is not surprising that a blanket of secrecy was often drawn over the financial affairs of 
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railroad companies. This was noted in a 1900 Government report on the subject. The 
report indicated that there was also a total lack of responsibility shown by directors to 
stockholders. Another common example of poor accounting practice was the “private 
ledger” which detailed capital expense accounts, directors’ salaries, and creditors and 
debtors totals. These ledgers were literally padlocked and the preserve of a trusted 
employee or designated director. This individual also posted the originating amounts 
from the normal accounting records, maintained a trial balance and was the only person 
who at any time knew the true financial state of affairs of the company (Previts and 
Merino, 1979: 81). 
 
This situation was partially ameliorated by British chartered accountants in America 
who had experience of the application of the British Companies Act and could modify 
its principles for use by their American counterparts (Previts and Merino, 1979: 91). 
 
One principle which was elusive in its application was that of an appropriate method of 
asset evaluation. Depreciation was usually not charged on the fixed assets of American 
companies and asset cost remained at book value. The Remington Arms Company, for 
example, did not disclose depreciation in its financial statements until well into the 20th 
Century (Previts and Merino, 1979: 81). 
 
In general terms, many railroad companies contained operating costs, including critical 
costs such as maintenance of assets. At year end the account headed “surplus shown 
above charges” / “dividend”, would be used to absorb maintenance costs spent but not 
posted to the general ledger. The final result was that the company would have no 
surplus and the line item “surplus above charges” would be a simple book entry 
(Previts and Merino, 1979: 84). 
 
As a result of this and other questionable practices, there was growing public concern 
about fair financial disclosure. One consequence of this concern was the establishment 
in 1887 of the Interstate Commerce Commission. In 1894, the Commission published a 
functional system of accounts entitled The Classification of Operating Expenses 
(Previts and Merino, 1979: 85). It was one of the initiatives that led ultimately to a 
more standardised and understandable system of financial reporting. 
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While responding to a financial problem after the fact was a poor recommendation for 
financial probity, a better one was a system of accounting standards addressing 
potential problems, while the best of all was the international and total standardisation 
of mine accounting. 
 
As Vent and Milne (1989) have shown, between 1895 and 1915 there was a sustained 
and energetic international effort to create such a system in the mining industry. There 
were two main reasons for this – uniformity and hence comparability of financial 
information and through these principles a public who had more trust in the financial 
statements of mining companies and were thus more willing to invest in mining 
ventures. 
 
Standardisation had wide support including, in 1897, that of the Transvaal Institute of 
Accountants and Auditors; the alternative was a multitude of methods “seemingly 
designed to conceal rather than reveal the financial position” (Vent and Milne, 1989: 
60). Obfuscation was also prevalent in South Africa where the cost of sinking mine 
shafts was often capitalised, but the size and regularity of an annual amortisation charge 
to the income statement was erratic and dependent upon profit for the year and the need 
to pay dividends (Vent and Milne, 1989: 61). Rates fluctuated between 5–25%. In an 
attempt to exert some uniformity of calculation in a chaotic situation, South African 
mines registered in London were obliged by their auditors to charge depreciation (1989: 
66). 
 
While the late 19th Century may have seemed the nadir in terms of reliable mine 
accounting, the “cowboy” days of the mining industry in the period 1867–97 were 
ending. In 1897, the Transvaal Institute of Accountants and Auditors began actively 
promoting the idea of a widely accepted uniform system of mine accounting (Vent and 
Milne, 1989: 61). It achieved limited success but contributed to the culture of change 
fundamentally that altered the mining industry in the period 1880–1920. Some of the 
changes included single property companies being taken over by larger multi-property 
organisations; increased technological expertise in finding and extracting ore; and the 
replacement of the “old school” learn-on-the-job miners with tertiary educated mining 
engineers. These new men had a greater sense of the need for proper accounting and 
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uniform procedures to produce the accurate financial statements demanded by 
shareholders. 
 
Although a form of international standardisation was a long way in the future, the 
process created positive spin-offs in that accounting issues were openly discussed. For 
example, JH Pim – later to give evidence before the South African Select Committee of 
1924 – gave a lecture in London in 1898 to the Chartered Accountants Student Society. 
In it, he espoused the capitalisation of property acquisition and preproduction costs but 
not their amortisation. The rationale behind this was that the mine was a single asset 
whose cost was unknown until it was exhausted. Property costs thus needed to be 
deferred until that point had been reached. The effect would have been to increase 
profit without allowing for a proper accounting for costs. Similarly a proposal was 
made to use secret revenue reserves to smooth income over several accounting periods. 
This was clearly manipulation of financial information to own advantage. 
 
In 1910, the Union of South Africa was principally a non-industrialised country, 
heavily reliant on mining and with unsophisticated agricultural practices (Hobart 
Houghton and Dagut, Vol. 2, 1972: 3). It needed to develop the necessary 
communication infrastructure to underpin its future economic progress. But political 
Union also meant a potential for a unified and reorganised railway system linking 
internal markets to ports and the abolition of internal customs barriers. It also meant 
greater administrative economies and support for agriculture in the form of legislation 
to control animal diseases, irrigation schemes and water rights, all of which culminated 
in the creation in 1912 of a centralised Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa 
(Hobart Houghton and Dagut, Vol. 2, 1973: 4). 
 
The 1911 census results published in July of that year listed the assets of the new Union 
from people to ploughs. Of significance for the future, the census listed a “European or 
White Race” total of 1 278 025 people, a decrease of 0.14% on preliminary figures, 
while people “other than Europeans or White” amounted to 4 697 152 or an increase of 
0.36% on first totals (Census 1911: Part 1, x). 
 
The period 1910–3 was one of moderate economic progress for the fledgling Union. In 
1913, for the first time, Union revenue receipts exceeded expenditure (Union Statistics, 
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1960: Q2) while the Government’s share of the profits in South African diamond mines 
peaked at £476 856 (De Kock, 1922: 105) shortly before the outbreak of World War I 
in 1914. 
 
THE ACCOUNTANTS: 1910 
Much of the modern history of South African accounting is recorded in Chapter 1 of the 
Report of the Accountancy Profession Commission of 1934 (UG49, 1935) as well as in 
the verbatim minutes of the South African House of Assembly in 1913. 
 
This history shows a profession expanding rapidly in response to increased economic 
activity flowing from gold mining activities in the Transvaal. This initial expansion was 
driven by expatriate British accountants, many of them members of the Royal 
Chartered Societies (SC3, 1913: Q4157) created in the latter half of the 19th Century. 
 
The formation of accounting societies and associations in the United Kingdom thus had 
an impact in the colonies. A plethora of societies was formed in the United Kingdom in 
response to the opportunities offered by expanding industrialisation and trade. For 
example, in 1885, the Society of Incorporated Accountants and Auditors was 
established at the metropolitan centre. It received no royal charter and instead sought 
the ordinary protection of the law through incorporation. Its foundation was important 
as the Society soon formed branches in the British colonies. In 1896, it created a South 
African Committee in the Cape Colony. The purpose of this body was threefold – to 
protect its members’ interests, to advise its London office “on all matters connected 
with accountancy in South Africa” and to run a system of intermediate and final 
examinations – one set of papers dealing with British law for candidates intending to 
practise in Britain and the other set dealing with South African law (SC3, 1913: Q13) 
for South African candidates. It also sought to increase its membership and hence its 
influence. The quality of its membership was, however, suspect. Before the 1913 Select 
Committee, one interviewer alleged it included “men who [had] never been out of the 
liquor shops in the Transvaal” (SC3 1913: Q2756). 
 
Before this initiative of 1896, no organised group of accountants existed in the Cape. In 
Natal in 1895, a voluntary Institute of Accountants had been established, while in 1894 
a voluntary Institute of Accountants and Auditors had been formed in the South African 
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Republic. The Transvaal Volksraad had approved a charter for it in 1899, just before 
the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War. Shortly after the cessation of hostilities in 1902, a 
branch of the Society of Incorporated Accountants was formed in the Transvaal (UG49, 
1935: 6). It was followed in 1903 by the establishment in the Transvaal of the Institute 
of Chartered Accountants in South Africa, its founding members being English and 
Scottish Chartered Accountants practising as such in the Transvaal. 
 
THE TRANSVAAL ORDINANCE OF 1904 
A further step was taken in 1904 when the Institute of Chartered Accountants in South 
Africa joined with the South African Institute of Accountants and Auditors to promote 
legislation to regulate accountants in the Transvaal. The result was Ordinance No. 3 
(Private) of 1904, a short, uncomplicated document of 10 pages and 22 sections headed, 
“To provide for the Registration of Accountants in the Transvaal”. It had the support of 
Milner’s Administration which was keen to get the Transvaal working again. 
 
This legislation created the Transvaal Society of Accountants (Ord. Tvl, 3/1904: xi) and 
also prohibited people from describing themselves in the Transvaal as “accountants” or 
“public accountants and auditors” unless registered in terms of the Ordinance. All other 
Societies in the Transvaal needed to have their members registered but for some – like 
the Scottish and English Chartered Accountants – this was little more than formality 
(Ord. Tvl, 3/1904: xiii). At least three members of the 12-member Provisional Council 
established to oversee the registration process were British chartered accountants. They 
founded accounting firms in South Africa and practised for many years before being 
amalgamated into other firms. The members were Alex Aiken, John Gordon Carter and 
Howard Pim and the firms they founded were Alex, Aiken and Carter, and Pim Goldby, 
the former remaining in existence until the 1980s when it lost its separate identity upon 
amalgamation with KPMG. 
 
The new Society in the Transvaal admitted all public accountants then in genuine 
practice in the Transvaal, regardless of whether or not they could claim to be formally 
qualified. Public practice and residence in the Transvaal were the prime determinants of 
admission. These were also key elements in the New Zealand Act of 1908 which dealt 
with the registration of accountants. It is possible there was a cross pollination of ideas 
with South Africans as many New Zealanders saw service in the Anglo-Boer War. 
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The Society was empowered to formulate by-laws, to conduct examinations and to 
allow for the regulation of admission to the Society’s register (Ord. Tvl, 3/1904: xiv). 
The Ordinance included a number of provisions that were later to be included in the 
Registration of Accountants (Private) Bill of 1913. These included the creation of a 
provisional council to oversee the initial registration of those entitled to be registered 
and then, six months after the passage of the enactment, to pass its authority on to an 
elected permanent council of 12 members. The Ordinance also contained a list of nine 
offences which, if members were found guilty of transgressing any one of them by the 
Supreme Court, would merit suspension or complete removal from the register. The 
Transvaal Society created no internal disciplinary process, preferring matters to be dealt 
with in open court – and possibly saving upon the costs of an internal hearing. Many of 
the offences had longevity, appearing in modern codes of professional conduct, but two 
deserve special notice for their obvious significance in 1913 and their continual 
significance in 2013 – paying commission or “other consideration” (Ord. Tvl, 3/1904: 
xv) to bring in work, and secondly, performing any work connected with a dispute or 
litigation on condition that payment for such work is subject to the successful resolution 
of the dispute or litigation. Both have the effect of limiting the professional’s 
independence by introducing a strong element of self-interest. 
 
Those registered in terms of the Ordinance were each entitled to be called “Registered 
Public Accountant (Transvaal)”. 
 
THE ACCOUNTANTS’ REGISTRATION (PRIVATE) BILL, 1913 
The Accountants’ Registration (Private) Bill, 1913, was also known in the draft 
legislation as the “Private Bill to Provide for the Registration of Accountants in the 
Union”. It was based on the Transvaal Ordinance No. 3 (Private) of 1904 but was a 
more sophisticated piece of legislation in a number of ways. For example, it contained 
an extensive list of objects (1913: 3) which empowered the proposed society to perform 
a wide variety of tasks in support of the profession and ranged from conducting entry 
examinations into the Society, to acquiring such movable and immovable property as 
was necessary for the new Society to meet its responsibilities. Both Ordinance and Bill 
(1913: 20) contained an extensive list of offences and both proposed taking delinquent 
members to the relevant provincial Supreme Court, a costly and time consuming 
exercise, especially for the member who lacked the resources of the Society. 
 118 
 
The 1913 Bill also provided for a more complex process in the election of the society’s 
first council in that four district committees – one in each of the provinces – had to be 
elected by residents in the provinces who had also been accepted as members of the 
new Society. A further such election would see the election of a national council (1913: 
11–4). 
 
The complexity is understandable as the Bill envisaged a Union-wide registration of 
accountants. But the difference between Ordinance and Bill is no more clearly 
illustrated than in the list of those eligible for registration upon application – with little 
complication. They were members of the Chartered Accountants Societies of 
Edinburgh, Glasgow and Aberdeen (the Scottish Societies), the Chartered Societies of 
England and Wales, and Ireland, as well as the Society of Incorporated Accountants 
and Auditors. While the Transvaal Ordinance was fairly liberal in its admission to its 
Society, admitting all who were bona fide practising in public as accountants and 
resident in the Transvaal, the Bill excluded those who, at the time of its anticipated 
passage, were working in some accounting role in Natal and the Transvaal but were not 
members of those provinces’ statute-established societies. The argument in support of 
this exclusion was that if the individuals concerned were not eligible for admission at 
the provincial society level, they could not expect admission to the proposed national 
body. 
 
There were other good reasons for this. The Transvaal experience of an “open door” 
was not all positive as many “accountants” were admitted but their knowledge and 
experience were not equal to those of their chartered colleagues. This created tensions 
for both the Transvaal Society and its clients. Samuel Thomson, a former President of 
the Transvaal Society, admitted before the Select Committee: “I have heard it 
frequently expressed amongst business men that the Provisional Council exercised their 
powers in too lenient a manner altogether – that we admitted too many” (SC3, 1913: 
Q1668). While not stated specifically, the implication is that the Council let in too 
many unqualified people. This was the New Zealand experience as well and is 
discussed later in this Chapter. 
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THE CAPE SOCIETY OF ACCOUNTANTS, 1907, AND THE SOCIETY OF 
ACCOUNTANTS AND AUDITORS IN THE ORANGE FREE STATE, 1907 
Encouraged by their colleagues’ success in the Transvaal, accountants in 1906 in the 
Cape introduced into the legislature a Bill to provide for the registration of accountants 
there. The initiative miscarried as it failed to secure a majority consensus as to whether 
membership should be voluntary or compulsory. Instead, in 1907, the Cape Society of 
Accountants was established with voluntary membership. In that year, too, another 
voluntary membership body, calling itself the Society of Accountants and Auditors, 
was established in the Orange Free State. 
 
THE NATAL ACT, 1909 
The next significant event was the passage through the Legislative Council and 
Assembly of Natal in 1909 of an “Act to provide for the registration of Accountants in 
Natal” or simply the “Accountants Act, 1909” (NGG, December 1909: No. 1228). The 
Act was based closely on the Transvaal Ordinance to the extent that members were 
even entitled to call themselves “Registered Public Accountants (Natal)”. 
 
The timing of the Natal Act is suggestive as it was one of the last enactments of its 
Legislative Council before Union. Its status as an Act is also suggestive of a calculated 
attempt to garner a commercial advantage for Natal, the smallest province to enter the 
Union. That Natal sought a competitive edge over its larger neighbours had led it to a 
fractious referendum which had nevertheless supported Union. In return, and under the 
railway dispensation, Natal was given 30% of the Rand rail traffic; Lourenço Marques 
received 50–5% and the remaining 15–20% went to the Cape Ports (Walker, 1957: 
535). 
 
At the time of the political union of the four provinces of the Cape, the Orange Free 
State, the Transvaal and Natal in 1910, the latter two had legislation in place which 
made it compulsory for public accountants in practice to register with their respective 
provincial societies, being either the Transvaal Society of Accountants or the Natal 
Society of Accountants. In the Cape and the Orange Free State, anyone, in theory, 
could practise as an accountant as there were no formal restrictions upon such practices. 
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The South Africa Act of 1909 recognised earlier legislation as being binding upon 
future Union activities or until such time as the Union Parliament amended or abolished 
it. But it was clear that to amend existing rights would not be done easily or quickly. 
This fact was to give both the Transvaal and Natal Societies considerable power in the 
process of unifying the accounting profession, and often the use of that power appeared 
narrow, parochial and detrimental to the national process. 
 
THE NEW ZEALAND SOCIETY OF ACCOUNTANTS ACT, 1908 
As in South Africa, the initiative to achieve statutory regulation of the profession in 
New Zealand came from local societies. In New Zealand’s case, the Incorporated 
Institute of Accountants of New Zealand (IIANZ) formed in May 1894 and the New 
Zealand Accountants’ and Auditors’ Association (NZAAA) was established in 1898. 
One reason for this registration was “the need for better auditing to protect investors in 
companies springing up throughout the land” (Graham, 1960: 13). 
 
The Act was a short document of less than 10 pages comprising 35 sections. Among the 
purposes listed for the creation of the new Society were items similar to those detailed 
in the South African Bill of 1913 – such as the control and regulation of the 
accountancy profession and the training, education and examination of aspirant 
accountants. This similarity was not accidental as it is probable the New Zealand Act 
had influenced the content of the South African Bill as had the Natal Act and Transvaal 
Ordinance. There are four years between the two pieces. A New Zealand inclusion 
absent from the South African Bill was the “pecuniary and other assistance” (NZ Act 
211, 1908: 2(e)) available to members and their families in times of hardship and death 
(NZ Act 211, 1908: 3(2)(g)). 
 
As with the South African Bill, the nub of the New Zealand document was the first-
time registration of accountants, the associated work and decision-making being 
handled by a provisional body – the Registration Board – before being replaced by a 
permanent Council. The Registration Board comprised Government officials – ex 
officio the Auditor-General, the Commissioner of Taxes (NZ Act 211, 1908: 6), the 
Insurance Commissioner, the Secretary to the Treasury and the Solicitor-General. The 
1913 Bill had a Board which comprised much the same officials, ex officio. 
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Membership to the new Society was open to all current and future members of the two 
initiating Societies, the IIANZ and the NZAAA. In addition, any member of any similar 
accounting organisation in the British Empire recognised as being of “adequate 
standing” was entitled to registration. Again, entitlement was extended to accountants 
who for three continuous years had been engaged in an accounting business in New 
Zealand for their own account or in accounting employment – providing the Board was 
satisfied as to their proficiency as an accountant. It was left to the Board to determine 
how proficiency was to be measured. 
 
The New Zealand Act, as implemented by its Board, appeared relaxed in its admission 
practices, allowing, for example, accountants in current employment, a three-month 
interval in the three continuous years requirement, presumably to take into 
consideration periods between employment (NZ Act 211, 1908: 7(d)). In addition, 
Paragraph 8 of the Act restricted membership to those over 21, of good character and 
reputation and not involved in any business “inconsistent with the integrity of the 
profession of accountancy”. It was left to the Board to define “inconsistent”. The net 
effect of the New Zealand Act was that poorly qualified individuals with less than three 
years’ practical experience, actually qualified for admission to the Institute. 
 
As a result, 2327 applications were received by the Board in early 1909 and 2116 were 
approved, this at a time when New Zealand’s population was less than one million. The 
South African population was at the time 5.9 million of whom 1.2 million were White 
(Census 1911, Part 1: (n)). As to why so many unqualified people applied, Graham 
(1960: 26) speculates that they saw the possibility of personal advancement in a new 
Society which both restricted and enforced practising rights. The loss of many members 
post implementation is an indication of how flawed this thinking was on the part of 
these aspirant accountants and, possibly, the stern reality of the economic environment. 
 
A further 23 people were admitted by an amendment to the Act in 1910. Of the 
successful applicants, only 11% were qualified by examination, and by 1912 almost 
300 members had surrendered that membership as a result of the non-payment of 
subscriptions. It was only in 1924 that the number of examination-qualified members 
exceeded the number of non-examination qualified members and only in the early 
1930s that the membership “bubble” of 1909 had worked itself out. The final reward of 
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the process was a unified, recognised and professional body of accountants (Graham, 
1960: 25–8), a goal which eluded South Africa until 1951. Of significance are two 
facts, these being that the New Zealand Act granted no  
 
 accounting monopoly to the new Society; nor any 
 power over non-members with the exception that they were prohibited from using 
the phrases “public” or “registered” accountant or any abbreviations thereof 
(Graham, 1960: 23). 
 
The New Zealand Act was unlike the South African Bill in two further respects:  
 
 it contained no list or partial list of offences, leaving these to be dealt with through 
by-laws; 
 it directed that any offence “be dealt with summarily” (Act 211, 1908: 35). This 
was in stark contrast to the lengthy process through the Supreme Court envisaged 
by the South African Bill. 
 
CRITICISM OF THE NEW ZEALAND ACT 
The admission of so many unexamined and thus potentially unqualified people into a 
professional accounting organisation drew criticism from witnesses before the 1913 
South African Select Committee on the Accountants’ Registration (Private) Bill. It was 
pointed out that the New Zealand enactment had been a New Zealand Government 
initiative carried by a party majority and that “hundreds” of applicants admitted by the 
Registration Board had been removed subsequently “on account of ignorance alone” 
(SC3, 1913: Q185). The journal of the profession in England, The Accountant, 
lamented the fact that in the process, no rights were granted or privileges conferred that 
were greater than those already enjoyed. 
 
This point of view was reinforced by reference to the ninth annual meeting of the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales in October 1907 where the 
benefit of being a chartered accountant was likened as unity with other like-minded 
individuals and the strength, prestige and profit which arose as a result (SC3, 1913: 
Q557). 
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Therein lay the difference between the South African and New Zealand approaches. 
The South African promoting societies were private bodies seeking personal privilege 
and requiring Parliament to recognise the profession and “compel members” to join the 
new society (SC3, 1913, Minutes: Q633) so that they could be controlled (SC3, 1913: 
Q2858). 
 
But they also sought to raise the status (SC3, 1913: Q2896) of the profession in 
response to the growing practice among the “mercantile community” in Cape Town and 
on the Rand “of employing qualified men to audit the books of the mercantile people” 
(SC3, 1913: Q1020). A sophisticated use of commercial legislation saw firms floating 
themselves as companies with a concomitant increase in audit work and need (SC3, 
1913: Q2955). 
 
In the period 1911–3, the idea of a single unified society of accountants in South Africa 
gathered ground for a number of reasons, not the least of which was the inequality felt 
by Cape and Orange Free State accountants who could not practise their profession in 
the regulated environments of Natal and the Transvaal. Their Natal and Transvaal 
counterparts could, however, practise in the Cape and Orange Free State (SC3, 1913: 
Q1288). 
 
Another important reason for the desire to control the profession was the undoubted 
perception that the economy would grow and increasingly would require the services of 
accountants and auditors. A unified profession would also enhance its public status and, 
besides registration, appeared to be an empire-wide imperative. Keeping abreast of 
colonies like New Zealand and its exports of mutton and wool, the same type of 
commodities produced by a largely agrarian South Africa, was important. The sixth 
Annual Statement of Trade and Shipping, 1911, listed the export of 132 million pounds 
of wool worth nearly £4 million (Statement, 1911, No. 4: Con 65). This was a 
significant amount in comparison, for example, to the war debt of £38 million. 
 
The Grocott’s Penny Mail of 9 January 1924 quoted from the Commonwealth 
Statistician’s report for 1922 that the aggregate value for all recorded industries in 
Australia amounted to £346 662 000 or an average of £62 18s 3d per head of 
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population. With reference to Union Statistics for Fifty Years, 1910–1960, South Africa 
reflected 
 a total population of 6 927 403 on 3 May 1921 (1960: A3); and 
 a national income of £218 300 000 for 1921 (1960: s3). 
 
Using these two figures, a rough estimate of £31 per capita per annum can be 
calculated. This difference with the Australian figure reveals the significant economic 
gulf that existed between South Africa and at least one of its brother dominions in the 
1920s. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This Chapter has sought to indicate the major “players” in the game. It has also 
introduced a summary analysis of what was happening to the profession in New 
Zealand. This is important as New Zealand had both significant similarities and 
important differences to South Africa. Amongst the similarities, we can list common 
dominion status under the British crown, a White colonial population imposed on 
indigenous peoples, and a need for economic development. Amongst the differences 
were the facts that South Africa had been involved in a recent major internal conflict 
which had embittered the Afrikaners and made them both intractable and sensitive as to 
their own worth. Other differences included a large indigenous population which was 
generally ignored and marginalised. Great mineral wealth was to be had from the 
Transvaal Witwatersrand, but at tremendous cost, capital investment and population 
displacement through the use of migrant labour. South Africa also had two powerful 
accounting bodies established by law pre-Union. While New Zealand was sufficiently 
unified to create a unified accounting profession within a short period of time, the 
differences outlined above put a brake on the profession in South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE REGISTRATION OF ACCOUNTANTS 
(PRIVATE) BILL OF 1913: THE FIRST FAILURE 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
While it is unlikely that many people in South Africa in 1913 anticipated a war on the 
scale that broke out in 1914, the war impacted upon the South African economy in a 
number of ways. The railways, for example, achieved an unexpected and early surplus 
on the re-coaling of shipping diverted from the Suez Canal to the route around the 
Cape. The absence of foreign competition resulting from the preoccupation of the Great 
Powers with the war in Europe led to the establishment of secondary industries like the 
manufacture of textiles, leather wares and furniture (Feinstein, 2007: 115). The danger 
of submarines sinking shipping during the Great War restricted imports to South Africa 
and gave a degree of protection to South African industries (Hobart Houghton and 
Dagut, Vol. 2, 1972: 4) which resulted in their rapid development. The gross value of 
industrial output increased from £17 million in 1911, to £40 million in 1915–6 and £98 
million in 1920–1, and the number of industrial concerns expanded from 2 500 in 1911 
to 7 000 in 1920 while the number of employees rose from 66 000 to 180 000 (De 
Kock, 1936: 74). Accountants and bookkeepers would have been included in that 
number. 
 
The growth was so great that, in 1917, the Government performed a census of industrial 
activity followed, in 1918, by a similar census of agricultural production (Benians et 
al., 1963: 760). 
 
The negative effects of the conflict on the South African economy were principally 
concerned with the decline in necessary imported goods, such as railway rolling stock, 
and a growing realisation of the fact that the South African manufacturing sector was 
small, light and heavily dependent upon the mining sector, and thus facing an uncertain 
future. 
 
Overall, Parliament managed the financial aspects of South Africa’s involvement in the 
war reasonably well. In 1914, the main sources of revenue available to the Union 
Government came from customs duties, mining and income taxes. In anticipation of a 
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war deficit, the Government instituted increases on customs dues, placed a levy on gold 
mining profits, increased taxes on diamonds, reduced income tax exemptions and 
raided the frozen bewaarplaatsen funds, these being fees paid to Government by 
mining companies to mine the land beneath the early dumps. Other extraordinary 
revenue sources were the sale of large amounts of wool for uniforms and coal to fuel 
the increased number of warships and merchantmen calling at South African ports. The 
Government managed to create a regular surplus on its current account by crediting it 
with all special levies raised and charging the full cost of its participation in the war to a 
loan account (Walker, 1957: 571). When it came time to “pay the piper” the conflict 
had cost the Union in excess of £38 million of which a staggering 85% represented loan 
funds (Benians et al., 1963: 759). 
 
Overall, the Great War and its immediate economic consequences had little impact 
upon the drive to create a unified society of accountants other than to mourn the 
inevitable casualties from amongst the profession’s ranks. But the beginnings of 
industrial diversification that the War encouraged, also encouraged greater state 
intervention in the economy where it had two imperatives – White employment and a 
steady revenue stream from the gold mines (Yudelman, 1983: 38–9). 
 
The Registration of Accountants (Private) Bill of 1913 was influenced both by the 
English Society of Incorporated Accountants and Auditors, and the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants, England both of whom had established close links with what 
became known as the four Provincial Societies. 
 
These two English societies were representative of many whose members were to be 
found in South Africa in 1913. The reasons for the plethora of English societies 
competing for a place in the emerging profession in the Union were threefold – the 
work opportunities generated by the mines, the professional saturation of the available 
opportunities in the United Kingdom and the dominance there of the chartered 
societies. This was the evidence (SC3, 1913: Q4157) of John Andrew who represented 
the English Central Association of Accountants of London and who was one of the two 
petitioners in opposition to the Bill (SC3, 1913: v), the other being one William Hay, a 
member of the Scottish Corporation of Accountants of Glasgow (SC3, 1913: Q3347). A 
point to note is that an opponent could be a member of one accountants association yet 
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represent another before the Committee. This can complicate understanding. By 
contrast, the only society not South African in origin and listed as a petitioner for the 
Bill was the English Society of Incorporated Accountants and Auditors. The other four 
petitioners in support of the Bill were the four Provincial Societies (SC3, 1913, 
Appendix A: i). Thus, while the Bill was ostensibly South African in origin, selected 
United Kingdom societies – such as the chartered societies – would have benefitted 
from its passage. The benefit would accrue from the recognition by Parliament of a 
restricted, professional elite. It would also cut out much dubious registration in the 
Cape and Orange Free State. As in the mining sector, so too in the accounting 
profession, the idea of foreign control was an unpopular one. 
 
In giving evidence before the Select Committee on 13 February 1913, Mr Harry 
Gibson, a member of the English Society of Incorporated Accountants and Auditors, 
gave the most recent membership numbers of the Bill’s five promoters as follows:  
 
 Transvaal  540 
 Natal  280 
 Cape  110 
 Orange Free State  30 
 South African Committee of the Incorporated Society  40 
 TOTAL:  1 000 
(SC3, 1913: Q69–78) 
 
From the above, it is obvious that Transvaal and Natal – the societies established by 
statute – were in a dominant position. It is also interesting to note that the Cape Society 
had been incorporated as a limited liability company in terms of the Cape Companies 
Act of 1892 (SC3, 1913: Q4151), and was legally not an association. Clearly its 
founders sought the security of an enforceable commercial legal structure with limited 
liability. 
 
The relationship between “Incorporateds” and “Provincials” over the years was strained 
and uncertain but the “Incorporateds” showed tenacity and their members – 
significantly – in South African branches were accorded membership in terms of the 
1951 Act. 
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Beginning in 1911, these Societies had thrashed out a common understanding and 
agreement which had resulted in the Bill (SC3, 1913: Q49–54). 
 
Gibson stated that the Bill had been discussed by the councils of the promoting 
societies and with their members in general meeting and that there had been no 
opposition to the principles in the Bill, only suggested amendments to particular clauses 
(SC3, 1913: Q79–84). The four Provincial Societies played an important role in 
providing support for the 1913 Bill and clearly there were diverse accounting groups 
jockeying for position in what was perceived as a lucrative market, that of providing 
professional accounting and auditing services – in contemporary parlance, “a turf war”. 
In this highly competitive environment, the Transvaal Society had important 
advantages – its statutory origins, its large membership, the fact that it functioned in the 
gold-rich Transvaal with its many opportunities and, finally, its alliance with key 
accounting societies in each of the other three provinces. In the course of the period 
1913–51, the four Provincial Societies were often accused of attempting to create an 
accounting monopoly, an accusation they strongly denied. But if not a monopoly, then 
at least significant influence in the profession for their own benefit is a reasonable 
conclusion based upon a review of the available parliamentary sources. 
 
THE BILL 
The Private Bill to provide for the registration of accountants in the Union comprised a 
preamble and 40 sections covering 24 pages, 12 each in Dutch and English. The 
Preamble was intended to be an explanation of what was to follow and an aid to 
interpretation of any ambiguities within the Statute. The Preamble is the “key of a 
Statute to open the minds of the makers as to the mischiefs which are to be remedied 
and the objects which are to be accomplished by the provisions of the Statute” 
(Bouvier, John, 1993: 44). 
 
Sections 1 and 2 of the Bill were important in that they abolished the Transvaal and 
Natal enactments and introduced the proposed new society as a body corporate 
intended to register all “accountants”, “public accountants” and “auditors”. Section 3 
listed the Bill’s objects – 13 of them – from keeping a register of accountants to selling 
or leasing the Society’s property. Section 4 declared that only Public Accountants on 
the register would be permitted to practice, while Section 5 listed the penalty for the 
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contravention of that stipulation. Section 6 dealt with the formation of the Provisional 
Council and set the date for the first meeting. Section 7 dealt with quora and the 
authority of the Provisional Council. Section 8 allowed the Provisional Council to 
divide itself into committees. Of great importance in the structure of the Bill was 
Section 9, which defined who was eligible to go on the register and stipulated that 
applications needed to be made within nine months of the passing of the Act. It also 
listed nine Accounting Societies that would be given preferential treatment. Most of 
these Societies were foreign to South Africa. This section of the Bill evoked 
considerable opposition. Section 10 stated that after the expiration of two months from 
the passage of the Bill, the Transvaal and Natal registers would cease to exist. For the 
purposes of registration, Section 11 recognised the four Provinces and their boundaries 
for administrative purposes. Section 12 took this further and stipulated that meetings 
needed to be held in each Province to elect district committees. Section 13 dealt with 
three items: representation, the fixing of district committees and the election of 
chairmen. Section 14 stipulated that the Provisional Council would expire in 12 months 
from the passage of the Act, to be replaced by a full council, whose composition was 
fixed by this section, three each for the Transvaal, Natal, and the Cape and two for the 
Free State. Section 15 instituted a reassessment of representation on district councils at 
the end of five years. Section 16 vested management in the Council with the provision 
of urgent matters without the need for a full Council meeting. Section 17 allowed 
Council to delegate powers to District committees while 18 (again an important 
section) defined who was eligible for admission to the register, subsequent to the elapse 
of 12 months after the passage of the Act. The actual placing of this section was, 
curiously, within considerations of the Council. Section 19 levied a fee of 5 guineas for 
every application to be placed upon the register. Section 20 defined offences under the 
Act and listed 13 of them from styling a firm as Accountants and Auditors without 
being members, to improperly obtaining work. Section 21 empowered Council to 
obtain evidence to assist in an investigation of an alleged offence in terms of Section 
20. Section 22 continued the logic and gave Council the power to deal with offending 
members and to seek judgement from the Supreme Court. Section 23 dealt with the 
non-payment of subscriptions and the removal of a member from the register. Section 
24 allowed such members to resign, but to be readmitted at some future date upon 
payment of all arrears. Members dealt with in Sections 23 and 24 above, were, in terms 
of Section 25, not to have any claim on the Societies’ assets. In terms of Section 26, 
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members were entitled to acquire a designation suitable to indicate their calling. Such 
designation was to be decided upon later. Contravention of this section would be an 
offence attracting a fine of up to £10. Section 27 provided for examinations, while 
Section 28 dealt with annual general meetings. Section 29 detailed the annual report 
needed to disclose the affairs of the society together with audited statements. Section 30 
authorised special general meetings, while Section 31 worked out who would be 
entitled to vote at such meetings. Section 32 set out that which could not be discussed 
in general meetings while Section 33 indicated clearly that by-laws needed to be 
prepared by the Council. Section 34 detailed the process by which by-laws were to be 
effected. Section 35 dealt with the liquidation of the Transvaal and Natal societies and 
the apportionment of their funds. Section 36 was a standard liability limitation while 37 
gave indemnity to the Council and officers of the society. Section 38 listed those 
disqualified from holding office while 39 gave Council indemnity for acts of good 
faith. Section 40 listed the short appellation of the Act as “Accountants’ Registration 
Act 1913”. 
 
The Accountants’ Registration (Private) Bill successfully navigated the initial stages of 
the parliamentary procedure detailed in Appendix 1. The Bill was first read in the 
House of Assembly on 30 January 1913. Again, in accordance with parliamentary 
procedures, as the Bill was approved it was sent to a Select Committee appointed by 
Orders of the House dated 4 and 6 February 1913. The Committee comprised seven 
members – Messrs Krige (Chair), Baxter, Brown, Andrews, Vincent, Henderson and 
Cronje who are detailed in the following table. The uneven number of members on the 
Committee represented normal practice to relieve the Chair of having to use a casting 
vote too often. The proponents of the Bill were represented by three advocates and a 
parliamentary agent while the opponents had retained the services of a single 
parliamentary agent. Both were costly options. 
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TABLE 6.1: 
ACCOUNTANTS’ REGISTRATION (PRIVATE) BILL, 1913: MEMBERSHIP 
OF SELECT COMMITTEE, 12 FEBRUARY – 7 MARCH 1913 
 
 Member Electoral Division Party Affiliation 
1. 
 
Krige, The Hon. CJ 
(Chair) 
Caledon 
 
SAP 
 
2. Baxter, WD Cape Town 
(Gardens) 
Independent 
3. Brown, DM, OBE,  
 
Three Rivers 
 
Independent 
 (SAP from 1921) 
4. Andrews, WH Georgetown Labour 
5. Vincent, AI Riversdale SAP 
6. Henderson, JAS Durban 
(Berea) 
Independent 
(SAP from 1921) 
7. Cronje, Maj. FR Winburg SAP 
Source: SC3, 1913. 
 
THE SELECT COMMITTEE OF 1913 
The information that can be extracted from the Select Committee’s Report to the House 
gives a good idea of the immensity of its task and the nature of its response to the 
House’s Orders. The Committee met on 17 occasions in the period 12 February to 
7 March 1913. With the exception of 5 March, meetings were held on every weekday in 
accordance with the principle that the Committee met continuously until the task at 
hand had been completed. The Committee examined 17 witnesses of limited diversity, 
such as Mr Harry Gibson from Cape Town and an Incorporated Accountant, Mr FE 
Roberts, the Registrar of the Transvaal Society of Accountants, Johannesburg and Mr 
William Hay, Accountant and the Mayor of Sea Point (SC3, 1913, Proceedings: xiii). 
The social stratum to which they belonged was solid professional middle class. Table 
6.2 gives some detail. Later Select Committees and debates in the House would take 
evidence from a wider – but not necessarily inclusive – spectrum of professional 
society. 
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TABLE 6.2: 
DRAMATIS PERSONAE 
SELECT COMMITTEE: ACCOUNTANTS’ REGISTRATION (PRIVATE) 
BILL, 12 FEBRUARY – 7 MARCH 1913 
 
1. Petitioners in opposition to the Bill 
 John Andrew – for himself 
 John Andrew, Accountant and Chartered Secretary, Cape Town, representing 
the Central Association of Accountants (Limited by Guarantee) of London 
 William Hay, Accountant, Cape Town, member of the Scottish Corporation of 
Accountants of Glasgow 
Represented by:  
 Mr Walker of the firm Messrs Walker, Jacobsohn and Le Roux, Parliamentary 
Agents 
 
2. Promoters of the Bill 
 Mr Harry Gibson 
Represented by:  
 Messrs Advocates Close, KC, de Villiers and Roux 
 Mr Hofmeyr of the firm Messrs Bisset and Hofmeyr 
 Blackman, Alfred, Chief Agent of the National Bank of South Africa 
 Andrew, John, Accountant, Cape Town 
 
3. Interviewees 
Forrester, Richard, Accountant, Durban 
Gibson, Harry, Incorporated Accountant, Cape Town, Chairman and Convenor, 
Committee for the Private Bill and presenter to Select Committee 
Hay, William, Accountant and Mayor, Sea Point 
Herbert, Joseph, Merchant, Cape Town 
Herold, Thomas, General Manager and Chairman of the Land and Agricultural 
Bank of South Africa 
Leisk, James, Secretary for Finance and member of the Transvaal Society 
Lowe, James, Secretary, Stutterford and Co., Ltd, Cape Town 
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Maxwell, Robert, Merchant, Cape Town 
Roberts, Frederick, Registrar, Transvaal Society of Accountants, Johannesburg 
Smetham, George, Incorporated Accountant and Chairman of the Society of 
Accountants, Orange Free State 
Snell, Edward, Accountant, General Post Office, Cape Town 
Starkey, George, Secretary of the East London Board of Executors and Trust 
Company, and Incorporated Accountant 
Stevenson, Thomas, Public Accountant and Manager of the South Africa 
Association, Port Elizabeth 
Thomson, Samuel, Chartered Accountant, Johannesburg and twice President of the 
Transvaal Society 
Source: SC3, 1913. 
 
Some 4685 questions were put to the witnesses in the process of examination, cross 
examination and re-examination, and all questions and answers were recorded and 
printed in 501 pages in the Report, together with an eight-page summary of the 
proceedings and two appendices referenced A and B, these comprising the Petitions for 
and against the Bill. 
 
Any study of the Committee’s Report needs to consider the major foci evident in that 
Report. The important foci in the 1951 Act revolve around articles and examination, the 
auditors’ powers and responsibilities and discipline, and are essentially the themes 
developed in a maturing and experienced process concerned with compromise. The 
themes apparent in the 1913 Bill are basically those of a narrow interest group seeking 
out an opportunity for its own benefit. The key elements in the 1913 Bill are thus the 
methods by which the proposers of the Bill sought to achieve those benefits and 
included things like fees to be charged (an unwitting weakness in the Preamble), the 
requirements for membership in the proposed new society and the composition of the 
provisional and final councils. But modified and tempered for fairness, many of the 
1913 provisions were included in the 1951 Act, such as a provisional council to filter 
applications. The 1908 New Zealand Act used a similar but courser filter. It is little 
wonder that the Bill failed in a Parliament concerned with maintaining a balance of 
rights as detailed by Kilpin (1946).  
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However, the Bill’s failure did not lessen the fact that some regulation of the profession 
was necessary. The Transvaal Ordinance of 1904 was followed by the Transvaal 
Companies Act of 1909 and together they sought to regulate key elements of the 
province’s commercial activities. The result was avoidance and many Transvaal 
companies were registered in the less rigorous commercial environment of the Orange 
Free State. It is unlikely the Transvaal accountants were happy with this state of affairs 
and their dissatisfaction probably provided additional impetus to their objective of a 
legally unified profession. By 1926, this cross-border activity encompassed so much 
questionable commercial matter that the Minister of Justice specifically referred to it in 
his presentation of the Companies Bill (later Act) of 1926 together with the intention of 
using the new Act to enforce uniformity (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 25/2/1926: 976). 
 
Further, the 1913 Report is a multi-layered reflection of the currents and cross currents 
that eddied around and through Parliament and South African society at large in the 
immediate post-Union period. For example, on 21 February, Baxter of the Committee 
questioned Mr Samuel Thomson, a Chartered Accountant in Johannesburg and a 
member of the Transvaal Society of Accountants, about the appropriateness of the 
proposed council’s task of judging a man’s character in light of the fact that “there are 
such things as prejudices in this country. There is a prejudice against the coloured man 
for instance”. 
 
Thomson’s response was “the coloured question is one that we do not deal with” (SC3, 
1913: Q1987), an echo of the fact that the Union Convention of 1908–9 had not given 
much thought to the political situation of Blacks, Asians and Coloureds in South Africa. 
Again, when Advocate Close, for the Bill’s promoters, was cross examining Mr 
Andrew, one of the petitioners against the Bill, the matter turned to the fact that 
“overseas men” should not be granted an advantage over South Africans. Close made 
the observation that while this was an obvious principle, it was not always consistent 
with common sense. To this, Andrew responded “if it is consistent with the Englishman 
it is consistent with the Dutchman”. With what is imagined to be a touch of asperity at 
the Anglo-Boer War overtones and the sensitivities they created, Close answered, 
“please keep that out. You know it is unfair to introduce anything like that”. Andrew 
probably feigned innocence and said it was contained in the Bill that “overseas men” in 
terms of Section 9 of the Bill (AB, 1913: 8) would have an advantage. Close retorted “it 
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does not say to the Dutchmen of the country”, to which statement Andrew agreed. 
Close was not to be mollified as he queried further “then how dare you put it in that 
way … At a time like this it is a most improper thing to do”. Andrew, finally admitting 
he had erred, declared “I do not intend to create any feeling. I withdraw that” (SC3, 
1913: Q4400–5). 
 
The key Bill issues that need to be considered in some detail include the following:  
 
 promoters 
 qualifications and the relevant skills of accountants and bookkeepers 
 articles of clerkship and examination 
 registration and subscription fees 
 Sections 9 and 18 
 the “Incorporateds” 
 the Bill’s Preamble 
 New Zealand. 
 
THE PROMOTERS OF THE 1913 BILL 
The promoters of the Private Bill to provide for the Registration of Accountants in the 
Union put much time, effort and money into the Bill. Evidence given to the 1927 Select 
Committee, charged with the consideration of the Designation Bill, suggested the 1913 
Bill had cost the Transvaal Society alone an amount of £2 000 (SC5, 1927: Q269). The 
1913 promoters were represented at the Select Committee by no less than three 
advocates and one parliamentary agent. One of the advocates, Mr Close, was a King’s 
Counsel and would later be elected to the Union Parliament as the Member for 
Rondebosch. In 1924, he would put the case in the House of Assembly for the South 
African Society of Accountants (Private) Bill. While a skilled advocate and debater, it 
was his misfortune to be closely associated with the two failed Bills. After 1924, he was 
no longer to play a public role in this matter. 
 
QUALIFICATIONS 
The issue of “qualification” as an element of membership was very much in the minds 
of the Bill’s promoters. While being examined by Advocate Close on 13 February, 
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Gibson reasoned that unqualified men could, in good faith, cause loss to their 
employers through ignorance or a failure to detect fraud. As detailed earlier in this 
thesis, the detection of fraudulent activities was considered an important audit function 
in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries. The expectation was that a qualified man would 
have the experience and training, as well as the theoretical knowledge derived from 
passing appropriate examinations, to prevent or discover fraudulent activity (SC3, 
1913: Q98–104). In this way, “the protection of the public” (SC3, 1913: Q101) would 
be promoted. While such a distinction was easy to make in the abstract, it was less so in 
practice. 
 
The promoters of the Bill were firm upon a tripos of non-negotiable requirements as the 
framework for the proposed new society – “compulsory registration, compulsory 
qualification and compulsory membership” (SC3, 1913: Q106). But within this 
framework and during the transitional stages after the Bill had been enacted, there was 
probably the intention to protect the “vested rights” of those in some form of public 
accounting practice as well as the intention to ensure that “no man’s living” would be 
taken away from him (SC3, 1913: Q106–7). The reality, of course, was a tension 
between the demands of the framework and vested rights which could not be resolved 
and unqualified men were usually the losers. The Bill’s requirements for registration 
and entry into the proposed new society were restrictive and invariably bookkeepers 
were excluded, as were accountants in the civil and municipal services. The latter were 
to form a large and effective pressure group in 1924 when the House of Assembly was 
considering the South African Society of Accountants (Private) Bill. But, as in 1913, 
the promoting Societies in 1924 were reluctant to concede the point. It became apparent 
that at some stage the Government probably would need to intervene actively in the 
process of registration. 
 
ACCOUNTANT AND BOOKKEEPER: SKILL AND ROUTINE 
[The interplay between interviewee and interviewer in Committee is kept as far as is 
possible to highlight the thrust and direction of the debate and what was being exposed 
in the process.] 
 
When called upon by the Select Committee’s Chair to define the position of 
bookkeeper while giving evidence on 21 February, Samuel Thomson put it thus:  
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“If a man had been at one set of books all his life and at nothing else, he would 
be nothing more than a bookkeeper. He would not have the experience to set up 
as an accountant. He has not the experience” (SC3, 1913: Q2134). 
 
In Thomson’s view, such a person would not transgress the Bill if he called himself 
“accountant to such and such a firm” (SC3, 1913: Q2135). But calling himself a “public 
accountant” would break the proposed new law and, in terms of its Section 5, render the 
offender liable to a fine of £100 for each offence or imprisonment for a period of not 
more than six weeks. Mr Baxter, a member of the Committee suggested that the term 
“accountant” should be defined in the Bill. To this seemingly reasonable query, 
Thomson replied: “I am afraid it is better not defined. It is a little difficult to define … 
It is a mistake to define anything of that kind. If there is any doubt it should be left to 
the Courts to say what it is” (SC3, 1913: Q2137). The reason for reluctance is clear – it 
would not suit the promoters to have too precise a definition of “accountant” as this 
could take membership beyond the control of the promoters. 
 
When being cross examined by Walker on 26 February, James Leisk was similarly 
vague. In an attempt to define “accountant”, Walker produced a dictionary definition of 
“one who keeps, examines or is skilled in accounts”. Leisk declared it to be a “very 
feeble definition” and stated that as the modern accountants’ duties were many and 
varied, it was “a virtual impossibility to define what an accountant is … In fact, there is 
no limit to the duties of an accountant” (SC3, 1913: Q2996). 
 
Walker made another obvious connection – if there was no definition of “accountant” 
or “accountancy” how could a man prove he was practising as an accountant (SC3, 
1913: Q3416–7). 
 
Walker pursued the point by suggesting the inclusion of bookkeepers in a definition of 
accountants would be consistent with the Bill’s Preamble “which proceed[ed] on the 
basis of protecting existing rights” (SC3, 1913: Q3007). This would allow on the 
register the large number of men throughout the Union doing accounting work “such as 
Civil Servants, employees of banks, employees of corporations, municipal and 
commercial and so on, and of private firms” (SC3, 1913: Q2994). 
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Leisk’s response was a simple statement that registration would depend on the 
qualifications of the individuals making application for enrolment – and the fact that if 
a man was a bookkeeper this did not mean that he was an accountant (SC3, 1913: 
Q3004). With Leisk wearing his hat as member of the Transvaal Society instead of the 
Union Government’s Secretary for Finance, compromise was a long way off (SC3, 
1913: Q2873–4). 
 
The participation of a senior Union Treasury official in the Select Committee 
underlines the point made by Verhoef (2011: 23) that the state perforce became 
involved as a result of the need for the auditing of public accounts. Inevitably much of 
this work was contracted out to accountants in practice, with varying results. This is 
evidenced by a complaint brought before members of the Transvaal Society of 
Accountants at their eighteenth Annual General Meeting on 27 February 1923. The 
Chairman stated: “I regret to say our financial position has suffered severely during the 
year and this through no fault of ours”. A loss of £824 5s 10d had been made 
performing work for the Attorney-General (SAAHC, TRA, Minute Book: 73, 8 June 
1922 – 13 July 1926). 
 
The question of who did what for whom was fraught with uncertainty. Heathcote 
(2012: 49) points out that members of the Orange Free State Society of Accountants 
were particularly vocal about the incongruity of civil servants doing tax work for 
private clients and the award of a tender for municipal audit work to a Government 
auditor in his private capacity. This is an important observation given the long held 
view of the Four Societies that private professional auditing, accounting and tax needed 
to be done by qualified practitioners. Only in this way could the interests of the public 
be protected (SC3, 1913: Q153). 
 
ARTICLES OF CLERKSHIP AND EXAMINATIONS 
The promoters of the Bill laid great emphasis on the necessity of qualifications gained 
through examination and, later, in 1924, experience gained through a period of 
apprenticeship known formally as articles of clerkship. This latter requirement appears 
to have been in its infancy in the Union in 1913. When asked by the Chairman of the 
Committee on 20 February as to whether any law in the Transvaal required a period 
under articles for accountants, Thomson stated that they were optional but believed 
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“there may be a chance for articles when the country gets more settled in years to come. 
You may be able to have them in the next generation” (SC3, 1913: Q1893). In 1924, his 
prophecy came true but the completion of articles created another stumbling block in 
the process of professional unification. 
 
Thomson estimated that between 73–5% of those who had passed the final examination 
in the Transvaal had had no practical experience in an accountant’s office. He 
concluded by saying again: “The country is too young to insist upon that yet” (SC3, 
1913: Q1894). Examinations were a different matter and could be insisted upon as a 
measure of an individual’s ability. 
 
Mr Brown of the Committee, at the meeting on 21 February, put it to Thomson, a 
chartered accountant and twice president of the Transvaal Society (SC3, 1913: Q1546), 
that South African examinations were equal to those of societies in the United 
Kingdom. Thomson’s reply was surprising – they were not equal to those of the 
chartered accountants because they did not include courses on actuarial science and 
political economy, and attendance at a university. Thomson’s response is an indication 
of the esteem in which the British accountancy profession was held in South Africa as 
well an indication of his personal pride. Nevertheless, he agreed the Cape and 
Transvaal examinations were good, but the difficulty was that too few people passed 
them (SC3, 1913: Q1958). While interviewing FE Roberts, the Registrar of the 
Transvaal Society of Accountants, Advocate Close, for the Bill’s proponents, suggested 
that the proposed new society would “use its powers to stiffen up the examinations so 
as to squeeze out people and prevent them coming in”. When questioned about the 
Transvaal Society’s poor results in 1910 and 1912, Roberts declared the candidates had 
been a “bad lot”, by which he meant academically weak. The result for the Society’s 
first examination in 1905 had not been much better: in the intermediate phase there had 
been a 50% pass rate while out of 106 candidates for the finals, 41 had passed and 65 
had failed, giving a 61% failure rate (SC3, 1913: Q2209–10). Clearly there were 
academic and other problems which needed to be resolved if the South African 
profession was to match that of its British counterparts. 
 
Another difficulty explored by the Select Committee was that accountants who came 
straight out from the United Kingdom lacked the knowledge of South African law 
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required by practising accountants but were nevertheless allowed to practice. In this, 
Brown of the Committee saw preferential treatment of English, Scottish and Irish 
Chartered Accountants in terms of the Bill when he asked the question: “you are asking 
Parliament to give persons from the Old Country a greater privilege than you are asking 
it to give to the youth of this country?”, Thomson agreed (SC3, 1913: Q1967). 
 
THE OPPONENTS TO THE 1913 BILL 
For their part, the petitioners in opposition to the Bill contented themselves with 
representation by one parliamentary agent, a Mr Hofmeyr of the firm of Messrs Bisset 
and Hofmeyr, Parliamentary Agents. The composition of the Bill’s formal opposition 
was fairly low-key as well and comprised John Andrew, a Cape Town accountant and 
chartered secretary [John Andrew again, but this time representing the Central 
Association of Accountants of London], and one William Hay, another Cape Town 
accountant. As a point of information, John Andrew, an opponent of the Bill, should 
not be confused with Mr Andrews, a member of the Select Committee. 
 
A DEFECT IN THE 1913 BILL’S PREAMBLE 
The strategy of the petitioners in opposition was simple – to show that “the Preamble 
[did] not adequately set forth all the objects or cover the scope of the Bill” (SC3, 1913, 
Proceedings: vi) and thus defeat the Bill on a technical point. To a newly elected 
Parliament of a newly created nation, careful of a need for balance, this was important. 
But behind this simple strategy was a very full petition listing 30 points as to why the 
Bill should not be allowed to stand (SC3, 1913, Appendix B: iii–vii). The points 
included the belief that “the Bill if passed would prevent numbers of deserving and 
qualified persons from earning a livelihood in the only manner open to them.” (SC3, 
1913, Appendix B: v) 
 
A comparison of the 1913 Bill’s Preamble with the actual content of the Bill reveals a 
significant discrepancy. At Section 33(b) of the Bill, the proposed new society was 
given the power to fix “the annual subscription and any other fees payable to the 
society and the times for the payment of same” (AB, 1913: 20). This important power 
was placed in a list of proposed by-laws ranging from the regulation of council 
meetings and controlling the society’s finances to regulating the custody of the 
society’s common seal. In the Preamble, general reference was made to the “making, 
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altering or cancelling of by-laws and regulations to carry out the objects of the Act” 
(AB, 1913: 1). Specific references to “subscriptions” and “fees” due to the society were 
not made in the Preamble but they were clearly important issues and should have been 
dealt with more fully in the Preamble. Undoubtedly this omission was part of the reason 
for the Select Committee’s report that it had “examined the allegations contained in the 
Preamble of the Bill, but the same have not been proved to its satisfaction” (SC3, 1913: 
iii). 
 
The promoters of the 1924 South African Societies Accounting (Private) Bill learnt this 
lesson; in the Preamble to their Bill they made clear reference to “the fixing of an 
annual subscription and other fees payable to the Society” as well as “the payment of a 
registration fee prior to admission of any person to the register” and, in the instance of 
non-payment of these amounts, for their recovery (AB, 1924: 1). However, the 1924 
promoters had also missed the point. The 1913 Bill had failed de facto for two less 
obvious but more important reasons: Parliament was 
 
1. reluctant to recognise and empower a professional body over which it had little 
influence (SC3, 1913: Q1903) (this was ultimately resolved by an annual subsidy); 
2. unwilling to give preferential treatment to one group of accountants to the exclusion 
of another (SC3, 1913: Q2240). A compromise was preferable. 
 
Ironically, the 1924 Bill’s preamble was sent back to the House twice for condonation 
of errors in the Preamble. On both occasions the error was condoned. 
 
REGISTRATION AND SUBSCRIPTION FEES 
The issue of the registration and annual subscription fees proved to be a contentious 
one as the perception was that they were intended to keep people out of the new society 
by being set high. When questioned on 20 February, Mr Samuel Thomson, one-time 
President of the Transvaal Society and a supporter of the Bill, believed the issue could 
be left to the council proposed in the Bill, pointing out that the new society was to be “a 
profit-making one” so that there was “no need to accumulate funds” (SC3, 1913: 
Q1699). The initial registration or entrance fee would be levied to meet the initial 
expenses incumbent in setting up the new society. In the nature of things, there would 
be a lag between incurring the expenditure and generating the income from the 
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membership subscriptions to meet those expenses. It appears the promoters’ actual 
intention was to charge everyone who wished to apply for registration an immediate fee 
of 5 guineas and, presumably at a later date, to those successful candidates, their first 
annual subscription. No mention was made of a refund to unsuccessful candidates. The 
reason for this early payment strategy was that, should the Bill pass, subscription fees 
could only be levied after 12 months had passed (SC3, 1913: Q2624–5). To give some 
idea of the value of 5 guineas: an articled clerk in London in 1923 was paid £1 a month 
in the fifth and final year of his articles (where 1 guinea = £1 1s 0d) (The South African 
Chartered Accountant, Vol. 9, No. 12: 438–9). Again, in 1913 in South Africa – for 
comparative purposes – a pound of beef cost 4s 3d, a pound of tobacco, 1s 3d, and a 
pound of tea, 1s 9d (USA, 1960, Union Statistics: H8–H9). In addition, the weighted 
average monthly house rental was £5 5s 11d (USA, 1960, Union Statistics: H27) – a 
little more than the fee. Thus, 5 guineas represented a sizeable amount of money to an 
ordinary man. 
 
When pushed, Thomson agreed that 5 guineas should be charged as the combined 
registration and annual subscription fee for the first year. He anticipated extraordinary 
expenditure in the new society’s first year or two of existence due to the need to 
advertise its existence, convene meetings of the new council with members throughout 
the Union, thereby incurring travel costs, and the implementation of the society’s 
objectives (SC3, 1913: Q1703–9). The reality was that distances in South Africa were 
greater than in the United Kingdom. When asked his opinion of a proposal to allow 
members practising in clearly defined geographical areas to have their fees set in 
relation to the population density of those areas, Thomson did not support the idea. He 
believed it would be an arbitrary decision to set the areas and “one hundred yards might 
make the difference between say three guineas and one guinea” (SC3, 1913: Q1717).  
 
Apart from the utilitarian purpose of the 5 guineas in meeting costs, Thomson revealed 
other reasons for its quantum when he pointed out: 
 
“If you made it [the new society] purely voluntary and only a small subscription 
was required, no one would join and there would be no one to see that the 
provisions of the Act were carried out, or to have supervision over the members. 
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You defeat the whole object of the Bill if you separate the one [subscription] 
from the other [compulsory membership]” (SC3, 1913: Q1978–80). 
 
Thus, compulsory membership and control were key elements. In this, Thomson was 
supported by RE Forrester, the Secretary to the Natal Society of Accountants, who 
stated the fees would pay for the expenses of creating “a body which, as we claim, will 
perform the double duty of raising the status of the profession and protecting the 
public” (SC3, 1913: Q2663). The last remark was a common claim made by the 
promoters and their witnesses. Thomson, for example, linked the public good with 
“properly trained and qualified men” (SC3, 1913: Q1727). 
 
When asked by Walker, the Parliamentary Agent for the opponents to the Bill, for his 
opinion, James Leisk, Secretary for Finance in the Union Government, stated that he 
believed many would apply for registration and agreed the process would bring “an 
immense sum of money to the coffers of the Council, for which it is giving no value”. 
The last comment is instructive of Leisk’s opinion of the Bill on its 1913 presented 
form. He pointed out that he would also have some difficulty in defending a claim to 
retain the fees paid by applicants in such circumstances (SC3, 1913: Q3022). The fact 
that Leisk was interviewed in his official capacity is significant. While not explicitly 
stated, it is possible that he was the semi-official voice of the Union Government. His 
criticism of the proposed fee was thus important. 
 
When William Hay, the Mayor of Sea Point and a petitioner against the Bill, was asked 
his opinion with regard “to this subscription” he declared bluntly “they want too much 
money” (SC3, 1913: Q3656). He did not, however, believe in the efficacy of a 
subscription calculated at 1% of the member’s earnings (as declared by them) (SC3, 
1913: Q3659) and stated the annual subscription should be “one guinea” (SC3, 1913: 
Q3664). 
 
The common agreement was thus that the fee of 5 guineas – however split between 
registration and subscription – was too much. 
 
The issues of subscription and registration fees were, understandably, closely linked to 
the issue of membership. This was clearly illustrated by the evidence given by one 
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EW Snell, a civil servant in the “accountancy branch” and a licentiate of the Central 
Association of Accountants, “the third largest in the United Kingdom” (SC3, 1913: 
Q3859) and with a membership of 14 in South Africa. The Association was one of the 
petitioners against the Bill (SC3, 1913: Q3856–8). When questioned by Walker, Snell 
admitted that his perception of the Bill was that it was inimical to his rights. He was not 
an accountant in terms of the Bill as he had neither passed the final examination nor 
was he practising as an accountant (SC3, 1913: Q3870) and he similarly failed to meet 
the terms of Section 9(5) of the Bill which could allow admission to people “by virtue 
of their knowledge and past experience in the business of an accountant” (AB, 1913: 
20). But Snell was employed as a Government accountant and, together with his 
colleagues in the service of municipalities and the railway administration, formed an 
important pressure group. This would be important in 1924 when a second Bill came 
before a House with a significant Labour membership component as a result of the 
Nationalist-Labour Pact of 1924. 
 
Snell recounted how he had contacted the secretary to one of the Bill’s promoters, a 
Mr Douglas of the Cape Society of Accountants and Auditors, and asked whether the 
new society would be obliged “to admit men of very limited experience” to which 
Douglas had replied “yes, but then, of course, the subscription will probably force them 
out in time” (SC3, 1913: Q3876). While Snell admitted that Douglas may have not used 
those exact words, the effect was along the lines “that the subscription would freeze 
them out or get them out somehow” (SC3, 1913: Q3876). Walker was the questioner at 
this point and noted that Snell was part of a large body of men who would be affected 
adversely by the Bill if it passed. 
 
In his cross examination of Snell, Advocate Close for the proponents, put it to him that 
Douglas had not shown any intention that the subscription would be used to “force 
anybody out” (SC3, 1913: Q3941) merely that some prospective members would 
choose not to pay and therefore forfeit a potential membership. It was a moot point 
which Snell refused to concede, merely stating “I cannot say what was at the back of 
Mr Douglas’ head when he made the statement. He ought to be able to tell you” (SC3, 
1913: Q3948). 
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The adversarial tone of this exchange between witness and counsel is an indication of 
the hard legal game undertaken by both counsel for the promoters of the Bill and their 
opponent, Mr Walker, the Parliamentary Agent. Walker had in fact signalled this 
intention on the second day of proceedings – 13 February 1913 – when he took 
exception to the petition of the Bill on the grounds that the main signatory’s signature 
had not technically been witnessed in the correct jurisdiction (SC3, 1913, Proceedings: 
viii). The result was that the Committee was adjourned until the following morning so 
that the matter could be considered. When the Committee met on 14 February, the 
Chair – Krige – acknowledged the correctness of Walker’s objection “from a strictly 
legal point of view” as well as the fact that because the matter had been raised in 
Committee, it would need to be resolved in Committee. He suggested both parties agree 
to amend the petition appropriately (SC3, 1913, Proceedings: vii). Agreement was 
found and the proceedings continued. In such a competitive environment, mistakes 
were costly as the faulty Preamble was to show. 
 
MEMBERSHIP OF THE NEW SOCIETY 
 
SECTIONS 9 AND 18: THE TOOLS OF EXCLUSION 
Membership of the new society was also a divisive issue. The Bill allowed for the 
establishment of a body corporate entitled the “South African Society of Accountants” 
but it was far from inclusive of all accounting societies in South Africa. In terms of 
Section 9 of the Bill (AB, 1913: 8), individuals could, in writing, with the prescribed 
fees and within nine months of the promulgation of the Bill, make application to a 
provisional council for enrolment as public accountants and auditors and membership 
of the society. Further, this enrolment was subject to five provisos and applicants 
needed to satisfy the provisional council that they were met appropriately. Variations 
on these provisos were to be found in all attempts to legislate for the profession, 
including the 1951 Act. The provisos were listed in Section 9(3) of the Bill and were as 
follows:  
 
1. membership of one of the four Provincial Societies; or 
 
2. success in the final examination of any of the four Provincial Societies at the 
date of the Bill’s promulgation; or 
 147 
 
3. residence in South Africa and membership of one of a select list of mainly 
foreign societies. This list included the royally chartered British accounting 
bodies: the three Scottish Societies of Edinburgh, Glasgow and Aberdeen, as 
well as the Institutes in England and Wales, and in Ireland. In addition, the 
Incorporated Institutes of Accountants in South Australia and Victoria were on 
the list as was the Institute of Accountants in Natal and the Society of 
Incorporated Accountants and Auditors (1885). While none of the last four were 
chartered societies, it is apparent that the promoters of the Bill believed a 
charter indicated a quality of service and expertise beyond that provided by a 
non-chartered society (see for example SC3, 1913: Q2730, Forrester before the 
Committee). Increasingly in the period 1913–27, this would be public opinion 
as well and would prove to be an important aspect in the passage through the 
Union Parliament of the Chartered Accountants’ Designation Bill of 1927. Also 
worthy of note is the fact that of the nine accounting organisations listed in 
Section 9(3) of the Bill, only one was of direct South African origin. This was 
an important mistake in the light of Hertzog’s self-deterministic 1912 speeches 
and the growing idea of “South Africa First” (Davenport, 1987: 235). 
 
Why the Bill specifically allowed entrance from the Institute of Accountants in 
Natal when the Act of 1909 required compulsory membership in Natal is 
unclear. However, the treatment given to the societies listed in the third proviso 
above suggested preferential treatment of selected groups and attracted criticism 
and censure. No such list appeared in the 1924 Bill; 
 
4. persons who, at the date of the Bill’s promulgation, were bona fide practising 
accountants and had lived in the Cape Province or the Orange Free State 
continuously for not less than six months; or 
 
5. residents of the Cape and Orange Free State who, at the date of the 
promulgation of the Bill were considered by the Provisional Council “fit and 
proper persons to be admitted to the register by virtue of their knowledge and 
past experiences in the business of an accountant” (AB, 1913: 10). 
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Three issues need to be clearly explained at this point. Firstly, the exemptions available 
in terms of provisos 4 and 5 above were only available to accountants in the Cape 
Province and the Orange Free State. Those resident in Natal and the Transvaal and who 
were not members of either of the Societies established by statute in those two 
provinces, were excluded by the Bill and would have no chance of an initial 
acceptance. The argument was that they should either have attained membership in 
terms of the founding legislation or qualified subsequently in terms of the statute law in 
Natal and the Transvaal. Such persons would de novo need to write and pass 
examinations in terms of Section 3(b) of the Bill as well as complete the necessary 
period of tutelage in terms of articles of clerkship. These requirements encouraged 
determined opposition to the Bill, particularly as people were originally allowed into 
the fledgling Transvaal Society in 1904 without examination (SC3, 1913: Q1818). 
Since its founding in 1904, the Transvaal Society had matured to the point that by 1913 
admission to it was strictly by examination (see, for example SC3, 1913: Q1934 
(Thomson before the Select Committee)). 
 
The second point of importance was the composition of the proposed provisional 
council (mentioned in proviso 5). In terms of Section 6 of the Bill, the council was to 
comprise 11 persons. The Transvaal, Natal and Cape Provincial Societies were each to 
appoint three members while that of the Orange Free State would appoint two. The 
statutory Societies had thus a potential clear majority in the affairs of the provisional 
council and could either accept or reject applicants on the basis of their being “fit and 
proper”. 
 
The third issue was the preferential treatment of the foreign societies listed in the Bill. 
 
Advocate Close examined Samuel Thomson on 19 February and again on 20 February. 
Thomson was a man of some importance, having served twice as the President of the 
Transvaal Society of Accountants as well as being on its Provisional Council in 1904 
where he assisted with the first registration of people permitted to join that new society. 
He was of the opinion that the Transvaal Ordinance of 1904 had worked well and raised 
the long-term standard of the profession in that province (SC3, 1913: Q1599–1600). 
When Close drew his attention to the list of acceptable foreign societies in Section 9(3) 
of the 1913 Bill, Thomson pointed out that in the negotiations that led to the Private 
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Bill of 1913, both the Transvaal and Natal delegates had believed it important that the 
societies listed in Section 9(3) be retained “so as to preserve any rights which those 
bodies had under the Transvaal and Natal Acts” (SC3, 1913: Q1628). Obviously there 
were reciprocal arrangements in place between the Provincial Societies and these 
foreign societies (SC3, 1913: Q1640; 1649). 
 
It appears the intention of the promoters was to allow members of the foreign societies 
a window period of nine months in which to obtain membership of the proposed new 
society. Thereafter, membership would be in terms of “such Societies as are put on the 
list and in the by-laws under section eighteen of the Bill” (SC3, 1913: Q1641–3). This 
interpretation appears reasonable in terms of the wording of Section 9 of the Bill. 
 
In general terms, Section 18 applied 12 months after the Bill became law and required 
applicants who wished to be placed on the register to prove South African residency 
and either membership of a society recognised by the new South African society or 
proof of having passed an appropriate examination and was, in council’s opinion “of 
good character and standing befitting a member of the Society” (AB, 1913: 14). 
Thomson’s conclusion was that thereafter, the council of the new body needed to 
reconsider the matter of registration. There can be no doubt that Sections 9 and 18 of 
the 1913 Bill were intended to be exclusionary. Section 9 of the Bill detailed who 
would be allowed into the new society automatically on the basis of existing 
qualifications or membership of existing societies. Section 18 dealt with admission 
after the Bill – now Act – had been in existence for 12 months. Admission via this 
section would be in terms of the new society’s by-laws established during the 
intervening 12 months. The only reasons for non-admission specifically detailed in 
Section 18 were those of “character” and “standing” and both required a council 
resolution supported by three quarters of the votes of the council’s total membership. 
 
Thomson admitted that the promoters of the Bill had received applications from other 
societies to be added to the list but had considered none, as the process was a lengthy 
investigation of examinations, qualifications, status and “so on before names could 
possibly be put on the list” (SC3, 1913: Q1629). He also supported the statement made 
by a previous witness – Mr Harry Gibson – that if the Select Committee required other 
names to be added to the list, the promoters would “withdraw the Bill” (SC3, 1913: 
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Q1630). Thomson also noted that neither the Central Association of Accountants of 
London [in opposition to the Bill] nor the Corporation of Accountants Limited of 
Glasgow [rejected in 1906 for membership privileges (SC3, 1913, Proceedings: xiv)] 
had applied to be put on the list but were deliberately “setting up this opposition and 
these allegations of hardship” (SC3, 1913: Q1636–9). At this point it is appropriate to 
consider Harry Gibson’s evidence. Gibson was both the convenor of a committee to 
consider and promote the Private Bill and its chairman at the time the Select Committee 
met in 1913 (SC3, 1913: Q48). He had submitted the actual Bill to the Committee on 
behalf of its proponents. 
 
THE “INCORPORATEDS” AND POTENTIAL GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION 
By his own testimony, Gibson was an Incorporated Accountant, the designation by 
which members of the English Society of Incorporated Accountants and Auditors were 
known (SC3, 1913: Q2). This Society was listed as one of the privileged societies in 
Section 9(3) of the Bill. The petitioner against the Bill stated that it was 
 
“a private measure of an arbitrary character drafted primarily in the interests 
and for the benefit of the Institute of Chartered Accountants and the Society 
of Incorporated Accountants and Auditors of England and the Bill is not 
drafted in the interests of professional accountants generally” (SC3, 1913, 
Appendix B: vii). 
 
When these facts are considered together they suggest a degree of coordination and 
cooperation between the named United Kingdom societies in Section 9(3) on the one 
hand and the four South African Provincial Societies on the other with the Incorporated 
Accountants in South Africa acting as a via media in the form of Harry Gibson. An 
organised profession in South Africa with international reciprocity was in everybody’s 
interest, providing every accountant had equal opportunity. 
 
From 1896, the Incorporated Accountants had an organisation in South Africa known 
as the South African Committee. The main purpose of this body was to protect its 
members’ interests and to advise its London office “on all matters connected with 
accountancy in South Africa” (SC3, 1913: Q13). It is clear from the evidence Gibson 
gave that this Committee wielded influence in the Cape and Transvaal. It is also 
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suggestive that Gibson presented the Bill on behalf of the promoters. This is evidenced 
through minutes of a joint meeting of the Society of Accountants in the Cape and the 
South African Committee of the Society of Incorporated Accountants and Auditors held 
in the offices of Mr Gibson in the New York Buildings, Cape Town, on Friday 
11 October 1912 at 4.15 PM (SAAHC, TSA Minutes, 11 October 1912). Here Gibson 
explained at length the draft Union Accountants’ Registration Bill. Support for it was 
strong, but there was an underlying tension as a result of Messrs Blair and Louw 
previously pointing out the absence in the draft Bill of any mention of the Incorporated 
Society of Accountants and Auditors. Their Johannesburg branch wanted assurance that 
none of the privileges enjoyed by that Society under the Transvaal Ordinance and its 
by-laws would be withdrawn in any new measure that might be introduced. Further, 
they wished for the Bill to protect articled clerks already under service (SAAHC, TSA, 
Special General Meeting of the Transvaal Society, 6 October 1912). The Incorporated 
Accountants were important in the drive towards a Registration Act. But whether they 
were the moving force behind the Bill is difficult to either prove or disprove on the 
basis of the available evidence. The fact remains that the only formal petitioners for the 
Bill were the four Provincial Societies and the Incorporateds. Gibson refuted a 
suggestion that the Bill was not in the interests of South Africa but instead to promote 
the “interests of Chartered Accountants and the Incorporated Societies overseas” (SC3, 
1913: Q66) by pointing out that such organisations were neither invited to the 
conference that had set the Bill in motion, nor had they contributed financially to the 
process (SC3, 1913: Q66–8). But the suspicion remained. 
 
Gibson opposed the idea of a permanent quasi-Government board independent of the 
profession to control the members’ register or the examination of potential candidates 
on the grounds it “would not be able to deal with qualifications and we do not know 
how it would affect the public” (SC3, 1913: Q185). While he had no objection to 
placing on the Council current Union senior civil servants, such as the Auditor-General 
or the Head of Treasury, as suggested by the opponents to the Bill, he pointed out that 
future occupants of these positions might not be as suitably qualified. But the idea was 
carried forward to 1951 where key posts were held ex officio. 
 
Gibson referred to the New Zealand Society of Accountants established in 1908 where 
its board comprised, amongst others, officials such as the Auditor-General and the 
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Commissioner of Taxes. While the New Zealand issue has already been discussed, 
Gibson’s evidence highlights key elements. On the available evidence – “because 
naturally the Society will not state in its report that the thing does not work very well” 
(SC3, 1913: Q185) – the New Zealand Act had created problems. In particular, he drew 
attention to an article in a publication called The Accountant, a “recognised organ of the 
profession”, which stated that hundreds of men who had been put on the members 
register by the New Zealand Registration Board “had to be removed on account of 
ignorance alone” (SC3, 1913: Q185). 
 
This and the crisis it precipitated caused a scandal. Gibson described the New Zealand 
experience as “a Government Bill and the Government carried it with their Party 
majority” to the detriment of the profession there. In comparison, he pointed out that 
the South African experience had commenced with “a Private Bill” (SC3, 1913: Q185). 
Gibson did not attempt to elucidate the differences in the two processes, whether 
positive or negative. But the omnipresent spectre of unilateral action on the part of the 
South African Government to force a Bill through Parliament ultimately led the Four 
Societies to compromise in the 1951 Act. Whatever the ups and downs in the New 
Zealand process, it had points of similarity and difference with that in South Africa. For 
example, Sir Joseph Ward, the New Zealand Prime Minister voiced something very 
similar to what the South African promoters sought when he stated:  
 
“The purpose of this Bill is to establish a corporate body consisting of qualified 
accountants, and having power to make provision for the training and 
examination of members of that profession, and generally to promote in such 
manner as it thinks fit the efficient practise of that profession in New Zealand. 
The Bill confers no monopoly and no coercive powers over persons who are not 
members of the Society, save that by clause 32 no person other than a member 
is at liberty to use in connection with his business the terms ‘registered 
accountant’ or ‘public accountant’ ” (Graham, 1960: 23). 
 
The idea of Government oversight of the profession was also anathema to the Chair of 
the Orange Free State Society of Accountants and Auditors, George Smetham, during 
his cross examination by Walker on 19 February. When asked whether he would object 
to a Government register and registrar independent of the proposed new society’s 
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council, he declared that he would – on principle. “The principle would be that those 
who are to have control of the profession ought to be of the profession, having adequate 
knowledge of its needs and requirements” (SC3, 1913: Q1370). 
 
MEMBERSHIP AND THE PREAMBLE: OTHER WEAKNESSES AND THE 
QUESTIONING OF GEORGE SMETHAM 
The issue of membership as laid out in the Bill was dealt a heavy blow by Walker for 
the opponents while questioning George Smetham, the Chairman of the Orange Free 
State Society of Accountants and Auditors and originally an Incorporated Accountant. 
He was thus an important figure in the process. On 19 February 1913, Walker put the 
question: “Your preamble proceeds on the basis of all practising or entitled to practice. 
Is that not so?” (SC3, 1913: Q1320). To this he received agreement whereafter he 
asked:  
 
“Then is it not a fact that the succeeding Clauses in the Bill seriously limit that, 
and prevent a number of people who are entitled to practice from practising, or 
at all events make the right to practise dependent on the will of an interested 
Council?” (SC3, 1913: Q1321). 
 
To this question, he received a response indicating that Smetham was unsure as how to 
answer. Walker simplified the question into two parts, the last asking whether there 
were serious restrictions in the Bill. To this Smetham replied: “I should say no – not 
serious” (SC3, 1913: Q1324). Walker pushed the point: “does not the latter part of your 
Bill go outside the Preamble?” When Smetham replied “not necessarily” (SC3, 1913: 
Q1327), Walker again adopted the approach of breaking his question into two parts. In 
the first part, he asked: “But any man reading the Preamble will take it for granted, if he 
is practising or entitled to practice, that he would be registered?” Smetham agreed 
(SC3, 1913: Q1327). Walker then enquired: “But when we come to go down into the 
Bill we find restrictions imposed” to which Smetham again agreed (SC3, 1913: 
Q1329). Walker then concluded this line of enquiry: “What I want is this. The 
Preamble of the Bill does not give us any notice of these restrictions and limitations. 
Did your notice to the public give any notice of these?” (SC3, 1913: Q1330). Smetham 
avoided any direct answer, but Walker had achieved his goal – the Preamble was 
defective – and the Select Committee could draw its own conclusion. 
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Earlier during that session, Walker had questioned Smetham who confirmed his 
attendance at the 1911 conference held by the Provincial Societies to consider the draft 
Bill, as well as to having a good knowledge of it. He had also read the petition in 
opposition to the Bill with its three petitioners – John Andrew, Andrew, again, but as a 
representative of the Central Association of Accountants (London) and William Hay. 
While not representing them specifically, Hay was a Fellow of the Corporation of 
Accountants Limited of Glasgow (SC3, 1913, Appendix B: iii). When Walker asked 
Smetham whether he had any reason to doubt whether the above-mentioned 
organisations were “bodies of high repute”, he answered “I know nothing about them 
beyond their names” (SC3, 1913: Q1307–8). Walker found this odd because his next 
question was “but do you not think as an active member of the Committee [i.e. the 
proponents of the Bill] you ought to have enquired into the status and standing or 
otherwise of these people?” Smetham’s reply was a non-committal: “I do not think it 
affects the position” (SC3, 1913: Q1309). Smetham had been evasive and reluctant to 
discuss the issue of membership, no doubt aware that it was contentious. But Walker 
scored a direct hit regarding defects in the Preamble and the unwillingness of a senior 
member of the promoter’s camp to “come clean” on the issue. 
 
THE PUBLIC GOOD 
Despite his inability to reply effectively to Walker’s questions, Smetham was quite 
clear as to one of the fundamental principles behind the Bill when he responded to a 
question from Cronje, a member of the Select Committee, as to whether the Bill gave 
protection to the accountant. Smetham stated that it was “not a question of protecting 
the accountant. The protecting of the public is the first point” (SC3, 1913: Q1531). By 
this, he meant that if a unified society of accountants existed in South Africa, its desire 
to achieve a consistently high standard of accounting and auditing would enable the 
public to use the services of that society’s members with confidence. 
 
This is a theme much emphasised by the proponents and other supporters of the Bill 
before the Select Committee in 1913 and again in 1924 in the House of Assembly when 
it was considering the South African Society of Accountants Bill. Advocate Close 
described the process as follows: “the matter is regarded from the point of view of the 
promoters, first, as it affects the public and next the interests of the profession, as it will 
tend to the interest of the public” (SC3, 1913: Q61) of achieving the public good 
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through a unified accounting profession. ACM Blackman, the Chief Agent of the 
National Bank of South Africa in the Cape Province, pointed out it was “well to know 
that balance sheets presented to the bank are certified to by competent persons, and not 
only competent people but people of some repute” (SC3, 1913: Q3180). The process 
resonates strongly with Douglass C North’s idea of change at the margin or edge 
ultimately impacting upon the centre; in this instance, one characteristic (competence) 
first introducing another (repute) and both, over time, becoming standard practice at the 
centre and changing how things work. 
 
The promoter of the Bill, Harry Gibson agreed with Advocate Close’s observation that 
an object of the Bill was “to provide for the registration of persons publicly practising 
or entitled to practice publically in the Union of South Africa” (SC3, 1913: Q85). The 
purpose of such registration was to make available to the public and private sectors of 
the economy lists of people competent to practise accountancy and auditing and “to 
debar unqualified persons from practising” (SC3, 1913: Q87–93). Later in the 
proceedings, when asked whether organised commerce supported this idea, Gibson 
responded (as already quoted in Chapter 5 above): “Undoubtedly. The practice is 
growing in Cape Town and also on the Rand of employing qualified men to audit the 
books of the mercantile people” (SC3, 1913: Q1020). This statement underlines the link 
between the growth in the South African economy and the growth in the profession. 
Greater commercial activity and the investment of foreign capital – especially in the 
goldmines – necessitated the use of suitably qualified accountants in preference to 
bookkeepers. 
 
A reading of the evidence given to the Select Committee, however, reveals little actual 
public interest in the Bill. A Cape Town merchant – RM Maxwell – appeared before 
the Committee on 26 February in support of the Bill but admitted to Cronje of the 
Committee that he was giving his own views and not those of the public or only so far 
as he knew them and so far as he had discussed them with friends. When asked whether 
he had proposed calling a public meeting to discuss the Bill, he admitted that he had not 
(SC3, 1913: Q3145–7). But, the topic had received coverage in the press. In the Eastern 
Cape, The Eastern Province Herald in Port Elizabeth of 30 October 1912 reported upon 
the annual meeting of the Cape Society of Accountants. The article stated:  
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“The object of the Union Accountants’ Registration Bill is, briefly to secure the 
recognition of accountancy as a profession throughout the Union. It is generally 
admitted today that the services of an accountant are as necessary for the 
protection of the public, and particularly of the business man, as a lawyer. With 
the enormous development of commercial interests and especially the rapid 
growth of the limited liability principle, the services of an accountant are 
practicably indispensable. Accountants have been termed the watchdogs of 
commerce, but, as Mr Gibson pointed out, they must, like all watchdogs, be 
properly trained if they are to be of real service to those who employ them.” 
 
In addition, and as required by parliamentary procedure, the Private Bill was advertised 
in The Eastern Province Herald on November 1, 5 and 8, 1912, by the proponents’ 
Parliamentary Agents, Bisset and Hofmeyr. 
 
This idea of competent practitioners of repute servicing the public good was aired in the 
testimony of JR Leisk, Secretary for Finance in the Union Government, when he was 
again examined on 27 February. Leisk acknowledged that he supported the Bill and that 
it had its origins in the Transvaal Ordinance No. 3 (Private) of 1904. He believed that it 
had served the public interest well in the Transvaal. When asked by Krige, the Chair of 
the Select Committee, as to why legislation similar to the Bill had not been enacted in 
England, Leisk attributed it to two reasons – the difficulty in piloting private legislation 
through the British Parliament, “the congestion is so great”, and the difficulties in 
securing agreement between the various accounting organisations (SC3, 1913: Q3275). 
 
There was also a possible third reason – a reluctance on the part of the British 
Government to get involved and force registration, while the public good was not put in 
jeopardy. The Chair then asked whether there had been “such a general public demand 
in England?” Leisk confirmed that there had not because of “the opportunities that are 
there available to the commercial world for obtaining the best advice” (SC3, 1913: 
Q3276). Earlier in this thesis it was suggested that Leisk was present at the Select 
Committee as a semi-official representative of Union Government and had reservations 
about the fees proposed by the Bill. His comments at this point support the view of the 
Government’s desire for competency and integrity within the profession but not at the 
cost of fairness. 
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Leisk held an important position in both camps – as a senior civil servant and as a 
member of the Transvaal Society of Accountants. This, together with his obvious 
competency and wide knowledge, led him to advise the accountants on legal 
technicalities. In the SAAHC file entitled “TSA Legislation and Communication of 
Incorporation 1906–60”, correspondence in late 1910 between the Registrar of the 
Transvaal Society of Accountants and Leisk at the Treasury, resulted in his advising 
that alterations to the by-laws of the Transvaal Ordinance of 1904 needed “a two thirds 
majority of members present at the Special General Meeting convened for the purpose 
of sanctioning such alteration (Tvl Ord. 39/7, 6 April 1910). 
 
A letter from Webber and Wentzel (lawyers for the Transvaal Society of Accountants) 
to the Secretary of the Treasury confirmed the changes and the amendment could then 
be submitted to his Excellency the Governor in Council for approval (Tvl Ord. 39/7, 14 
April 1910). 
 
The New Zealand Attorney-General – Dr Findlay – assessed the process in that country 
which culminated in the creation of the New Zealand Society of Accountants in 1908 as 
follows:  
 
“The Bill protects the public to some extent against incompetency on the part of 
accountants. In these cases it seems to me that the interests of the public are 
much more important than the interests of the profession itself. Just as in the 
legal profession, the medical profession, in dentistry, and so on, we have 
required that certain qualifications shall be possessed so that the public may 
have some means of knowing whether a man is qualified or not, so here it is 
sought to give the public an opportunity of knowing whether a man is a 
registered and qualified accountant – whether he has the higher qualifications to 
which this Bill refers. It is in keeping with legislation in all directions and aims 
chiefly at protecting the public against incompetency” (Graham, 1960: 23–4). 
 
The ideals were thus the same in both South Africa and New Zealand but they were not 
the basis of the South African solution in 1913. The New Zealand solution was 
inclusive – no doubt based on the premise that if all registered, all could be subject to 
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control and penalty. The South African solution was both exclusionary and elitist 
within a framework of self-regulation. 
 
THE IDEA OF AN ACCOUNTANTS’ MONOPOLY AND THE REALITY OF 
DISCIPLINE 
A problem the fledgling Union faced in 1913 was a chronic shortage of qualified 
manpower in most fields, and the demand for accountants outstripped supply. In such a 
situation, the words “monopoly” and “fee” gain special significance. While examining 
Thomson on 21 February, Advocate Close explained that a circular entitled Creating a 
Monopoly had been distributed to members of Parliament and he offered Samuel 
Thomson an opportunity to comment upon it. Thomson stated cryptically, “I once 
wrote an article and I was accused of uttering a deliberate falsehood, but two days 
afterwards there was an apology in the paper that published it” (SC3, 1913: Q1897). 
 
This appears to be the only reference to the idea of an accounting service monopoly in 
the minutes of the Select Committee’s 1913 meetings. But the idea that the four 
Provincial Societies were seeking to dominate the market through their Private Bill was 
“out there” and this became more of an issue in debates on the 1924 Bill. Closely linked 
to the idea of an accountants’ monopoly was the topic of fees, specifically the amount 
accountants charged clients for services rendered. When being examined on 21 
February, Thomson made reference to bookkeepers doing “a little audit work” for £25–
30 per year (SC3, 1913: Q2000) and indicated this to be a small fee. When asked 
during the same session as to whether the Transvaal Society had established the fees its 
members could charge their clients, he declared members charged what they could 
command in the same way “the barrister who has exceptional ability commands a 
higher fee because the people go to him” (SC3, 1913: Q2039–41). 
 
As an interesting aside, Walker enquired of Harry Gibson on 17 February how much 
money – in the form of subscriptions and other charges to prospective members – was 
expected to flow into the society in its first 12 months if it became a legal fact. Gibson 
estimated £10 000 (SC3, 1913: Q705–7). When Walker pointed out that advocates, 
attorneys, notaries, medical men and land surveyors paid the Government a fee for 
admission to their respective societies and asked whether the accountants intended to 
pay something similar, Gibson indicated that no Government proposal had been 
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received but that in a previous draft licence bill, which had failed, “accountants were 
down for £20” (SC3, 1913: Q708). However, in due course, practising accountants 
were obliged to buy a practice licence from the Government. Before the Select 
Committee considering the 1924 Accountants Bill, TC Mitchell, a member of the Natal 
Society of Accountants, stated licences were payable in the Cape and Orange Free State 
but not in Natal (SC7, 1924: Q331) and, presumably, not in the Transvaal either. James 
Douglas of the Cape Society confirmed the licence cost of £10 (SC7, 1924: Q835). 
Hooper, an English Chartered Accountant practising in Cape Town, also confirmed the 
fee of £10 to be an annual fee (SC7, 1924: Q2518). With regard to the idea of a 
monopoly, it is probable that if the promoters did not actually seek one, then their 
actions suggest they sought an elitist, exclusionist and disciplined society. 
 
DISCIPLINE 
In terms of Section 20, the Bill listed 13 offences, the perpetration of which rendered 
members liable, if found guilty, to either suspension from practice or removal from the 
register of accountants. Among the offences listed were practising as a “public 
accountant” without being a member of the society, describing a firm “as accountants 
and auditors” when every member of it was not a member of the society and 
“improperly obtaining or attempting to obtain work” by employing questionable 
methods, such as making unrealistic promises as to costs. 
 
The Bill allowed a number of specific exclusions in “grey” areas, for example members 
could carry on businesses other than accounting, such as brokerages and receive 
commissions therefor. Presumably other businesses envisaged were professionally 
oriented as well.  
 
Other exemptions allowed non-members who were not permanently resident in the 
Union to audit and report on accounts prepared in the Union on behalf of persons or 
corporations not resident in South Africa. Presumably this meant local branches of 
companies not registered in the Union being audited by foreign auditors. Also, 
members practising in the Union or elsewhere in partnership with someone not on the 
register and not resident in South Africa were permitted to do so, providing that the 
foreign partner was a member of a recognised [foreign] society which would enable 
him to register as a public accountant in South Africa. 
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As the Union became more politically and economically mature and less dependent 
upon foreign influences, so too did the exceptions change and develop into South 
African-centred issues. An analysis of the 1951 Act shows a small number of societies 
admitted as exceptions, but that Act also made provision for such societies to lose their 
seat on the Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ Board (PAAB) should their membership 
in South Africa fall below a certain number. Also, the vacant seat could not be filled by 
anyone else and was thus removed from the list of seats (Act 51, 1951: s3(1)(d)). Chief 
among this group was the Society of Incorporated Accountants and Auditors which had 
lasted the course set in 1913 only to fail at the last hurdle. With the growth in the 
acceptability of the South African body of accountants, direct foreign influence on the 
profession waned. 
 
In terms of Section 21 of the Bill, the council could summon members of the society 
who transgressed Section 20 to appear before it, to hear and take evidence and to call 
witnesses. Members facing allegations of misconduct were to be informed of the nature 
of the complaints against them and to answer such complaints personally or through an 
authorised agent. Any member disobeying the council’s lawful summons would need to 
show cause before the Provincial Division of the Supreme Court of the province in 
which he lived. Similarly, anyone found guilty of any offence in terms of the proposed 
Act, a by-law or regulation, would need to show cause before the Provincial Division 
why he should not be suspended from practice or have his name removed from the 
register. 
 
The non-payment of the annual subscription was considered so important that it was 
given an entire section – Section 23. In the case of a subscription being overdue for two 
years, the council could apply to the Court for removal of the defaulter’s name from the 
register. 
 
Important in terms of what the subsequent Designation Act of 1927 achieved with the 
designation of Chartered Accountant, Section 26 of the 1913 Bill required each member 
to “append to his signature on any balance sheet, the title, description or initials allowed 
to members of the society” (AB, 1913: s26). This section had, as part of it, a fine of £5 
on a first conviction by the appropriate Resident Magistrate for failing to do so and a 
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fine of not more than £10 for every following conviction. Identification of 
responsibility was thus important. 
 
The disciplinary process was onerous, time consuming and expensive for those falling 
within its ambit – as was probably intended. But the Select Committee based its final 
decision on other issues. 
 
THE MACHINERY OF THE PRIVATE BILL OF 1913 
The Private Bill of 1913 to provide for the Registration of Accountants in the Union 
drew upon the Transvaal Ordinance of 1904, the New Zealand Act of 1908 and the 
Natal Act of 1909. 
 
The Bill envisaged the initial process to be overseen by a provisional council whose 
membership in terms of the Bill was comprised solely of persons from the four 
Provincial Societies and who were to hold office for 12 months. The previously 
mentioned two pieces of South African legislation had had in place provisional councils 
to oversee the registration process in Natal and the Transvaal after which they made 
way for elected councils. In New Zealand, the initial process was handled by a 
registration board but, after completing its task, it too arranged for the election of a 
permanent council to govern the newly created Society of Accountants. 
 
A significant difference was that the 1913 Bill (AB, 1913: 6) saw the provisional 
council as being made up of members of the four Provincial Societies; the New Zealand 
Act (NZ Act 211, 1908: 6) populated its registration board with senior civil servants 
like the Commissioner of Taxes and the Secretary to the Treasury. The direct influence 
of the New Zealand Government in the New Zealand process is apparent. 
 
The 1913 Bill directed the first meeting of the South African provisional council to be 
convened – notably – by the President of the Transvaal Society in Johannesburg within 
six weeks of the Bill being enacted by Parliament. The rules to govern the proceedings 
of the council were detailed in Section 7 of the Bill (AB, 1913: 8). A quorum was set at 
five members. Ordinary business would be passed by a majority of members present at 
the meeting. Issues dealing with admission to the register of members – which the 
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council would control – would require a majority of the whole council. Twelve months 
after the passing of the Act, the registers of accountants permitted to practise in Natal 
and the Transvaal would cease to exist. The council would create four districts within 
the Union, each covering a province “for administrative purposes” (AB, 1913: 10). On 
days fixed by the provisional council after the promulgation of the Bill, members in 
each district would meet under the personal auspices of a member of the provisional 
council to elect district committees of not less than five nor more than nine members. 
District committees would each elect their own chairmen. The first council of the new 
society would be elected in a manner decided by the provisional council and consist of 
11 members, three each from the Transvaal, Natal and the Cape and two from the 
Orange Free State, reflecting its largely agrarian base. 
 
The issue of the council is dealt with more fully later in this Chapter. The Bill 
authorised the provisional council, at the request of a district committee, to make 
“special provision” as it saw fit regarding the qualifications of members of district 
councils as well as the representation at meetings of elected members who were unable 
to attend (AB, 1913: 10–12). There was thus a degree of flexibility in the process. 
 
Within 12 months of the enactment of the Bill, the provisional council would hand over 
the business of the society to its first council, which would then hold office for three 
years. At the first annual general meeting thereafter, and at every subsequent annual 
general meeting, one member from each district, as decided by that district’s 
committee, would retire and not be eligible for re-election for one year. On a five-
yearly cycle, each district’s representation would be considered on the basis of the 
society’s by-laws, but no district would be represented by less than two members. 
 
The Bill envisaged the permanent council as running the society’s business with full 
powers to act in terms of by-laws still to be adopted but to be framed in terms of 
Section 33 of the Bill. Anything not covered by the by-laws was to be decided by the 
society in general meeting. In terms of Section 17 of the Bill, district committees were 
to act in accordance with the society’s by-laws and in terms of powers delegated to 
them by the council. But the council could not delegate its power to admit persons to 
the register or to amend that register “in any way” (AB, 1913: 12). 
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FROM PROVISIONAL COUNCIL TO COUNCIL 
The proposed provisional council and its replacement permanent council drew some 
fierce criticism in the Select Committee hearings, not so much for their existence, but 
for their proposed founding membership and the fact that much of the detail in the by-
laws and regulations was left in the Bill to be drafted by these two bodies – after the 
fact of its promulgation. To many, it appeared that the promoters of the Bill wished 
Parliament to give them a blank cheque. The proponents of the Bill took the point of 
view that if the by-laws and regulations were approved by Parliament, then subsequent 
amendments would similarly need to be approved by Parliament in what could be a 
lengthy and expensive process. 
 
The criticism by the Bill’s opponents in this instance appears unfair. The New Zealand 
Act of 1908 similarly left the fine detail and formulation of the Society’s regulations to 
its members in general meeting (NZ Act, 211, 1908: s20), such regulations to have the 
final approval of the Governor-in-Council. Significantly the issue of fees was deferred 
to this process as well, the Act stating only that they would comprise a once-off 
admission fee and annually “or at such other intervals as the regulations prescribe” such 
fees as approved (NZ Act 211, 1908: s30). 
 
Both the Natal Act and the Transvaal Ordinance also deferred the final determination of 
their by-laws to their post promulgation period, the Governor-in-Council to give final 
approval in Natal and the Lieutenant Governor in the Transvaal. This mechanism 
avoided the need to go back to Parliament. It was thus common practice to finalise by-
laws after promulgation of the legislation. 
 
But there were other more immediate and critical issues that concerned the Committee. 
Mr Andrews of the Select Committee (not to be confused with Mr Andrew, an 
opponent of the Bill) interviewed George Smetham, the Chairman of the Orange Free 
State Society of Accountants and Auditors, on 19 February. Smetham confirmed that 
the Natal Society wanted the four Provincial Societies to elect the first council and that 
it would be for the provisional council to decide upon “the methods of election” (SC3, 
1913: Q1489–91). This was later confirmed by FE Roberts, the Registrar of the 
Transvaal Society, when examined by Brown of the Committee on 24 February (SC3, 
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1913: Q2561). Andrews voiced the concern that “it may be a very arbitrary body that 
will be appointed by this Bill” (SC3, 1913: Q1404). 
 
Andrews was clearly concerned as he pursued the issue, stating there was no guarantee 
that the proposed council would be elected democratically with the only redress being a 
costly and time-consuming appeal to the Supreme Court in matters of disagreement and 
thus an action of last resort. 
 
When Advocate Close for the proponents examined Thomson on 20 February, he was 
at pains to have his witness clarify a number of points, principally that the proposed 
council, far from acting arbitrarily, would comprise men elected into a fiduciary 
position by their fellow professionals. Thomson observed “I do not think that these men 
would be so lost to all sense of honour and duty as to prostitute their duties and abuse 
them” (SC3, 1913: Q1602). 
 
Thomson was no mere cypher. When examined by Vintcent of the Select Committee on 
21 February as to the nature and difficulty of accounting work, Thomson replied, with 
some perspicacity:  
 
“Methods change as we go along. You find bigger corporations, and very often 
big matters of principle involved, while as the country grows older, we get 
bigger vested interests and bigger questions arising” (SC3, 1913: Q1995). 
 
He had a sense of the evolution of the profession and the South African economy. 
 
THE SELECT COMMITTEE’S CONCLUSION 
Henderson of the Committee highlighted some key issues when, on 24 February, he 
asked FE Roberts why the Bill was an immediate necessity. To this, Roberts answered 
that the system in 1913 in the Union was untenable because one set of rules governed 
Natal and the Transvaal while another was in force in the Cape and Orange Free State. 
In this, he was correct, but it would take until 1951 to solve the problem. When 
Henderson agreed that an amalgamation of societies would be in the interests of 
accountants, Roberts added “in the interests of both the accountants and the public” 
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(SC3, 1913: Q2542). The implication here was that a unified profession would benefit 
all South Africans and the nation’s economy. 
 
With regard to representation on the proposed council, Roberts stated he was opposed 
on principle to representation outside the profession but he would support a nomination 
to the council made by the Governor-General-in-Council. When asked why, he declared 
he was “bowing to the wishes of this Committee” (SC3, 1913: Q2550–1). When asked 
what the idea was for having outside representation, Roberts replied that as the 
proposed Bill was new to South Africa, “the public would derive a certain amount of 
benefit from having an independent man on the Council” (SC3, 1913: Q2552). Outside 
representation was thus an unpopular option for the promoters – and in contrast to the 
New Zealand model where the process was run by “outsiders”. 
 
Much of the reason for opposition to the Bill is encapsulated in the evidence given by 
Andrew on 28 February (SC3, 1913: Q4151). 
 
Andrew was a petitioner against the Bill individually and as a representative of the 
Central Association of Accountants (Limited by Guarantee) London. From the tenor of 
his evidence, this Association resented its exclusion from the list in the Bill of foreign 
societies whose members could be registered with relative ease (AB, 1913: 9(3)(d)). As 
a result, Andrew took “strong objection to the inclusion in Section 9 of the foreign 
bodies” (SC3, 1913: Q4093), partly because the Bill’s Preamble contained no reference 
to this but principally because foreign accountants would be allowed to “practise over 
the South African youth who has been compelled to pass his examination” (SC3, 1913: 
Q4094). Also, the Bill, as it stood, would see many men performing accounting 
functions being “shut out” of the profession. In Andrew’s experience, many 
accountants then in practice had originally held a “position in the bank or in the railway 
… one I know of was a brewer’s clerk” (SC3, 1913: Q4108). If the Bill passed, the 
privilege given in the past “by law” would be denied to others. 
 
Ironically, the examples cited by Andrew tend to support the need for a uniform system 
of articles and examination to train accountants. Andrew had no objection to a 
voluntary society of accountants being incorporated by Parliament, but, after 17 years 
in the profession, he believed being forced to register the Bill would result in “no 
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tangible benefit” (SC3, 1913: Q4135) being derived by him. On the contrary, it would 
see the little man knocked out of practice and would “create a corner [of privilege] in 
the accountancy profession similar to what they have in the Transvaal” (SC3, 1913: 
Q4136). Questioned further by Walker, Andrew agreed Parliament should either set or 
vet the proposed society’s regulations as well as providing for an independent board of 
examiners (SC3, 1913: Q4139–45). Andrew continued with the theme of the little man 
in his objection to the proposed society creating its own rules. He stated: 
 
“We know that the small man has to be very careful in running a business so as 
not to run up against the big men on the Council” (SC3, 1913: Q4138). 
 
Advocate Close put the promoters’ view of their opponents succinctly when 
questioning Roberts:  
 
“It has been put to you that accountants are the watch dogs of the profession, 
but apparently the opponents of this Bill want to muzzle them and make them 
ineffective” (SC3, 1913: Q2399). 
 
On Friday 7 March, the Select Committee heard closing arguments from Walker and 
Close. The Chair then cleared the room and put the following question to the vote: 
“That the Preamble stand part of the Bill” (SC3, 1913, Proceedings: xviii) – that is: the 
Bill be accepted. Krige, Vintcent, Henderson and Cronje voted against while Baxter, 
Brown and Andrews voted for and lost. Thus, the Bill failed. 
 
The 1913 Bill failed ostensibly because its technical content regarding fees and 
registration was not accurately reflected in its Preamble. A similar error was allowed 
twice by the Select Committee dealing with the 1924 Bill. The 1913 Bill failed more 
practically because the Select Committee of the day realised that it was too narrow in 
its application and that the “public good” included the recognition of the interests of 
“the small man” and recognition of the South African individual’s interest before that 
of the foreign man. Something better was needed. 
 
The process was expensive, costing the Four Societies in excess of £3 000. Much of the 
expense was absorbed in the employment of parliamentary agents. In terms of North’s 
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institutional economics, the agents had knowledge their clients lacked, thereby 
rendering it asymmetrical in their favour and granting them a special understanding of 
the complex workings of the parliamentary systems, as well as how to access it. These 
were valuable attributes. As North points out, 
 
“commodities, services and the performance of agents have numerous attributes 
and their levels vary from one specimen or agent to another. The measurement 
of these levels is too costly to be comprehensive or fully accurate. The 
information costs in ascertaining the level of individual attributes of each unit 
exchanged underlie the costliness of this aspect of transacting” (North, 1990: 
48). 
 
In short, the process had become too expensive to continue. 
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CHAPTER 7: “SOUTH AFRICA FIRST” AND THE DRIVE TO 
SELF-SUFFICIENCY: THE SOCIETY OF SOUTH AFRICAN 
ACCOUNTANTS (PRIVATE) BILL, 1924: ANOTHER FAILURE 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: SOUTH AFRICA: 1913–24 
The period 1913–24 was marked by many problems in South Africa: social, political 
and economic. It was also a period of slow but tangible development. The new Union 
Parliament had the task of administering a vast territory stretching from Cape Town in 
the south to the Limpopo River in the north. This difficulty was compounded by the 
Great War of 1914–8 and South Africa’s emergence as a post-war British Dominion 
with an inadequately defined status but with a new pride, new responsibilities and new 
powers in the former German colony of South West Africa. The period of enforced 
isolation in 1914–8 had stimulated the beginnings of industrialisation in South Africa 
and pointed the way to its economic future. But after War’s end, much of the 
manufacturing capacity was mothballed as imports were cheaper and it would take the 
Pact Government to see the effective revival of a policy of industrialisation. 
 
The hardships inflicted by the Great War – such as a war debt of £38 million added to 
the national debt (Plant in Benians et al., 1963: 829) – contributed to the growth of the 
“Poor White” problem as well as growing support for JBM Hertzog’s National Party, 
formed in 1914. Poor Whites were largely White Afrikaners who lacked land as a result 
of the uneconomical subdivision of farms and the destruction wrought by the Anglo-
Boer War. As a result, they lacked skills to compete in a modern economy but 
potentially had to compete with the equally unskilled but more numerous Blacks (Brits, 
1995: 195). The existence of this stratum of society and the political need to appease its 
needs led to much discriminatory legislation, particularly in the mining industry. 
 
Initially Hertzog’s new political party began with the support of Afrikaners who 
believed Botha to be too pro-British as well as slow in considering their interests, but 
increasingly it gained the support of rural voters in the Orange Free State and the 
Transvaal. The Rebellion of 1914 was a struggle among Afrikaners and the 
Government’s quick suppression of it led to increased support for Hertzog’s party. This 
support was shown in the General Election of 1915 where the National Party won 27 of 
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the 130 seats available in the House of Assembly. The South African Party took 59 
seats, the Unionists, 40, and Labour, four (Davenport and Saunders, 2000: 710). 
 
Hertzog’s political principles were expressed in a series of contentious speeches he 
gave in 1912, climaxing in a speech at de Wildt near Brits in December 1912 
(Davenport, 1987: 257). Here, he made the observation that South Africa should no 
longer be ruled by those “who were not imbued with the proper South African Spirit” 
and denounced the foreign fortune hunters whose loyalty was to the British Empire 
rather than to South Africa (van den Heever, 1946: 148). This sentiment was taken up 
in the slogan “South Africa First” and, together with an earlier comment by Hertzog 
that South Africa was a nation of two streams – one English-speaking, the other 
Afrikaner (Krüger, DW, 1958: 67), alienated many pro-imperialists; but the idea of two 
separate peoples each with their own language and identity, appealed to just as many. 
 
Both Smuts and Botha attended the Peace Conference in Paris in early 1919 to give 
notice of the then Union’s existence and expectations. Two unofficial South African 
deputations also went to Paris – one led by Hertzog to plead for the restoration of the 
independence of the former Boer republics and the other, members of the South African 
Native National Congress. This organisation was later renamed the African National 
Congress, and had been formed in 1912 to press for the rights of Blacks ignored by the 
Union Government and subject to restrictive social legislation, such as the Native Land 
Act of 1913 (Davenport, 1987: 259–62). Both unofficial delegations failed in their 
quests. 
 
Louis Botha died in 1919, shortly after returning from Paris. He was replaced by Jan 
Smuts, a man many Afrikaners found to be distant and cold but a man of “uncommon 
brains” (Hancock, 1968: 3). Smuts pledged himself to the principles of maintaining the 
imperial link between London and Pretoria, continued cooperation between English and 
Afrikaner in South Africa and the industrial development of the young nation 
(Breitenbach et al., 1974: 334). 
 
But it is in statistical terms that the Union’s development in the period 1910–24 can be 
most easily understood. At the beginning of the period, the population stood at 5.9 
million; 11 years later it amounted to 6.9 million (Union Statistics, 1960: A3). In 1911, 
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24.7% of the population was urbanised; in 1921, the percentage stood at 27.9% (Union 
Statistics, 1960: A10). The greatest increase in migrants from rural to urban areas, 
unsurprisingly, was amongst the whites with 51.6% in 1911 to 59.6% in 1921 of the 
White population living in urban areas. Also unsurprisingly, the Orange Free State was 
one of two Provinces with a 10% increase in the number of whites moving from land to 
town. Natal was the second with an increase from 63.9% to 74.3% in its urban 
population (Union Statistics, 1960: A10). It should be noted that figures for “Asiatics” 
are only available from 1926 when 60.7% of them were urbanised (Union Statistics, 
1960: A10). Their ability to own land in rural areas of the Union was restricted by 
discriminatory legislation (Breitenbach et al., 1974: 531).  
 
In 1910, the mines employed 291 377 people of all races of whom 31 810 were White, 
255 494 were Black and 4 073 Asian. By 1924, the corresponding figures were 302 482 
(total), 31 109 (White), 269 215 (Black) and 2 158 (Asian) (Union Statistics, 1960: 
G4). In 1915, light manufacturing industry employed 88 844 people while 10 years 
later the figure amounted to 131 562, a 48% increase (Union Statistics, 1960: L3). 
 
THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 1920 
Towards the end of the period under review, the years 1920–3 were characterised by 
depression and falling gold prices. Feinstein (2005: 80) has pointed out that while the 
costs of mining production increased during the War, especially labour costs, the 
selling price of gold had been artificially inflated to the benefit of its producers. The 
fear – soon realised – was that, should the price of gold fall to its pre-war price, this 
price would be insufficient to cover the cost of production and many mines would be 
forced to close. 
 
The year 1920 began on an economic low as a world-wide post-war depression and the 
abandonment of the gold standard took its toll and contributed in South Africa to an 
estimated unemployed – and often unemployable – Poor White population of 100 000. 
The Union-wide White population in May 1921 was calculated to be 1.5 million (Union 
Statistics, 1960: A3).  
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The decade ended with the onset of the Great Depression of 1929–33 by which time the 
number of Poor Whites had increased to an estimated 300 000, or one in three of the 
White Afrikaans-speaking population (Feinstein, 2007: 85). 
 
Smuts called a General Election in March 1920 as the closure of mines on the 
Witwatersrand and a steep rise in the cost of living precipitated a political crisis. But 
there were other ingredients in the mix. Hobart Houghton, in his book The South 
African Economy (1976: 121), supports the view that the end of the Great War saw a 
decline in local manufacturing and employment in this sector as it again became 
cheaper after 1918 to import manufactured goods into South Africa. Botha’s 
administration needed to take some of the blame for these problems. At the outbreak of 
war in 1914, the Union Parliament had given the executive branch of Government 
power to regulate prices. But the authorities had been lethargic in doing so, even when 
shipping constraints led to an acute shortage of wheat. The cumulative effect of these 
problems cost the South African Party the election (Walker, 1957: 571–2). 
 
The results of the 1920 election saw the 134 seats available in the House divided as 
follows: 41 to the South African Party (SAP), 25 to the Unionists, 21 to Labour, three 
to the Independents and 44 to the National Party, thus making it the largest single party 
but without an absolute majority. Its clarion call for independence from the British 
Empire and separateness struck a resonating chord in those who believed in “South 
Africa First” (Davenport and Saunders, 2000: 710; Breitenbach et al., 1974: 323). The 
increase in the number of Labour seats was mainly at the expense of the Unionists. As a 
result, Smuts could only govern with the support of the Unionists and Independents. 
This gave his ministry a narrow majority of four seats. The SAP and the Unionists 
worked well together while the Nationalists and Labour appeared to be moving closer. 
But the reality was that the Nationalist’s rural base did not fully support the socialist 
ideals of the Labourites (Horwitz, 1967: 96). 
 
At a conference in Bloemfontein in September 1920, Smuts attempted to bridge the gap 
between the SAP and the Nationalists and failed. With a real concern about the 
potential loss to the Union of foreign investor capital should secession from the British 
Empire take place, Smuts approached the Union Party under Sir Thomas Smartt and 
crafted a coalition (Davenport, 1987: 274) of their parties based on their common belief 
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of the need for the imperial link. On this basis, Smuts called another General Election 
in 1921. The National Party maintained its hold over the electorate but Labour lost most 
of its previous gains and only won nine seats. There was a single Independent, but the 
SAP/Unionist merger paid off with a total of 79 seats (Davenport and Saunders, 2000: 
710). This victory was soon overshadowed by the Government’s heavy handed 
treatment of three crises: the Bondelswarts revolt in South West Africa in 1921, the 
minor threat represented by the Israelite Sect at Bulhoek in the Eastern Cape in 1922, 
and, particularly, its handling of the Rand strike, also in that year (Davenport, 1987: 
279–83). 
 
THE GOLD MINES: BLACK VS WHITE LABOUR 
Both the National and Labour parties drew support from the unskilled White labourers 
who moved into the Witwatersrand from the rural areas in search of work in the wake 
of the 1920 depression. This trek increased the extent of the Poor White or bywoner 
problem (Yudelman, 1983: 113; Feinstein, 2007: 83–5). They were protected against 
the competition of unskilled Black labour by the colour bar – the regulations to the 
Mines and Works Amendment Act of 1911 (Davenport, 1987: 258) which prevented 
Blacks from filling certain posts and the status quo agreement by which the mines 
agreed to maintain a specified ratio of Black to White workers (Breitenbach et al., 
1974: 335; Yudelman, 1983: 40, 147). The spirit of White labour in South Africa at this 
time ran counter to the nascent idea of “South Africa First” – the White miners 
identifying more readily with the notion of an international working class across the 
Dominions. In the Union, this was largely the result of the employment of White 
foreigners, principally English miners (Yudelman, 1983: 125, 129, 183). 
 
The Chamber of Mines decided in December 1921 to reduce wages, abandon the status 
quo agreement (Walker, 1962: 589; Davenport, 1987: 280) and employed Blacks in 
semi-skilled work. The result was a massive strike by White gold miners following on a 
strike by Transvaal coal miners. Negotiations failed to secure a compromise solution. 
Smuts supported the mine owners. He persuaded them to reopen their mines, instructed 
the miners to go back on conditions unilaterally established by the owners and 
promised the Government would ensure law and order (Davenport and Saunders, 2000: 
295). The situation escalated out of control; the miners took up arms, Smuts called out 
the military and declared martial law on 10 March 1922. The miners fought back and 
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Smuts, taking personal command of the Union forces, directed the Government’s 
offensive. Fierce resistance was encountered in the Fordsburg area of Johannesburg and 
the Government responded by using artillery and aeroplanes to crush the revolt and 
reassert control. The ringleaders were hanged and many more were sentenced to prison 
terms (Walker, 1962: 591). 
 
1922: THE WORKING CLASS 
Popular literature has reinforced the largely mistaken belief (Yudelman, 1983: 183) that 
the Rand Rebellion of 1922 was a Bolshevik inspired uprising in the pursuit of ultimate 
world domination through Communism and the working man (see, for example, Smith, 
1997: 80–3; Handcock, Vol. 1, 1962: 364–5). The reasons for this are not difficult to 
find. In the chaos precipitated by the strong stand taken by the Government to the 
labour unrest and widespread intimidation on the mines, a small group of Communists 
formed the Council of Action, declared for the Third International and sparked the 
conflagration that was the Rand Rebellion of March 1922. The Fordsburg miners’ 
contingent raised a banner calling on “Workers of the World, Unite and Fight for a 
White South Africa”. Feinstein interpreted this as the “triumph of racial over class 
solidarity” (2007, 81) while Davenport suggested that the strikers’ intention was first to 
build class consciousness among the whites before dealing with the colour bar (1987: 
283). But Hirson points out (2005: 19) that the small international socialist league, later 
to be the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), actively engaged in strikes on the 
Rand with the South African Native National Congress (SANNC), and gave the 1922 
strikes its total support. This support included access to the International until the 
printing press was confiscated by the Government. 
 
These nuanced opinions give an indication of the complexity of South African labour 
issues in the post-1902 period. There are many complex, interrelated elements in the 
mix but perhaps the critical ones are the investors who put up the capital to develop the 
mines, the labour needed to extract the gold, the state as a regulatory body and the 
whole complicated further by considerations of race and class. And within each element 
there were further complications, such as “pro-Empire versus South Africa First and 
Afrikaner Republican radical versus Anglophone syndicalist/unionist radical” 
(Yudelman, 1983: 125). 
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At this point, some consideration needs to be given to the idea of “class” in South 
African society in the period under review. In simple terms, social class is a system of 
social stratification “in which people are grouped into a set of hierarchical social 
categories” (Barry Jones, RJ (ed.), 2001: 160–9). The terminology used for class 
differentiation is usually upper, middle and lower classes; in socio-economic terms the 
phrases “working class” or “professional class” are used to describe people who have 
the same social, economic or educational background. It is this form of class that 
manifests itself in the House of Assembly after the 1924 election when Advocate Close, 
KC, clashed with the new Labourites in Parliament – Rayburn, Waterston and Hays. 
This observation is borne out by the fact that the perceived social difference is 
exhibited in the South African Who’s Who for 1925 and 1926. This publication gives 
Close a fairly detailed Biographical thumbnail sketch, while the three Labourites are 
described simply as members of Parliament. 
 
In the South African context, Johnstone (1976: 50) has identified the working class 
with lack of ownership of the means of production and land. The White working class 
in South Africa had its origins in the immigration of skilled White workers from Britain 
and other countries, as a result of the discovery of gold on the Rand (Johnstone, 1976: 
53). In the early 1920s – primarily in the Transvaal – there still existed large groups of 
White people who lacked land but were politically free to organise trade unions, 
political parties and had the vote. Previously known as bywoners, more recently as Poor 
Whites and latterly as the Afrikaner White working class, they became an important 
focus for Hertzog’s various legislative initiatives to free them from poverty. In South 
African history, the term working class came to mean “two groups of workers subject 
to quite different relations of production with the property owning class – a group of 
ultra-exploitable (non-White) workers and a group of politically free (White) workers, a 
sector of forced (non-White) labour and a sector of free (White) labour” (Johnstone, 
1976: 50). 
 
As stated earlier in this thesis, the intention is not to “write a history” of South Africa; it 
is also not the intention to enter a debate about the complex nature and development of 
South African labour and class in the early 20th Century. But some background is 
needed to be better able to understand the dynamics in the House of Assembly in the 
period 1924–5. At that time, the four Provincial Societies attempted to steer through 
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Parliament the South African Society of Accountants (Private) Bill but were prevented 
from doing so largely through the efforts of the Labour Party. 
 
The liberal-radical debate on the interpretation of South African history took place 
during the 1970s and 80s and was given a focus by HM Wright’s The Burden of the 
Present (1977). 
 
With regard to White labour from 1924 onwards, the liberal interpretation is perceived 
by some to be one of state intercession in the market “to create a privileged white 
stratum in the wage-earning classes” (Davies, 1979: 2) contrary to the interests of 
capital and instrumental in the exploitation and domination of the Black classes. Racial 
prejudice is an issue phenomenon flowing from the class struggle and in need of 
analysis and explanation (Davies, 1979: 1–3). 
 
The radical school as interpreted by Davies (1979: 2) had many problems with the 
liberal interpretation, among them the treating of two elements – the tensions between 
capital and White workers, and the tensions between Black and White workers – as a 
single element. While acknowledging the school’s early preoccupation with issues such 
as the role of capitalist exploitation in social formation in preference to analyses of the 
White working class, Davies refers to Johnstone’s pioneering work – Class, Race and 
Gold. Johnstone advances his study along several axes, but the basic premise of his 
work is that the employment colour bar was not so much derived from racial prejudice 
as from the perception of a class (with limited skills) of limited job opportunities when 
faced by the more numerous and “ultra exploitable” Blacks (Davies, 1979: 4). This is 
clearly shown in Johnstone’s analysis of the Status Quo Agreement of 1918 which 
White workers viewed as 
 
“a protectionist response to the new war-time developments in the industry, 
extending job protection to the new, less skilled white workers” (Johnstone, 
1976: 110) 
 
This is not to deny the importance of race as an element in the mix. Keegan (1996: 14) 
has shown that racial prejudice, far from being culturally inert, was equally useful on 
the South African frontier in the 18th and 19th Centuries as it was in Parliament. In the 
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1924–5 consideration of the Accountants Bill in Parliament, the elements of capital 
class and White workers are apparent; race and Black workers are not. This would be a 
problem for future generations to resolve. 
 
1922: THE CONSEQUENCES 
The political and economic consequences of the strike and its suppression were 
important. Many strikers were imprisoned and the mines were obliged to employ Black 
workers in their place. White wages were cut by 25% but the effect was cushioned by a 
fall in the cost of living (Feinstein, 2005: 81), while the ratio of Black to White miners 
was set at 10:1, allowing the former to perform semi-skilled activities, such as the 
sharpening of drills. The now defunct status quo agreement had previously specified a 
ratio of 8:1 (Feinstein, 2007: 80). 
 
This, coupled with the introduction of small jackhammers which allowed Black miners 
to drill further and faster than was possible previously, increased productivity and 
reduced costs. Also, no longer facing the need to wait for White miners to perform 
tasks previously reserved for them meant they spent more time at the rock face and 
hence achieved a better utilisation of labour. 
 
In 1924, the percentage of White miners in gold mines to Black miners was 10.15% 
with a total employment of 210 986. In 1916, with a total employment figure of 238 
054, the percentage had been 10.73%. By 1933, the percentage was 10.83% and by the 
outbreak of war in 1939 it had reached 13.06% (Union Statistics, 1960: G5). This 
suggests that the small gains made by Black miners in the 1920s were reversed in the 
1930s, a contention supported by the Pact Government’s primary concern to uplift the 
economic wellbeing of whites and the implementation of a “civilised labour” policy 
(Feinstein, 2007: 86). In terms of this policy, whites were employed to unskilled and 
semi-skilled posts for payment beyond normal economic rates and many Blacks lost 
their jobs in Government and quasi-Government departments like railways and 
harbours. Legislation prevented the private sector from employing Blacks at cheap rates 
(Feinstein, 2007: 86–7). 
 
While the immediate result of the 1922 Rebellion was a victory for the mining 
companies, they were unable to make further inroads into the privileged position of the 
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White miners (Feinstein, 2007: 82). Two years later, in the General Election of 1924, 
the Labour Party – supported by English speakers, many of them working class and the 
urban poor – garnered enough votes to hold the balance between the Nationalists and 
the South African Party in Parliament. With memories of 1922 and Smuts’ prominent 
role in the events of that year, Labour was predisposed to form a pact with the 
Nationalists (Feinstein, 2007: 82). 
 
The leaders of these two parties saw common ground and in April 1923 concluded an 
election pact. Hertzog assured Creswell, the Labour Party leader and the electorate at 
large that should they win the next election, the Nationalists would not seek a change in 
South Africa’s constitutional relationship with the British Crown (Breitenbach et al., 
1974: 337). For their part, the Nationalists had the support of the rural Afrikaners, and 
the unskilled Afrikaner workers who had trekked from the farms to the towns in search 
of employment on the mines. They resented the Government’s inability to alleviate 
their distress. This Poor White problem played an important role in both the 1924 
election and the Pact’s subsequent social and economic policies (Feinstein, 2007: 82). 
 
THE ORIGINS OF THE PACT GOVERNMENT 
A year after the agreed alliance between Labour and the National Party – in April 1924 
– Smuts’ majority in the House of Assembly was reduced to eight (Breitenbach et al., 
1974: 339) when the South African Party lost the Wakkerstroom by-election. 
Previously considered a safe seat, the votes of the Volksrust railwaymen tipped the 
scale. Smuts realised that his party had lost support, dissolved Parliament and called a 
General Election for June which he lost to the Pact. The Nationalists won 63 seats, an 
increase of 16, and Labour 18, an increase of five; there was one Independent while the 
SAP took 53 seats and lost 19. 
 
In many ways, 1924 represented a political and social watershed. Afrikaner and Briton 
now sat on both sides of the House in Parliament. Both National and Labour Parties had 
a concern for unemployment and a growing Poor White problem and each was desirous 
of achieving a lasting solution. Both Labour and National Parties were deeply 
suspicious of the mining companies, the former because of their fear of exploitation 
while the latter believed the gold mines’ directors and shareholders put foreign interests 
above those of South Africa. A strong manufacturing sector would go far in reducing 
 180 
 
the importance of the mines as well as providing a source of employment and an 
additional revenue stream for Government. Hirson points out that the South African 
Labour Party (SALP) supported segregation, ignored the Black struggles for 
recognition and in fact were openly hostile to Black advancement (2005: 19). 
 
Creswell was reported in Grocott’s Penny Mail in April 1924 as saying “PACT was the 
best thing to have happened to South Africa and it has killed racism more than anything 
else in the last 20 years could have killed it”. The irony is that Creswell meant the 
conflict between the English and Afrikaans speakers rather than between White and 
Black. 
 
The Botha-Smuts era had seen strong support for White political and economic 
dominance through the enactment of much segregationist law, such as the Native Land 
Act of 1913 – which weakened Black ambitions of equality. As Davenport and 
Saunders note, this legal foundation “made the removal of inhumanity in the law harder 
to contrive, and this fact played into the hands of the more ideological politicians who 
took over the reins in 1924” (2000: 299). 
 
The year of 1924 also saw the beginning of a period of sustained industrialisation and 
economic recovery even though the South African manufacturing sector was small, 
mainly light in character and ironically, heavily dependent upon the mining industry to 
sustain it. 
 
The following table devised by Feinstein and based upon Union Statistics for Fifty 
Years, 1910–1960 (1960: L6–L33) indicates the importance of light industry. 
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TABLE 7.1 
COMPARISON OF GROSS AND NET VALUE OF OUTPUT IN 
MANUFACTURING BY SECTOR, 1924/5 
 
 (1) 
Gross value 
of output 
(2) 
Net value 
of output 
 (per cent) 
Light industry     
 Food, beverages, and tobacco  46.1  32.4 
 Textiles, clothing, leather, and footwear  10.8  10.0 
 Wood and furniture  5.9  6.9 
 Paper, printing and publishing  6.7  11.2 
 Other manufacturing  2.3  2.7 
TOTAL:  71.8  63.2 
Heavy industry   
 Chemicals and chemical products  11.6  12.1 
 Pottery, glass, and other non-metallic mineral 
products 
 4.6  7.0 
 Basic metal industries   6.0  8.9 
 Metal products and machinery (incl. electrical)  2.5  3.3 
 Transport equipment  3.2  5.3 
 Rubber products  0.2  0.2 
TOTAL: 
[Rounding of 0.1% in column 1.] 
 28.1  36.8 
Source: Feinstein, 2007: 116. 
 
As Feinstein points out, column 1 shows gross manufacturing output while column 2 
shows this output less costs, such as raw materials and power. What is evident from the 
table is the fact that the light industries accounted for over 70% of gross output. With 
reference to the Food, Beverages and Tobacco sector with its 46.1% share of the gross 
value of manufacturing in the period 1924–5, the Union Statistics also reveal the 
following:  
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TABLE 7.2 
WHITE EMPLOYMENT AND REMUNERATION: FOOD, BEVERAGES AND 
TOBACCO SECTOR: 1924–5 
 
 (1) 
Food 
(2) 
Beverages 
(3) 
Tobacco 
(1) & (2) 
& (3) 
Total 
Overall 
Manufacturing 
(Major 
Groups) 
Total 
Establishments 1 569 280 61 1 910 6 182 
Employment 
(Total):  
- Whites 
 
 
6 367 
 
 
840 
 
 
892 
 
 
8 099 
 
 
51 076 
- Other groups 20 284 2 373 1 814 24 471 80 486 
Wages & 
Salaries:  
- Whites 
 
£1 100 000 
 
£186 000 
 
£163 000 
 
£3 985 000 
 
£10 539 000 
- Other groups £827 000 £124 000 £86 000 £1 037 000 £3 985 000 
Source: Union Statistics, 1960: L3, L6–8. 
 
The remuneration paid to whites is significantly higher than that paid to other groups, 
but whether as a result of more skilled work or subsidisation is difficult to determine. 
At this early stage, the Pact’s policies were still in the process of being implemented so 
the practice of subsidisation may already have been widespread or more prevalent in 
some sectors than others. But the fact remains – Whites were paid more in this sector in 
1924–5. As Yudelman has pointed out (1983: 40–1), economic success from 1924 
onwards was at the cost of providing sheltered employment for Whites which the Pact 
transferred largely from the mining sector to the manufacturing and state sectors, being 
aware of the limitations of the ability of the mines to both generate nationally needed 
profits and to absorb the inflated cost of labour. 
 
The year 1924 thus also marks an important economic watershed in South African 
history. Jill Nattrass supports this point of view and takes it a step further by stating that 
the process of industrialisation led to the development of “a class of local 
manufacturing capitalists” (Nattrass, 1990: 162) whose existence resulted in South 
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Africa avoiding the “ill effects of economic imperialism that were the concomitant of 
colonialism in so many instances on the African continent” (Nattrass, 1990: 162). From 
her point of view, it might be argued that 1927 was the key year in that it saw the 
passage through Parliament of a Bill to establish a state-owned iron and steel 
corporation – ISCOR. This enterprise was the first of many, which, including ESKOM 
and SASOL, accounted for 11 per cent of South Africa’s total manufacturing output by 
1977 (Nattrass, 1990: 163). 
 
THE PACT GOVERNMENT IN OFFICE 
The leader of the National Party, JBM Hertzog, took office in June 1924, the third 
Prime Minister of the Union as well as the third former general to hold this position. 
The South African Party retained control of the Senate until the passage of the Senate 
Act of 1926 required the Governor-General to dissolve the Upper House within three 
months of a general election (Breitenbach et al., 1974: 345). 
 
The economic progress in the period 1910–24 has been outlined at the beginning of the 
Chapter and allowed Hertzog to concentrate on three other issues: labour, language and 
race. A Department of Labour was created in 1924 with Creswell as Minister of 
Labour. The passage of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 (Davenport, 1987: 258–
9) made interaction between White trade unions and employers easier but did not 
recognise Black trade unions, while a Wage Act of 1925 set minimum wages for 
workers (Davenport, 1987: 287). These pieces of legislation, together with the Old Age 
Pension Act of 1927, did much to improve the position of White workers but Blacks 
and their welfare were largely ignored in the process. 
 
With regard to language, the new Government in the form of DF Malan, Minister of the 
Interior, insisted upon bilingualism in the Civil Service, a move which created many 
opportunities for Afrikaners. In 1924, White workers on the railways made up 9.5% of 
the labour force. By 1929, this statistic had increased to 28.7% (Breitenbach et al., 
1974: 346). With the support of all parties, in 1925 the definition of “Dutch” in the 
constitution was amended to include Afrikaans as an official language (Davenport, 
1987: 287). From 1914, Afrikaans was used in Dutch Reformed Churches and in 1916 
it was decided to translate the Bible into Afrikaans, a project completed in 1933 
(Breitenbach et al., 1974: 350). In the early years of the 20th Century, Hertzog himself 
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had encouraged Afrikaans cultural development and had set up the annual Hertzog 
prize for the best Afrikaans literary work. There was thus a sense of expectancy and 
change abroad in the nation and the accountants were not immune to its siren call. 
 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIETY OF ACCOUNTANTS (PRIVATE) BILL, 1924 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Against this political and economic background, in early 1924, a second Accountants 
Bill was promoted in Parliament by the four Provincial Societies, these being the Cape 
Society of Accountants and Auditors, the Natal Society of Accountants, the Transvaal 
Society of Accountants and the Society of Accountants and Auditors in the Orange Free 
State (SC7, 1924, Proceedings: xii). The task was unlikely to be easy – in the United 
Kingdom in the previous 20 years there had been some 30 attempts to have Parliament 
pass similar legislation “promoted by all sorts of people” but without success (SC7, 
1924: Q241–4). There were two main reasons – factionalism and a Government which 
saw no reason for central control of the profession. 
 
The reasons for the promotion of a second bill in South Africa were varied but what 
was perceived as a good idea in 1913 remained even more so in 1924 – a unified 
accounting profession responsible to a single governing body and responsive to the 
needs of a developing economy. New Zealand had gone this route in 1908 while 
Australia was still in the process of doing so. It would achieve its goal in 1928 with a 
unique Royal Charter granted by King George V which saw the incorporation of the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia (Graham, 1978: 12). In South Africa, a 
groundswell of positive public support for a post-war Union was crystallised in the 
resurrected slogan “South Africa First” and was demonstrated by the legal regulation of 
key professions as they organised themselves across the Union. This is evidenced by 
the passage through Parliament of the Architects and Surveyors (Private) Bill which 
went to a select committee in 1926 and emerged as Act 18 of 1927. As previously 
mentioned, the medical profession, too, was the subject of central regulation in a draft 
Medical, Dental and Pharmacy Bill which was introduced in 1925. The Bill lapsed 
thereafter but was revived in 1927 and passed as Act 13 of 1928. In such an atmosphere 
of independence, the award of a charter from the metropolitan centre was unlikely to be 
universally accepted or acceptable in South Africa. 
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The overall situation in the accounting profession in 1924 in South Africa was much as 
it had been in 1913; accountants in public practice in the Transvaal and Natal had to be 
members of the respective societies and membership was compulsory. The reason for 
this was that in each of these two provinces, the accounting profession had been unified 
and regulated by prior legislation, namely the Transvaal (Private) Ordinance of 1904 
and the Natal Act of 1909. As a result, and as Walker, parliamentary agent for the Bill’s 
proponents, put it, these societies were “properly entrenched and [had] virtually nearly 
all the powers that we seek now for all the four provinces of the Union” (SC7, 1924: 
Q21). 
 
In the other two provinces, the Cape and Orange Free State, the respective provincial 
societies had no such legislative foundation. Membership of their societies was 
voluntary and anyone could practice publically in these two provinces as an accountant 
providing they paid £10 to the provincial Government for a licence to practice. About 
200 licenses were in issue in 1924 (SC7, 1924: Q835–6) compared to a membership of 
the Cape Society of between 110–20 people (SC7, 1924: Q746). As a result, there was 
no central control in the Union over the competency of accountants or the quality of the 
work they produced. 
 
One of the things that had changed since 1913 was the level of cooperation between the 
Four Societies. In the post-1913 period, in addition to cementing their relationship, the 
four Provincial Societies spent much time and effort in consolidating and extending 
their already important, if not dominant, position in the accounting profession in South 
Africa. For example, in terms of a 1921 agreement – known as the South African 
Societies’ General Examining Board Agreement – the Four Societies and the Rhodesia 
Society of Accountants agreed upon common admission regulations. It was also clear 
that accountancy as a profession was growing, albeit slowly. Samuel Thompson’s 
evidence to the Committee on 29 February 1924 was that the membership of the 
Transvaal Society was between 440–50 people (SC7, 1924: Q54). Thompson was a 
member of the Transvaal Society as well as being a member of the Institute of 
Accountants in Glasgow, a Chartered Scottish Society. The evidence of George Foster, 
representing the “younger school of accountants” in the Transvaal (SC7, 1924: Q1823), 
was that the Society had qualified “over 200” accountants since its inception in 1904. 
With its goldfields, the Transvaal was the economic hub of the nation. 
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Another issue from 1913 was that of an accounting monopoly. Foster, at the time, was 
being examined by Advocate Davis for the opponents of the 1924 Bill in the form of 
the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. Davis underlined the 
thrust of their opposition when he posed the question 
 
“Do you agree with me that if the Society is to be given an entire monopoly of 
the profession by Parliament, then that Society cannot be permitted to close its 
door to any legitimate avenue into the profession?” 
 
Foster agreed that any process of closing an avenue of entrance had to be gradually 
implemented over a period of time (SC7, 1924: Q1824). 
 
THE BILL 
The 1924 Bill was, in many respects, similar to the 1913 Bill whose key details were 
listed in Q2596–600 of the 1913 Parliamentary Select Committee’s minutes (SC3: 
1913). These included the creation of a Society of Accountants in South Africa and the  
 
 opening of a register; 
 compulsory registration of all accountants in South Africa; 
 the provision of a means to distinguish qualified from unqualified applicants; 
 the development of qualifications for current and future admission to the 
register; and 
 the development of a legal body corporate with an elected council (preceded by 
an appointed provisional council) whose task it was to establish the society and 
its register and arrange for the election of the society’s first council through 
district committees which, similarly, would be elected. 
 
In addition, the proposed society was to have the power to: 
 
 control the professional conduct of its members; 
 declare certain acts and practices as offences; 
 punish members found guilty of these offences; 
 make by-laws to regulate the society’s affairs; 
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 take any suitable steps to achieve its objects; and 
 superintend examinations for entry into the profession. 
 
The 1924 Bill was described as “providing for the establishment and incorporation of 
the South African Society of Accountants and further to provide for the constitution, 
rights, powers, privileges and duties of that society and the members thereof”. 
 
The Bill consisted of 44 sections, spread over 30 pages, half of them Dutch, the other 
half English. Afrikaans would be recognised as one of the two official languages the 
year after the Bill was introduced (Saunders and Southey, 1998: 5). Following an initial 
statement by the Preamble – which had been corrected twice on application to the 
House – a lengthy and unnumbered series of paragraphs laid out the reasons for the 
Bill. These paragraphs were highly detailed and explicit as to what the Bill required and 
envisaged. Together these paragraphs constituted the Preamble. The more complex the 
material, the greater the chance for error and this was clearly the case for the Preamble. 
Overall though, it is evident that considerable time and effort had been spent in “getting 
it right”. Whereas the 1913 Bill failed for a technical reason regarding its Preamble, the 
lawmakers in 1924 allowed revisions to the Preamble. This fact indicates the desire to 
settle the affairs of the Accountants to the benefit of the Union. It could be argued, in 
terms of North’s institutional economics, that change had occurred at the “margin” 
(North, 1990: 49). 
 
Section 1 of the Bill stated the intention of the legislation and established the new 
society. Section 2 required the creation and maintenance of a register of the members of 
the society. Section 3 set out the 14 objects ranging from the conduct of examinations 
to promoting legislation deemed to be of advantage to the society. This suggested the 
new society would be pro-active in its own interests. Section 4 limited the register to 
Public Accountants in practice only, and stipulated 12 months after the passage of the 
Act that the use of the designation would not be tolerated unless the accountants so 
concerned were employed on a salary. Section 5 detailed the penalties for contravening 
this section. Section 6 detailed the formation of the provisional council and set the date 
and time of its first meeting. Section 7 set the quora and enabled it to appoint staff, 
notably the Registrar. The placing and wording of this section was almost exactly 
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similar to Section 7 of the 1913 Bill. Clearly the drafters of the Bill made use of the 
earlier documentation. Section 8 empowered the provisional council to divide itself into 
committees for local administration purposes. Section 9 defined eligibility and 
stipulated that applications were to be made within nine months of the commencement 
of the Act. Section 10 stipulated that within 12 months of the commencement of the 
Act, the Transvaal and Natal registers would cease to exist. Section 11 divided the 
Union into four administrative districts (the Provinces) while Section 12 detailed when 
and where meetings were to be held in administrative districts. Section 13 stated when 
district committees would meet to elect chairmen. Section 14 fixed the composition of 
the provisional council while Section 15 made readjustment of representation of the 
districts on council possible. Section 16 vested management and council, as well as 
providing for special powers to act without council for urgent matters. Section 17 
provided for Council to delegate powers to district committees, while Section 18 
defined eligibility for admission subsequent to 12 months after the passing of the Act. 
Section 19 detailed eligibility for those who had served 18 months in the office of 
practising members. [This was aimed at those accountants and auditors in the Union 
Public Service and the Provincial Administration.] Section 20 established the right of 
appeal to the Supreme Court. [This was in connection with Sections 9, 18 and 19.] 
Section 21 reserved the right of articled clerks, non-articled clerks and students in-
service at the time of the passage of the Act. Section 22 established the registration fee 
of 5 guineas. Section 23 detailed extensively offences under the Act. Section 24 
empowered the Council to obtain evidence in the investigation of alleged offences, 
while Section 25 empowered Council to deal with offending members. This section 
also directed Council to require that members show cause to the provisional division of 
the Supreme Court why they should not be suspended. Section 26 stripped a member of 
his position when guilty of non-payment of subscription fee overdue by two years. 
Section 27 allowed members to resign but allowed them to reapply once all arrears had 
been declared. Section 28 established the principle that, where members were removed 
from the register, they ceased to have any claim on the assets of the society. Section 29 
entitled all registered members to the designation “Chartered Accountant (South 
Africa)”. Section 30 established the principle that, upon being elected to office, the 
Council could frame by-laws. Section 31 dealt with annual general meetings while 32 
required council to report annually upon the affairs of the society. An audited statement 
of accounts was obligatory. Section 33 empowered Council to call a special general 
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meeting while Section 34 allowed all members to vote personally or by proxy at all 
general meetings of the society. Section 35 detailed what could not be discussed at 
general meetings unless two thirds of members personally or by proxy resolved to the 
contrary. In terms of Section 36, the Council was required to pass by-laws and to do so 
thereafter from time to time. Section 36 (a–m) detailed a general list of the subject 
matter of these by-laws. Section 37 detailed who could hold office on Council while 
Section 38 detailed what made acts of Council valid. Section 29 stipulated that upon the 
commencement of the Act, the Transvaal and Natal Societies were to be liquidated and 
their funds were to be dealt with as their respective council decided before liquidation. 
Section 40 fixed the liability of members to their registration fee and subscription, 
while Section 41 indemnified members of council and the society’s officers from all 
losses incurred by them except where this was done through “wilful default”. Section 
42 repealed the Transvaal and Natal Acts within 12 months of the commencement of 
this Act. Section 43 was a rudimentary list of definitions, while Section 44 stipulated 
the official title of the Act to be The South African Society of Accountants (Private) 
Act of 1924. 
 
From this brief analysis of the Bill’s contents, it is obvious that the draughtsman of 
1924 had simply “cut and pasted” large portions of the 1913 Act. The assumption was 
that the problem in 1913 had been confined to the Preamble and they failed to realise 
that the true weakness of the Bill was its lack of inclusiveness. 
 
FOREIGN SOCIETIES 
The Societies’ by-laws from 1919 allowed them to recognise a claim upon entry to their 
membership by members of the Chartered Societies of Scotland, England and Wales as 
well as the English Incorporated Society. A provision in the 1913 Bill had specifically 
listed these foreign societies (AB, 1913: s9). This had been so unpopular that no such 
list was included in the 1924 Bill and as South Africa matured into a nation, so too did 
the internal foreign links weaken in favour of domestic imperatives. The Societies’ by-
laws dealing with foreigners were scrapped in favour of a common by-law which 
allowed the admission of foreign members providing they had completed a period of 
practical experience in the form of articles outside South Africa and passed 
examinations equivalent to those required by the South African Societies (UG49, 1935: 
7). This emphasis upon articled service and examination was to remain a constant and 
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consistent requirement by the Societies’ in following years; it was also a source of 
much friction. 
 
Although the names of foreign societies were specifically excluded in the common by-
laws, it was common knowledge that while the chartered societies in the United 
Kingdom required their candidates to complete a period of service under articles, other 
accounting societies there did not and were thus effectively excluded from applying for 
membership of the South African Societies. 
 
In a draft of the 1924 Bill, the Societies initially included a section which would have 
preserved the intention of the original by-laws with regard to foreign societies but to the 
detriment of other societies. This section was later modified in a cumbersome way and 
placed authority for the admission of suitably qualified members of foreign societies in 
the hands of the Governor-General, as advised by a provisional, and later a permanent 
council, both to be established in terms of the Bill (AB, 1924: 18(1)(c)). As the 
prepared provisional council would have a majority of the Provincial Societies’ 
nominees, it is little wonder that the 1924 Bill raised a chorus of opposition. But the 
opposition also included the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. 
Their opposition was not related to the by-laws, but resulted from the Bill’s proposed 
award of the designation “Chartered Accountants (South Africa)” to South African 
accountants (AB, 1924: s29(1)). The Institute was a formal opponent to the Bill before 
the Select Committee. 
 
It is clear from the above that the four Provincial Societies were moving quickly away 
from their 1913 position of encouraging overseas chartered accountants to join the new 
society to give it credence and weight, to one where they pushed to accrue to 
themselves directly the benefits flowing from the use of the designation “chartered 
accountant”. 
 
COMPARISONS: 1913, 1924 AND 1951 
The significant differences between the 1913 and 1924 Bills were the facts that the 
latter intended to confer upon all accountants registered in terms of the proposed Act 
the coveted designation “Chartered Accountant (South Africa)” and made provision for 
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the rights of clerks – including articled clerks – in the by-laws to be framed by the 
proposed Act. 
 
In common with the 1913 Bill, that of 1924 envisaged the process of initial registration 
being controlled by a provisional council comprising 14 members. The mechanism of a 
provisional council had been used in both the Transvaal and Natal when implementing 
their respective legislative enactments. As with the 1913 proposal, the 1924 Bill 
provided for this council to be dominated by the four promoting Societies through their 
power to appoint 12 of the councillors. The remaining two positions would be filled by 
the Auditor-General of the Union as chair of the council and a nominee of the Minister 
of the Interior chosen from those practising accountancy but other than members of the 
promoting Societies. 
 
Although a marginal improvement over the 1913 proposal, it came nowhere near to the 
final composition of the governing body – the Board – as constituted by the 1951 Act. 
This 1951 Act also included some sophisticated elements in that six of the Board’s 15 
members had to be registered as accountants and auditors in terms of the Act. Put 
another way, the majority of the Board was comprised of people skilled in some field 
but not having the potentially stultifying uniformity of a professional membership. In 
addition, the 1951 Act required members to vacate their seats on the Board in a number 
of instances, primarily: 
 
 where their estates had been sequestrated; 
 they had become unsound of mind; 
 they had been convicted of an offence and sentenced to imprisonment without the 
option of a fine; or 
 failure to attend three consecutive meetings of the Board without its permission. 
 
All these elements represented a significant improvement over the provisions of the 
1913 and 1924 Bills. It would not be an exaggeration to see in these improvements 
early attempts to enhance independence, reduce conflicts of interest and create a sense 
of good governance, all critical elements in the profession in 2013. 
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In the Bills of 1913 and 1924, the proposed provisional councils were charged with the 
creation of district committees – one in each of the four provinces of the Union. It is 
important to note, again, that the provincial councils were to prescribe the manner of 
the permanent council’s election, with three members elected respectively from each of 
the districts of the Transvaal, Natal and the Cape while two would be elected for the 
district of the Orange Free State. Whereas the provisional council in 1924 would have 
14 members, the first permanent council was to consist of 13 members, the nominee of 
the Minister of the Interior being dropped, presumably having completed the task of 
monitoring the process and handing over authority from provisional to permanent 
council. As in the 1913 Bill, the 1924 council could delegate – as allowed by its by-
laws – such of its powers as it saw fit. It could not delegate any powers to admit 
members or amend the membership register (AB, 1924: s18). The Act of 1951 made no 
provision for district committees, allowing rather the four Provincial Societies to 
undertake the organisation at this level, thus prefiguring the creation of what is today 
SAICA – that is: the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants. At the end of 12 
months, the provisional council would cease to exist (AB, 1924: s14(2)) making for 
very tight deadlines in establishing the new Society and completing the registration 
process. 
 
RULES OF THE GAME, 1924 
The process of the Bill through the various parliamentary stages is instructive and needs 
to be viewed in the context of two critical facts:  
 
• White labours’ intense dislike of Smuts and his social policies and the latter’s need 
to call a General Election for June 1924 after the South African Party’s loss of the 
Wakkerstroom by-election in April 1924; and 
• the rules and regulations which controlled parliamentary activity. 
 
The South African Society of Accountants (Private) Bill was presented to the House of 
Assembly on 4 February 1924 and two days later the Speaker of the House presented 
the report of the Examiners to the effect that the Bill complied with the House’s 
Standing Orders. The Bill was brought up to the House of Assembly on 12 February 
and was read for the first time. On 18 February, the Speaker brought to the attention of 
the House that in terms of its Standing Order No. 40, petitions in opposition to the 
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Private Bill needed to be presented within three days of its first reading (USA, HA, 
Debates, Vol. 1, 18/2/24: 273), that period ending on Friday 15 February. 
 
He continued that he had discovered two petitions in opposition to the Bill to be 
presented at the current sitting. Furthermore, he noted that both petitions had been 
lodged with the Clerk of the House on 15 February – that is: within the stipulated 
period. He also noted that the first petition had been “irregular” in that only one 
petitioner had signed it while the second petition had not been signed by any of the 
petitioners as they were resident in England, but by their parliamentary agent. The 
Speaker further stated that the first petition had been amended by the omission of the 
words “and on behalf of his said partners” while, with regard to the second, he stated: 
 
“basing my opinion on a precedent established in the late Cape House (V and P 
1906 pp 179 – 180), I think that the irregularity in the second petition can be 
cured by the Parliamentary Agents depositing with the Clerk of the House the 
telegraphic authority for their principles, on whose behalf they signed the 
petition. I am informed that this telegraphic authority has not been deposited 
with the Clerk and in the circumstances would recommend that indulgency be 
granted in both instances” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 1, 18/2/1924: 273). 
 
This was agreed and is a clear indication of Parliament’s painstaking attention to detail 
as well as a sense of reasonable compromise so as to get the process moving. In terms 
of institutional economics, this could be viewed as “change at the margin” (North, 
1990: 49). The new Labour members in the House after the General Election of June 
1924 challenged the principles embodied in the Bill and in so doing slowed the process 
and pushed any solution into the future. At this point circumstances did not allow for 
compromise. 
 
REASONS FOR THE OPPOSITION TO THE BILL 
At the first meeting of the Select Committee, the clerk to the committee detailed a 
further party in opposition to the Bill, this being the London Association of 
Accountants, Limited, its petition being signed by its President, Fred Maddox. The 
petitions against the Bill are important documents as they detail the very real concerns 
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of practitioners to the proposals as underwritten by the Four Societies. They also 
provide an interpretation of the Bill. 
 
HOOPER’S CONCERNS 
The petition of AS Hooper listed a number of concerns, principally with:  
 
(i) the use of the designation CA; 
(ii) the Cape and Orange Free State; and 
(iii) the by-laws. 
 
Each concern is discussed and analysed in detail:  
 
(i) DESIGNATION 
The use of the term “Chartered Accountant” was applied in England and South Africa 
to members of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, and the 
Society of Chartered Accountants in Edinburgh, Scotland. Such membership was 
earned by five years of articles and an admission examination. Thus, the term was 
“accepted as vouching for qualifications of the highest degree in Accountancy” (SC7, 
1924, Appendix B: v). 
 
This was the crux of the matter as the term had a cachet in the international world of 
British commerce. Hooper believed that if such a term was applied to members of the 
proposed new Society it would mislead the South African public who could reasonably 
expect that such persons had the qualifications of, or experience with, the Chartered 
Societies in the United Kingdom. Much time and effort would be expended in debating 
this issue both in this Bill and in the lead up to the passage of the Designation Act of 
1927 before the phrase “South Africa” was placed after CA. The new Australian 
Society of Accountants adopted a similar solution in 1928. 
 
The proposed use of the designation “chartered accountant” caused much debate in the 
Select Committee. To start with, Advocate Mars, for the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales, pointed out that the proposal contained in Section 
29 of the Bill giving registered South African accountants the right to use the 
designation “Chartered Accountant (South Africa)”, had not been the subject of a 
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public notice. Mars was shown to be correct and the omission needed the specific 
sanction of the House. Mars believed the Scottish Societies of Chartered Accountants 
“would be here in opposition today if they had had notice” (SC7, 1924: Q907), (SC7, 
1924: Q487). He considered this to be unfortunate as he believed it was “one of the 
greatest matters of contention in the Bill” (SC7, 1924: Q489), and pointed out that there 
had been an active campaign in South Africa in support of the designation (SC7, 1924: 
Q509). Mr Mitchell, a member of the Natal Society, giving evidence at the time, 
believed that “a large majority” of South African accountants were in favour of the 
designation (SC7, 1924: Q513; Q558). 
 
Mars continued his questioning of Mitchell and, in the process, the history of the 
designation was elucidated. The phrase was originally used to describe societies of 
accountants in the United Kingdom given official recognition in the form of the award 
of Royal Charters. At the time of the award, “it did not indicate any high standard” 
(SC7, 1924: Q530), but, as Mars noted “in consequence of the high personal character 
of the members belonging to [those societies] the word [had] acquired this 
significance” (SC7, 1924: Q532). Mars summed up by stating that if there was “any 
magic in the word” (SC7, 1924: Q533) it was attributable to the personal achievements 
of the societies and their members to whom the phrase applied. The dangers in using it 
to describe another society of accountants was that the public would “ascribe to that 
body the personal characteristics of the members of the existing chartered societies” 
(SC7, 1924: Q534) and would be confused – indeed, it would “almost amount to 
deception” (SC7, 1924: Q517). South African accountants needed to earn their 
reputation. 
 
Mitchell pointed out that the addition of “South Africa” would give the phrase 
sufficient distinction to avoid any confusion. He also stated that there were five or six 
Canadian societies who used the designation “CA” without the qualification “Canada” 
(SC7, 1924: Q535). He ascribed this usage to the “authority of their local laws” (SC7, 
1924: Q537). The implication was clear – if other members of the Empire could do it, 
then so could South Africa. 
 
It was clear that in South Africa, as elsewhere within the Empire, “chartered 
accountant” had become synonymous with “skilled public accountant” and this had 
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been a powerful motivating factor in its choice (SC7, 1924: Q569–70) and one which, 
if applied in South Africa, would give its users a definite business advantage. In South 
Africa, the alternative was “Registered Public Accountant” which had been authorised 
by the Transvaal Ordinance of 1904 as well as by the Natal Act of 1909 (SC7, 1924: 
Q493–5). Mitchell’s evidence given on 4 March 1924 was that this title had never been 
popular (SC7, 1924: Q503). 
 
Another concern was the perceived intention of the four Provincial Societies to reserve 
the title “Statutory Accountant” for the members of the Cape and Orange Free State 
societies who had joined just prior to the presentation of the Bill. Mr James Douglas, a 
member and the honorary secretary of the Cape Society of Accountants and Auditors 
explained that to give such new members “the title of ‘Chartered Accountant of South 
Africa’ would be rather lowering the standard, so they put him on a level by himself 
and say after five years he can get it, sooner if he likes by the examination” (SC7, 1924: 
Q895). This proposal was not accepted with much enthusiasm and Douglas agreed to 
leave it “in the hands of the Select Committee” (SC7, 1924: Q903). It got no further. 
 
Not all members of the four Provincial Societies were in favour of the designation 
“CA(SA)”. This was the view of James Pim, an English chartered accountant who had 
pursued a career in accountancy work in Johannesburg and Kimberley from 1890. He 
had also been the first President of the Council of the Transvaal Society (SC7, 1924: 
Q1872). Pim believed that the term “chartered” had a narrow meaning attached to 
individuals who had “reached a certain standard” and that it would be unfair to “extend 
that term to persons outside of that class” (SC7, 1924: Q1914–5). He was also of the 
opinion that “try as you will and do the best you can for your pupils you cannot give 
them [the clerks] the training they can obtain in the Old Country” (SC7, 1924: Q1920). 
Here Pim was referring to the fact that in 1924 South Africa’s process of 
industrialisation was nowhere near that of Great Britain and, accordingly, the 
availability of practical experience and perhaps job opportunities in South Africa were 
limited. While this was true in 1924, that year also saw the advent of the Pact 
Government and its policies of industrialisation and job creation for whites. 
 
Pim’s facts were supported by details given by him of the numbers of chartered 
accountants actually practising in the Union. According to information he had, there 
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were two in Natal, one in the Orange Free State, seven in the Cape and 18 in the 
Transvaal (SC7, 1924: Q1925–8), a total of 28. Advocate Mars, for the opposition in 
the form of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, made some 
observations on these facts:  
 
(a) If the designation CA was “such a business asset”, the reasonable expectation 
would be to see more of them in public practice in the Union (SC7, 1924: 
Q1926); 
(b) Out of a total number in the Union of 554 practising accountants in the four 
Provincial Societies, only 28 were chartered accountants and British trained 
(SC7, 1924: Q1929); 
(c) With regard to the Incorporated Accountants, there were 67 in the Transvaal, 21 
in Natal, three in the Orange Free State and 16 at the Cape. Mars commented 
further: “So apparently the term “Incorporated” does not seem to have suffered 
in comparison with the term “Chartered” ” (SC7, 1924: Q1933–4); what Mars 
neglected to add was the inevitable future increase in Chartered Accountants 
should the Provincial Societies have their way. This is what the “Incorporateds” 
feared – that is: being superseded by their opponents as accountants. 
(d) The result of the award to members of the proposed South African Society of 
Accountants of the designation “Chartered Accountants (South Africa)”, would 
“instead of raising the 554 to the eminence of the 28, … destroy that eminence, 
save in respect of the 28 individuals” (SC7, 1924: Q1940). This was an emotive 
observation, underlining the widespread belief that few accounting 
qualifications matched the quality of a United Kingdom chartered accountant’s 
training. Perhaps a dip in standards was inevitable as in New Zealand in 1908 
and would need to work through the system. 
 
Another answer to Mars’ observations could possibly be that South Africa was still 
emerging from the post-war depression and an agrarian background, and that greater 
industrialisation and its concomitant need for more accountants, lay in the future. 
 
While there was opposition to the use of the designation “CA”, it is equally clear that 
there was widespread support. Walker, for the promoters of the Bill, pointed out to the 
Committee that at meetings of the Provincial Societies held throughout South Africa to 
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discuss the Bill, three of the four Promoting Societies had unanimously agreed that 
their designation should be “Chartered Accountant” and that the outstanding society – 
the Society of Accountants and Auditors in the Orange Free State – would soon fall in 
line (SC7, 1924: Q1212). The belief of many was succinctly put when Mr DM Brown, 
member for Three Rivers, described the designation as “the hall mark 22. It is the 
highest title you can get” (SC7, 1924: Q2560). The Select Committee agreed and those 
in opposition to the title had to be content with the geographically descriptive addition 
“South Africa”. In a display of a growing sense of South African nationalism, Samuel 
Thompson, a member of the Council of the Transvaal Society of Accountants, put it as 
follows: “It is only the foreign societies who are opposing and we take no notice of 
them. It is purely a South African affair and we say they have no right to interfere with 
our legislation” (SC7, 1924: Q246). 
 
On the last day of the Committee’s proceedings it decided that all accountants 
registered in terms of the proposed Act were to be entitled to use the designation 
“Chartered Accountant (South Africa)”. An attempt by one member of the Committee – 
Mr Fitchat – to have “South Africa” removed, was defeated by five votes to one (SC7, 
1924, Proceedings: xxxi). Shortly thereafter the Select Committee agreed to report the 
Bill, with amendments, especially to the Preamble, to the House of Assembly. 
 
Previously, on 10 March 1924, in front of the Select Committee, Advocate Mars for the 
Bill’s opponents had put the basics of the matter succinctly when questioning Mr Wood 
of the Cape Society of Accountants and Auditors. He asked: 
 
“what you really want in this Act of Parliament is a declaration from Parliament 
that the South African Society of Accountants shall obtain the same standing 
and status as the chartered society”. 
 
Wood agreed (SC7, 1924: Q1550), and as it turned out in the end, the South African 
Government was not averse to doing so, but not through the means of a Bill intended to 
unify, register and regulate the accounting profession. Another piece of legislation was 
needed for that – the Designation Act of 1927. 
 
 199 
 
What is apparent is that the 1924 Bill had seen a subtle switch in the focus of the 
Provincial Societies from a single unified accounting society in which they had a 
significant influence, to a society in which they exercised that influence mainly through 
the benefits flowing from its establishment as a chartered society. 
 
(ii) THE CAPE AND ORANGE FREE STATE 
In terms of the Bill, residents of the Cape Province and Orange Free State not practising 
as accountants at the time the Bill became an Act, could only be admitted to the new 
society at the discretion of the majority of the provisional council detailed in the Bill. 
Hooper objected to the potential for the arbitrary use of such discretion. This issue 
would remain so long as the Transvaal and Natal Societies could claim establishment 
by statute, effectively until the 1951 Act. 
 
(iii) BY-LAWS 
Members of any society or institute of accountants outside South Africa could only be 
admitted and registered as accountants with the new South African body 12 months 
after the commencement of the proposed Act, should the new body’s by-laws and 
regulations allow. The rights of existing and potential members would be at the mercy 
of such by-laws, the point being that the by-laws would only be formulated after the 
passage of the Act. The Four Societies would thus be able to neutralise overseas 
competition, or at least to inconvenience it. This concern was difficult to assuage for a 
number of reasons, one of which was that if Parliament approved, only it could amend 
the legislation in a lengthy time-consuming process. Both New Zealand and Australia 
adopted the “by-laws after enactment” model. 
 
The 1924 Bill’s Section 28 authorised the proposed society’s council, after election, to 
frame by-laws – inconsistent with the proposed Act – to cover the examination and 
admission of people under Sections 18 (defined eligibility) and 19 (set a registration fee 
of 5 guineas) (SC7, 1924, Proceedings: xxx). The by-laws, of course, covered many 
other issues and these were detailed in Section 36. One of the main amendments made 
by the Select Committee in an attempt to defuse concerns that the new society’s council 
would behave in a high handed fashion, was to subject any future change or addition to 
its by-laws to approval by the Governor-General and publication in the Union Gazette 
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(SC7, 1924, Proceedings: xxxii). By this means, the Committee hoped to restrain any 
excess or unfairness. 
 
THE LONDON ASSOCIATION’S CONCERNS 
The petition of the London Association of Accountants was in much the same vein. It 
reflected a concern that the four Provincial Societies promoting the Bill did not 
represent them and many other people who practised accountancy in the Union. In fact, 
the petition alleged the promoting Societies represented 
 
“certain bodies of Accountants Overseas, to wit those of the Chartered and 
Incorporated Accountants who are professional competitors of and hostile 
towards the London Association whose rapid growth and uniform success they 
have viewed with the greatest concern” (SC7, 1924, Appendix D: xi). 
 
Given the English Chartered Society’s concerns as detailed in Hooper’s petition, this 
conspiracy was unlikely, but it suggests that the professional competition in the United 
Kingdom had the potential to spill over into South Africa and these petitioners were 
concerned at the extent of their metropolitan competitor’s influence, real or imagined. 
 
What is indisputable are the facts that:  
 
 the four Provincial Societies had British qualified chartered accountants in their 
ranks, some at senior levels; 
 there had been a proliferation in the United Kingdom of accounting societies for 
some time; and 
 in South Africa the advent of the Pact Government in mid-1924 signalled economic 
recovery, pro-White legislation and opportunity, an attractive mix for many, 
including those who offered accounting and auditing services. 
 
But as suggested earlier, the links between the four Provincial Societies and the United 
Kingdom chartered societies were probably tenuous, the real links being between 
individuals of the two groupings. It is also possible that the Bill’s proposed designation 
of “Chartered Accountant (South Africa)” was intended partly to prevent any formal 
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relationship with United Kingdom societies simply on the basis that their designation of 
“Chartered Accountant” would enhance the proposed new Society’s standing in the 
public eye. The South African designation would do equally well and would fit in with 
a growing national awareness encapsulated in the slogan, “South Africa First”. 
 
The London Association was also concerned that if the Bill passed into law, only those 
registered with the proposed new Society would be able to practise as public 
accountants and auditors which law, if contravened, could mean fines and 
imprisonment. The Association, in its petition, was concerned with several other 
specific aspects of the Bill. These concerns were because 
 
 of the pre-eminence accorded in the Bill to the four Provincial Societies, who could 
influence admission to the register, the composition of the provisional council and 
the district committees, the appointment of office bearers and, finally, the 
permanent council; 
 qualified accountants not on the new Society’s first register provided by the 
provisional council would have no say in the election of the district committees and 
thus the first permanent council. 
 the Association’s members would only qualify for membership of the new Society 
if they were practising as public accountants in the Cape or Orange Free State. The 
reason the Cape and Orange Free State could offer an avenue of entry was twofold, 
firstly their accountants were members of the group promoting the Bill, and 
secondly membership of their respective societies was voluntary and “open”. The 
Natal and Transvaal Societies were “closed” in the sense that they had been 
legislated into existence by their previous respective colonial administrations and 
admission to them was compulsory to all practising in their provinces and this was 
strictly regulated. Those accountants in these two provinces not registered in terms 
of existing provincial legislation were not to be given an exemption in the proposed 
national legislation. The reason for this is that any exemption was perceived as 
unfair to the existing membership in Natal and the Transvaal who had gained 
admission through service and examination. 
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The Bill also stipulated that unless they could prove to the new Council they were 
members of a society or institute of accountants whose membership was deemed 
sufficient in terms of the new Society’s by-laws and regulations, 12 months after the 
promulgation of the Act, no one would be allowed to register as a public accountant 
without meeting the Act’s requirements. In essence, this objection was the same as that 
included in the submissions of Hooper and the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales (detailed earlier). The concern was that ordinary accountants could 
be denied membership to the new Society and thus prevented from earning a living in 
the profession of accountancy. 
 
There was also a concern that the Bill would force South Africans to study to be 
accountants only through the promoting Societies or with certain overseas bodies. 
 
The fundamental fear exposed in the Association’s petition was that the Bill would 
create a monopoly of accounting power in the hands of the Four Societies and their 
allies (SC7, 1924, Appendix D: xii). 
 
THE LONDON ASSOCIATION: MORE CONCERNS 
Some of the interesting aspects of the 1924 Bill lie in its similarities with, and its 
differences from, the 1913 Bill. When questioning Samuel Thompson, member of the 
Council of the Transvaal Society of Accountants and a British CA, Advocate Davies 
for the London Association put it to him that the only difference was that the 1913 Bill 
had included a list of societies approved by the four Provincial Societies. Thompson 
agreed. This inclusion had provoked a storm of protest from those societies excluded 
from the list. While the 1924 Bill contained no such list, preferring to allow the 
proposed council to make its own choices (SC7, 1924: Q227–9), it is clear that there 
were antagonistic feelings between the promoters of the Bill and the London 
Association of Accountants whom Davis represented. 
 
This “hereditary feud” (SC7, 1924: Q1251) had its roots in the different approaches to 
staff training with regard to examination and experience that the promoters and the 
London Association adopted. This was apparent in the evidence given to the Committee 
on 3 March 1924 by Mr TC Mitchell, a member of the Natal Society of Accountants. 
When questioning Mitchell, Advocate Davis stated that salaries paid to articled clerks 
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were so small that candidates admitted to articles could very often not afford to spend 
six years in the office of a practising accountant. Mitchell was firm in his belief that 
without this service such individuals “would not be getting the necessary experience” 
(SC7, 1924: Q419). When Davis countered that the London Association believed 
experience could be obtained in ways other than at an accountant’s office, Mitchell 
replied simply: “That is our view” (SC7, 1924: Q420). Davis’ response to this was: 
“And consequently may we take it that so long as you have anything to do with it, if the 
London Association persists in that view, then you will not recognise the London 
Association as an approved body” (SC7, 1924: Q422). 
 
Mitchell demurred. But when Davis later interviewed Mr FR Maddox, the President of 
the London Association, Maddox quoted Samuel Thompson’s earlier response to a 
question as to why the London Association had not been put on the Transvaal’s list of 
approved societies, as being:  
 
“The council considered that the standard set for admission to that society was 
not equal to ours. Those who applied for admission were not equal in the 
ordinary, to those who came into our society” (SC7, 1924: Q2362). 
 
Maddox stated that this belief had never been communicated to the Association. 
 
It is clear from the Minutes of the Committee’s Proceedings that the London 
Association’s standards at one time had been questionable and possibly remained so in 
1924. Maddox agreed that, before 1919, the Association had admitted to membership 
without examination “people of good standing in the profession”, but pointed out that 
many societies had done so originally (SC7, 1924: Q2409a). He also pointed out that 
entry was now examination-based, but was evasive when Walker, for the promoters, 
asked whether the examinations had been “stiffened up” (SC7, 1924: Q2406–8). 
 
The following paragraph details membership numbers of various accounting bodies 
practising in South Africa in the early 1920s. Of interest is the fact that the British-
trained accountants exerted an influence beyond their numbers – this despite the fact 
that not all were chartered. The reason is the continuing imperial connection. The 
British may have withdrawn their troops but they still exerted considerable influence 
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through their investment in the economy, particularly mining and banking. In part, this 
influence was exhibited and implemented through trained expatriates working in the 
economy. This influence was eroded: politically, by the Balfour Declaration of 1926 
which recognised the autonomy of the Dominions; and, economically, through the 
establishment of the small but financially powerful Sanlam group by WA Hofmeyr 
(O’Meara, 1983: 31). Another issue was the export of agricultural goods to imperial 
Britain at prices over which South African producers had no control. This made them 
unhappy and translated into anti-imperialism at a grass roots level and a demand for 
higher subsidies which, ironically, needed “some form of collaboration with mining 
capital” (O’Meara 1983, 29–30). Change was in the air. 
 
MEMBERSHIP TOTALS COMPARED 
The membership worldwide of the London Association in 1919 was 1 800. By 1924, it 
had grown by 712 to 2 512 as a result of a policy to recruit those who had not 
completed articles but who held responsible accountancy positions in commercial firms 
and municipalities (SC7, 1924: Q2370; Q2378). Of this world total of 2 512 members, 
59 were in the Union with 17 in the Cape, 35 in the Transvaal, six in Natal and one in 
the Orange Free State (SC7, 1924: Q2201–2). As a comparative in this period, the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales had 6 000 members 
worldwide (SC7, 1924: Q2384), the Society of Incorporated Accountants (in England) 
had 3 500 members (SC7, 1924: Q2385). In South Africa, at that time, there were in the 
four Provincial Societies 554 practising members, 28 being chartered accountants from 
one or other of the United Kingdom Chartered Societies, 107 were originally 
Incorporated accountants, and 419 had South African qualifications (SC7, 1924: 
Q1430–3). While not specifically stated, it is likely that some of the 28 chartered 
accountants had been early admissions to the Four Societies, particularly in Natal and 
the Transvaal and had been admitted without having passed an examination. Certainly, 
Walker (SC7, 1924: Q1434) believed that there were chartered and incorporated 
accountants in South Africa who had never sat for an examination but who were in 
public practice nevertheless. 
 
It would appear that in the eyes of their South African counterparts, a significant 
weakness in the London Association’s policy was not insisting upon practical 
experience in the form of articles as a prerequisite for membership. But from Maddox’s 
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testimony given to the Select Committee on 14 March there was also “a state of 
hostility” between the London Association and at least some of the United Kingdom 
chartered societies, “mostly in regard to private Bills and measures before Parliament at 
Home; they tried to get the words ‘chartered’ and ‘incorporated’ inserted into Bills to 
the exclusion of any other body of accountants” (SC7, 1924: Q2386). 
 
Whatever the issues, the London Association did not appear in Section 23(3)(b) of the 
Public Accountants and Auditors Act of 1951. This particular section allowed the 
members of certain societies to apply for registration in South Africa. Of the five listed, 
three were of South African origin and only two from overseas – the Society of 
Incorporated Accountants and Auditors and the Association of Certified and Corporate 
Accountants. In keeping with the policy of “South Africa First”, the exemption applied 
only to members of the South African branches of these overseas organisations. 
 
The London Association contended that the standard of their qualifying examination 
was equal to those of the promoting Societies and that there was no reason for 
excluding their members from the ambit of the Bill or putting the Association’s 
members in a lesser position than those of the promoting Societies. The petition of the 
London Association concluded with the statement that the preamble to the Bill did not 
“adequately set forth the objects nor cover the scope of the present bill” (SC7, 1924, 
Appendix D: xv) – the technical reason which sunk the first Private Bill in 1913. The 
Select Committee took this latter criticism seriously. 
 
THE BILL BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE 
In accordance with Parliament’s Standing Orders, the House on 19 February referred 
the Bill to a Select Committee on a seconded motion from RW Close, KC, the member 
for Rondebosch. 
 
In 1924, Close was a member of the SA Party and probably a “Smuts man”. To this 
Select Committee were also referred two petitions in opposition – one from AS Hooper 
of Cape Town, a partner in the firm of Deloitte, Plender, Griffiths, Annan and Co., 
Chartered Accountants, and an associate of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales and the second from Fairbridge, Arderne and Lawton, 
Parliamentary Agents, on behalf of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England 
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and Wales. These two petitions had similarities in content and a single counsel 
appeared before the Committee on their behalf, this being Advocate Mars. The Select 
Committee met from 28 February to 31 March 1924 and its membership – both before 
and after the General Election of June 1924 – is shown in Table 8.2 in the next chapter. 
The list of witnesses interviewed by the Committee is shown in Table 7.3. 
 
TABLE 7.3 
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIETY OF 
ACCOUNTANTS (PRIVATE) BILL: 1924, 
LIST OF WITNESSES 
 
1. Brown, DM, OBE, MLA Certified Accountant, Cape Province 
2. Brunt, JPJ Accounting Officer, Assistant Provincial Secretary and 
Controller of Educational Finance of the Cape 
Province and a member of the Public Services 
Association 
3. Douglas, J Member of the Cape Society of Accountants and 
honorary secretary, and formerly a member of its 
Council 
4. Foster, G Member of the Transvaal Society of Accountants and 
its “younger school of accountants” 
5. Goch, LC Registered Public Accountant in the Transvaal, passing 
the final examination in 1907 
6. Hooper, AS Member of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
England and Wales 
7. Latham, JC Secretary to the London Association of Accountants 
8. Maddox, FR President of the London Association of Accountants 
and a member of the London Chamber of Commerce 
9. Martin, CB City Treasurer, Cape Town Corporation and a member 
of the Society of Incorporated Accountants 
10. McConnell, FC Associate of the Cape Society of Accountants and an 
Incorporated Accountant 
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11. Mitchell, TC Member of the Natal Society of Accountants 
12. Pim, JH A member of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
England and Wales 
13. Roos, J de V The Controller and Auditor-General of the Union of 
South Africa 
14. Stuttaford, R The Chairman and General Manager of Stuttaford and 
Company Ltd, and a member of the Cape Town 
Chamber of Commerce 
15. Thompson, S Member of the Transvaal Society of Accountants and 
its Council 
16. Warner, GW A member of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
England, the Incorporated Society of Accountants and 
Auditors of England, and the Council of the Society of 
Accountants and Auditors of the Orange Free State 
17. Wood, NS A member of the Cape Society of Accountants and 
Auditors 
Source: SC7, 1924: Q1. 
 
THE SELECT COMMITTEE BEGINS ITS INVESTIGATION: RULES OF THE 
GAME: THE ISSUE OF THE 1924 PREAMBLE 
The London Association’s legal counsel, Advocate Davis, put to the Committee a 
schedule detailing omissions in the Preamble in its original form. The Committee 
deliberated and instructed its chairman, Bissett, the member for South Peninsula, to 
make a special report to the House of Assembly with a request that the original 
Preamble be replaced with the more acceptable one provided by the Committee. The 
reason given for the substitution was that “certain Clauses of the Bill, though covered 
by the published notices of the objects of the Bill, [were] not covered by the Preamble” 
(SC7, 1924, Report: ix), possibly the result of poor draughtsmanship. 
 
The “certain Clauses”, were 9, 18 and 27, and respectively dealt with the powers of a 
proposed provisional council to admit members; the scope of by-laws yet to be 
established regarding admission of members of foreign societies and, finally, the 
reservation of the title “Chartered Accountant (South Africa)” to members of the 
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proposed new society. This final provision, its opponents believed, misled the public 
into believing bearers of the appellation had qualifications and experience which they 
did not possess. The designation would create considerable debate and later form the 
subject of a new bill – the Chartered Accountants’ Designation (Private) Bill of 1927. 
The changes needed the specific approval of the House (SC7, 1924, Appendix C: vii) as 
a question of parliamentary procedure was involved. 
 
In spite of the opposition of Hooper and the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales, Bisset reported the problems with the Preamble to the House on 
28 February and obtained its approval to continue. Why the London Association did not 
join the other opponents in protesting the issue is not clear. Perhaps its representatives 
realised there was a predisposition on the part of the House not to put unnecessary 
barriers to the process running its course. The latitude that the House was prepared to 
allow in 1924 can perhaps, in part, be ascribed to a desire by the ruling party to see the 
profession regulated by a single nation-wide statute. This was certainly in line with the 
idea of “South Africa First”. 
 
The Committee then commenced its investigation and the procedural jockeying began. 
Mr Walker, of the firm Walker, Jacobson and le Roux, for the promoters of the Bill, 
objected to the London Association being heard in any way other than upon the distinct 
grounds set out in its petition. Davies, on behalf of the petitioners in opposition, denied 
that he had departed from the petition and while the Chair, Bisset, noted that any such 
perceived departure would enable Walker “to raise an objection to the Committee” 
(SC7, 1924, Proceedings: xvi), Walker did not do so, the point having been made that 
the opposition could face a tough battle. 
 
A succession of witnesses (see Table 7.3) for and against the Bill were examined by the 
Committee until on 27 March 1924 it resolved that the Chair of the Committee report to 
the House and request that it be permitted to amend again the Preamble to the Bill in a 
number of ways detailed in the Committee’s Report “in order to restrict the scope of the 
Bill” (SC7, 1924, Proceedings: xxv). 
 
The second event occasioning a request to the House of Assembly for approval to 
amend the Preamble was as a result of its use of language. Towards the end of the 
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Select Committee’s investigation, it became apparent that certain words and phrases 
used in the Preamble needed to be changed or omitted to align it with the restrictions 
placed in Committee upon the scope by the Bill. Words like “unqualified” were 
changed to “unregistered” while the phrase “practise or be admitted to practise” became 
“hold themselves out” and “to provide for a right of appeal in the case of persons 
aggrieved by a decision of the Council” was inserted (SC7, 1924, Report: ix–x). The 
changes were approved by the House on 27 March. 
 
When this permission was received on the following day, the Chair, Bisset, proposed 
“That the Preamble stand part of the Bill” (SC7, 1924, Proceedings: xxvi). The 
Committee agreed, and with the Preamble “proved”, the way was open for the 
Committee to amend the Bill as it saw fit. 
 
This process began on 28 March and ended on 31 March 1924. Members of the Select 
Committee debated a large number of issues in great detail, paying careful attention to 
the meaning of words in their context. Each contentious issue was considered and 
difficulties were resolved by majority vote. Finally, the Committee resolved “That the 
Chairman report the Bill with amendments and specially the amendments in the 
Preamble” (SC7, 1924, Proceedings: xxxiii). 
 
An interchange between the Speaker of the House and a Mr Alexander, representing 
Cape Town Castle, underlines the necessary attention to detail in the process and its 
attendant potential for confusion. While considering the Select Committee’s request to 
the House to approve changes in the Preamble, Alexander made the comment that the 
House needed an opportunity of comparing the changes with the Bill. “There are very 
important alterations to it and it should be laid on the table”. Alexander had confused 
changes in the Preamble to mean changes to the Bill as well. The Speaker put him right: 
“The Bill will come back to the House. It is still in Select Committee which will come 
back to the House in its amended form” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 1, 27/3/1924: 1132). 
 
The Speaker of the House accepted the Select Committee’s report in the House on 
1 April and set a day for its second reading – 4 April (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 1, 
1/4/1924: 1235). Again the concern not to hinder the process is evident and is indicated 
by the fact that, whereas the 1913 Bill was lost in Select Committee as a result of 
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technical inadequacies in its Preamble, the Preamble in the 1924 Bill survived its 
inadequacies on two separate occasions. 
 
PROPOSALS FOR ADMISSION: THE FIVE CATEGORIES 
In comparison to the Australian model, the South African Society of Accountants 
(Private) Bill of 1924, as amended by the Select Committee and sent to the House of 
Assembly, proposed five categories for admission (AB, 1924: s9). 
 
The first category covered all persons whose names, at the commencement of the Act, 
were on the registers of the four promoting Societies, these being the Transvaal Society 
of Accountants, the Natal Society of Accountants, the Cape Society of Accountants and 
Auditors and the Society of Accountants and Auditors in the Orange Free State. This 
specific inclusion was not to be found in the 1951 Act, despite the fact that the 
definition accorded to “society” in that Act meant one of these four Provincial 
Societies. However, a careful scrutiny of the 1951 admission requirements makes it 
clear that members of these Societies would gain admission without difficulty. 
 
The second category comprised people, who, at the commencement of the proposed 
1924 Act or within nine months of this date, qualified for admission to, or membership 
of, one of the Four Societies detailed in category one. 
 
The third category allowed entrance to all who, on 31 March 1924, were bona fide 
practising as public accountants in the Cape or Orange Free State. The inclusion of a 
specific date before the actual date of commencement of the Act was clearly to prevent 
a last minute rush of people purporting to be public accountants in practice. While the 
Bill gave no details as to how this would be implemented, it is possible that reference 
would be made to the licences issued to those who wished to practice accounting. A 
licence was a common requirement to practise in the Cape and Orange Free State (SC7, 
1924: Q206–9). 
 
The next category extended admission to all resident accountants in the Cape Province 
or the Orange Free State who, in the opinion of the majority of the provisional council 
were “fit and proper persons to be admitted to the register by virtue of their knowledge 
and past experience” (AB, 1924: s9(d)). This provision did not apply to Natal or the 
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Transvaal for the simple reason that both had had accounting societies constituted by 
law in existence for some time. It was a strong conviction of these societies that no 
similar concession should be made in their provinces where individuals could only 
legally practice publically as accountants if they were members of the Provincial 
Societies. 
 
The final category for admission attempted to ameliorate the previous one and granted a 
concession to those in the Transvaal and Natal if they could show they had been bona 
fide practising as public accountants in either province at the time the provinces opened 
their registers for admission in terms of either the Transvaal Ordinance of 1904 or the 
Natal Act of 1909 but had failed to register as a result of “sickness, absence or other 
sufficient cause” (AB, 1924: s9(e)). But it was unlikely that there were many 
accountants to whom this would apply. In terms of Section 10, at the end of a set 12-
month period the membership registers of the Natal and Transvaal Societies would 
“cease to exist” and anyone not registered in the South African Society of Accountants 
in terms of Section 18 of the Bill could not “hold themselves out as accountants”. This 
was also reinforced by the strictures of Section 4 of the Bill which, however, made the 
point that those employed exclusively on a salary on writing up accounts for an 
employer, could describe themselves as accountants. 
 
RULES OF THE GAME: CHANGES MADE TO THE BILL BY THE SELECT 
COMMITTEE – PUBLIC SERVANTS 
One of the biggest changes made by the Committee was to insert a new Section 19 after 
Section 18 in response to the considerable pressure exerted by the Public Service for its 
accountants to be included within the ambit of the Bill. The essence of the addition was 
to allow Public Servants of at least the rank of a second grade clerk in the Union Public 
Service and with a minimum service of 10 years in its accounting or auditing functions, 
to complete a continuous 18-month clerkship with a practising member of the new and 
unified Society. Thereafter, upon complying with Section 18(1)(a) and (b) of the Bill as 
to character and completion of the appropriate examination, the successful candidate 
could pay the registration fee, and then register as a qualified member of the Society. 
This opening was also available on similar conditions to municipal servants or those 
employed in corporations, companies or mercantile businesses. Common to all was the 
caveat that persons covered by this section could only sit for the final examination 
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during or after the 18-month service (SC7, 1924, Proceedings: xxviii-xxix). The change 
did not satisfy the Public Servants and became the source of much acrimonious debate 
in the House after the Pact’s victory in the 1924 General Election. 
 
The sense of entitlement felt by the Public Servants incensed (unofficially) the Four 
Societies. A telegram sent on 15 March 1924 by the Transvaal Society of Accountants 
to Mr Douglas, Secretary to the Cape Society, gives vent to this frustration. It read (in 
abbreviated telegram style):  
 
“Bill intended for registration practising accountants and those who have 
qualified as such by training and examination and not meant to grant status to 
civil servants or municipal audit clerks or a reserve for these persons on which 
they can fall back on retirement. Stop. Bill not intended for them. Stop. Rather 
than open door again to such even for nine months, Council no hesitation 
definitely withdrawing from Bill. Council refuse agree any alteration clause 
eighteen no greater justification five years than fifty. In order however meet 
Committee views Council reluctantly agree modification original clause nine … 
This is irreducible minimum if not acceptable will withdraw from Bill” 
(SAAHC, TSA, Minutes 15 March 1924: 155). 
 
Despite this hardline attitude, the Public Servants remained persistent. 
 
At this point, it is appropriate to consider the South African Public Service. At Union in 
1910, all public officials in the Cape, Natal, Transvaal and Orange Free State, had been 
put under the authority of the Governor-General, as were the corresponding 
administrative powers, authorities and functions. They were used by the Governor-
General to place supreme control in the hands of the first elected Parliament with the 
first Ministry responsible to it. 
 
The new South African Public Service was modelled along the lines of the British Civil 
Service, with entry by examination. A Public Service Commission, supposedly free of 
political interference, was to regulate conditions of service, rates of pay, criteria for 
promotion etc. But whereas the British Civil Service was run along professional lines 
after a thorough review and adoption of the recommendations for improvement 
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contained in the Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1854 (http://www.politicsweb.co.za 
[accessed 27/9/2013]), the South African Public Service gained a reputation for being a 
source of political patronage. As Feinstein (2005: 86) notes, one of the first acts of the 
Pact Government in 1925 was to retrench hundreds of Blacks employed on the railways 
and harbours, and to replace them with mainly Afrikaans-speaking Whites. This 
observation is reinforced by O’Meara, who states that much was done by the Pact  
 
“to foster the particular economic interests of the Afrikaans-speaking petty 
bourgeoisie – equal language rights, as a result of the Official Languages of the 
Union Act, 1925 and the South Africa Act, 1909, Amendment Act, 1925, 
compulsory bilingualism in the Civil Service, the appointment of Afrikaner 
intellectuals to senior Civil Service positions [and] their large-scale employment 
in senior and middle-management … of state-run industries” (O’Meara, 1983: 
56). 
 
But perhaps the most damning criticism comes from Nathan in his 1919 book entitled 
The South African Commonwealth. He wrote: “Admission into the Public Service is 
comparatively easy. There is an entrance examination, but it cannot be said that its 
requirements are severe or that a high standard of attainment is expected” (Nathan, 
1919: 151). The Public Service was thus seriously flawed. 
 
ADMISSION TO THE NEW SOCIETY: ARTICLES OF CLERKSHIP 
If the issue of the designation in South Africa was problematic, the issue of who was to 
be admitted to the proposed new Society was more so. Matters were complicated 
further by the insistence of the Four Provincial Societies that articles of clerkship were 
a prerequisite for membership. By articles, they meant a period of service – usually five 
years – with a member of one of the Four Societies who was in public practice. In lieu 
of formal articles, the Societies were prepared to admit to an examination anyone who 
“had been in an accountant’s office for six and a half years” (SC7, 1924: Q37). Upon 
passing the examination, the successful candidate would be admitted to the new Society 
as a member. The common element of the two situations was a period of practical 
experience in a practising accountant’s office. 
 
 214 
 
In 1913 in South Africa, the issue of articles had not been of too great a significance. 
The 1913 Private Bill intended the issue to be more fully dealt with in by-laws to be 
framed by the first council and Section 33(i) (AB, 1913) sketched briefly an intention to 
regulate “the service under articles of clerks of members of the Society and the 
forfeiture of such articles for misconduct or other sufficient cause”. The 1951 Act dealt 
with the issue of articles in detail in the body of the Act. When asked in February 1913 
by the Chair of the Select Committee into the Private Bill of 1913 as to whether the 
Transvaal Society compelled “articles to an accountant”, Samuel Thompson, an English 
chartered accountant and a member of the Transvaal Society replied – as quoted earlier 
but more fully here:  
 
“No. They are optional. The Council have arrived at the conclusion that the time 
is not ripe for them. There are comparatively few offices where young men can 
get training in the business. There may be a chance for articles when the country 
gets more settled in years to come. You may be able to have them in the next 
generation” (SC3, 1913: Q1893). 
 
He added that in his estimation “73 or 75 per cent of those who [had] passed the [final] 
examination [had] not had experience in an accountant’s office” (SC3, 1913: Q1894). 
Thompson spoke with knowledge – he had been in practice as an accountant in the 
Transvaal since 1880, twice President of the Transvaal Society of Accountants and a 
member of its Provisional Council which had registered those entitled to come into the 
Society in the first place under the Ordinance of 1904 (SC3, 1913: Q1546–8). 
 
By 1924, things were changing. The Union was “growing up”, business was expanding 
and accounting practices were becoming more sophisticated. The 1924 Bill followed 
that of 1913 in its intention to leave the detail of articles of clerkship to the by-laws 
which were still to be framed by the first council, and satisfied itself with a general 
statement in Section 36(j) of the Bill of the intention to regulate “the service under 
articles to members of the Society and the forfeiture of such articles for misconduct or 
other sufficient cause” (AB, 1924). The wording used was exactly similar to that of the 
1913 Bill. Of some interest, too, is the fact that the objects listed in both Bills were 
almost exactly the same, and contained some noble sentiments, such as the 
encouragement of the study of accountancy by members and clerks alike, the formation 
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and maintenance of libraries for use by members and the promotion of legislation 
deemed to be of advantage to the new Society (AB, 1913: s3; AB, 1924: s3). Clearly by 
these means a competent profession was to be developed. 
 
While before the Select Committee on the 1924 Bill, Samuel Thompson had the 
question put to him by Advocate Davis for the opponents as to whether he still believed 
his 1913 comment that South Africa “was not yet ripe for articles” (SC7, 1924: Q268). 
Thompson’s answer contained two elements – firstly, that articles were not necessary if 
an individual had served “six and a half years with a practising accountant” but that the 
chartered societies in the United Kingdom insisted upon a formal articled period of five 
years. And secondly, he opined: “By and by, as the conditions improve and the 
profession goes ahead, we shall be able to bring up our standard to that of the chartered 
societies, where they insist upon it” (SC7, 1924: Q270). Thompson believed that it was 
“only possible to get the requisite training for an accountant in an accountant’s office”. 
He continued by stating that he laid more stress upon practical training than upon 
examination, that the specialised training needed was not available in local commercial 
houses nor the offices of large corporations where the accounting employed was of a 
repetitive nature. 
 
One of the reasons for his stance was Thompson’s belief that in return for privileges 
under the Bill, there were obligations for the promoting Societies, one of them being to 
ensure that professional accountants were qualified to do the work required of them. 
This, he believed, could be achieved by insisting on examinations and training. 
Thompson admitted that, in the beginning, the accounting societies had been obliged to 
take on men with little training and qualification but pointed out that time usually 
solved the problem and that now it was possible to guarantee “that they are qualified. 
We wish to lay the foundation for the future” (SC7, 1924: Q276). 
 
Thompson’s opinions were largely supported by the next witness before the Select 
Committee, Thomas Mitchell, a member of the Natal Society of Accountants, who 
pointed out that experience in an accountant’s office was “now essential” (SC7, 1924: 
Q411). While probably a minority opinion, not all accountants believed in the fact that 
only training in an accountant’s office was appropriate. Before the Committee on 7 
March 1924, Louis Goch, a registered accountant in the Transvaal, believed that 
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entrance to the proposed new society should be reasonably wide and that experience, 
other than in an accountant’s office, should be recognised as well (SC7, 1924: Q1387). 
 
Of interest at this point is Mitchell’s comment to the Committee on 3 March 1924 of 
the sympathetic stance taken when the Natal Act came into existence. Mitchell stated 
“we did not keep anyone out that we could fairly admit” (SC7, 1924: Q322). 
 
However, the promoters of the Bill believed the issue of experience was one which they 
could not afford to back down from and that the compromise embodied in the new 
Section 19 of the Bill was as far as they could go. This section allowed individuals the 
opportunity to complete a truncated period of 18 months’ continuous service in the 
office of a practising member of the Society in lieu of articles, or a period of six-and-a-
half years of non-articled service. While the promoters may have been satisfied with the 
compromise, many others, both in Parliament and out, disagreed. 
 
In obeying the Order of the House to consider the Bill, the Select Committee had sat for 
11 days taking evidence and thereafter six days deliberating the detail of the Bill. In all, 
the process had taken six weeks – from 19 February to 31 March 1924. The abiding 
impression given by this sustained effort is that the parliamentarians involved in the 
Select Committee saw a need for South African accountants to be registered and 
regulated by a central body for the ultimate good of South Africa as an emerging 
nation, and for its economic development. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The second reading of the Bill did not happen as planned in April 1924. In that month, 
the SAP’s failure in the Wakkerstroom by-election persuaded Smuts to call an early 
General Election in June. Parliament was prorogued. 
 
The promoters of the Bill had every reason at that point in time to believe that the Bill 
would be passed into law. The arguments of the opponents to the Bill seemingly had 
been neutralised. The London Association, in particular, had fared badly in dealing with 
the question of articles. The concerns of the Chartered Accountants in England about 
designation had been assuaged by the addition of “South Africa” to the South African 
designation. In addition, the promoters had introduced Section 18 to allow less 
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qualified civil and municipal servants the opportunity to qualify and become members 
of the new society. The question of by-laws had been deferred to consideration by the 
first council when appointed. 
 
When Parliament resumed in mid-1924, the promoters of the Bill were alarmed to 
discover the fact that the new Labour members of Parliament had decided to target 
perceived inequalities in the Accountants Bill. 
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CHAPTER 8: THE CONCLUSION TO THE 1924 BILL 
AND THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter deals with two main topics. The first is the slow demise of the second 
Accountants Bill from July 1924 through to June 1925. The Accountants Bill falls 
logically into two parts – the euphoria following the Bill’s successful passage through 
the Select Committee followed by defeat at the hands of the Labourites in the House. 
 
The second main topic in the chapter details the Australian experience in achieving a 
unified Accounting Profession and explains its success. The acquisition of the 
Australian Charter is almost a picture perfect process and in strong contrast to the 
muddled and often intractable South African move towards unification. 
 
THE DEMISE OF THE SECOND ACCOUNTANTS BILL 
 
AFTER THE 1924 GENERAL ELECTION: CLOSE BEFORE THE HOUSE 
About three months after Easter in 1924, on the 29 July 1924, the South African 
Society of Accountants (Private) Bill resurfaced in the House of the new Parliament 
where it was introduced by RW Close, KC, returned member for Rondebosch. Close 
was the same individual who, in 1913, had appeared as an advocate before the Select 
Committee into the Accountants’ Registration (Private) Bill on behalf of its promoters. 
He was thus well versed in the matter and a natural replacement for Bisset who had 
retired in the period after the General Election. In fact, by August 1924 only three of 
the original seven members of the Select Committee appointed in February 1924 
remained in Parliament; one of them was Close, the other two being Swart and Christie 
(USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 2, 1/8/1924: 147). Close was SA Party in affiliation, Swart 
was the National Party representative for Ladybrand and Christie was the Labour 
member for Langlaagte. 
 
  
 221 
 
TABLE 8.1 
THE 1924 GENERAL ELECTION 
 
Party Seats Seats % Votes Votes % Leader 
National Party 63 46.67 111 483 35.25 JBM 
Hertzog 
South African 
Party 
53 39.26 148 769 47.04 Jan Smuts 
Labour Party 18 13.33 45 380 14.35 FHP 
Creswell 
Independent 1 0.74 10 610 3.36 n/a 
TOTAL: 135     
Source: South Africa 1982: Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa: 129, 174, 
176. 
 
In terms of votes cast, the South African Party polled 47% compared to the Nationalists 
36%. This difference was because most of the SAP’s support came from the Cape, with 
its numerically greater constituencies, and from urban constituencies which had been 
increased by as much as 10% in the 1923 delimitation (Davenport and Saunders, 2000: 
298). 
 
TABLE 8.2 
SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE HOUSE: 21 FEBRUARY 1924 
ANALYSIS BEFORE AND AFTER THE GENERAL ELECTION OF JUNE 
1924 
 
Name Party and 
Constituency 
Returned 
after 1924 
General 
Election 
Replaced by Party and 
Constituency 
Bisset, M 
(Chair) 
 
SAP, South 
Peninsula 
 
N 
 
 
Chaplin, Sir F 
 
 
SAP, South 
Peninsula 
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Close, R, KC 
(later replaced 
by 
Mackeurtan, 
H, KC) 
 
Enslin, JM 
 
 
Saunders, E 
 
 
Christie, J 
 
 
Greenacre, W, 
OBE (later 
replaced by 
Fitchat, H) 
 
 
Swart, The 
Hon CR 
SAP, 
Rondebosch 
 
SAP, Durban – 
Umbilo 
 
NP, Graaff-
Reinet 
 
SAP, Natal-
Coast 
 
Labour, 
Langlaagte 
 
SAP, Durban-
Point 
 
SAP, Albany 
 
 
NP, Ladybrand 
Y 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
Y 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
Y 
- 
 
 
Rayburn, G 
 
 
Bremer, Dr K 
 
 
Arnott, Brig. 
Gen. W 
 
- 
 
 
Miller, Maj. A 
 
 
Struben, RH, 
OBE 
 
- 
SAP, 
Rondebosh 
 
Labour, 
Durban-
Umbilo 
 
NP, Graaf-
Reinet 
 
SAP, Natal-
Coast 
 
Labour, 
Langlaagte 
 
SAP, Durban-
Point 
 
SAP, Albany 
 
 
NP, Ladybrand 
Source: Union of South Africa, Debates of the House of Assembly, 4th Session, 4th 
Parliament (25 January – 10 April 1924, Vol. 1), and Parliamentary Register, 1910–61. 
 
Before General Election:  
SAP  6 
NP  2 
Labour  1 
  9  Y 3 
    N 6 
     9 
After General Election:  
SAP  5 
NP  2 
Labour  2 
  9 
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The reasons for the changes are not difficult to find. An unexpected defeat in the 
Wakkerstroom by-election had caused Smuts to dissolve Parliament and call a General 
Election for June 1924. Smuts had discerned in the Wakkerstroom loss an indication of 
declining popular support for the South African Party. In the event, the SAP forfeited 
its parliamentary majority and was faced off by Hertzog’s Pact of Afrikaner Nationalist 
and urban Labour Parties. While the Nationalists did not have an outright majority (see 
Table 8.1), it was clear that their partner – Labour – had not forgotten 1922 and could 
be expected to give the South African Party little latitude in Parliament, although 
Yudelman (1983: 217) suggests 1922 was not as important a fact in Smuts’ defeat as 
imagined. There was little change with regard to the political composition of the Select 
Committee; but of a total of nine members, five represented the SAP, two the NP and 
two the Labour Party. The SAP, while losing one member’s seat to the Labour Party, 
still had five seats with a majority of one. However, what is obvious is the solid middle- 
to upper-middle-class backgrounds of many of the Committee members. This is 
evidenced by the detail available; for example, Close and Mackeurtan were King’s 
Counsel; Arnott and Miller retained their military ranks of Brigadier-General and Major 
respectively; Swart was a judge and Struben and Greenacre had been honoured with the 
title, “Officer of the British Empire” – OBE. 
 
Some detail of the Bill’s limited passage through the House of Assembly is needed as 
the process reveals much in the way of parliamentary procedure as well as a move away 
from the spirit of compromise to a fractiousness which bogged the Bill down and 
eventually made it unworkable. 
 
The fluid and sometimes apparently directionless nature of the debate with its 
interjections and its changes in pace make a narrative approach the best way to deal 
with the balance of the Bill’s progress in the House. In this way, the reader will 
understand the lack of any real progress, and instead comprehend the growth of 
uncertainty and the way the Bill floundered. It will also indicate how the rules of the 
game did not always favour the Bill’s promoters, as other members of the House 
invoked them to support their assessments of the Bill’s progress or lack of it and 
thereby attempted to manipulate its progress. A speedy resolution of the Bill was in the 
interest of the promoters, an extension of the process would favour its opponents and 
the growth of extra-parliamentary opposition. 
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In his introduction of the Bill to the House for a second reading, Close made some 
important points as to why the Bill, in the new political dispensation, should be 
resumed where it had been left at the end of the previous session:  
 
(i) The Bill had been introduced as a private measure, but was of “considerable 
public importance” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 2, 29/7/24: 35) as it sought to 
ensure the profession of accountancy was carried on under the “best conditions 
and guarantees”; 
 
(ii) The Select Committee chosen to inspect the preamble and its Bill had been 
thorough and as “a result of discussions and long deliberations by the 
Committee certain compromises were arrived at and concessions made” (USA, 
HA, Debates, Vol. 2, 29/7/24: 36); 
 
(iii) Great expense had been incurred by the promoting Societies who had brought 
the Bill forward “in the most public-spirited way” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 2, 
29/7/1924: 37); 
 
(iv) There was a provision in the House’s Standing Rules under which a Bill left 
undecided at the end of one session could be revived in the following session. 
Close believed the correct parliamentary procedures had been followed at the 
previous session to allow the Bill’s reintroduction after the General Election. 
 
The expenses mentioned by Close above undoubtedly worried the Four Societies. As at 
the end of June 1924, the Bill had cost its private promoters £2 996 8s 1d. The Cape 
Society estimated the final cost would be £3 200 in total (SAAHC, TSA, Minutes 19 
August 1924: 190, Minute Number 12) (See Appendix 5). The Transvaal Society stated 
that its share of this final amount would deplete their accumulated funds of £1 461 17s 
3d (SAAHC, TSA, Minutes 19 August 1924: 194). By 29 May 1925, costs had gone up 
and the total for the Union Registration Bill amounted to £3 413 17s 1d (SAAHC, TSA, 
Minutes 9 June 1925: 260, Minute Number 9). 
 
As a comparative, the Bill of 1913 cost the societies £3 124 3s 4d (SAAHC, CSA, 
Council Minutes 8 July 1913: 197). 
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THE BILL’S SECOND READING AND THE ISSUE OF ADMISSION – AGAIN 
The House agreed to honour the agreement made at the previous sitting and the Bill’s 
second reading was set for 1 August 1924. On that date, Close again spoke to the 
motion to introduce the Bill for a second reading. Again, he made some important 
points as he summarised the proposed admissions criteria – the Five Categories – for 
the new society. It is clear that the promoting Societies had not moved their position 
very far in the period since Parliament had been dissolved before the General Election 
despite further compromise being suggested by the Speaker. Their position remained 
that registration with the new society would be compulsory for all practising 
accountants. 
 
Close noted that the Select Committee had added one further admissions criterion in the 
form of a new Section 19 (as mentioned in the previous chapter). He emphasised the 
fact that any public servant at a rank not lower than that of a second grade clerk and 
employed for at least 10 years on accounting or audit work in the Public Service, 
provincial or municipal administration, or of any company approved by the new 
Society’s council, could, after 18 months’ continuous service in the office of a 
practising member of the society, be entitled to be registered. There was one further 
proviso – such a candidate could not sit the final examination except during or after the 
period of 18-month service. Close pointed out that the normal period both in South 
Africa and the United Kingdom of practical service for articled clerks was four years 
with one year remission for graduates of a University and six for non-articled clerks. 
The 18-month concession had been agreed to by the delegates of the Transvaal and 
Natal Societies where three years’ practical service was the minimum period (USA, 
HA, Debates, Vol. 2, 1/8/1924: 158). Any people who believed they had a claim to be 
registered under this Section 19 or under 18 or 9, could also appeal the matter to the 
Division of the Supreme Court in whose jurisdiction they lived. Close was clearly 
pleased with the new Section 19 as he stated:  
 
“I submit that the society has succeeded by this Bill in making a compromise, 
allowing, in the first instance, everybody who ought to come in and has any 
moral claim to come in, to come in, and to take steps thereafter that for future 
generations the accountants shall build up a body of men of whom South Africa 
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can be proud as an honourable, skilful profession” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 2, 
1/8/24: 152). 
 
THE ISSUE OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE: THE PEARCE AMENDMENT 
Later on in the proceedings – at the House-in-Committee stage – Pearce, the Labour 
member for Liesbeek, proposed an amendment which would permit public or 
provincial servants, employed in accountant or audit posts at an equal or higher status 
than that of accountant, to apply for registration within nine months of the Act passing. 
Pearce pointed out there were concerns about “retrenchments in the public service” – 
perhaps a veiled reference to the impending “Afrikanerisation’ of the Civil Service by 
the Pact Government. The perceived threat to their jobs could explain the push from the 
civil servants to be admitted into the new society as a means of securing alternative 
employment. This amendment would affect 25–30 men only (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 
2, 8/8/1924: 327). Close, clearly discomforted by this punt for a special interest group, 
pointed out the ways already available for such men to enter the register. He declared: 
“Why should public servants have a claim to a special privilege” (USA, HA, Debates, 
Vol. 2, 8/8/1924: 330). However, as the chief negotiator for the promoting Societies, he 
was prepared to compromise and agreed to waive the requirement for 18 months 
practical service and passing the final examinations for those with 10 years public 
service. The compromise was restricted to the Cape and Orange Free State and was a 
“once-off offer” – providing public servants applied immediately for registration so as 
to avoid a “wait and see” complication. Those coming in later would need to serve 18 
months. Close was also prepared to compromise by allowing public servants to sit for 
examinations at any time and not as restricted by Section 19 to during or after the 
period of 18 months’ service. This was to accommodate a further proposal from the 
member for Ladybrand, Mr Swart. Clearly, the Bill’s promoters had given Close a 
degree of latitude within which to operate. Pearce’s amendment as it stood was, 
however, unacceptable in Natal and the Transvaal as the twin requirements of service 
and examination needed to apply there. 
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SUPPORTIVE COMMENTS MADE IN THE HOUSE: THE PUBLIC GOOD AND 
THE NEEDS OF COMMERCE 
The issue of admission had clearly not been resolved, and a full debate broke loose – 
despite recommendations made by the Select Committee. CR Swart, a National Party 
member of the Select Committee, pointed out that 
 
“the object of the Bill [was] to put accountants on a better footing and to give 
them a proper status. It [was] in the interests of the accountants and [was] also 
to protect the public … It [was] in the public interest that only properly 
qualified men should practise as accountants” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 2, 
1/8/1924: 154). 
 
His view, also was that if the name was changed from “Chartered Accountant” to 
“Registered Accountant” for those who qualified under the Bill, preference would 
always be given to accountants (and by this he meant foreign accountants) described as 
Chartered Accountants. The public good was clearly an issue in the House. 
 
Stuttaford, the SAP member for Newlands, welcomed the Bill, pointing out that, 
increasingly, commerce was being conducted through the medium of public companies 
and cooperative societies with many small investors looking to the chartered accountant 
to safeguard those interests, the title denoting in the public mind a qualified man (USA, 
HA, Debates, Vol. 2, 1/8/1924: 155). He continued that the Bill coming out of the 
Select Committee was better than the original which had made the profession “too close 
a preserve” in disallowing otherwise qualified persons from entering the profession. 
 
Stuttaford was supported by J Christie, the Labour member for Langlaagte and a 
member of the Select Committee who urged opponents of the Bill to allow a second 
reading and thereafter to air their problems with it in Committee. He believed that the 
two main contentious issues – that of reopening the registers of the Transvaal and Natal 
Societies, and that of allowing civil, provincial and municipal servants, working in their 
respective Treasury Departments, to have an opportunity to write the Society’s 
examinations – had been solved by careful changes to the Bill’s wording. This allowed 
those practising in the Transvaal to do so as bookkeepers, and secondly allowed civil 
and other public servants the opportunity detailed in Section 19 of the Bill. Christie was 
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a member of Parliament both before and after the General Election and was more 
moderate than some of his Labour colleagues. 
 
Close concluded by moving the second reading of the Bill, which was done and the 
debate subsided. But his attempt to take the Committee stage immediately after the 
reading failed and the stage was set for 8 August. 
 
THE HOUSE-IN-COMMITTEE: 8 AUGUST 1924: LABOUR TO THE FORE 
On Friday 8 August 1924, the House met and went into Committee to consider the 
South African Society of Accountants (Private) Bill. The process at this point was an 
analysis of the Bill, section by section. Close reiterated the position of the Bill’s 
supporters:  
 
“We are trying to put this profession on the same basis as the legal or medical 
profession, not in the interests of the profession itself, but in the interests of the 
public which that profession serves” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 2, 8/8/1924: 
311). 
 
RB Waterston, the Labour member for Brakpan, questioned whether the Bill was in fact 
for the protection of the public and stated it was rather for “the protection of such 
gentlemen who have been responsible for bringing this Bill before the House” (USA, 
HA, Debates, Vol. 2, 8/8/1924: 311). He continued by saying that he was convinced 
that when South Africans wanted any work done by the new Society, they would find 
the professional charges to have been “raised considerably above what they are now”. 
From this point on in the debate, criticism of the Bill centred on the Labour benches in 
the House and would be concerned with the interests of the little man. This was in line 
with the Nationalist labour policy and it dealt with, at some length, the Labour Party’s 
attack on the Bill and the Bill’s withdrawal. This is significant as it ultimately meant 
Government would need to step in to achieve a more equitable Act as in New Zealand. 
Never again in the period under review would Labour be able to exert this degree of 
influence. Indeed, outspoken members like Waterston, Hay and Rayburn served limited 
terms: Waterston from 1920–9, and the other two from 1924–9. All three lost their seats 
in the 1929 elections, when the Labour Party split; Creswell’s supporters took a 
moderate route and continued to support the National Party, while Madeley’s followers 
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formed a more radical splinter group. In contrast, John Christie held various seats for 
the Labour Party until March 1953 (Parliamentary Register, 1910–61). Waterston, Hay 
and Rayburn are difficult to define, and remain in the shadows of history. Each appear 
briefly in the South African Who’s Who of 1925 and in the House of Assembly. 
 
Thereafter, there was considerable debate over what unregistered accountants could do. 
In essence, it was agreed those in the small towns (little men) would be able to do the 
work of auditor and bookkeeper-accountant as long as they did not describe themselves 
as qualified accountants, thereby deceiving the public (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 2, 
8/8/1924: 318). Close pointed out again that the Bill prohibited people from describing 
themselves as accountants unless they were registered in terms of the Bill. Non-
registered individuals could still be employed and paid providing they did not describe 
themselves as accountants and did not use the word “audited” in connection with the 
work done. Close emphasised that the word “examined” would be acceptable. He 
continued by saying that many sets of accounts drafted in South Africa were intended 
for foreign concerns with large interests in the country. This veiled reference was to the 
mines. He believed that if, by the effective work of the new Society, an acceptable 
accounting standard was set, such concerns would employ South African accountants 
and not send out their own accountants from overseas. 
 
The Committee moved on to the next item for debate – the penalty for an unregistered 
person claiming to be an accountant being £100 for each offence or a period of six 
weeks in prison. Waterston made the comment that the object of professional societies 
was 
 
“to keep away competition so that the members of these professions shall not 
know what it is to experience unemployment … They do not want to face the 
competition of the children of the working classes who have been educated in a 
secondary school and who are qualified for professional work” (USA, HA, 
Debates, Vol. 2, 8/8/1924: 322). 
 
Again Waterston’s focus was on the little man, and probably anti-capitalist in 
sentiment. 
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Close’s response later on was the observation that such societies were formed for the 
benefit of the public and that the protection afforded to its members was incidental 
(USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 2, 8/8/1924: 324). 
 
The next point Waterston raised was the fact that those in the Transvaal not members of 
the Transvaal Society would not be entitled to register in terms of the Bill. Close 
pointed out that since the enactments of 1904 and 1909, those unregistered individuals 
in the Transvaal and Natal respectively, had been practising without hindrance 
providing they did not call themselves “auditors” or “accountants”. He also pointed out 
that within six months of the passing of these enactments, every person entitled to 
register, being in practice or qualified or being “fit and proper persons”, had been given 
the opportunity to do so. 
 
“The door was opened very wide to existing rights, there having been no 
previous prohibition by law against a man holding himself out as, or describing 
himself as an accountant” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 2, 8/8/1924: 326). 
 
The existence of the 1924 Bill owed much to the Natal and Transvaal Societies, and the 
Transvaal Society believed it was impossible to open its register widely 20 years after it 
was closed. This point of view was supported by the other three Provincial Societies. 
Close stressed that it was a 
 
“vital thing for this Bill that the registers of the Transvaal and Natal, which have 
been fixed and established under their own statute, should not be reopened on 
the ground that there is no claim on the party of anybody, in law or otherwise to 
be put on the registers. That would also apply to public servants” (USA, HA, 
Debates, Vol. 2, 1/8/1924: 329). 
 
OPEN THE DOORS WIDE 
Waterston was not impressed by the need to protect existing rights and repeated the 
point of view that it was “necessary to open the doors as wide as possible so that no one 
will be injured” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 2, 8/8/1924: 335). Waterston also wanted the 
new Section 19 widened to include town clerks and treasurers and for there to be no 
difference across the four provinces. 
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GA Hay, Labour member for Pretoria (West) believed with reason that it was “clear 
that the [Bill] was designed to protect a certain class of practitioners and a certain 
number of people who want to make this profession a close preserve” (USA, HA, 
Debates, Vol. 2, 8/8/1924: 337). Close disagreed and pointed out again that the 
“Transvaal Society at the present moment is entrenched in the interests of the public 
with powers to develop the profession of accountancy in the Transvaal on sound and 
strong lines” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 2, 8/8/1924: 337). Those promoting the Bill 
believed that weakening the proposed Society’s qualifications would weaken the status 
of its members and the regard of the public and overseas interests. The promoters of the 
Bill regarded the current compromise as “the irreducible minima and if others are 
passed cannot shoulder their responsibilities further” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 2, 
8/8/1924: 338). Swart made the point that should the Bill not be passed, South Africa 
would remain the  
 
“hunting ground of overseas accountants who will be able to come here without 
having to pass the examination here and practise as chartered accountants 
whereas our boys are not in the position to study for the position of chartered 
accountants and take the examination in this country. They will have to proceed 
overseas” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 2, 8/8/1924: 338). 
 
ANOTHER COMPROMISE? 
The debate took a different path when Waterston drew attention to the fact that the 
Bill’s promoters had issued an ultimatum – if Pearce’s original amendment was carried, 
they, the promoters, would withdraw the Bill. A dangerous point had been reached but 
the debate on this issue wound up on a technicality when Christie asked, on a point of 
order, whether an amendment could be withdrawn once he had put it on the Order 
Paper without the consent of the Committee. The Chair of the Committee pointed out 
the amendment had not been moved and thus the Committee’s consent was not needed. 
Thereafter, the Committee accepted Pearce’s amendment as modified by Close (see 
earlier paragraph entitled: “The Issue of the Public Service – the Pearce Amendment”) 
and the debate moved on to the next issue – Section 10 – the cessation of separate 
register in Natal and the Transvaal 12 months after the commencement of the proposed 
Act. This issue was dealt with speedily. 
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But when it came to next consider the contentious Section 19, CW Giovanetti, OBE 
and SAP member for Pretoria (East), proposed to omit the section which required 
candidate members to spend 18 months in the office of a practising member (USA, HA, 
Debates, Vol. 2, 8/8/1924: 342). This, despite the compromise reached earlier 
[discussed above] and an indication of the depth of concern aroused by the proposed 
Society. The fact that the issue resurfaced again was also an indication of the persistent 
lobbying of Public Service organisations outside of Parliament.  
 
Giovanetti stated that he had been asked to do so by the Municipal Association of the 
Transvaal and others as they believed their work fitted them to take the examination 
without serving the continuous practical period, a requirement for which most would 
not be given time off by their employers to complete. He pointed out that in the 
Transvaal, Natal and the Cape there were tertiary institutions and Faculties of 
Commerce through which prospective members could take a Bachelor of Commerce 
degree which would enable them to pass the examination, but the 18 months’ service 
imposed a hardship which was difficult to surmount. 
 
Close pointed out that Section 19 already represented a compromise with the 
promoters. He also stated that the Bill, in essence, eliminated the unqualified person, 
and protected the public by having a qualified body “to deal with the errant ones who 
lack either efficiency or conduct” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 2, 8/8/1924: 344). He noted 
that there was not an accounting society that did not require service as the work of an 
accountant depended upon practical experience. This applied also to the voluntary 
societies of the Cape and Orange Free State. As the London Association did not require 
service in the form of articles, Close either did not know or ignored it, possibly for 
dramatic effect. 
 
Close then posed a rhetorical question:  
 
“Why do people join a Society with restrictions of that kind unless they believe 
that the fact of admission to that Society is going to be of commercial and 
professional value to them?” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 2, 8/8/1924: 345). 
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While the public or municipal service had good men, their work was often specialised 
and they could not acquire the experience to enable them to become of use to the public 
in a professional capacity as an accountant. 
 
“In which of those [municipal] offices does a man get an experience in 
insolvency, company work or in the management of deceased estates? Yet these 
are the big branches of work which a man in an accountants’ office would have 
to deal with and the lack of practical experience might mean very serious loss, 
and even ruin to the people who employed him” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 2, 
8/8/1924: 345). 
 
G Rayburn, the Labour member for Durban (Umbilo), made the critical point that 
expecting public and municipal servants to be permitted to stay away from their jobs 
was impractical. “There is no municipal service in this country, I am sure, which will 
permit its senior officials to go away for 18 months, sit for examinations and then come 
back” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 2, 8/8/1924: 346). Similarly, there were few 
accountants who would take in people at age 50 so that they could acquire the status of 
a practising accountant. He concluded by stating that very often public and municipal 
officials had served their communities better than many others in private enterprise. 
 
Close accepted an amendment from Swart that the examination could be taken at any 
time. While Waterston believed it meant nothing, Stuttaford pointed out that a public 
servant could write the examinations while still employed, and then leave to spend the 
18 months in an accountant’s office: “He has converted risk into certainty” (USA, HA, 
Debates, Vol. 2, 8/8/1924: 349). Stuttaford also pointed out that with new Companies 
and Insolvency Bills coming forward to the House, trained accountants were a necessity 
to see such legislation was properly applied. Hay interjected with the comment that the 
more the Committee delved into the Bill, the more in his opinion it appeared to foster a 
closed profession. However, Stuttaford had made an important statement – legislation 
then in the pipeline, including a Companies Bill, would require skilled practitioners to 
implement it effectively. 
 
Swart proposed a further, complicated proviso which would mean no one could 
describe themselves as an accountant and auditor until after serving 18 months’ 
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continuous service with a practitioner. An effect of this proviso would make people full 
members of the society so long as they remained in public or municipal service. In this 
service, they could describe themselves as accountants. Once leaving the Public Service 
to practise publicly they would need to complete service with a practising accountant 
registered with the proposed new society to retain the designation. Swart had put his 
finger on an important fact – designations as a form of advertisement of ability were a 
critical element in the public furore created by the Bill. 
 
But Waterston pointed out that Swart’s amendment did not address the main issue, that 
being the 18 months’ service. “Unless this 18 months proviso is deleted, I am sure we 
must really be prepared to shoulder that tremendous burden of tremendous indignation 
that we shall have to meet in wrecking this Bill” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 2 8/8/1924: 
352). Swart’s amendment went no further. 
 
SUSPENSION AT THE END OF THE SESSION: SEPTEMBER 1924 
An impasse had been reached. Hay suggested time be given to consider changes to the 
Bill and moved that the Chair report progress and asked leave to sit again. This was 
agreed but the Committee only reconvened on 2 September 1924. At this meeting, 
Close stated that it was impossible to complete the Bill at the present session and asked 
leave to continue with the Bill at the next session of Parliament. It was then that 
proceedings were suspended at the same stage. In effect, this would be the Bill’s second 
carry-over, the first having been in April 1924 shortly before the General Election. 
 
RULES OF ORDER – AGAIN 
MKC Alexander, the member for Cape Town (Hanover Street), a working class area 
with a strong “coloured” base prior to 1933, pointed out that Rule of Order 78 seemed 
to indicate that only one such indulgency could be given, and this had been done at the 
end of the previous session. A second postponement was now requested and he 
supported a liberal interpretation of the intention of the rule. He also suggested that, in 
the intervening period, the promoters of the Bill should negotiate with those bodies who 
believed the Bill did great injustice to them, principally the Outside Accountants’ 
Defence Committee of the Transvaal, the Public Service organisations and the 
municipal employees association. 
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Waterston took a similar view and pointed out that if the House-in-Committee wanted 
to kill the Bill, it could oppose Close’s motion to proceed at the next session. He 
stressed that all sought a Bill which gave “equality of opportunity” (USA, HA, Debates, 
Vol. 2, 2/9/1924: 1194). Hay agreed and pointed out that while the House did not have 
an objection to taking up the Bill at the next session, they had not accepted the main 
principles of the measure regarding admission and had been overwhelmed by 
representations as to its inequality. Unless such representations were satisfied, Hay 
promised to do his utmost to prevent the Bill going through the next session. He 
specifically referred to a deputation from the Transvaal that had arrived to make 
representations on behalf of the large number of people who believed the Bill 
threatened their livelihood. 
 
Thereafter, Close’s motion to suspend the Bill and bring it forward at the next session 
of Parliament was put and agreed. In the context of a new political dispensation, Hay 
and Waterston were members of the majority Pact Government and the perception was 
that the Bill had slipped from being supported by the majority in Parliament to being a 
minority cause. 
 
The inability of the Bill’s supporters to quieten the demand for inclusion from 
significant interest groups made the Bill unpopular in Parliament and, increasingly, the 
cause of protection for a minority. 
 
THE BILL BROUGHT FORWARD: MARCH 1925 
The South African Society of Accountants (Private) Bill resurfaced again in the Second 
Session of the Fifth Parliament of the Union of South Africa which was in session 
between February and July 1925. On 17 February, Close moved for the Bill to be 
revived at the place it was left off at during the last session and it was agreed that the 
House could resume in Committee on 27 February. But it was only on 13 March, nearly 
a year after the first meeting of the House, that the House-in-Committee met again. 
 
THE HOUSE-IN-COMMITTEE: 13 MARCH 1925 
The debate recommenced at Section 19 of the Bill. Close summarised the early debate 
in 1924 and confirmed agreement with Swart’s amendment of the previous year, the 
effect of which was that there would be no restriction as to when the final examination 
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could be written. But the old arguments were soon revived. In response to Giovanetti’s 
proposal to scrap the 18 months’ continuous service, Close reiterated his position that 
to do so would do more harm than good as a period of service was essential. Swart 
indicated that he was prepared to withdraw his amendment subject to  
 
(i) the last proviso in Section 19 being dropped – that is: fixing the final 
examination to be written after the 18 months’ service; and 
(ii) the final examination being held under the aegis of the University of South 
Africa. 
 
He told the Committee that he had been informed by representatives of the Civil 
Service that this would satisfy them. Giovanetti disagreed and pointed out that when he 
had been in Cape Town two weeks earlier, he had been pressed by the Railway Salaried 
Staff Association to support their position that the 18 months’ service be dropped in its 
entirety. He also indicated his belief that the period of service insisted upon was 
intended by the promoting Societies to do away with competition from public and 
municipal servants who really only wanted to qualify for the accountant’s degree to 
better fit themselves for promotion in their respective services and to prepare for 
possible retrenchment. The attitude of the Four Societies remained unchanged. At the 
Transvaal Society’s Annual General Meeting of 24 February 1925, the Society’s 
President commented, “I think that the outcry from the civil and municipal services is 
entirely unwarranted”. The response from this sector was that they would finally be 
“prohibited from joining a profession for which they contend[ed] their present life 
qualif[ied] them without undergoing unnecessary hardships” (i.e. examination and 
articled service).  
 
In response to a new application for registration by a newly founded body, the 
Transvaal Bookkeepers, the President of the Transvaal Society stated “under what 
pretext these men can possibly claim inclusion in the Bill altogether passed my 
comprehension. I can only imagine they have not the least conception of the aims of the 
Bill” (SAAHC, TSA, Minutes 24 February 1925: 229). Clearly the Bookkeepers’ 
attempt at inclusion indicated that the situation was becoming untenable. The Bill had 
become mired in controversy. 
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However, groups like the Bookkeepers  
 
“complained that nothing was being done for them in the Bill … they seemed to 
think that as a result of the contemplated general tightening up that would 
ensure on the passing of the proposed Consolidated Company Law, their 
earning capacity would seriously [be prejudiced] unless provision for their 
registration was provided for in the Accountants Bill” (SAAHC, TSA, Minutes 
9 June 1925: 260–1, Minute Number 9).  
 
This attitude was of concern to a Government committed to the eradication of White 
poverty. Bookkeepers were likely to be voters as well. 
Christie, Labour member for Langlaagte, added that because so many months had 
passed since the Bill had been first discussed in Committee, many of the members of 
the House did not understand the amendments. He added that he believed the 
amendments being discussed were not printed on the Order Paper before the House. 
 
“There is always a danger that when a clause [sic] like this comes before the 
House, it is passed before we realise what we have done. The vital clause, the 
heart and pulse of the whole Bill would be passed before the House realise what 
we have done” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 3 13/3/1925: 922). 
 
He continued that on the one hand he wanted the professionalism and education the Bill 
sought for its members and the resulting protection of the public, but on the other he 
saw men with vested rights in the profession at large who could lose status and 
livelihood if the Bill became law. Christie thereafter moved to report progress and end 
the session and for the amendments to be placed on the next sitting’s agenda. 
 
At this point, it is necessary to consider the complex system of amendments to motions, 
motions being the fundamental tool of parliamentary procedure. The objective of an 
amendment was:  
 
● to alter a motion placed before the House of Assembly to obtain the support of 
members of a political party who, failing such amendment, were required by the 
party whips to vote against or to abstain from voting a motion; and  
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● to put forward to the House an alternate to the original motion (Kilpin, 1946: 
68). 
 
Amendments needed to be in writing, seconded if moved, but not subject to notice. 
However a number of restrictions existed. An amendment needed to be:  
 
● relevant to the motion it sought to amend; and 
● of such an interpretation that it did not make the original motion unclear 
(Kilpin, 1946: 68). 
 
In addition, there were only three types of amendment to a motion:  
 
● words could be omitted; 
● words could be inserted; 
● words could be omitted and substituted by others. 
 
The first two forms modified the original motion, while the third form was usually 
intended to create a new proposal (Kilpin, 1946: 69). 
 
In terms of Parliament’s Standing Orders, there was a presumption that a motion be 
retained in its original form. The actual detail of its process of amendment is given in 
Kilpin (1946: 70–3) but, in general, amendments were usually considered in the order 
received. All three forms of amendment could be used to change an original motion and 
it was possible to propose an amendment to an amendment. When amendments in all 
three forms were moved to the same motion, they were dealt with in the order in which 
they occurred in each line of the motion and not in the order they were proposed. 
 
It was one of the tasks of the Speaker of the House to ensure that amendments were 
dealt with correctly in debate and in conclusion to that debate. This could be an onerous 
task in the heated environment of a close debate dealing with contentious or sensitive 
issues. Very often members of the House became confused as to what was actually 
being proposed, and the Speaker was required to put the position clearly (see for 
example: Christie, USA, HA Debates, Vol. 3, 13/3/1925: 920–2). To this end, a highly 
stylised use of language was employed. If the words of a motion were retained intact, 
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this meant the amendment was dropped (and vice versa). The House then proceeded to 
deal with the other amendments. (Kilpin, 1946: 72–3). 
 
 
MORE DISTRACTIONS: AMENDMENTS NOT ON THE ORDER PAPER 
The Chair pointed out that amendments were put on the Order Paper at the request of 
members, implying that Christie had not done this earlier. Christie could therefore not 
attach any conditions to his motion and could only request their inclusion, which he 
accordingly did. Before the Chair could react, Stuttaford interjected that if progress was 
to be reported, it would be difficult to be brought up again in the current session of the 
House. Other members called out, saying that many of them had received deputations 
against the Bill. Hay supported the motion to report progress and pointed out that if the 
Bill died, the status quo would stand and that a fear of the promoters was the fact that 
they stood to lose the £3 000 spent to date on promotion expenses. Hay stated 
unequivocally that he was for trade unionism and saw no reason to exclude any who 
carried on their livelihood as accountants from the new Society (USA, HA, Debates, 
Vol. 3, 13/3/1925: 924). The Chair rebuked him for entering into the merits of the Bill 
and not remaining within the parameters of the debate. 
 
Close spoke and admitted to being dumbfounded when Christie, a member of the Bill’s 
Select Committee, had proposed his motion, telling the Committee that he did not 
understand the amendments. He stated, “I think the hon[orable] member must be 
having a little joke” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 3, 13/3/1925: 924). It was more likely he 
was filibustering – that is: talking the Bill into oblivion. Clearly, Christie had been 
pulled into line by the Party whips. He also took Hay to task for suggesting there had 
been agreement at the last House-in-Committee meeting in August 1924 to reconcile all 
differences raised by outside parties. A meeting had been held in Bloemfontein of 
interested parties which agreed to support the continuance of the Bill through the 
House. Close pointed out that the Bill would create employment for young South 
Africans and declared against the motion to report progress, thereby postponing a final 
decision on the Bill. 
 
Alexander, member for Cape Town (Hanover Street), pointed out that it was 
unacceptable that the amendments to be considered did not appear in the Order Paper. 
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He also pointed out that since the last meeting of the Committee, the Transvaal Society 
of Accountants had issued a circular (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 3, 13/3/1925: 830) to the 
effect that “if certain amendments were persisted in, the Society would retire forthwith 
as co-promoter” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 3, 13/3/1925: 926). 
 
This signalled the beginning of the end of the Bill in its current form as it indicated a 
hardening of attitudes and made a compromise more difficult to achieve. It also 
indicated that the promoters were thinking of alternative ways of reaching their 
objectives. 
 
MOTION TO POSTPONE THE BILL: THE ISSUE OF THE MISSING 
AMENDMENTS 
DM Brown, SAP member for Three Rivers, declared that the “only way to choke off a 
Bill is to get it held over till some future date” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 3, 13/3/1925: 
926). Other members of the House-in-Committee, while supporting the Bill, lamented 
the fact that the amendments had not been made available. Christie agreed that he had 
been a member of the Select Committee but pointed out to Close that while a member, 
he had made it known that he reserved the right to oppose certain points in the Bill in 
the House (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 3, 13/3/1925: 927). He continued that he was not 
anxious to wreck the Bill as he believed that accountancy work in South Africa needed 
the best possible standard. But it was unreasonable to consider the amendments if they 
had not been placed on the Order Paper and if this wrecked the Bill, the blame lay with 
Close. 
 
Swart, National Party member for Ladybrand, pointed out that one amendment only 
deleted 18 words. In support, Duncan, KC, and member for Yeoville, pointed out that 
these words, if not on the Order Paper, were nevertheless available in the “Votes and 
Proceedings” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 3, 13/3/1925: 928). Duncan also defended the 
Transvaal Society’s right to withdraw the Bill should it be contrary to their interests. 
Madeley, Labour member for Benoni, pointed out that the Transvaal Society’s threat 
showed that the promoters were more concerned with their interests than those of the 
public. This meant the Committee had a responsibility to consider the Bill with 
“meticulous care”. He continued that while both Close and Duncan had stated the 
purpose of the Bill was to ensure a high standard of chartered accountancy, “I feel we 
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must regard it with suspicion” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 3, 13/3/1925: 928). Members 
of the House clearly saw the Transvaal Society’s threat to withdraw the Bill as 
worrying and vaguely against “the rules”. It angered some. 
 
Close took up the debate again and stated that Madeley’s criticism had not been fair and 
that people skilled in accountancy were “best able to inform the House as to whether 
the class of qualification contained in the Bill is vital or not vital for the formation of a 
sound profession in the public interest” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 3, 13/3/1925: 929). 
He also pointed out that difficulties regarding the amendment papers should have been 
brought up with him earlier as the Bill had been on the Order Paper for weeks. Close 
concluded: “I appeal to members to be content with the skirmish we have had, and to 
let us continue with the Bill” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 3, 13/3/1925: 930). 
 
Alexander refused to relent and pointed out that the promoters needed to accept 
legislation in the form passed by Parliament and that he knew of no procedure which 
allowed a private promoter to withdraw a Bill once it had reached the stage the House 
was at presently. He continued: “I do not say it is disrespect, but we are not here to pass 
what they want … I hope this House is not going to be a rubber stamp” (USA, HA, 
Debates, Vol. 3, 13/3/1925: 931). He concluded by supporting the motion that progress 
should be reported. Madeley ended the debate by saying ominously: “We ought to 
consider the rights of the public in South Africa and not the promoters of private bills” 
(USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 3, 13/3/1925: 933). 
 
MORE POLITICAL UNDERCURRENTS 
Thereafter a vote on the motion to report progress – that is: to end the debate – was 
taken and defeated by 56 votes to 40, indicating a continued and significant level of 
support for the Bill. While it is difficult to determine the party split of this vote, some 
speculation is not out of place. The House of Assembly in 1925 comprised 135 seats 
with 53 occupied by the SA Party, 63 by the Nationalists, 18 by Labour and one 
Independent. To achieve 56 votes to defeat the motion the South African Party must 
either have had 100 per cent attendance at the vote and 100 per cent vote in favour – 
both of which are unlikely – plus two votes from another party, or the motion was 
defeated by a lack of common purpose in the Pact, with Nationalists supporting the 
South African Party. NC Havenga and JC Smuts are listed amongst the opponents to 
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the motion while Hay and Rayburn are listed among its proponents. Waterston is not 
listed and was probably not present at the split. 
 
AG Barlow, member for Bloemfontein (North), declared that the House needed to 
adopt a “South Africa First” attitude and pass the Bill to give young South Africans an 
opportunity to become chartered accountants without having to go overseas. If the Bill 
failed, he predicted “so far as the Transvaal accountants are concerned, I daresay they 
shrug their shoulders, because they will be in no better position if the Bill goes through. 
Their status as chartered or incorporated accountants of England will remain and they 
will not have the chartered accountants to compete with them” (USA, HA, Debates, 
Vol. 3, 13/3/1925: 945). He continued that “as a Labour man I support this Bill. I want 
to protect the public by having qualified men to audit the books of the people” (USA, 
HA, Debates, Vol. 3, 13/3/1925: 945). He concluded that the House needed “to make 
this as good a profession as the legal profession, which stands as high as the legal 
profession in any part of the Empire” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 3, 13/3/1925: 945). 
Barlow’s statement makes it clear that not only was the Pact split over the Bill but also 
its Labour representatives in the House, notably Hay, Waterston and Rayburn, were 
opposed to the Bill for a variety of reasons especially its exclusionary nature, while the 
idea of a South African profession for the benefit of South Africans appealed to others 
like Barlow. 
 
REPEAT ISSUES 
Proposed amendments were then brought up for debate, many being covered a third or 
even fourth time. 
 
(i) NATAL 
KC Nathan, SAP member for Von Brandis, brought forward a motion for the Bill to 
treat people who were practising as accountants in the Transvaal and Natal equally with 
those in the Cape and Orange Free State. This issue had been debated before on 
numerous occasions but Close pointed out that the motion touched one of the 
fundamentals of the Bill in that it considered people in the Transvaal and Natal who 
were not allowed into the profession in terms of the Bill. He pointed out that under the 
Bill, such people would not lose their living providing they did not describe themselves 
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as accountants or public accountants. If they had not described themselves thus before 
the Bill, they could continue in the same way after the Bill. 
 
(ii) THE PUBLIC SERVANTS 
The issue of the civil servants was again brought up by Christie who pointed out that as 
the Bill stood, a civil servant in the Cape could be admitted to the new Society but that 
a similar civil servant in the Transvaal could not. While he acknowledged the fact that 
the Transvaal had had an Ordinance in place for over 20 years, the situation now 
created was “an absurdity” and that “in this respect the Transvaal Society has been 
unduly selfish” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 3, 13/3/1925: 936). 
 
Giovanetti produced a letter from the Transvaal Municipal Association testifying to 
how some civil servants in that province had been denied admission to the Transvaal 
Society but had subsequently risen to high accountancy positions and were still 
classified as unqualified accountants by the Transvaal Society. A few had been allowed 
to sit for the final examinations but that had ended when the Society had passed a 
resolution that none could sit for the final examination unless they had served articles. 
 
Giovanetti also referred to the opinion of the City Treasurer of Cape Town before the 
Committee in which the Treasurer stated that forms of accounting experience – such as 
in the civil and municipal services and other than that obtained in a practising 
accountant’s office – were equally as good. The City Treasurer also pointed out that 
municipal experience was often wider than that achieved by articled clerks (USA, HA, 
Debates, Vol. 3, 13/3/1925: 938). He concluded by quoting from a letter from the 
Municipal Association of the Transvaal to the effect that the 18 month service 
envisaged in Section 19 “erected an impenetrable barrier to local government officials” 
both in time away from their offices and the practicality of finding a practising 
accountant who would take on such individuals as articled clerks. 
 
Swart responded that the Select Committee had established that articles were necessary 
to achieve the appropriate experience that was neither municipal nor Civil Service 
oriented but commercial in nature. Moreover, articles sent a message to people in South 
Africa and overseas that South African qualified accountants had adequate and 
appropriate experience. He told the Committee again that he had been informed by 
 244 
 
representatives of the Civil Servants’ Association that while they would have liked the 
period of articles done away with, they were prepared to accept the fact that the 
qualifying examination could be written at any time (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 3, 
13/3/1925: 939). Not all accounting organisations in South Africa were totally at odds 
with the Bill. 
 
(iii) PUBLIC SERVANTS – AGAIN 
Allen, Labour member for Springs, pointed out that accountants in Government, 
municipal and provincial employment would be disadvantaged and would, if the Bill 
were passed, not be allowed to practise outside their service. But they would find in 
time that the qualification of Chartered Accountant would become necessary for those 
intending to apply for senior posts within these services. He declared that the Bill’s goal 
of improving the standard of the profession was laudable. “It indicates progress and 
brings the country level with competitors” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 3, 13/3/1925: 
946). 
 
He continued by saying that if the promoters of the Bill accepted the demands of those 
in the Public Service, they would achieve that goal in the long run and “without 
creating a great deal of prejudice in the public mind and in the minds of those practising 
up to the present” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 3, 13/3/1925: 946). In this, he was 
supported by JSF Pretorius, National Party member for Fordsburg, who stated that he 
had been convinced by the afternoon’s proceedings that an injustice was being 
perpetrated and put the opposition point of view as follows: “We can argue as we like, 
but it amounts to this, that the people in that position [of chartered accountants] do their 
best to keep others out”. He moved that the Chairman “leave the chair” (USA, Debates, 
Vol. 3, 13/3/1925: 947). 
 
Close asked the Chair to explain what this meant as he believed few would realise that 
if the motion for the Chairman to leave the Chair was carried it would mean the 
dropping of the Bill for a time, perhaps never to come before the House again. The 
Chairman agreed with Close’s summation of the matter but pointed out that the Bill 
could be brought forward after further notice and the approval of the House. The 
House-in-Committee voted and the motion was defeated by 54 votes to 11 (USA, HA, 
Debates, Vol. 3, 13/3/1925: 947). Barlow, Nathan and Rayburn voted against the 
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motion while Hay and Pretorius voted for it. Rayburn then moved that the Chair report 
progress and ask permission to sit again. Close attempted to get a vote on the 
amendment to allow the final examination to be written at any time but this was not 
agreed to and instead the Chair reported progress and the House agreed to resume in 
Committee on 27 March. 
 
THE HOUSE-IN-COMMITTEE: 24 APRIL 1925 
The pressure of business in Parliament meant that the House only resumed in 
Committee to consider the South African Society of Accountants (Private) Bill on 24 
April 1925. The proposed amendment arising out of the meeting of 13 March was 
summarised, namely the final examination could be written at any time but the 18-
month “continuous service” with a practising member of the proposed new Society, 
remained. 
 
The debate resumed. Waterston took up the cudgels again against the 18-month service 
required by municipal and public servants, calling it “an effective barrier against these 
persons being able to enter the profession as an accountant” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 
4, 24/4/1925: 2497). For Waterston, one of the issues was a living wage for those 
public servants doing the 18 month service. “How can he afford to put in 18 months 
apprenticeship at 2s 6d or 10s a week in order to become qualified as an accountant?” 
Even if a town clerk earned £1 000 a year, such an individual would be unlikely to be 
able to save much as he had “to live in decency and pay for the maintenance and 
education of his children. I do not believe that, as far as earning money is concerned, he 
would earn enough during his period of qualification to pay for his food” (USA, HA, 
Debates, Vol. 4, 24/4/1925: 2497). He stated that should Close agree to drop the 18-
month service requirement, this act of good faith would assist in getting the clause 
through the House. Close responded that all he could concede was the deletion of the 
requirement that the qualifying examination had to be taken during the period of 
service. The status quo since the last meeting had not changed. 
 
Close reiterated three points. 
 
1. the promoters of the Bill were best qualified to judge the value of the new 
Society so all would be proud of it; 
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2. the young people of the country could join a real profession with status; and 
3. the promoters were Four Societies, one from each province. Two were statutory 
Societies with nothing to gain from the Bill. But they stood to lose the 
professional status they had acquired since their establishment if they agreed to 
an “open door” policy. 
 
Nevertheless, Close pointed out: “In the interest of the general body of the profession 
and of the general public, they are prepared to sacrifice the position guaranteed by [this] 
status, which will be altered by this Bill” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 4, 24/4/1925: 2498). 
But there were limits – people who previously had little chance of entry into the Society 
could, by examination and 18-month clerkship, be allowed in. The Four Societies 
promoting the Bill were unanimous in the belief that the Bill was the only way to 
secure “the registration of South African accountants as being of a high status in 
accountancy work” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 4, 24/4/1925: 2498). He further pointed 
out that he had been authorised to state that the public services accepted the Bill 
providing the examination could be written at any time. He appealed to the members of 
the House to end discussion and come to a straight vote on the issue of the Bill. It was a 
forlorn hope and the debate broke out afresh. 
 
TABLE 8.3 
ANALYSIS OF MAJOR LABOUR PARTICIPANTS IN HOUSE-IN-
COMMITTEE DEBATES ON THE ACCOUNTANTS BILL: 8 AUGUST 1924,  
2 SEPTEMBER 1924, 13 MARCH 1925, 24 APRIL 1925, 9 JUNE 1925 
 
Name Party 
Affiliation 
Service in Parliament Constituency 
Barlow, AG 
 
 
Hay, GA 
 
Kentridge, M 
 
 
 
Rayburn, G 
 
Waterston, RB 
Labour 
United Party 
 
Labour 
 
Labour 
 
United Party 
 
Labour 
 
Labour 
1921–43 
1943–53 
 
1924–8 
 
1914–33 
 
1933–53 
 
1924–9 
 
1921–9 
Bloemfontein (North) 
Hospital 
 
Pretoria (West) 
 
Durban (Central), 
Fordsburg 
Troyeville 
 
Durban (Umbilo) 
 
Brakpan 
Source: Parliamentary Register, 1910–1961. 
 247 
 
LABOUR RAMPANT IN COMMITTEE 
Hay pointed out that there was still resentment over the “servitude of 18 months” 
(USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 4, 24/4/1925: 2501) and stated he was out to get justice for 
those accountants threatened with exclusion from the new Society. He moved for the 
Chair to report progress and ask leave to sit again, clearly in a delaying tactic designed 
to wear down Close and his supporters. Kentridge declared that if the Committee did 
not report progress, he – Kentridge – would allow the Committee stage to continue and 
simply vote against the Bill at the report stage. Nevertheless, Hay moved to report 
progress and a vote was taken. The motion was defeated. Hay, Kentridge, Rayburn and 
Waterston supported the motion while the opponents included AG Barlow (USA, HA 
Debates, Vol. 4, 24/4/1925: 2503). Smuts and Havenga were noticeable by their 
absence from the House. The Bill had lost traction and, more importantly, was 
beginning to prove an embarrassment to the Government. What is also noticeable is the 
class and language gaps that were beginning to open between Hay and his strongly 
spoken colleagues on the one side, and the conservative Barlow and Havenga on the 
other. The analysis of Labour members of the House given at Table 8.3 reinforces the 
impression of instability in Labour’s ranks. Hay, Rayburn and Waterston – or 43% of 
Labour’s representation – lost their seats in the 1929 election and the Labour Party 
went from 17 to 10 Parliamentary seats. 
 
Rayburn made the point that a municipal accountant could become a member of the 
Incorporated Society of England by passing an examination with no need to serve 
articles. It was his opinion that the chartered society was for rich men while the 
incorporated society was for poor men (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 4, 24/4/1925: 2504). 
He continued, artfully, that he believed the Bill’s promoters wanted to maintain the 
proposed new Society’s status “and they fear lest a second grade clerk in the municipal 
service may be allowed to enter” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 4, 24/4/1925: 2505) – this, 
despite Close’s pronouncements to the contrary, previously given. 
 
A CIRCULAR DEBATE 
The issue of the Bill had become circular with points raised being repetitive in their 
nature. For example, Swart pointed out that accountants in the Transvaal would not lose 
their livelihood as Section 19 dealt with municipal and public servants, suggesting that 
people were misinformed about what the real intention of the Bill and its objectives 
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were. Waterston, with political perception, was of the opinion that Close was pushing 
for a vote “because he has a steam roller majority behind him at the moment, he wishes 
to rush this Bill through and he is not going to concede anything at all” (USA, HA, 
Debates, Vol. 4, 24/4/1925: 2509). Waterston produced telegrams and letters from 
citizens who believed the Bill would be detrimental to them, one author claiming, “I 
make the definite allegation that in the Transvaal work is being taken by accountants, 
but it is actually performed by the clerical staff and these gentlemen are getting big fees 
for work they have not done themselves” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 4, 24/4/1925: 
2511). Close made another attempt to get the House to vote on the amendment, but 
fruitlessly so. 
 
The Labourites had a full head of steam now and were remorseless and careless of the 
facts. Kentridge, for example, queried Close’s contention that he spoke for the public 
servants when Waterston had produced a telegram from the Transvaal Municipal 
Association, representing most of the municipal employees in that province, stating 
their opposition against the Bill. Close’s response was that he had the support of the 
public servants, not the municipal ones. Kentridge withdrew his remark, but pointed out 
that a previous statement that accountants could earn between £18–25 a month, did not 
make sense. He knew of instances where bookkeepers in Johannesburg performing the 
work of accountants or company secretaries were offered only £4–5 a month to do so. 
For such men, the recognised practice of accountancy would be closed by the 
enactment of the Bill (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 4, 24/4/1925: 2512). 
 
FOREIGN SOCIETIES – AGAIN 
Waterston resurrected the issue of foreign societies and re-entered the debate with a 
letter he had received from a Mr A Mitcham pointing out that accountants who 
qualified with the London Association of Accountants or the Corporation of 
Accountants, Glasgow, but who were not at present practising, would not be allowed to 
join the new Society. Both aforementioned Societies, Waterston said, made allowance 
for South African law in their examinations. In England, the system was open to all 
providing they qualified under a recognised Society. The Bill was seen as an attempt 
“to limit the profession to those presently practising and enable them to exact exorbitant 
fees from the public as is the case with doctors and lawyers” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 
4, 24/4/1925: 2517). 
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Mitcham’s letter also detailed suggestions for basic future educational requirements – 
such as those laid down by the National Commercial Examining Body of the Union 
Government of South Africa – as well as admission to the new Society of those 
belonging to the Corporation of Accountants (Glasgow) incorporated in 1891, and the 
London Association of Accountants, incorporated in 1905. The former suggestion was 
to operate for all those intending to become practising accountants while the latter 
would operate for a window period of a few months after the passing of the Bill. 
 
Close’s comment was that the proposals would require “an entirely new Bill” (USA, 
HA, Debates, Vol. 4, 24/4/1925: 2519). Waterston pointed out that the first amendment 
would allow all to enter the profession while the second one would allow in others at 
present qualified but shut out by the Bill. He continued by saying he preferred 
personally to see how attempts to legislate the profession in the United Kingdom fared 
and for the present South African Bill to be quashed. It is significant that the debate that 
raged in the House-in-Committee centred on South African issues, this despite the 
petitions raised by foreign societies at the beginning of the process. One implication is 
that internal issues became more important to members of the House as the debate had 
touched upon sensitive issues, one being an overt sense of class. 
 
RAYBURN TO THE FORE 
Rayburn pointed out that while the Bill had been before the House for 18 months, some 
members of Parliament were new as a result of the General Election of June 1924 and 
did not have Close’s familiarity with it, alluding to Swart’s earlier remarks about 
members’ difficulty in understanding the legal niceties of amendments proposed (USA, 
HA Debates, Vol. 4, 24/4/1925: 2507, 2520). Swart protested that he had been 
misrepresented to which Rayburn apologised but stated, again, that his point was that 
the Bill made accountancy a closed preserve for those who could afford to go through 
an expensive series of examinations. The Chair chastised him and stated that he should 
confine his comments to Section 19. But Rayburn persisted and said that many good 
accountants had never passed the matriculation examination, declaring it to be “a fetish 
which has been forced upon this country, particularly in late years” (USA, HA, 
Debates, Vol. 4, 24/4/1925: 2521). The Chair again insisted Rayburn confine his 
remarks to Section 19. Rayburn’s censure by the Chair indicates two important facts – 
underlying class tensions and a reluctance to play by the rules. 
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WATERSTON AND HAY 
Hay took up the fight and questioned Close’s statement that the public servants 
supported the amendment, stating no letter had been provided. He then read a letter 
from a senior public servant who did not support the amendment or the exclusion of 
those in Natal and the Transvaal while their equals (or even inferiors) were allowed 
admission because they were resident in the Cape or the Orange Free State. Provincial 
barriers created a series of inequalities which the letter detailed, declaring that 
provincialism needed to be done away with in favour of South Africa as a whole (USA, 
HA, Debates, Vol. 4, 24/4/1925: 2523). Christie urged Close to do away with the 
provincial aspects of the Bill, promising, if he did, many more would support the Bill. 
He pointed out, however, that the 18-month articles was manageable now that Close 
had agreed to the final examination being written at any time. 
 
Waterston read another letter, this time from the Municipal Association of the 
Transvaal in which they stated that those who received a degree, diploma, or passed an 
acceptable examination in accountancy, should be admitted to the new society. The 
letter pointed out that 18 months’ service was impossible, assuming accountants in 
practice were prepared to accept such candidates. Hay concluded that he had, to hand, 
letters from important accountants in South Africa urging him to oppose the Bill. Hay 
denied any desire to wreck the Bill preferring instead to be “the builders up of a 
righteous measure” to which Close remarked: “a friendly gesture from the Labour 
Benches” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 4 24/4/1925: 2526) thereby acknowledging the 
increasingly effective opposition of the Labour Party. 
 
Hay continued that “we are fighting for the livelihood of [deprived] people” and moved 
to report progress. The Chair declared him out of order as he had already moved a 
similar motion in the current debate. Alexander tried to move for an adjournment of the 
debate but was also ruled out of order by the Chair. Oost, National Party member for 
Pretoria (North), then moved for progress to be reported and Close pointed out to the 
Bill’s supporters “that if they accept this motion, the whole thing goes altogether” 
(USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 4, 24/4/1925: 2527). This motion was put and lost. Rayburn 
moved to report progress and to ask leave to sit again. This passed and the House-in-
Committee was scheduled to meet on the following Monday to continue debating the 
issue. 
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THE BILL IN TROUBLE – AGAIN 
Again this was not to happen and the next time the Bill appeared before the House was 
on 2 June 1925 when Swart moved that its debate be suspended again and permission 
be given to proceed with the Bill at the next session of the House at the same stage as 
that at which the proceedings were suspended (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 4, 2/6/1925: 
3886). Hay objected and further consideration was postponed to 9 June 1925 when it 
was left to the Speaker to point out that while motions similar to that proposed by Swart 
had been accepted in the past, there was no precedent for the motion being repeatedly 
made with the same Bill – except where a general election intervened and the following 
session of Parliament was too short to handle the matter. The Speaker acknowledged 
that this had been the case with the South African Society of Accountants (Private) Bill 
where the House had agreed to the Bill’s first suspension in the first session of 1924 
and again in the short second session following the General Election of 1924. The 
Speaker pointed out that he was not prepared to rule Swart’s motion out of order and 
that it was for the House to accept or reject it. 
 
SWART’S MOTION 
Thereafter Swart formally moved to have the proceedings suspended as contained in his 
2 June proposal. He continued by saying the Bill had been “hanging in mid-air” (USA, 
HA, Debates, Vol. 4, 9/6/1925: 4213) since 1924. It had already cost the Promoting 
Societies between £3 000 – £4 000 and had generated “determined opposition” in the 
House. Swart brought to the House’s attention that it had been impossible for the 
Promoting Societies’ representatives to deal with the points of opposition raised during 
the current session concerning public servants and the perceived provincial inequalities, 
as these representatives had had no authority to depart from their mandate. Swart hoped 
that during the recess matters could be resolved so that an amended Bill suitable to both 
promoters and opposers could be introduced in 1926. He pointed out that if the motion 
was not carried, the Bill would be wrecked and the promoters would be unwilling to 
bear the cost of bringing another Bill forward. He concluded, “I hope the House will 
take the assurance from me that the promoting Societies will do everything possible 
during the recess to meet the points raised by the members who object to the Bill” 
(USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 4, 9/6/1925: 4213). Close was conspicuous by his absence, 
being “not at present in this country”. 
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Swart then moved the motion to postpone the Bill to the next Session. Giovanetti 
seconded the motion with Christie supporting it, particularly as the Promoting Societies 
were urged to convene a conference in the interim to discuss the points raised by the 
opposition. He concluded that should they not resolve the issues, the publicity 
generated by the Bill might persuade the Government to bring forward a fairer 
dispensation measure. In this assessment, Christie showed a shrewd political sense. The 
extensive bickering both in Parliament and out coupled with the inability of opposing 
parties to reach a compromise had created an embarrassing situation for the 
Government as there was a clear need to regulate the accounting profession. Even the 
most ardent supporters of a private Bill recognised the need for intervention if the 
confusion continued. 
 
A GOVERNMENT BILL? 
Hay was supported by Allen, the Labour member for Springs, who believed the matter 
should begin de novo with Government sponsoring the Bill to save the Societies 
money. He stated that if the motion were passed “there is, next session, going to be a 
good deal of the time on private members days used up in retraversing the discussion, 
and I think this would be rather straining the indulgence of the House” (USA, HA, 
Debates, 9/6/1925: 4215). This was an interesting revelation of a tactic rather similar to 
the American filibuster in that its goal was to extend the debate upon a subject 
indefinitely so as to delay progress and prevent a vote upon a particular proposal. 
 
DM Brown, SAP member for Three Rivers, objected to Hay’s remarks and pointed out 
that before he, Hay, had been voted to the House in the General Election of 1924, a 
Select Committee had sat for 15 days hearing a large range of witnesses. He pointed out 
that “the largest and wealthiest Society” [the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales] had not opposed the Bill but had “opposed South Africa being 
allowed to use the name chartered accountant, which is really the hallmark of 
accountancy and they spent close on £1 000 fighting that point alone” (USA, HA, 
Debates, 9/6/1925: 4215). The Select Committee had rejected that point, deciding 
instead that South Africans needed the same title as the best designation in the world. 
At this point, the Speaker brought Brown to task for discussing the Bill. Brown 
continued that much time and money had been spent on the Bill, before concluding 
with the comment “an honourable member says this Bill tries to exclude everybody. I 
 253 
 
challenge that statement. It does not seek to exclude a single person, but it refuses to 
admit everybody” (USA, HA, Debates, 9/6/1925: 4215). Brown pointed out that most 
of the members opposing the Bill were new members of the House who cried out for 
trade unions “but this is a legitimate trade union and still they oppose it” (USA, HA, 
Debates, Vol. 4, 9/6/1925: 4216). The new Labour members in the House were making 
a clear impact, but not perhaps as intended. 
 
How White unions viewed the Labour Party in Parliament is unclear. Its leader, 
Creswell, failed to force a White Anglophone Labour policy on the mines at a time 
when its National Party allies had dropped the idea in favour of placing the economic 
burden of employing White (Afrikaner) labour on the Public Service and secondary 
industry (Yudelman, 1983: 225). In this environment, many mine unions became 
dominated by increasingly less militant Afrikaners (Yudelman, 1983: 129). In the 
period 1900–24, South African trade unions had undergone a radical transformation 
from exclusive skilled miners to inclusive racially and class based organisations to cater 
for unskilled White Afrikaners (Yudelman, 1983: 225). 
 
WB Madeley, Labour member for Benoni and member of the Cabinet for Public Works 
and Post, entered the debate on Hay’s side and criticised the promoters of the Bill for 
their intransigent attitude and failure to compromise. He believed it would be foolish to 
expect anything further if the motion was carried. He also took Brown to task on his 
comments about trade unionism, pointing out trade unions opened their ranks while the 
Bill closed the door to those capable of becoming chartered accountants and put 
insurmountable barriers in their way in the form of a period of practical service. In 
response to a query about similarities in the legal profession, Madeley was of the 
opinion that the “lawyers [had] been able to pass legislation which entrenches a circle 
of them, but that is no reason why we should perpetuate it” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 4, 
9/6/1925: 4216). He called for a Government bill so that there would be a public point 
of view rather than that of private individuals and urged the House not to pass the 
current Bill as it was unsatisfactory. He held out that should the Bill be reintroduced in 
a form acceptable to the House it was almost guaranteed passing. Swart responded that, 
if possible, the current Bill would be amended to meet the opposition’s demands, but if 
not “it was probable there will be a new Bill” (USA, HA, Debates, Vol. 4, 9/6/1925: 
4219). 
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The motion to postpone the Bill to the next session of Parliament was put and passed by 
63 votes to 15. A review of the voting lists shows those in opposition included 
Labourites Hay, Kentridge, Rayburn and Madeley, indicating that they were consistent 
in their pro-worker attitude. While moderate Labourites like AG Barlow were equally 
consistent in their voting pattern concerning the Bill in the Committee, two supporters 
of the motion of 9 June 1925 are notable – JBM Hertzog, Prime Minister of the Union 
of South Africa and leader of the Nationalist Party and his Minister of Defence and 
leader of the Labour Party, FHP Creswell. Creswell’s background was typically South 
African – a former mine manager, he had served in both the Anglo-Boer War and 
World War I. Part of their 1923 election pact had been an understanding that political 
cooperation would not affect party allegiance (Breitenbach et al., 1974: 338) yet a 
Labour split is clear in this vote. Equally clear is the Government’s desire that the 
matter of the Bill proceed, but in a different way. The promoting Societies had been 
bested in the House and had no further appetite for this particular approach to their goal 
of a united accounting profession in which they wielded significant influence. But in 
the period 1926–7, two other bills offered a way forward – the Companies Bill and the 
Chartered Accountants’ Designation Bill. 
 
CONCLUSION 
A number of issues need to be considered further to achieve what Leedy and Ormrod 
(2005: 161) call the “meaning of events”, history in their view being “nothing more 
than an ever flowing stream of events and the continuing changes in human life and its 
institutions”. The inclusion of beliefs and norms is important, given North’s view of 
institutional economics. Chance had a role to play as well. 
 
Firstly, the economic and political landscape in 1924 was different to that of 1925 
because the new Pact Government was wedded to an aggressive pro-White, Afrikaans 
regime marginally tolerant of foreign capital. As Yudelman (1983, 217) points out, the 
Pact Government introduced legislation in its first three years [of existence] which 
influenced industrial and race relations for the next 50, amongst them the policies of job 
creation and reservation for whites which led to an enlarged Civil Service and a 
marginalised Black population. Horwitz’s view is that “Afrikaans-speaking workers 
[found] their political identification with Afrikaner nationalism, which had given 
legislative and administrative proof of its intention and its ability to promote the 
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interests of White workers” (1967: 103). But the absorption of semi-skilled whites into 
the mines’ bureaucratic support structures was resisted with some success. The Mines 
Department, for example, was dominated by former Transvaal civil servants – largely 
clerks – far into the 1930s while the Labour Department, in the beginning, was run by 
ex-Cape civil servants (Yudelman, 1983: 231). The mining sector was very important 
economically and needed careful treatment. 
 
The general meaning behind the events described above is relatively clear: the 
achievement of economic and political power so that some people’s lives – the voters – 
could be influenced, hopefully for the better. Secondly, the Accountants Bills of 1924 
was seriously flawed, both technically and morally. The technical aspects are well 
documented and comprise elements like incomplete and late petitions, poor 
draughtsmanship and verbatim use of the detail of the 1913 Bill, all of which needed to 
be condoned by the House. The moral argument so effectively used in the House by 
Waterston and his minority Labour colleagues in 1924–5 did much to undermine the 
1924 Bill which was specifically exclusionary and out of step with events in the 
profession in other parts of the Empire, notably New Zealand and Australia. 
 
North (1990: 3) has observed that institutions are the “rules of the game” or the 
“humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” politically, socially and 
economically. These rules comprise either formal or informal rules, the former 
encompassing laws, contracts, political systems, organisations and markets and the 
latter concerned with traditions, customs, value systems and religions. The choices of 
individuals are thus limited by the rules but in return uncertainty and sometimes 
inefficiency are reduced by the “stable structure to human interaction” given by 
institutions (North, 1990: 6). 
 
Institutional economics has, as Fraser observed in his inaugural lecture in October 2012 
at Rhodes University, an unusual nature:  
 
“Economists for the most part hold on the crutch of theory, hard data and 
econometric techniques in their research and are somewhat lost without them. 
Venturing into the realm of qualitative analysis required for institutional 
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economic research, which is more the sphere of anthropologists and 
sociologists, makes economists rather uneasy” (Fraser, 3/10/12: 1). 
 
An important element in North’s hypothesis is the “organisation”. Fundamentally, 
institutions create opportunities which organisations, in turn, are created to maximise 
effectively. Simply put, in the process, the institution evolves and in return shapes 
economic behaviour. A further element is cost and, as North (1990, 27) notes:  
 
“The costliness of information is the key to the costs of transacting, which 
consist of the costs of measuring the valuable attributes of what is being 
exchanged and the costs of protecting rights and policing and enforcing 
agreements. These measurement and enforcement costs are the sources of 
social, political, and economic institutions.” 
 
Thus, in its simplest form, institutional economics requires a broad analysis of 
institutions and sees the economic system as the product of the interaction between 
institutions such as people, organisations and social norms (Fraser, 2012: 3–4). 
 
Again, institutionalists do not seek one all-encompassing model. The ideas behind 
institutions “facilitate a strong movement towards specific and historically located 
approaches to analysis” (Fraser, 2012: 15). Inevitably there are many levels and forms 
of analysis. 
 
Against this broadly sketched background, meaning is elusive. The facts of 1924–5 
would suggest the following:  
 
 Parliament represented the rules, both of procedure and of fair play. To access it 
was costly. 
 The promoting societies and the opponents were the organisations formed to take 
advantage of the opportunity inherent in the 1924 Bill and Parliament’s ability to 
create and enact it into law and thereby change opportunity into certainty. 
 Cost was that of measuring the Bill’s value, i.e. the cost of following the rules, of 
controlling the nascent society, including the public relations cost and the “fall out” 
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from Labour’s exposure of the potential unfair treatment of a number of categories 
of accountants. 
 
Any reference to cost in economics necessitates reference to Reginald Coase’s 
publication The Problem of Social Cost (1960). Coase postulated that efficient markets 
are competitive and enables participants to solve the problem and maximise aggregate 
income costlessly (North, 1990: 15). Clearly, measuring the cost and value of the 
attributes of the 1924 Bill are difficult to do. Intuitively, one believes the failure of the 
Bill had an impact on the public good and the economy, but how to show it? The 
concept of a reportable irregularity may be an answer – or at least an avenue to one. 
This will be considered in the conclusion under the subheading, “Reportable 
Irregularity: A Tool for Institutional Economics?” 
 
THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
At this point, it is appropriate to consider the creation of a formalised accounting 
profession in Australia. As with the New Zealand Act of 1907, so too did the 
incorporation of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia by Royal Charter in 
1928 have similarities and significant differences with the process in South Africa. 
 
EARLY DAYS 
First and foremost, both were in response to economic growth – principally in the gold 
mines in South Africa and in the rapid urbanisation of Australia from 1885. The large 
amounts of money invested in the growth called for enhanced bookkeeping methods 
and procedures which in turn needed a professional underpinning (Graham, 1978: 1). 
This underpinning was well described in the preamble to the Australian Royal Charter 
(as discussed later in this chapter).  
 
As in South Africa, in Australia in the mid-to-late 19th Century there were many 
“accountants” offering a myriad of services. An early amalgamation of some of these 
loose groupings into more formal societies was effected by the incorporation in March 
1886 of the Adelaide Institute of Accountants. In an attempt to achieve uniformity, it 
required members to have passed an examination prior to admission (Graham, 1978: 1). 
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The creation of the Adelaide Institute was soon followed later in 1886 in Victoria by 
the formation of the Incorporated Institute of Accountants of Victoria. 
 
LESSONS 
There are four important facts following from these amalgamations which are important 
from a South African perspective. Firstly, the impetus for the establishment of the 
Victoria Institute came from CA Cooper of the Society of Incorporated Accountants 
and Auditors of the United Kingdom who had convened a meeting to consider its 
formation in Melbourne, Australia, “of those having kindred interests in their common 
calling and a desire to place their profession on a higher plane than it had occupied in 
public esteem” (Graham, 1978: 1). The “Incorporateds” also played a key role in the 
profession in South Africa, beginning with the formation in the Cape Colony in 1896 of 
a South African Committee. Clearly, the Incorporateds saw the colonies and dominions 
as important areas for growth and were assiduous in their efforts to cultivate them. 
 
Secondly, the new Institute was subsequently registered in the state of Victoria, 
Australia, Act No. 764, which gave the Institute legal sanction and significance when 
the Commonwealth of Australia was formally inaugurated in January 1901. The 
Transvaal and Natal Societies had similar “protective” legislation which the South 
Africans used in their own interests. 
 
Thirdly, the Victoria Institute later became the Commonwealth Institute of Accountants 
which pushed hard for the creation of an accounting profession under Royal Charter, a 
process that took until 1928 to accomplish. And there was no lack of competition. In 
the period 1890–1910, at least 13 organised accounting bodies emerged in metropolitan 
Australia (Graham, 1978: 3). 
 
And finally, those responsible for the establishment of these societies had an abiding 
belief that if people offering themselves to the public as “accountants” would only gain 
public support if these accountants exhibited a skill which indicated “the possession of 
the necessary qualification for the special work” (Brentnall, 1938: 46, quoted in 
Graham, 1978: 1). This refrain is one common to the South African process as well, but 
undermined in part by its almost aggressive exclusiveness. 
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THE SYDNEY INSTITUTE 
The next important event in the Australian progression towards a unified accounting 
profession was the establishment of the Sydney Institute of Public Accountants in 1894. 
As a professional organisation, the Institute espoused minimum standards for 
admission. Associates of the Institute were required to be at least 21, resident in New 
South Wales and to have passed such examinations as required. Fellows of the Institute 
were Associates aged at least 25 who had completed no less than three years’ 
continuous practice (Graham, 1978: 3). These requirements were very similar to those 
required by the four South African Provincial Societies. Another group of importance 
was the Tasmanian Institute of Accountants formed in 1917. 
 
THE FIRST ATTEMPTS AT UNIFICATION 
The proliferation of accounting bodies in the 1890s in Australia, as in South Africa, led 
to a wide variation in entry standards and an inability of the smaller societies to run 
examinations. As a result, and with the intention of creating a uniform system, the three 
main Australian institutes – the Sydney Institute, the Adelaide Society and the 
Incorporated in Victoria – developed a scheme of joint examination in rotation. The 
inclusion of the Incorporated Institute of Accountants of New Zealand in the process 
provided a short-lived opportunity in 1903 to establish the Federal Institute of 
Accountants (Graham, 1978: 4). This attempt was two years after the political change 
of Australia from colony to federation and the idea of unification grew. 
 
The similarity between these Australian events and the process in South Africa in 1913 
is marked. In summary, both experienced a recent and significant devolution of 
political power to former colonies, both proposed to unify the profession with 
automatic admission to the members of the founding institutes and proposed a 
distinction between professional (practising) and non-practising or non-professional 
accountants. Even the final “deal breaker” had South African echoes – the New 
Zealanders wanted the admission to the new society of all accountants in all fields; a 
majority of the Australians led by the Sydney Institute wanted to restrict membership of 
the new institute to public accountants. 
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The New Zealand attitude was understandable, given the fact that recent legislation in 
that country had seen the creation of a unified accounting profession that had defined 
“accountant” loosely and consequently had minimal entrance requirements. 
 
The participants in the federal scheme also failed to agree as to where the head office of 
the proposed institute should be situated. This was followed by the news in 1904 that 
only two out of 186 candidates who wrote the joint examination passed. The Victorian 
and New Zealand Institutes resigned from the body. 
 
In June 1907, conscious of the need for the new nation to have a unified accounting 
profession, FN Yarwood, President of the Sydney Institute, organised a meeting of 
likeminded individuals who represented their state rather than an accounting institute. 
The process was successful and saw the incorporation of the Australasian Corporation 
of Public Accountants (ACPA) in February 1908, a body which had a significant 
influence on Australian public accounting in the 20 years prior to the issue of the Royal 
Charter in 1928. This unified group of public accountants was the first step (Graham, 
1978: 7) in the process. 
 
CHASING THE CHARTER 
The commercial and professional success of the British Royal Chartered Societies from 
the first award of a Charter in the 1850s to the current period of 1910 made the 
nomenclature “Chartered Accountant” a valuable one. An attempt in 1909 by the 
Incorporated Institute of Accountants of Victoria failed, but a carefully calculated 
approach by the newly created Australasian Corporation dealt carefully with a number 
of key issues. As in the South African Parliament, so too in the English Monarch’s 
Privy Council – interested parties were permitted to raise objections and counter 
petitions. 
 
One such objection from the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
was the use of the phrase “chartered accountant” which they believed, with reason, to 
belong to them and other Royal Societies. The Australians agreed and made the 
acceptable proposal to add the suffix “(Aus)” to the designation to indicate its 
Australian antecedents (Graham, 1978: 7). The use of “South Africa” in the South 
African Designation Act of 1927 neutralised similar criticism in South Africa and was 
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first suggested in the 1924 Select Committee considering the second Accountants Bill 
(SC7, 1924: Q875) as previously mentioned. A more serious objection emanated from 
the Incorporated Institute of Accountants, Victoria, in the new body comprising of 
public accountants only. This exclusionary policy was similar to the standpoint of the 
Four Societies in South Africa in both 1913 and 1924/5. 
 
In contrast, the New Zealand response had been to make its process as inclusive as 
possible. 
 
In part, the opposition of the Victorians arose from the fact that they were Incorporated 
Accountants. A Royal Charter together with the “Chartered Accountant” designation 
would eclipse their qualification (Graham, 1978: 8) – and hence popularity – as an 
accounting society. The Incorporateds also took the line that, as Australia had 
responsible government, its Government should legislate for the accountancy 
profession, and not some “archaic and out of date” process (Brentnall quoted in 
Graham, 1978: 8). 
 
COMPROMISE 
Some form of compromise was needed but the Great War of 1914–8 put the process on 
hold until 1925 when a conference was held between the Presidents of the 
Commonwealth and the Federal Institutes of Accountants in Australia. Its objective was 
to clear the way forward to the award of the Royal Charter and a compromise was 
achieved by the Presidents with the ACPA in February 1926, later to be known as “the 
gentleman’s agreement” (Graham, 1978: 8–9). In terms of this agreement: 
 
 qualified members of the Commonwealth Institute were to be admitted to 
membership of the chartered body provided they were of “reputable character” and 
met any of the charter’s requirements regarding service and/or experience; and 
 the first council would comprise equal membership drawn from the Corporation and 
Commonwealth Institute, the latter spread over the Australian States in a show of 
unity. 
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There were points of similarity with the South African Pearce Agreement, notably 
compromise to get the process moving in a positive direction, but the Pearce proposal 
dealt with small numbers which had little real impact on the process. 
 
The Australian compromise was more substantial and enduring and in June 1928, King 
George V granted the Royal Charter which constituted the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in Australia. 
 
The Australians succeeded where the South Africans failed for a number of reasons, 
specifically: a prior degree of unity in the profession through the establishment of the 
ACPA before it was decided to seek a Royal Charter; a willingness by most participants 
to compromise, especially after 1918; and the clear, sound leadership of key ACPA 
officials like Thomas Brentnall, one-time President of the ACPA and first President of 
the Institute (1928–32), Sir George Mason Allard, second President of the Institute 
(1932–41) and FN Yarwood, a prime mover in the establishment of ACPA and in 
promoting the Charter and all it meant to the Australian profession. 
 
The South African dramatis personae – apart from their Parliamentary Agents and 
legal counsel – were less obvious in the drive to a formal status for the South African 
profession than the Australians were in theirs. 
 
In another dominion of empire – Canada – membership of accounting societies was 
voluntary and the designation “chartered” was awarded by provincial legislature at their 
discretion and without infringing upon the rights of others to practise as accountants in 
that province (SC7, 1924: Q947–51). In Canada, for an accountant to call himself 
“Chartered”, all he need do was pay membership fees to an accounting society 
recognised by a provincial legislature (Graham, 1978: 4). 
 
The case against the Canadians is perhaps overstated. In his article on “Canada’s 
Accounting Elite 1880–1930”, Alan J Richardson makes the following points: 
 
Elitism was associated with privileges granted to accountants by society at 
large. In return accountants had a responsibility to act in the interests of society. 
(Richardon, 1989: 1–2) 
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The elite group identified by Richardson comprised 79 accountants in total, as follows: 
  
CAs (23 FCAs) 66 
Society of Accountants and Auditors 1 
Corporation of Public Accountants of the Province of Quebec 1 
No professional attachment discernible 11 
TOTAL: 79 
 
Clearly, chartered accountants predominated. 
 
Richardson (1989: 7–8) discovered that the accounting elite had a lower proportion of 
native-born Canadians (57.5%) compared to a total native-born population of 77.6%. 
The accounting elite also showed an “unusually high proportion of individuals born in 
Great Britain (England, Scotland and Ireland)” (1989: 7). One would expect this figure 
with regard to British-trained chartered accountants looking for opportunities beyond 
the metropole. 
 
Serious accounting education in Canada was available in its universities from 1913 
onwards and the state granted accounting associations “the right to certify the 
competence of their members” (Richardson, 1989: 13). 
 
It is therefore clear that the designation was not easily awarded internationally – before 
the South African Select Committee of 1924, it was estimated that there were 12 
accounting societies throughout the Empire which were permitted to designate their 
members as chartered accountants, five United Kingdom societies and seven Canadian 
(SC7, 1924: Q1414–5). 
 
THE AUSTRALIAN CHARTER OF 1928 
The Charter was a relatively short document of 24 pages including an eight-page 
preamble with a further seven pages of index, giving it a total of 31 pages. Despite its 
relative simplicity of presentation and language, the Charter was an important 
document as it represents the bench-mark standard in 1928 for such forms of 
association. In comparison, the two-page South African Designation Private Act of 
1927 was the simple legal award of the designation “chartered” by and to a limited 
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stratum of the South African accounting profession. Any details – such as a national 
controlling society or institute to regulate the accounting profession – were left to a 
future Act, a decision which left the profession in uncertainty until 1951. The 
Australian Charter reflected the care put into its genesis. 
 
The first paragraph of the preamble noted the wide acceptance and existence 
throughout Australia since 1907 of the Australasian Corporation of Public Accountants 
and its membership of 636 “persons engaged in the profession of Public Accountants” 
(Charter, 1928: 4). This also meant that all other “accountants” not specifically “public” 
– municipal, Government and bookkeeper – had had 21 years to get used to the idea of 
the differential nature of the Australian accounting profession and their exclusion from 
its highest level. In 1928, this was a significant membership; in South Africa, the 
equivalent was about 1 000, but spread over five societies. By 1978, the number of 
Australian chartered accountants had risen to nearly 10 000 (Graham, 1978: 135).  
 
As previously demonstrated, the New Zealand and South African experiences were 
different. The former allowed accountants from all strata of practice into a national 
Institute which spent over 20 years sorting out the resultant problems, while the 
promoters of the 1924 South African Bill found themselves embroiled in the House of 
Assembly in a disagreement over membership of the proposed society with a newly 
influential Labour Party. Labour wanted an all-inclusive approach like in New Zealand, 
whereas the promoters favoured the Australian selective approach but had failed to 
establish the necessary foundation over time for this to happen. 
 
The second paragraph of the Charter preamble noted the “great and growing 
importance” (Charter, 1928: 4) of Public Accountants in liquidations, bankruptcies, 
insolvencies, audits, certification of the accounts of public companies and “various 
other kindred matters” (Charter, 1928: 4). There is a strong similarity between this 
detail and the detail contained in the 1927 Rhodes University College calendar entry for 
the South African Degree of Bachelor of Commerce (Calendar, 1927: 51–3). There was 
a clear alignment testifying to the widespread nature of the matter of accounting. 
 
The third and fourth paragraphs of the preamble represent the crux of the Charter – the 
ACPA had been established 
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“to secure the elevation of the profession of Public Accountants by the 
dissemination of professional knowledge and in inculcation of sound practice, 
and to increase the confidence of the banking, mercantile and general 
community in the employment of recognised Public Accountants, and to afford 
means of reference for the amicable settlement of professional differences and 
to decide upon questions of professional usage and etiquette and for other 
kindred meritorious objects and ends” (Charter, 1928: 4–5). 
 
The award of the Charter recognised these facts, constituting public recognition at the 
highest level of society which, it was argued, would raise the profession in the public 
eye. 
 
INITIAL MEMBERSHIP AND ARTICLES 
The preamble dealt generally with two levels of membership – first time admission to 
the new Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia and those seeking admission 
subsequent to the inauguration of the Institute. The former was dealt with simply – 
membership of those already in public accounting would be granted if the applicant 
had: 
 
 long experience in the profession; 
 long service as a public accountant’s clerk; and 
 passed the appropriate examination. 
 
The latter required a combined period of three years under articles of clerkship and the 
successful completion of a series of three examinations – preliminary, intermediate and 
final. A remission of one year was available to graduates of “recognised universities 
within the British Dominions” (Charter, 1928: 6). The preamble also listed a number of 
subjects in which articled clerks were expected to show proficiency. Again this list is 
very similar to the 1927 Rhodes University curriculum for the degree of Bachelor of 
Commerce. 
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THE COUNCIL OF THE CHARTERED INSTITUTE 
The Charter itself comprised 28 paragraphs and the first three dealt with the 
composition of the Institute’s Council and its first incumbents. Unlike the New Zealand 
and South African proposals of a delegated provisional council to oversee the process 
and then to be replaced later by an elected body, the Australian Charter presented a 
council fait accompli. This had clearly been orchestrated by the Charter’s petitioners 
and would have reflected the status quo within the ACPA. The Charter was a private 
initiative of the petitioners to George V in his role as King of Australia and did not 
involve the Australian Parliament directly, providing the King operated within his 
powers and protocol was observed. A similar attempt by South African petitioners in a 
sensitive post Anglo-Boer War environment, would probably not succeed. Recent 
research by Michael G Keenan of the University of Auckland into the New Zealand Act 
suggests a similar antipathy to the award of the designation by a metropolitan centre as 
distinct from the designation “chartered accountant” itself. 
 
The Council was:  
 
 entrusted with the “management and superintendence of the affairs of the Institute” 
(Charter, 1928: 14–5) subject to its members’ approval in General Meeting, its by-
laws and the provisions of the Charter which could itself be amended by 
supplemental Charters; 
 required within 12 months of the Charter’s date to call the first General Meeting 
and to submit draft by-laws for approval (Charter, 1928: 21–2) with final approval 
by the King’s representatives; and 
 directed to make by-laws to regulate, for example: 
o the admission of Associates and the election of Fellows; 
o fees for initial entrance – initially 10 guineas for Fellows and 4 for 
Associates – and annual subscriptions of 4 guineas for Fellows and 2½ for 
Associates (Charter, 1928: 17) (the South African equivalent was 5 guineas, 
and had created a storm in 1913 – see chapter 6); 
o the holding of members’ meetings; 
o the filling of vacancies on Council; 
o the appointment of auditors; and 
o the service of clerks, articled or not, and members. 
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THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES AND THE BY-LAWS 
The by-laws were supplemented by four rules known as the “fundamental rules of the 
Institute” (Charter, 1928: 19). These represent the genesis of a code of ethics and were 
very similar in content to Section 23 of the 1924 South African Bill. The Australian 
rules outlawed members of the Institute 
 
 from joining non-members in public practice; 
 from sharing profits from professional work with lawyers or participating in a 
lawyer’s professional profits or accepting any commission or bonus; 
 from accepting a commission or a bonus from brokers, agents etc., charged with the 
selling or letting of real or personal property to which the member had a 
professional connection, such as its management. This latter rule was expanded to 
include members not practising as public accountants; any business in which they 
became involved could not be “inconsistent” with the activities of the profession. 
 
Section 20 of the Charter listed the circumstances which could lead to a member’s 
exclusion or suspension. These included violation of the rules, conviction of a felony, 
bankruptcy and failure to pay the Institute’s entrance and annual subscription fees. The 
Council of the Institute was charged with investing such sales and making a decision. 
This is in contrast to the complex disciplinary system proposed in both the 1913 and 
1924 South African Bill. But, in common with South Africa, the question of what was 
to be in the Australian by-laws, beyond the requirements of the Charter, proved 
vexatious (Graham, 1978: 17–20). The purpose of the by-laws was sketched in the 
Charter at Section 25, the actual detail being left to the first Council to propose and 
navigate through the system. 
 
ASSOCIATES AND FELLOWS 
While the existence of the ACPA did much to ensure a smooth transfer of membership 
to the Institute, the Charter dealt carefully with the issue of Associates and Fellows, a 
form of recognised seniority in the profession, much favoured by the United Kingdom 
Societies. The 1927 South African Designation Act made provision for their use, but 
the idea never caught on in South Africa. 
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Firstly, those Associates or Fellows of the ACPA at the time of the Charter remained so 
on transfer (Charter, 1928: 11–3) to the new Society. The Council was also empowered 
to admit to the new Australian Society those who were members of recognised 
associations of public accountants “in the United Kingdom or elsewhere in the British 
Empire”. 
 
In many respects the Royal Charter constituting the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
in Australia was superficially similar to the South African Bills of 1913 and 1924. For 
example, the first meeting of the Council was stipulated to occur within six months of 
the receipt of the Charter. The South African Bills stipulated 12 months, and this 
suggests common draughtsmanship or similar ideas prevailing at the time. 
 
Per Section 11 in the Charter, Council was empowered to exercise all powers granted 
by the Charter as modified by the by-laws, and any resolutions passed at a general 
meeting. Section 12 dealt with service under Articles of Clerkship. As previously 
mentioned, a minimum period of three years of articles was stipulated for those serving 
under a Public Accountant, and two years for graduates of an Australian University or 
of a recognised university within the British dominions. 
 
These stipulations were in line with counterparts in both the United Kingdom and South 
Africa. In theory, a graduate from the University of South Africa or Rhodes University 
College could sign articles in Australia and expect to serve two years’ articles. 
 
Section 13 dealt with examinations in some detail, an indication of the importance of 
this activity. It is interesting to note that the Australian Institute placed significant 
importance on examinations and practical training. These had been the consistent 
mainstays of the policy of the four South African societies, and were to be carried 
forward into the 1951 South African Act. 
 
Section 14 dealt with the election of fellows and associates to the Institute, while 
Section 17 allowed members certain initials, e.g. FCA (Aust.) which represented the 
words “Fellow of the Institute of Chartered Accountants (Australia)”. Section 15 dealt 
with registration fees: 10 guineas for Fellows, Associates in practice 4 guineas and 1 
guinea if not in practice. Section 16 provided for each member in good standing to 
 269 
 
receive a Certificate of Membership. It is an interesting fact, common to both the South 
African Bills and the Australian Charter, that the sections do not always seem to follow 
a logical sequence. For example, Sections 14 and 17 deal with Fellows and Associates, 
and between these, Sections 15–6 deal respectively with entrance fees and by-laws for 
Fellows. 
 
As with the South African Bills, members ceasing to be members had no claim on the 
funds and the property. Sections 23 and 24 dealt respectively with Council’s power to 
create by-laws and, within 12 months of the commencement of the Charter, to send 
copies to members prior to the calling of a general meeting to formally adopt them. 
Section 25 was particularly important in that it provided general guidance as to the 
subject matter and purposes of the by-laws. 
 
As an acknowledgement of its origins, the Institute’s by-laws had no effect until 
submitted to, and allowed by, the “Lords of our Council”. 
 
The Australian Charter was dated 19 June 1928. 
 
CONCLUSION 
With regard to the failure of the 1924 Bill in South Africa, it is apposite to quote from 
an anonymous letter to the Transvaal Society of Accountants, dated 19 November 
1925. The writer alluded to the “vexed question” as to who should, and who should not, 
be eligible for a place on the Register. “Modifications” had been made in the hope they 
would satisfy the “determined opposition to the Bill in the House of Assembly”. 
Compromises made represented “a serious departure from our standard and ideals and 
indeed even our principles”, but these were 
 
“utterly futile as the activities of the opposition showed no abatement. From all 
I can gather the members of the Government have extended a rare sympathy to 
the Bill. Every assistance was rendered to the Promoters and to the Opposition 
to ensure the passing of the measure, but the prolonged discussions without 
result compelled the Government finally to refuse further facilities for 
discussion” (SAAHC, TSA, Minutes: 290). 
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Chapter 8 has dealt with the failure of the 1924–5 South African Bill and the success of 
the Australian Charter. From the point of view of institutional economics, political rules 
can lead to economic benefits, for example, the creation and enforcement of property 
rights and individual contracts which are detailed and upheld by the process of 
“political decision-making”. This is apparent in the Australian experience where 
economic benefits were rewarded by a political process in which contracts and property 
rights were both important and enforced. 
 
In turn, economic interests impact upon political structures where “in equilibrium, a 
given structure of property rights (and their enforcement) will be consistent with a 
particular set of political rules (and their enforcement)” (North, 1990: 48). This is the 
case of the failed Accountants Bill of 1924 where the rights of public servants and those 
of the Four Societies were balanced by the political rules which enforced behaviour in 
the House of Assembly. As North (1990: 48) points out, “changes in one [that is: 
economic interests and political rules] will induce changes in the other”. However, 
political rules are dominant. In simple terms, the Accountants Bill was a good idea 
economically, but was trumped by Labour as a result of their political clout in the Pact 
Government. 
 
In many ways, the South African promoters of the Bill were disappointed at its failure. 
However, the energy unleashed by the Pact Government in creating an industrial 
infrastructure, had already set the ball rolling to create a uniform regulation of 
companies throughout the Union. The lifeline extended to the Four Societies, whether 
intentional or not, was that all companies registered in the Union needed to be audited 
by competent and qualified individuals. This was essential if South Africa’s economy 
was to be safe for investors to invest in this expansion. Accountants were back in the 
limelight. 
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CHAPTER 9: THE COMPANIES ACT OF 1926: AN ALTERNATIVE ROUTE 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
THE FOUR SOCIETIES 
The enactment in 1926 of the South African Companies Act is testimony to two critical 
facts – increased economic activity (Feinstein, 2005: 121–7) and the need to regulate it 
by more sophisticated Union-wide corporate legislation. This Act falls mid-way 
between the final disappearance in 1925 of the South African Society of Accountants 
(Private) Bill and the passage of the Chartered Accountants’ Designation (Private) Bill 
which became law in 1927. That these three events are linked in this way is far from 
coincidental. The Designation Act specifically accorded to the members of the 
Transvaal Society of Accountants, the Natal Society of Accountants, the Cape Society 
of Accountants and Auditors (incorporated 1907) and the Society of Accountants and 
Auditors in the Orange Free State an entitlement to use the designation “Chartered 
Accountant (South Africa)” and “CA(SA)”. The reason for this statutory entitlement 
was given in the Designation Act and represented recognition of the fact that the Four 
Societies together had cooperated to allow “reciprocal admission to membership, 
qualification for admission to membership and the conduct of examinations” (SA 
Statutes, Vol. 1, 1927: 108) of prospective accountants. These combined actions had 
created a large body of highly qualified individuals “throughout the Union possessing a 
status warranting the conferring upon the individual members of the said Societies of a 
statutory designation” (SA Statutes, Vol. 1, 1927: 108). 
 
THE ENHANCED ROLE OF THE PUBLIC AUDITOR 
In the previous year, 1926, the Union Parliament had passed the Companies Act No. 46 
of 1926 which, among other things, attempted to supersede all other forms of company 
legislation and made it compulsory for all companies throughout South Africa to 
appoint an auditor (SA Statutes, 1926: 630 (s98(1)). For the first time in the Union of 
South Africa, this Act formally established the statutory duties of the auditor. They 
were as follows:  
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“The auditors shall make a report to the shareholders on the accounts examined 
by them, and on every balance-sheet laid before the company in general meeting 
during their tenure of office, and the report shall state – 
 
(a) whether or not they have obtained all the information and explanations 
they have required; 
(b) whether the company has kept proper books and records; and  
(c) whether, in their opinion, the balance-sheet referred to in the report is 
properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true and correct view of the state of 
the company’s affairs according to the best of their information and the 
explanations given to them, and as shown by the books of the company. 
 
The balance-sheet shall be signed on behalf of the board by two of the directors 
of the company or, if there is only one director, by that director, and the 
auditors’ report shall be attached to the balance-sheet, or there shall be inserted 
at the foot of the balance-sheet a reference to the report, and the report shall be 
read before the company in general meeting, and shall be open to inspection by 
any shareholder.” (SA Statutes, 1926: 632 (s99)). 
 
At the stroke of a pen, the legislature ensured the creation of watch-dogs in the 
economy as well as enhanced job opportunities for qualified individuals. The 
enactments of 1926 and 1927 put the four Provincial Societies in a strong position as 
the respected designation of Chartered Accountant made such individuals ideally suited 
to perform the function of a public auditor. A number of points need to be made here. 
 
Firstly, and in broad terms, North (1990: 48) makes the point for institutional 
economics that is evident here:  
 
“political rules in place lead to economic rules … [T]hat is property rights and 
individual contracts are specified and enforced by political decision-making”. 
 
Secondly, the 1926 Companies Act contained elements which had been carefully 
tailored to South African conditions, principally dealing with liquidators’ accounts and 
insolvent companies (Nathan, 1927: Preface). As a result, the education and training of 
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future South African accountants and auditors would need to take this into account 
while accountants and auditors who had received their training elsewhere would lack 
the knowledge and experience to deal with South African conditions. Other elements 
had been transferred from the English Act without careful cognisance of that Act’s 
sophistication and the pivotal role played by the English Board of Trade. South African 
attempts to equate its role to the Minister, Registrar or Master of the Supreme Court 
were mixed in their success (GP45, 1970: 5). 
 
Another point relates to the extended definition of the “auditors’ duties”, beyond those 
detailed in the 1926 Act, which was informed by case law, most of it English. For 
example, an auditor appointed in terms of a company’s regulations needed to take 
cognisance of those regulations, but not to the extent that they conflicted with the 
provisions of the 1926 Act (Newton v Birmingham Small Arms Co. [1906] 2 Ch. 378, 
quoted in Nathan, 1927: 235–6). 
 
When the auditors declared the balance sheet to present a true view of the company’s 
affairs, but it did not and damage resulted, the onus was upon the auditors to prove that 
such was not as a result of lapsed duty on their part (In Republic of Bolivia Exploration 
Syndicate Ltd [1914] 1 Ch. 139, quoted in Nathan, 1927: 236). This relates to an 
auditor’s liability, long an issue of concern. 
 
As late as June 1960, the profession’s journal, The South African Chartered 
Accountant, carried a weighty 19-page “Opinion by Counsel on an Auditing Liability 
for Negligence” (501–20). The basic opinion was that the auditor had a duty to report 
but incurred liability if the report was made negligently. 
 
In re London and General Bank [1895] 2 Ch. 673, LJ Lindley (quoted in Nathan, 1927: 
236) gave a clear indication of what comprised an auditor’s duties and what did not. It 
was not an auditor’s duty, for example, to give advice to directors or shareholders, a 
principle which is in line with modern audit practice. However, the observation that it 
was not an auditor’s duty to be concerned with a client company’s dividend declaration 
was out of step with the modern requirement that such a distribution leave a company 
solvent and liquid thereafter (SA Companies Act, 2008: s46). Clearly, the auditor 
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needed to take reasonable care that the company’s books reflected the state of its affairs 
(see Leeds Estate Co. v Shepherd [1886] 36 Ch. D 787 (quoted in Nathan, 1927: 237)). 
 
The 1926 Act formalised the auditor’s statutory duty in South Africa. As early as 1924 
– before the Select Committee on the Accountants’ Private Bill – it had been 
established that the audit function was growing as “all the leading firms” in the Orange 
Free State required an audit (SC7, 1924: Q1096). The passage of the Companies Act 
was thus both necessary and timeous. Of importance, too, was that the company 
envisaged by the Act had liability limited to its share capital. 
 
Before considering various aspects of the passage of the Act, some background is 
needed. Prior to 1926, the English Companies Act of 1862, as amended, held informal 
sway over much of Southern Africa and served as the blueprint for the Transvaal Act of 
1909, which in turn influenced the watershed first Union-wide Companies Act enacted 
in 1926. 
 
The 1947–8 final report of the Millin Company Law Amendment Enquiry Commission 
– one of several since 1934 – contained a graph prepared by the Register of Companies 
covering the period 1927–48 showing, in general terms: 
 
 the number of new companies registered in each year; and 
 the amount of new capital registered in each year, including capital increases by 
companies already on the register. 
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FIGURE 9.1 
“Graph prepared by the Registrar of Companies showing the number of new 
companies registered in each year since 1927–28, and the new capital registered in 
each year, including increases [in] capital by companies already on the register. 
The first six months of 1948 are included.” 
 
 
Source: Millin, 1948: 17. 
 
The graph has been included (see above) and supports the following:  
 
 In the period 1927–48, company registration increased significantly, underlining an 
increase in economic activity; 
 In 1935, at the end of the Great Depression, there were 7 852 companies on the 
register, of which 6 375 were private companies and 1 477 public companies; 
 These were ordinary trading companies; in addition, 191 companies were 
associations not for gain and seven were unlimited companies; 
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 According to the Registrar’s statement of July 1948, there were then about 32 000 
companies on the register; 
 The rate of increase is shown by the fact that whereas a total of 619 new companies 
were registered in 1927, the number of new companies registered in 1937 was 1 575 
and in 1947, 3 721; 
 The high-water mark was reached in 1945–6, with 3 820 new companies and new 
registered capital of £186 000 000; 
 The figures were well maintained in the first six months of 1948, with 2 341 new 
companies and new registered capital of £87 000 000; and lastly 
 Public and private companies were not separately classified in the Companies 
Offices but by July 1948 there were registered an estimated 7 500 public companies 
and 24 500 private companies. If this estimate is correct, there were far more public 
companies in proportion to private companies in the Union than in the United 
Kingdom, where, in 1947, there were about 18 000 private companies compared 
with 17 000 public companies (Millin, 1948: 17). 
 
The Millin Report (UG69, 1948) was an important document, but it too failed to grasp 
the uniqueness of South African conditions and sought to determine how far 
amendments in English law could be incorporated in South African Companies law. CS 
Richards, editor of the South African Journal of Economics, wrote a review article on 
the Millin Report for this journal’s September 1949 edition. 
 
He concluded:  
 
“A new Companies Act, moulded on the lines suggested, can lay improved 
foundations and an improved superstructure for the conduct of affairs. Its more 
effective functioning depends finally, however, on the extent to which the 
individual investor and shareholder takes advantage and makes use of the 
improved facilities and the new rights.” 
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In reality, practice often outstripped law. 
 
THE ACT AND THE MINES 
One purpose of the Companies Act was to ensure a uniform approach to company 
administration across the four provinces, another to keep a check “on bogus companies 
and all kinds of irregular practices” according to NJ de Wet, the Minister of Justice in 
February 1924 (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 1, 21/2/1924: 406). A further reason was given 
in the House in 1926 when Major GB van Zyl, the SAP member for Cape Town 
(Harbour), stated that the purpose of registering companies union-wide was so that their 
important details could be known to the public who needed “every possible facility for 
getting the latest authentic information in order to guide their investments” (USA, HA 
Debates, Vol. 6, 25/2/1926: 978). It was important to ensure that companies, especially 
the gold mining companies – and their declared profits – were subject to a degree of 
public scrutiny. 
 
Gold mining was a critical activity in the South African economy but its largely foreign 
ownership was deeply mistrusted, a sentiment evidenced in the debates in the House in 
this period. The value of total gold output for 1913 amounted to £37 376 000; by 1937 
it had increased to £82 557 000 (Frankel, 1938: 114). Two years before, in 1935, the 
South African tax on gold-mining income per percentage of taxable profit was 42%. 
Comparatively, the tax rates in Australia, Canada and Rhodesia were respectively 18%, 
13–9% and 23% (Frankel, 1938: 113). While the net profit attributable to the industry 
had increased by 96% in the period 1913–37, dividends paid in the same period had 
increased by 103% and taxation by 1 091% (Frankel, 1938: 83). 
 
A financial analysis of all gold mines on the Witwatersrand in 1936 quoted in Frankel 
revealed the following broad financial statement line items:  
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TABLE 9.1 
FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF GOLD MINES ON THE WITWATERSRAND, 
1936 
 
Rand gold production 
Declared working costs 
 
Working profits 
Additional sundry revenue 
 
Gross profits 
Capital expenditures, appropriated from profits 
 and not provided by capital funds 
 
Less taxation and Government participation in Lease Mines 
 
Provision on account of outstanding liability under the Miners’ 
Phthisis Act, and miscellaneous 
 
Available for dividends 
 
Rand dividend declarations 
£77 367 000  
45 318 000  
 
£32 049 000  
430 000  
 
£32 479 000  
 
1 350 000  
£31 129 000  
13 800 000  
£17 329 000  
 
300 000  
 
£17 029 000  
 
£16 927 000  
Source: Frankel, 1938: 86. 
 
While Frankel drew the conclusions 12 years after the enactment of 1926, they had 
relevance to the earlier period, as follows.  
 
1. The level of new investment in South Africa possible from foreign investors 
(Frankel, 1938: 75) was influenced by the value of the dividends received from 
past investments, especially as it was believed that mining dividends “represent 
not only net profits, but include also the return of the original capital 
subscribed” (Frankel, 1938: 78). Capital for new projects came from a small 
group of investors; failing their participation, expansion had to be funded from 
profits. This point is illustrated in Table 9.1 above. 
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2. South Africa needed to generate revenue from sources other than gold mining. 
At the time of the analysis, Frankel believed that the Government used tax 
revenues derived from gold mining to support other activities unable to 
contribute to the gross domestic product. He regarded this subsidisation as both 
uneconomical and obfuscatory to the real problems facing the South African 
economy (Frankel, 1938: 111). Interestingly, Feinstein established that much of 
the revenue Government derived from the gold mines went to subsidise white 
commercial farmers with “relief grants, capital works and loans” (Feinstein, 
2005: 108). 
 
By subjecting foreign companies, notably the mining companies, to public audit, 
Parliament sought some form of transparency in their financial affairs. There was never 
any doubt that the Companies Act was Government-sponsored legislation with the 
intention of regulating aspects of the economy, the watch-dog had been given teeth. For 
mining companies registered in countries other than South Africa but operating in the 
Union, disclosure of this was in terms of Chapters 5 and 6 of the Act. Again, the 
intention was to oblige foreign companies to identify themselves as such and to provide 
information like their articles, memorandum of association and details of the 
directorate. 
 
THE BEGINNING: 1923 
For a piece of legislation with great commercial significance, the debate in the House 
on the Companies Bill was often parochial with provincial issues brought to the fore. 
These issues often masked power plays of significance. An understanding of these 
issues, however, is necessary so as to put the Bill in the context in which the accounting 
profession functioned. The process was complicated by the fact that when members of 
the House entered a debate on a specific issue, they often used the occasion to voice 
their opinions on other topics, sometimes of a related nature other times not. Much of 
this “alternative debate” is important for an understanding of the issues underpinning 
the main issues. The result is a mass of detail which is often difficult to extricate in 
context. The method chosen in this thesis is to deal with the main issues in an 
aggregated manner under specific headings but to retain the “alternative debate” on a 
“member said” basis, thereby maintaining the personalised nature of such comments. 
 
 281 
 
As the South African Bill was based on the English Act, much of the technical detail 
was not contentious and was accepted without much comment. The English Act would 
prove a poor fit, needing constant amendment to deal with a rapidly expanding South 
African economy. It also was a fact that the English had spent much of the 19th Century 
experimenting with various companies acts, and their application in a geographically 
small country was not difficult. 
 
A chronology of the Companies Bill begins in 1923 when the Smuts Government 
introduced it into the House of Assembly and it was sent to a select committee. The Bill 
was thus put into process almost a year before the Accountants’ Registration Bill in 
February 1924. This is important as it means the Four Societies could hold to the 
Accountants Bill with little need to compromise – there was an alternative route. The 
Companies Committee met between February and May 1923 and submitted a report on 
the Companies Bill to the House of Assembly on 16 May, recommending it “with 
certain amendments” (SC14, 1923, Proceedings: iii). 
 
The Bill lapsed thereafter with the ending of Parliament’s sitting for 1923, but it was 
back on the order of proceedings for the House-in-Committee in the first session of 
1924. The Bill was debated on 21 and 25 February where provincialism reared its head 
as members criticised the idea of a centralised company’s office. NJ de Wet, responded: 
“The business of company registration is conducted in the three other provinces except 
the Transvaal where it is a sideshow by the Registrar of Deeds. The Acts are very 
ineffective” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 1, 21/2/1924: 406). A centralised system would 
be better, both in the view of the SAP and Nationalists. Individuals, mainly within the 
SAP, were opposed to it. 
 
On 28 February 1924 the Bill was reported – with amendments – and set down for 
further debate on 6 March. This debate never happened. 
 
INTERRUPTION: THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 1924 
Parliament was prorogued on 10 April in anticipation of a General Election precipitated 
by the SAP’s loss of the previously “safe” seat of Wakkerstroom in the Eastern 
Transvaal (as mentioned earlier). At this final session of Parliament in 1924, Dr DF 
Malan, the Cape leader of the National Party, wished members “many happy returns” 
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(USA, HA Debates, Vol. 1, 10/4/1924: 1407). In the Pact Government of 1924–9, 
Malan came back as the Minister of the Interior, Education and Public Health. Smuts 
was relegated to the political wilderness until 1933. 
 
THE COMPANIES BILL: KEY ISSUES 
The Companies Bill re-emerged in early 1926 and the new Minister of Justice and the 
Transvaal leader of the National Party, Tielman Roos, took charge of guiding it through 
the House as quickly as possible. Clearly the Pact saw the importance of the Bill as the 
SAP had. Before the House on 25 February, Roos pointed out that the Bill before it was 
“largely based on the English Act and upon the Transvaal Companies Act of 1909 
which in itself was based on the English Act” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 25/2/1926: 
973). He pointed out that the position in the other South African provinces was that the 
Cape had “a fairly satisfactory Act” but with little control after registration while little 
existed in either Natal or the Orange Free State and new legislation was needed. There 
were a number of issues around which debate coalesced. The debates also covered a 
variety of financial issues which also give a perspective upon the technical issues facing 
the accounting profession in 1926. 
 
ISSUE 1: THE LOCATION OF THE COMPANIES REGISTRATION OFFICE 
That the Bill would be more comprehensive than anything then in existence is testified 
to in a letter to the Minister of Justice, who had responsibility for the Bill, from the 
Registrar of Deeds in Cape Town. The Registrar wrote:  
 
“The present company registration work is insignificant but the work under the 
new Bill would be very considerable … and will require additional staff for 
which no accommodation can be found in my office which is insufficient for the 
needs of the deeds registration staff” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 25/2/1926: 
973). 
 
The Registrar continued,  
 
“the Bill contemplates a very close complete control of the affairs of companies. 
The principle of the Bill is widely at variance with the present company laws. 
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Some of the new provisions will constitute an entirely new departure from 
present day practice” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 25/2/1926: 975). 
 
The Minister explained that there was no intention to add the duties of the Registrar of 
Companies to the Deeds Office as they had nothing in common. He pointed out that 
important duties were assigned in the Bill to the new Registrar and his staff. They 
needed a competent knowledge of law and company practice and if the process was 
“run as a sideshow, it would result in laxity which would defeat the object of the Bill” 
(USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 25/2/1926: 976). The Minister continued that, since the 
passage of the 1909 Transvaal Companies Act, “most of the companies in the Transvaal 
have been registered in the Orange Free State – and a large number of companies which 
are not those upon which we look with much favour” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 
25/2/1926: 977). In the Minister’s opinion, these facts suggested improper if not illegal 
activity and indicated clearly the need for one central office to administer the envisaged 
Act which would also result in a common practice and savings on a system of four 
provincial registries. A central office had been the goal of his SAP predecessor, NJ de 
Wet when, in 1924, he had declared to the House that the proposal “was for a central 
registry office, wherever it is placed I do not mind” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 
21/2/1924: 406). 
 
Major GB van Zyl, the SAP member for Cape Town (Harbour), pointed out the original 
Bill had occupied nearly three months tied in the Select Committee where two points of 
view predominated – those that favoured separate registries in each province and those 
that wanted one central registry. The result was an amendment to the Bill which 
proposed the establishment of a central companies registry in Pretoria and three 
provincial registries, one each in Cape Town, Pietermaritzburg and Bloemfontein and 
all under “a certain measure of control” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 25/2/1926: 976) 
from Pretoria. This seems to have satisfied Anglo-Afrikaner sensitivities but there were 
other factors at play. Van Zyl continued by saying that this compromise was not only 
carried by the Select Committee but also by the Committee-of-the-Whole-House, where 
five of the 11 Government ministers present voted for the amendment. He pointed out 
that in a centralised system there would be a delay in registering companies, but more 
importantly there would be a delay in transferring deeds and mortgage bonds and 
raising money on debentures. Roos had indicated earlier in the debate that a 
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decentralised system would mean “an increase of expense to the country of £4 000” 
(USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 25/2/1024: 974). The matter was thus open to renegotiation. 
The issue had economic implications as the location which won the Office would also 
secure a coterie of lawyers and their staff to service the customers of the Office. Such 
professionals would generate income for the local economy in the form of rent, rates 
and living costs. 
 
Often underlying the apparent parochialism was hard fact. RW Close, SAP member for 
Rondebosh, pointed out that the Bill before the House did not include the amendment 
made by the Select Committee of 1923 of a central office in Pretoria and three 
provincial registries, one in each of the provinces. Two reasons had been given in 
opposition to this, namely expense and a concern about the possibility of divergence in 
practice across the Provinces. The Select Committee of 1923 had believed the latter 
bearable if the then current system of provincial registries were kept and Close 
questioned how a Government figure of £4 000 extra to fund separate offices had been 
calculated. He also pointed out that the Bill, while also putting a stop “to a good deal of 
company-managing that [had] been going on under the various laws of the provinces” 
(USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 25/2/1926: 990), must result in extra expenditure if the 
convenience of the public so required. 
 
The second point – of a variance in procedure across offices – had been met by the 
Select Committee’s idea of a central office in Pretoria with a complete record of all 
company work in the Union. This office would also be responsible for ensuring 
uniformity of practice across the provinces and the Bill made provision for the framing 
of regulations for the practice and procedure of the various offices. This was already the 
case with land registrations. But Close pointed out that “the real effect of the change 
proposed by the Bill [to centralise the process] would be that the public would be put to 
a good deal more expense” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 25/2/1926: 990). This was one 
of Close’s last political appearances, having first come to the fore as a proponent of the 
1913 Accountants Bill. 
 
Stuttaford, the SAP member for Newlands, agreed and pointed out that because South 
Africa was large and communication difficult, the time involved in using a centralised 
office would result “in considerable loss to many companies when they are trying to 
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carry through some transaction in which time is of the greatest moment” (USA, HA 
Debates, Vol. 6, 25/2/1926: 991). As an example of delay, Stuttaford pointed out that it 
had taken 58 days “to get a small refund from the north” from the South African 
Railways head office in Pretoria. 
 
The essence of a new amendment on offices from van Zyl was encapsulated in a series 
of points designed to give status to each Province. In detail, van Zyl’s amendment to a 
centralised office was as follows:  
 
1. A central Companies Registry established in Pretoria. 
 
2. Provincial Companies Registries established in Cape Town, Pietermaritzburg 
and Bloemfontein. At each of these provincial locations their Registrar of Deeds 
would also, where possible, fulfil the duties of Provincial Registrar of 
Companies. This was clearly at odds with the Minister of Justice’s desire for a 
dedicated company’s office, the principal points being:  
 
 The appointment of a full-time Registrar of Companies for the Union 
together with other clerks and officers as were necessary; 
 The Provincial Registrars were to carry out the powers and functions of the 
Registrar, subject to any regulations but could not register any company or 
change of company name until the central Registrar certified that no 
objection existed; 
 The duties of the Registrar and the Provincial Registrars were to be 
subjected to regulations made by the Governor-General; and 
 There was to be a general centralisation of company registrations in the 
offices of the Provincial Registries together with any staff who, prior to the 
passing of the Act, were employed in such activities. 
 Within 90 days of the commencement of the Act, all companies registered in 
Natal, the Cape or the Orange Free State were to send certified copies of 
their memorandum and articles of association to the appropriate provincial 
Registrars for transmission to the Registrar in Pretoria. Thereafter, 
Provincial Registrars were to continue to provide these documents to the 
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Registrar, appropriately certified, on current registrations (USA, Debates, 
Vol. 6, 24/3/1926: 1939–40). 
 
Considerable power was thus kept at provincial level, and thereby denied as patronage 
to the Pact Government. It also complicated a relatively simple exercise. 
Van Zyl referred to the 1918 Commission on Companies in England which 
recommended, for public convenience, the need for more than one registry office and 
with the Board of Trade empowered to establish new registries. Similarly in Canada, 
Australia and the United States of America there were registries in every state. 
 
With regard to expense, van Zyl pointed out that substantial revenue was generated by 
the stamp duty raised on the current system of company registration. Stamp duty for 
1920, 1921 and 1922 amounted to £40 091, £38 040 and £40 091 respectively. He also 
pointed out that share capital duty paid at the Deeds Office in Cape Town in the above 
years amounted to £67 053, while in Natal the amount was £18 952, the Transvaal, £54 
118, and in the Orange Free State, £26 144. “This was on new business alone and [had] 
nothing to do with regular annual and other fees on new and old companies” (USA, HA 
Debates, Vol. 6, 25/2/1927: 979). Also, joint stock companies incorporated in Cape 
Town in 1923–4 numbered 151 with a nominal capital of £3.5 million, this being an 
increase of £1.5 million over the period 1921–2, while 597 companies registered in the 
Transvaal in 1922 with a nominal capital of £270 000. Foreign companies registered in 
the Transvaal [presumably in the same period] had a nominal capital of £4.5 million. 
These latter facts, van Zyl believed, undermined the Minister’s contention that the 
Orange Free State was a preferred “easy” option regarding company registrations 
(USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 25/2/1926: 979) and indicated some popularity with regard 
to registrations in the Transvaal. He also stated that it was “estimated by the 
practitioners in Cape Town that the method of central registration in Pretoria for every 
deed of transfer or bond the increased cost will be from three to ten guineas” (USA, HA 
Debates, Vol. 6, 25/2/1926: 981). In the interests of the public, van Zyl requested the 
Minister to reconsider the “new method of registering”. Of significance, then, was the 
considerable revenue raised by the Companies Office which was very attractive to a 
Government committed to social programmes. 
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Sir Drummond Chaplin, SAP member for South Peninsula, entered the debate with the 
statement that the deciding factor should be “the question of convenience and expense” 
(USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 25/2/1926: 983) and supported local offices. 
 
Alexander, SAP member for Cape Town (Hanover Street), stated he thought local 
patriotism a good thing and that Cape Town should “get a square deal” (USA, HA 
Debates, Vol. 6, 25/2/1926: 984). But he stated that companies and deeds offices were 
so interlocked that it would be impossible to separate them. He thus supported the 
status quo. 
 
Mr De Waal, National Party member for Piketberg, entered the debate and pointed out 
that centralisation had not had the support of the 1923 Select Committee nor the House 
to the effect that the previous Minister of Justice, de Wet, had been defeated twice on 
that issue – yet here it was again (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 25/2/1926: 993). With 
hindsight, the objective was quite clear – a persistent Pact push to a centralised 
bureaucracy based in Pretoria in which the Companies Office was but a single step. 
 
Another dissenter about centralisation was OR Nel, SAP member for Newcastle, who 
made the telling comment: “I hope the Minister will allow this clause to be dealt with 
on non-party lines so as to give us all an opportunity of expressing our feelings on this 
particular question without being whipped by the party whips to vote party” (USA, HA 
Debates, Vol. 6, 25/2/1926: 993). He noted that on the previous occasion in 1924 of the 
Bill being brought before the House, a number of SAP Ministers had voted against a 
centralised office, including the then Prime Minister, Smuts (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 
25/2/1926: 994). They were probably voting according to their consciences. 
 
The Provincialism vs Centralism debate was one the Government was not prepared to 
concede. The 1926 Act, at Section 3, made the unequivocal statement: “For the 
registration of companies under this Act, there shall be established an office in Pretoria 
called the Companies Registration Office” (Nathan, 1927: 35). It was not an easy 
victory. 
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ISSUE 2: THE GOVERNMENT’S POSITION: COMPANIES REGISTRATION 
OFFICE 
WJ O’Brien, SAP member of Parliament for Pietermaritzburg (South), pointed out that 
he had been a member of the Companies Bill Select Committee which had met between 
February and May 1923 on more than 30 occasions and that the Bill would have been 
made law had not the then SAP Minister of Justice, HJ de Wet, disagreed upon the 
question of a decentralised registration office – believing rather in a centralised 
approach. The dissolution of Parliament then prevented the Bill from being finalised 
and placed on the statute book (USA, Debates, Vol. 6, 25/2/1926: 987). The SAP as a 
party, like the NP, sought centralisation as a means of administrative efficiency and 
control – but on its own terms. 
 
With regard to taking up the same position upon which his predecessor had been twice 
defeated, Roos pointed out that “the whole personnel of Parliament [had] changed” 
(USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 25/2/1926: 997). The Minister continued by saying the 
arguments advanced in support of provincial registries had not convinced him of their 
necessity. All information in the Pretoria companies’ office would also be available in 
the Registrar of Deeds’ offices in various places of the country. While he agreed that 
complete centralisation was not possible, he believed company registration was a 
comparatively small activity and thus easy to centralise. He pointed out again that 
leaving the system as it was would incur a recurring cost of £4 000 a year, and the 
money could be better used elsewhere. The country needed the Companies Act. The 
Minister of Finance, NC Havenga, was similarly unconvinced of the arguments for 
decentralisation and declared the matter would need to be discussed further in 
committee. 
 
ISSUE 3: CENTRAL CONTROL VS PROVINCIAL SENSIBILITIES: THE DEBATE 
IN THE HOUSE, 1 MARCH 1926 
Some further consideration of the debates surrounding the Companies Act in the House 
is needed as they give an indication of the political undercurrents of the day and their 
impact upon the profession. Clearly, the Government wanted a simple centralised 
system as it did a successful passage of the Designation Bill of 1927. Unfortunately, its 
tough approach ignored the innate provincialism of many of the Houses’ members as 
well as a mistrust of the Nationalists’ White Afrikaner-centred policies – hence 
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Coulter’s appeal to consider the principles in the Act of Union, the South Africa Act of 
1910. Coulter was the SAP member for the up-market constituency of Gardens, Cape 
Town. 
 
Havenga’s motion to read the Bill was put and agreed to, the Bill was read a second 
time and the House was scheduled to go into committee on 1 March which it did. 
Predictably, the 1924 amendment proposed in the Select Committee was tabled as an 
amendment of the 1926 Bill despite Roos’ earlier comments that he believed in a 
central office. The amendment proposed provincial offices for the Registrar of 
Companies and an office in Pretoria with “a controlling influence over all these 
provincial registrars” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1926: 1066). Major GB van Zyl 
began the debate. 
 
The net effect of the Bill, as it stood before the proposed amendment, would be that the 
central registrar would control all administrative aspects of the Act. Van Zyl pointed 
out centralisation would impact negatively upon acts, such as the cancellation of bonds 
in the Provinces which would need recourse also to the deeds registrar as well as 
written certification from the Registrar of Companies’ office in Pretoria. These 
problems would be compounded by the extra work that would need to be done to 
manage the new system. An estimate of the increased cost per transaction was between 
£2 2s and £10 10s (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1926: 1067). A local registry would 
obviate the complexity of the issue as well as the resulting delays. Companies would be 
subject to the jurisdiction of the courts in the province in which their registered offices 
were situated and such courts would have equal status with other courts in the other 
provinces dealing with similar issues. 
 
Mr CWA Coulter, SAP member for Cape Town (Gardens), entered the debate and 
declared that it would be impossible to separate company practice from deeds office 
practice and that the registration of companies was an integral part of the registration of 
deeds. A central registry was acceptable providing the provincial registrar’s retained the 
right to keep the “records on their files”. He pointed out that the fair way things had 
been handled since 1910 with regard to the Provinces had been an “essential feature of 
the Act of Union” and to tamper with these elements was “striking at a great principle” 
(USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1926: 1069). This was clearly the beginning of the 
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erosion of the Act so feared by some of its drafters; but the reality of the situation called 
for a centralised office. Perhaps the Act had been naïve in its expectations of provincial 
equality. The Transvaal was the economic hub of the new nation. 
 
The Minister of Justice, Roos, confirmed that members could vote upon the amendment 
as they pleased and would not be constrained by the party. He also pointed out that his 
predecessor had been from another party but had supported the idea of a centralised 
registry. He again reiterated that the cost of implementing the amendment, according to 
the Registrar of Companies, was £4 000, but that there would be other costs. He 
continued: “As long as the House clearly understands that we are starting further 
expenditure which no one today knows the limits of” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 
1/3/1926: 1070). While he made it clear that he would submit to any decision, he 
believed centralisation was the best solution and proposed a further technical 
amendment to the amendment which would “fall to the ground” if van Zyl’s 
amendment succeeded (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1926: 1068). 
 
With regard to the link between the Deeds Office and a company, the Minister pointed 
out that it existed nowhere else in the world and in South Africa the Deeds Office fell 
under the Minister of Lands while companies were the concern of the Minister of 
Justice. “That not only shows that there is no necessary connection between the two, 
but that we in South Africa think the two are so distinct that they fall under different 
Ministers” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1926: 1070). While centralising the Deeds 
Office was not an option because of the great number of sub-offices, the registration of 
companies involved “comparatively little work” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1926: 
1071). In the Cape, the annual average was about 90 registrations or seven-and-a-half 
per month, while “outside” there were 50 each year. “This means as regards new 
companies much less work, but as to old companies there will be much new work under 
the Bill” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1926: 1071). CAA Sephton, SAP member for 
Aliwal, stated that he opposed centralisation. Major Van Zyl stated again that he did not 
see the reason for the Minister’s estimated cost of the £4 000 if the system were left 
untouched and believed an extra clerk in the Cape Town office at an annual salary cost 
of £500 would be sufficient. He expressed concern that the Bill without the amendment 
would “deprive other centres of something” and Cape Town particularly of something 
it had “hitherto enjoyed and enjoyed well over a century” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 
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1/3/1926: 1072). Concerns of a parochial nature are clearly to the fore in this statement 
as are Van Zyl’s fundamental loyalties and resistance to change. But change was in the 
air as the Pact Government had social and industrial aspirations – hence the Companies 
Act, one of many social and economic acts passed under its rule in the period 1924–34. 
 
Mr C Pearce, Labour member for Liesbeek, supported the Minister’s stance, 
pragmatically stating there should only be one person to govern the formation of 
companies in South Africa. Pearce was then taken to task by both Colonel D Reitz, 
SAP member for Port Elizabeth (Central) and Coulter, SAP member for Cape Town 
(Gardens) for his change of position since 1924. Coulter noted sardonically that the 
Minister’s speech in Afrikaans must have been very persuasive and that the House 
needed an explanation for Pearce’s new stance. 
 
In answer, Pearce stated that he had changed his mind when he learnt of the selective 
registration chosen by some to avoid regulation. “In the Free State there are the most 
lenient conditions: the result has been that a large number of companies have been 
floated in the Free State” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1926: 1075). In such 
circumstances, he believed it appropriate to have one central office and one policy to 
interpret the law across the Union. 
 
Stuttaford stated that he did not support a central registry, and queried the extra cost of 
£4 000 to the Cape Town office where 150 applications were dealt with per year, 
making the cost £26 per registration. He did not believe that to be possible. 
 
In this, Stuttaford was mistaken in assuming the extra cost of £4 000 related to the Cape 
Town office alone. While Roos did not initially make the issue clear, the amount of 
£4 000 related to the total estimated cost of a decentralised system of company 
registration. This was confirmed when the Minister responded that the £4 000 was the 
difference between what the cost would be under a central registry and what would be 
needed if the amendment to the Bill was carried. In addition, this cost related not only 
to newly registered companies, but also to old companies needing to make many more 
new returns (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1926: 1076). 
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In a display of independence and conscience, CR Swart, Nationalist member for 
Ladybrand, stated he was pleased the matter was not a party question as he intended to 
vote for the amendment because the provinces had been given certain rights which were 
slowly being taken from them. If centralisation was the preferred alternative, this policy 
needed to be clearly stated. If not, the amendment needed to be supported by 
 
“some of us and some of the members of the South African Party voted against 
the then Minister. Let us maintain our previous attitude because if it was a good 
thing in 1924 under the SAP Government then it is just as good in 1926 under 
the Nationalist Government” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1926: 1078–9). 
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TABLE 9.2 
MINISTER’S AMENDED CLAUSE 3: VOTED 1 MARCH 1926 
Ayes – 52 
NP Badenhorst, AL NP Naudé, JF (T) 
NP Boshoff, LJ SAP Nieuwenhuize, J 
LP Boydell, T NP Oost, H 
NP Brits, GP SAP Papenfus, HB 
LP Brown, G I Payn, AOB 
LP Christie, J LP Pearce, C 
NP Cilliers, AA NP Pirow, O 
SAP Collins, WR NP Pretorius, JSF 
LP Creswell, FHP SAP Pretorius, NJ 
NP De Villiers, AIE SAP Reitz, D 
NP De Villiers, PC NP Reitz, H 
NP De Wet, SD LP Rayburn, G 
SAP Duncan, P NP Rood, WH 
LP Fordham, AC NP Roos, TJ de V 
SAP Geldenhuys, L LP Snow, WJ 
SAP Giovanetti, CW NP Steytler, LJ 
SAP Grobler, HS NP Te Water, CT 
NP Grobler, PGW NP Van Broekhuizen, HD 
NP Hattingh, BR NP Van der Merwe, NJ 
LP Hay, GA NP Van Hees, AS 
NP Kemp, JCG NP Van Niekerk, PW le R 
LP Kentridge, M NP Visser, TC 
LP Madeley, WB NP Vosloo, LJ 
LP McMenamin, JJ NP Wessels, JB 
LP Mullineux, J   
NP Naudé, AS   
Tellers: Pienaar, BJ (NP), Sampson, HW (LP) 
  
 294 
 
Noes – 48 
SAP Anderson, HEK NP Malan, DF 
SAP Arnott, W SAP Miller, AM 
SAP Ballantine, R SAP Moffat, L 
NP Basson, PN NP Mostert, JP 
SAP Bates, FT NP Munnik, JH 
NP Brink, GF SAP Nathan, E 
SAP Buirski, E SAP Nel, OR 
SAP Byron, JJ SAP O’Brien, WJ 
SAP Chaplin, FDP SAP Richards, GR 
NP Conradie, JH SAP Rider, WW 
SAP Coulter, CWA SAP Rockey, W 
SAP Deane, WA SAP Sephton, CAA 
NP De Villiers, WB NP Stals, AJ 
NP De Waal, JHH LP Strachan, TG 
NP Du Toit, FJ SAP Struben, RH 
SAP Harris, D SAP Stuttaford, R 
SAP Heatlie, CB NP Swart, CR 
SAP Henderson, J SAP Van Heerden, GC 
SAP Jagger, JW NP Van Rensburg, JJ 
NP Keyter, JG SAP Van Zyl, GB 
SAP Lennox, FJ NP Van Zyl, JJM 
NP Le Roux, SP NP Vermooten, OS 
SAP Louw, JP NP Werth, AJ 
Tellers: de Jager, AL (SAP), Nicholls, GH (SAP) 
Clause, as amended, accordingly agreed to. 
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VOTE TALLIES: 
 Ayes % Noes % Total % 
NP = National Party 28 54% 17 35% 45 45% 
LP = Labour Party 14 27% 1 2% 15 1% 
SAP = South African Party 9 17% 30 63% 39 39% 
I = Independents 1 2%   1 1% 
 52 100% 48 100% 100 100% 
 
 
MEMBERS: HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY 
 1921 1924 – Pact 
SAP 79 53 
NP 45 63 
LP 9 18 
I 1 1 
 134 135 
Source: USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1926, 1068, 1078–80. 
 
Total seats in House of Assembly: 135 
 
As a matter of interest, Swart remained a Nationalist Member of Parliament until 1959 
(Parliamentary Register, 1970: 119). Centralisation was indeed the preference of 
Government, and the Minister’s amended Clause passed by 52 votes to 48 (USA, HA 
Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1926: 1080) (see Table 9.2). This victory was effectively 
confirmed in the debate on 24 March and ultimately the final Act placed the Companies 
Registration Office in Pretoria with the Deeds Registries in Cape Town, 
Pietermaritzburg and Bloemfontein acting as conduits only of fees and forms to 
Pretoria (Nathan, 1927: 35). 
 
THE AMENDMENT REVISITED: THE DEBATE OF 24 MARCH 1926 
At the debate on 24 March, Major GB van Zyl, SAP member for Cape Town 
(Harbour), raised the hoary chestnut of provincial registries again and impishly 
proposed another amendment to the Bill, the same as the one he had tabled at the 
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House-in-Committee meeting on 1 March 1926 (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1926: 
1066). He was reintroducing it because  
 
“apparently there was some misunderstanding when we voted on it last time. 
The honorary [Labour] member for Langlaagte (Mr Christie) spoke strongly in 
favour of the amendment, and then he found himself voting against it. I 
understand there was some confusion in his mind at the time” (USA, HA 
Debates, Vol. 6, 24/3/1926: 1940).  
 
Van Zyl was clearly concerned that his amendment had failed by only four votes, 
particularly when most contributors to the debate had appeared to support it. 
 
To reintroduce an amendment already passed was an unusual thing to do. The fact that 
it was not challenged by the Speaker suggests that the proposal was not beyond the 
bounds of acceptability from a procedural perspective. A question must be asked as to 
what other reasons were behind Van Zyl’s tabled amendment, and the answer is 
probably contained in the comments made by the amendment’s seconder. 
 
In seconding the amendment, Coulter, SAP member for Cape Town (Gardens), pointed 
out that more was at issue than registries under the Companies Act, namely the 
principles contained in the Act of Union which he saw as being undercut by the “craze 
for centralisation”. If there was a desire to amend the Act of Union, Coulter believed it 
needed to be brought out into the open and debated. This appears to be the issue behind 
Van Zyl’s proposed second amendment – to clarify the rights of the Provinces. Coulter 
also pointed out that the Minister of Justice’s concern seemed not to be public 
convenience but the extra expense of £4 000 which, in reality, was “a mere individual 
expression of one by one registrar” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 24/3/1926: 1941). He 
concluded by stating the issue of three provincial registrars had been supported by the 
House in 1924 and nothing appeared to have happened subsequently to change that 
support. 
 
Alexander, SAP member for Hanover Street, supported Van Zyl and appealed to the 
Minister to reconsider as there had been confusion at the previous vote. He pointed out 
that Pretoria got something under the amendment that it had not had previously, namely 
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a central registry with the provincial registries subordinate to the central one. It also 
made sense to keep “some machinery in the provincial capitals” to handle delays and 
the great distances in South Africa. He concluded that the merit of the issue should be 
considered rather than as a “party matter” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 24/3/1926: 
1942). In some ways, centralisation was a sensible practice and not only a method of 
shifting power. 
 
Both WJ Snow, Labour member for Salt River, and OR Nel, member for Newcastle, 
indicated their support for the amendment. Mr WJ O’Brien, SAP member for 
Pietermaritzburg (South), stated that the matter had taken up enough of the House’s 
time and a vote needed to be called. Mr JB Wessels, Nationalist member for Frankfort, 
struck a sour note when he thanked the Cape members for their support of the 
provincial public’s convenience and declared “I want to assure them that they need not 
look after our convenience because we can do that ourselves” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 
6, 24/3/1926: 1944). He supported centralisation as did Mr P Duncan, SAP member for 
Yeoville. They were members of the Pact Government and the SAP respectively, an 
indication of the potentially divisive nature of provincialism which cut across party 
lines. 
 
In reaction to the idea of centralisation, RW Close, SAP member for Rondebosch, 
stated “the danger voiced tonight has been clearly let out now, and if we give way now, 
we are giving away the outworks” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 24/3/1926: 1945). He 
stated further that the public demand had been to keep things as they were and that the 
fear of different offices giving different legal interpretations could be met by a set of 
regulations governing all actions and an annual meeting of registrars. Close continued: 
“this is one of the first efforts to break down localisation, where localisation is needed 
in the public interest and to initiate centralisation where that is unnecessary” (USA, HA 
Debates, Vol. 6, 24/3/1926: 1945). With regard to the concern about the lack of 
consistency in the rulings of the provincial offices, he pointed out that magistrates 
throughout the country interpreted the same laws which were given a uniformity 
through appeal to the Supreme Court and its divisions. In the same way, the central 
Registrar in Pretoria would achieve this with regard to companies. And finally, he 
questioned how the amount of £4 000 extra cost to run the provincial system had been 
calculated. 
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The Minister then stood to reply, noting wryly “I shall know in future that when I 
introduce a Government measure, I shall have to make a party matter of it” (USA, HA 
Debates, Vol. 6, 24/3/1926: 1946). With regard to the fear of centralisation, he pointed 
out that it would be impossible to do with regard to units like the Deeds Office, but 
where it could be done on a small scale “it is accepted tacitly in the constitution that the 
centralisation must be at Pretoria” (USA, Debates, Vol. 6, 24/3/1926: 1946–7). He 
pointed out that there had always been only one Registrar of Companies, and that post 
was in Pretoria. There existed in the provinces Registrars of Deeds who also dealt with 
the registration of companies under a different piece of legislation. Roos was adamant 
that the Bill would create efficiencies, but stated that he had included an amendment 
allowing, for example, a Cape Town resident, with company interests in the Transvaal 
to summons the Registrar in Cape Town. Whether this would work over any extended 
period remained to be seen. 
 
Roos had interviewed his predecessor – Senator de Wet – who again stressed that 
centralisation was the best possible decision and concluded by saying that he stood by 
the already amended Section 3 dealing with the Companies Registration Office. The 
question was then put to the House that Section 3, as amended by the Minister on 1 
March, “stand part of the Bill”. The ensuing vote (see Table 9.3 below) affirmed the 
question by 46 votes to 40 and Van Zyl’s proposals were dropped as a result. But he 
had made his point (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 24/3/1926: 1950). Roos was part of a 
wider process which would see all power finally in Nationalist hands. 
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TABLE 9.3 
CLAUSE 3 AS AMENDED BY THE MINISTER (SEE TABLE 9.2):  
VOTED 24 MARCH 1926 
 
Ayes – 46 
LP Allen, J NP Malan, ML 
NP Boshoff, LJ NP Moll, HH 
NP Brits, GP NP Mostert, JP 
LP Brown, G LP Mullineux, J 
LP Christie, J NP Munnik, JH 
NP Cilliers, AA NP Naudé, AS 
SAP Collins, WR NP Naudé, JF 
NP Conroy, EA NP Oost, H 
LP Creswell, FHP LP Pearce, C 
NP De Villiers, AIE NP Pienaar, JJ 
NP De Villiers, PC NP Pretorius, JSF 
NP De Wet, SD SAP Pretorius, NJ 
SAP Duncan, P NP Raubenheimer, I van W 
NP Fick, ML NP Reitz, H 
SAP Giovanetti, CW NP Rood, WH 
SAP Grobler, HS NP Roos, TJ de V 
NP Grobler, PGW NP Te Water, CT 
NP Havenga, NC NP Van Broekhuizen, HD 
LP Hay, GA NP Van Niekerk, PW le R 
NP Hertzog, JBM NP Wessels, JB 
NP Heyns, JD   
NP Hugo, D   
NP Kemp, JCG   
LP Kentridge, M   
Tellers: Pienaar, BJ (NP), Sampson, HW (LP) 
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Noes – 40 
SAP Alexander, M SAP Louw, GA 
SAP Anderson, HEK NP Malan, DF 
NP Badenhorst, AL SAP Marwick, JS 
SAP Ballantine, R SAP Nathan, E 
NP Basson, PN SAP Nel, OR 
SAP Bates, FT SAP O’Brien, WJ 
NP Bergh, PA SAP Richards, GR 
LP Brown, DM SAP Rider, WW 
SAP Chaplin, FDP SAP Rockey, W 
SAP Close, RW SAP Sephton, CAA 
SAP Coulter, CWA SAP Smartt, TW 
SAP Deane, WA NP Snow, WJ 
NP De Villiers, WB LP Strachan, TG 
NP De Waal, JHH SAP Struben, RH 
SAP Henderson, J SAP Stuttaford, R 
SAP Jagger, JW NP Van Heerden, IP 
SAP Krige, CJ NP Van Rensburg, JJ 
SAP Lennox, FJ SAP Van Zyl, GB 
NP Le Roux, SP NP Van Zyl JJM 
Tellers: De Jager, AL (SAP), Swart, CR (NP) 
 
Question accordingly affirmed, and the amendment proposed by Major JB van Zyl 
dropped. 
VOTE TALLIES: 
 Ayes % Noes % Total % 
NP = National Party 32 69% 12 30% 44 51% 
LP = Labour Party 9 20% 2 5% 11 13% 
SAP = South African Party 5 11% 26 65% 31 36% 
I = Independents       
 46 100% 40 100% 86 100% 
Source: USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 24/3/1926, 1950–1. 
Total seats in House of Assembly: 134 
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ANALYSIS OF TABLES 9.2 AND 9.3: 
1. GB van Zyl, SAP member for Cape Town (Harbour), on 1 March 1926, proposed 
an amendment to counter a centralised Registrar of Companies office (USA, HA 
Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1926: 1066). 
2. Minister of Justice Roos confirmed that members could vote their conscience on 
Van Zyl’s amendment. 
3. However he proposed a technical amendment to Van Zyl’s amendment which was 
voted upon and approved by 52 votes to 48. This in effect crippled Van Zyl’s 
amendment. 
4. The amended amendment was voted upon on 24 March 1926 as “stands part of the 
Bill” and was carried by 46 votes to 40. 
5. As a result, Van Zyl’s original amendment fell away and Minister Roos’ technical 
amendment went forward. 
6. The NP’s push to a centralised Companies office in Pretoria was back on track. 
7. An analysis of the voting patterns on 1 March reveals the following points. 
• 54% of the NP supported the first motion, compared to 17% of the SAP. 
• Labour supported their NP allies and contributed 14 votes (or 27%) of the total. 
• Out of a House of Assembly of 134 members, 52 (or 39%) supported the 
proposal. 
• The SAP made a determined effort to prevent the passage of the clause and 
contributed 30 votes, or 63%, of the Noes. Whether this was because they 
supported decentralisation or because they opposed the NP, is difficult to 
determine. One thing is certain, however: the SAP Minister of Justice, NJ de 
Wet, who initiated the process of the Companies Bill in the House of Assembly 
in 1923, supported centralisation. 
• Of note: both voting sessions were attended by seven Cabinet Ministers; in a 
display of Cabinet unity, some ministers attended both sessions, while others 
attended one or the other session. This however appears to have been broken by 
DF Malan, who voted “No” on both occasions. Hertzog himself was present at 
the second count and voted the party line. 
 
In its debates on the Companies Bill, the House dealt with a large number of issues, 
some of greater significance than others, but all reflecting the concerns of the day. The 
next few would have been important from an audit perspective to ensure compliance 
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with the Act. The ensuing debate also revealed a largely informed and socially aware 
Labour Party whose participation was positive. But those in the electorate who could 
understand their “pro-individual” stance supported other parties with more attractive 
platforms. 
 
The local press in the form of the Grocott’s Penny Mail equated the Labour Party with 
socialism and communism. In the editorial of 5 January 1925, the editor declared that 
such people did not “like” constitutional methods and were impatient of them. The 
socialists were in too great a hurry to realise their personal objectives but “their 
numbers are negligible and therefore are generally disregarded because they are 
ineffective”. The irony was that Labourites in the House of Assembly in the period 
1926–9 often stood up for the “little men”. 
 
ISSUE 4: FOREIGN COMPANIES AND TRANSFER DUTY 
Stuttaford, SAP member for Newlands, drew attention to foreign companies. Some 
companies were entirely South African, but domiciled overseas, mainly England; 
having these companies registered in South Africa would be advantageous and he 
proposed that companies doing so should “be relieved of the transfer dues on [their] 
fixed assets” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 25/2/1926: 993). Transfer duty was payable 
on such transactions which the law viewed as sales.  
 
Stuttaford ticked off a number of advantages – greater employment, greater control 
over such companies and avoidance of double taxation on dividends. In this, he was 
supported by Coulter, SAP member for Cape Town (Gardens), who suggested, 
however, that the incentive should apply only to foreign companies wishing to be solely 
registered in South Africa (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1926: 1109). 
 
Stuttaford moved the introduction of a new section with regard to foreign companies. 
He explained that, in Committee, the House had agreed to the proposal that where a 
foreign company transferred its place of registration to South Africa, no transfer fees 
were payable upon its real estate. In terms of the Committee’s decision, the company 
had first to liquidate its foreign domicile and register the company in South Africa 
before the Registrar of Companies could decide whether the transaction was exempt 
from transfer fees. As this was not workable, the revised section provided for the 
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company to go to court and give evidence of its intention to liquidate itself in the 
foreign country and refloat itself in South Africa with the same shareholders. 
Thereupon the company would be issued a certificate which would enable it to put its 
real estate in its name without paying transfer duty. South Africa would benefit from 
having more companies in the country, generating revenue and paying salaries and 
taxes (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 29/3/1926: 2050–1). 
 
JW Jagger, SAP member for Cape Town (Central), seconded a motion to waive transfer 
duty, and the Minister agreed that the principle was better served by the new section 
(USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 29/3/1926: 2051). The new section was put and agreed 
upon and appeared in the 1926 Act as Section 203 which waved transfer duty for 
foreign registered companies already operating in South Africa when they registered in 
South Africa as well. 
 
Sniping in the House was common as was shown when Pearce, who had previously 
supported the idea, questioned whether Stuttaford “sincerely wish[ed] to put the foreign 
companies on the same level as the colonial ones” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 
1/3/1926: 1110). Stuttaford took umbrage at this comment and, on a point of order, 
asked the Chair whether Pearce was in order “in imputing insincere motives to me”. 
The Chair confirmed the behaviour as being inappropriate to which Pearce responded 
that he had not imputed insincerity but merely whether Stuttaford was sincere on the 
issue. He then indicated he would like to move Stuttaford’s amendment to which the 
Minister proposed a further amendment which would allow the Commissioner for 
Inland Revenue, at his sole discretion, to waive the transfer duty. He stated clearly that 
he could not accept the amendment without this proviso. Van Zyl stated that in his 
experience “there never [was] any discretion by Inland Revenue officers except in 
favour of the Treasury” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1926: 1111). To this, the 
Minister proposed the appointment of the Registrar of Companies instead of the 
Commissioner. Both Stuttaford’s amendment and the Minister’s amendment thereto 
were accepted by the Committee-of-the-Whole-House. While transfer duty for foreign 
companies was thus waived, registration fees for these companies in terms of the Third 
Schedule to the Companies Act were set at £5 compared to £3 for South African 
companies (Nathan, 1927: 414). While the £2 increase was negligible to a company, the 
idea of Morton’s Fork persisted in revenue collection. 
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ISSUE 5: THE PROTECTION OF SHAREHOLDERS: GOVERNMENT 
DIRECTORS 
Another issue aired in the debate was that of the protection of shareholders’ rights. 
Predictably, Labour took the lead here. GA Hay, member for Pretoria (West), a Labour 
seat, noted that a large section of the community had been disappointed by the dropping 
of the idea of Government directors to “watch the interests of the investing public” and 
for the “protection of shareholders of which they have had so little in the past” (USA, 
HA Debates, Vol. 6, 25/2/1926: 994). He pointed out that while there was a minority 
cry for a central control of key aspects of the economy, such as the mines, the state 
needed to control only what was necessary. Hay then alluded to the spread of limited 
liability companies and the fact that, as a result, a large number of small shareholders 
had come into existence. Hay stated that their “cultivation” as a source of capital was 
an “art” whereby “agents [were] employed everywhere to spread the holding of shares 
by holders in small lots, so that they do not interfere with market operations” (USA, 
HA Debates, Vol. 6, 25/2/1926: 995). Earlier in this thesis, pyramid schemes were 
discussed. While the above practices did not constitute such schemes, they were 
nevertheless questionable, both morally and in terms of a reasonable return on their 
investment. 
 
Hay continued by referring to a recent publication by a Mr Marriot, a consulting mining 
engineer, in which he opined “that the shareholder much [needed] protection and that 
the directors often have not the remotest interest in shareholders, except to get them to 
subscribe; they do not consult shareholders’ interests, but their own and the effect of 
reports on the market” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 25/2/1926: 995). He stated that 
while the present Government had only been in office for 13 months, much had been 
expected, including the placing of nominated directors upon the boards of large public 
companies. Hay believed the fact that such directors could notify the Minister of any 
information of a contentious nature they acquired, that the Minister could publish such 
information in terms of Section 219 of the 1923 Bill, and that this would have been a 
check on the activities of boards. While the principles embodied by such actions had 
been dropped in the 1926 Companies Bill, Hay stated the Minister of Mines had 
promised they would appear in a future Bill dealing with the mining sector and he 
hoped such principles would not be allowed to be subverted by big finance “which is 
gripping everything” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 25/2/1926: 996). He added, with some 
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disappointment, that South Africans had hoped Government would have dealt more 
directly with “the big interests, the big influences [international finance] which so 
subtly enter in and subvert the general welfare” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 25/2/1926: 
996). The reality was different and Yudelman suggests that the Pact not only had a 
symbiotic relationship with “capital” (i.e. mines) but could “isolate populist opposition” 
by legislating “supposedly pro-white populist policies” (1983, 216). Any Government 
concerned with the long-term would handle “big interests” carefully. 
 
Hay’s point of view raised the ire of AG Barlow, Labour member for Bloemfontein 
(North) and a member of the 1923 Select Committee on the Companies Bill, who 
expressed relief at the dropping of the idea of Government directors in public 
companies. He pointed out that “no man in this House and no decent man outside, 
would sit on a company as a spy. The type of man you would get would be one who 
would sell himself to the company or anyone else who wanted to buy him” (USA, HA 
Debates, Vol. 6, 25/2/1926: 996). He believed companies “doing the harm they are 
supposed to be doing [could] be dealt with in another way”. 
 
The debate continued well until the Minister proposed withdrawing Chapter 8 of the 
Bill headed “Mining Companies: Government Director”. Mr M Kentridge, Labour 
member for Troyeville, intervened to state the Bill in its present form regarding Chapter 
8 had met “a tremendous amount of approval from every section of the supporters of 
the Pact” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1926: 1111). He believed that it was 
necessary and right that the Government have  
 
“some control in connection with these [mining] companies by having a direct 
[appointed] representative on the board of directors. [This individual] would be 
able to ascertain to what extent [for example, their] non-ability to pay certain 
rates of wages [was] due to inefficient management or watered capital, or any 
other matters” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1926: 1112).  
 
If the Companies Bill did not deal with the matter, Kentridge hoped a separate Bill 
would be introduced later to give effect to the principles contained in Chapter 8. 
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Roos, the Minister of Justice, responded by saying that at the Bill’s second reading he 
had given the reason for dropping this Chapter as its being an inappropriate provision in 
a Bill dealing with companies generally, and more appropriate in mining legislation to 
be introduced by the Minister of Mines. He also pointed out that there had been a tacit 
agreement in the House that the current Bill would not go back to the Select Committee 
if the Chapter were dropped. Without this understanding, it could have been necessary 
to send the Bill back to the Committee, thus delaying the process when most members 
of the House wanted it passed. 
 
Kentridge declared that the Minister had not given the reassurance sought. The Minister 
stated Government had not gone back on its understanding but pointed out that whether 
such legislation would be passed during the current session was up to the Minister of 
Mines. The implicit meaning in Roos’ statement was that “big interests” needed to be 
handled carefully. 
 
Mr GA Hay, Labour member for Pretoria (West), lamented the loss of an opportunity to 
establish public directors, especially as the state held significant holdings in some 
mining companies. He pointed out that it were “as if big financial interests were almost 
able to dictate as to what they would not have” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1926: 
1113). He continued by saying that public representation on the boards of mining 
companies had been described as almost akin to spying and declared scornfully “you 
might as well describe an auditor as a spy”. Thereafter, proceedings began to wind 
down, progress was reported, and the House was timetabled to resume in Committee 
the next day, 2 March 1926. 
 
What does not seem to have made its way into the debate is that the Act required all 
companies to be audited and for directors to sign their balance sheets as evidence of 
their correctness. This would be verified – or not – by an audit. A poor audit could 
cause shareholders to withdraw their investment. 
 
ISSUE 6: THE REAL VALUE OF ASSETS, OTHER FINANCIAL ASPECTS AND 
THE ROLE OF AUDITORS 
A long debate ensued when Mr C Pearce, Labour member for Liesbeek, proposed a 
new section which would require balance sheets to disclose the real value of assets in 
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preference to their historical value (something that International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) in the 21st Century have sought over a long period and now require as 
a matter of course). He also wanted disclosure of the shares given and allotted to 
vendors instead of cash, as well as the value of shares, stock or debentures held in other 
companies (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1926: 1092–3). This was to counter the 
practice whereby companies (particularly mining) concealed their true financial 
situation when applying for reductions in railway rates or other forms of state 
assistance. 
 
The accounting issues raised by Pearce were important, technically complex and have 
absorbed much time and energy on behalf of the profession over decades in finding a 
generally acceptable solution. 
 
Coulter criticised the proposed amendment on the grounds that the balance sheet would 
become “a statistical return and contain a quantity of information which in the long run 
would make it far more difficult to understand than if it were confined to the ordinary 
functions of a balance sheet, just setting forth assets and liabilities” (USA, HA Debates, 
Vol. 6, 1/3/1926: 1094). Pearce pointed out that in a consideration of the 
 
“Goldmining Commission’s report of 1908 we find, in reply to a question, that 
the mines are only making a profit of 3.26 per cent, but further on in the 
evidence we find that on the real capital they are making over 32 per cent, 
showing quite clearly that the idea the gold mines of this country are not making 
money is false. It is true the present shareholders are not making money, but the 
millionaires have gone away with the boodle. The gold mining industry of this 
country makes a tremendous profit on real capital” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 
1/3/1926: 1097). 
 
GA Hay, Labour member for Pretoria (West), made the point that where a company 
was taking public money with its shares on the stock exchange, it was right for the 
directors once a year to declare the company’s assets and their valuation. Stuttaford, 
SAP member for Newlands, declared his opposition to Pearce’s amendment, stating 
Pearce could get the exact proportions issued to the public and others from the Deeds 
Registry “on payment of a shilling” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1926: 1096). He 
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also pointed out that shares valued in one year would need to be written down in 
another if there was a slump in-between. Apart from not wishing to be responsible for 
appointing sworn appraisers to value assets, the Minister noted much of the detail could 
be obtained from the companies and admitted to personally having “no special feeling 
one way or the other” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1926: 1097) about the issue. But, 
the mines were important to the Nationalists to fund their social programme. They were 
not to be antagonised unnecessarily. 
 
Pearce, in turn, was critical of Stuttaford’s stance believing him to be “connected with a 
subsidiary company which makes a greater profit than the parent company, of which he 
is a shareholder. I can now understand why he does not want the amendment” (USA, 
HA Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1926: 1097). Coulter responded by saying the provisions were 
such that few would understand and that they would not meet Pearce’s objective. He 
continued by considering the position of a subsidiary company and asked for a “logical 
reason” why its holding company 
 
“should not be entitled to keep its connection with the subsidiary unknown as 
far as the balance sheet is concerned? The auditor is given largely an 
entrenched, a statutory position, and he will have certain duties to fulfil as the 
watchdog of the shareholders” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1926: 1098). 
 
The idea of transparency was clearly limited in 1926. 
 
Mr H Oost, National Party member for Pretoria District (North), pointed out that 
Pearce’s intention was to protect investors. In this, he was supported by Mr RB 
Waterston, Labour member for Brakpan, who had a finer appreciation of the issues and 
stated that where companies sought money from the public, that public needed to be 
protected. He continued:  
 
“Take the mines in South Africa that pay a certain percentage of their profits to 
the Government for the right to work the mine. If the people in control of those 
mines are also large shareholders in some subsidiary … dealing in carbide, tree 
planting or anything else they can pay the price they want – bigger prices than 
they need – for their goods – and the subsidiary companies make a bigger profit 
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and therefore there would be less profit to the mining company and a less [sic] 
share to the Government” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1926: 1100). 
 
Duncan, SAP member for Yeoville, responded that he did not believe it to be a 
widespread practice but saw Pearce’s concern of over-capitalisation as a real one where 
“someone goes off with the plunder” and the company is left with “an excessive capital 
that does not represent the actual assets, but his amendment is not going to help that” 
(USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1926: 1100). He believed the solution to already exist 
in Section 26 of the Bill which required disclosure of the number of shares issued for 
cash. With regard to investments, he admitted to seeing sense in appending a statement 
of them to the balance sheet. Pearce replied that if his concerns were met by Section 26, 
there would be no harm in letting the amendment through. Stuttaford reiterated his 
opposition to the valuation of assets, saying it would be difficult in many instances to 
determine the original cost due to the passage of time. Hay contended that in the mining 
industry “concealing profit has at times been reduced to a fine art per market 
operations” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1926: 1102). 
 
The debate ended, Pearce’s amendment was put to the vote and passed by 47 votes to 
31, but it was later disallowed by a Senate perhaps more in tune with the importance of 
the mines to the economy (see Table 9.4 below). 
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TABLE 9.4 
PEARCE’S AMENDMENT – DISCLOSURE OF REAL VALUE: 1 MARCH 
1926 
 
Ayes – 47  
SAP Alexander, M NP Boshoff, LJ 
LP Barlow, AG LP Boydell, T 
NP Basson, PN LP Christie, J 
NP Conradie, JH NP Reitz, H 
LP Creswell, FHP NP Roos, TJ de V 
NP De Villiers, AIE NP Roux, JWJW 
NP De Villiers, PC NP Snow, WJ 
NP De Villiers, WB NP Stals, AJ 
NP De Wet, SD NP Steytler, LJ 
NP Du Toit, FJ LP Strachan, TG 
NP Grobler, PGW NP Swart, CR 
LP Hay, GA NP Van Broekhuizen, HD 
NP Kemp, JCG NP Van der Merwe, NJ 
LP Kentridge, M NP Van Heerden, IP 
NP Le Roux, SP NP Van Niekerk, PW le R 
NP Moll, HH NP Van Zyl, JJM 
NP Mostert, JP NP Visser, TC 
LP Mullineux, J NP Vosloo, LJ 
NP Munnik, JH NP Werth, AJ 
NP Naudé, AS NP Wessels, JB 
NP Naudé, JF NP Wessels, JHB 
NP Oost, H   
LP Pearce, C   
NP Pirow, O   
Tellers: Pienaar, BJ (NP), Vermooten, OS (NP) 
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Noes – 31 
SAP Ballantine, R SAP Moffat, L 
SAP Bates, FT SAP Nel, OR 
LP Brown, DM SAP Nicholls, GH 
SAP Buirski, E SAP Nieuwenhuize, J 
SAP Coulter, CWA SAP O’Brien, WJ 
SAP Deane, WA SAP Papenfus, HB 
SAP Duncan, P I Payn, AOB 
SAP Gilson, LD SAP Reitz, D 
SAP Giovanetti, CW SAP Sephton, CAA 
SAP Grobler, HS SAP Smartt, TW 
SAP Heatlie, CB SAP Smuts, JC 
SAP Lennox, FJ SAP Struben, RH 
SAP Louw, JP SAP Stuttaford, R 
SAP Marwick, JS SAP Van Zyl, GB 
SAP Miller, AM   
Tellers: Collins, WR (SAP), de Jager, AL (SAP) 
 
VOTE TALLIES: 
 Ayes % Noes % Total % 
NP = National Party 36 77%   36 46% 
LP = Labour Party 10 21% 1 3% 11 14% 
SAP = South African Party 1 2% 29 94% 30 39% 
I = Independent   1 3% 1 1% 
 47 100% 31 100% 78 100% 
Source: USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1926: 1102–3. 
 
Total seats in House of Assembly: 134 
 
The following facts may be drawn from analysis of Pearce’s amendment.  
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• The National and Labour Parties overwhelmingly supported the proposal with a 
total of 46 votes, a clear indication that party whips were doing their job to ensure 
the party line was followed. 
• Four Pact Cabinet Ministers voted. Of interest is the fact that it appeared that the 
Nationalists treated the mining industry with care. To require the disclosure of “real 
value” would be problematic. The proposal in fact died in the Senate. 
• Of equal interest is the fact that the SAP voted en bloc against the motion with the 
exception of M Alexander, SAP member for Cape Town (Castle). Smuts and Smartt 
were both present at the call. It is difficult to determine why the SAP was so 
opposed to Pearce’s proposal, and it may well have been that, like the National 
Party, they were reluctant to push the mining industry too hard in view of the 
significant tax payments and purchases made, all of which kept the economy afloat. 
 
But the principles implicit in Pearce’s amendment had been incorporated in Section 26 
of the Act which required substantial annual details of a company’s share capital, 
including the numbers issued for cash and those “otherwise for cash” together with “the 
nature of the consideration given for such shares” (Nathan, 1927: 100). The section 
stopped short of requiring a full valuation of a company’s assets but called for an 
audited summary of a company’s share capital, liabilities and assets with details as to 
how the values of fixed assets “have been arrived at” (Nathan, 1927: 100). 
 
It was Hay, Labour member for Pretoria (West), who took the high ground view in 
financial disclosure. He stated “I think no one can question that everyone should have a 
full and fair deal in regard to public companies which go on stock market lists and deal 
with public money, and they should be prepared at all times to put before the public a 
fair and square account of what they hold in assets etc.” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 9, 
24/3/1926: 1962). What Hay wanted specifically was the disclosure of shares held in 
other companies at director’s valuation. 
 
Hay pointed out that there had been much debate upon the amendment. He believed 
that the first part – disclosing the actual amount of cash received for shares – could be 
accepted but the disclosure in the balance sheet of the original vendor’s interests would 
not be viewed positively by directors of companies. Hay declared that he could 
personally see no reason for non-disclosure and believed shareholders and the public 
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should know what the vendors had received. He declared that it “would have a very 
steadying influence upon company promoters” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 29/3/1926: 
2041) if they understood what vendors received for their role in promoting a company. 
Hay stated that South Africa had a poor reputation worldwide for its company policy to 
the extent that invidious comparisons were drawn; for example, that given by a New 
York banking financier who declared an American concern as being “almost [as] bad as 
the transactions and the company flotations of the South African Kaffir [sic] market” 
(USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 29/3/1926: 2041). There is no way of either proving or 
disproving this. Again, the appointment of auditors was meant to remedy this kind of 
negative publicity. But Union Statistics (1960: K2) list the total capitalisation of all 
South African mines in 1911 as £93 196 000; by 1926 this amount had fallen to 
£75 644 000. The nadir was reached in 1932 with a figure of £68 714 000. The 
disparity could be the result of a number of factors, such as: 
 
 reduced investment 
 manipulation of data by the mining companies 
 the impact of the Great Depression. 
 
The total sales value for minerals in 1910 amounted to £43.1 million; in 1926 the 
amount was £58.8 million and in 1932, £56.8 million (Union Statistics, 1960: K4). 
Despite reduced capitalisation, sales appear relatively consistent. 
 
Hay also believed that company investments in other companies’ shares sold during a 
year, needed to be disclosed as he believed many people invested in companies 
“because of the known value of the subsidiary companies” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 
29/3/1926: 2042). Mr Duncan, SAP member for Yeoville, retorted that shareholders 
could obtain the information they needed. To this Hay replied that companies and their 
chairmen were not always forthcoming. He pointed out that Parliament had adopted the 
slogan of “South Africa First” and believed it needed to be extended to “honest 
company administration, honest accounts and no concealment, and also in regard to 
public directors to watch the interests of shareholders” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 
29/3/1926: 2043). Colonel Sir David Harris, SAP member for Beaconfield, declared 
that Hay, “having made frantic efforts to become a successful company-manager 
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himself, and having failed, is very hard on those company managers and directors who 
have made a success of their concerns” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 29/3/1926: 2044). 
The implicit issue of class was about to derail proceedings. 
 
Mr Kentridge, Labour member for Troyeville, declared his support for the idea of 
companies disclosing the actual cash put into a company as well as the number and 
value of vendors’ shares, the value of assets and the actual value of shares held in other 
companies. Without this kind of disclosure, he pointed out that a holding company 
could arrange its affairs such that the profits were made in the subsidiary company and 
unavailable to investors as dividends. In this instance, disclosure would benefit not only 
shareholders but the public at large (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 29/3/1926: 2046). 
 
The Minister of Justice intervened and stated that he supported the new clause but 
would consider the matter further to see whether information that should go to the 
shareholders could be “prevented from going to the public” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 
29/3/1926: 2046). As it happened, Pearce’s amended clause was rejected by the Senate. 
 
ISSUE 7: THE DEFINITION OF THE TERM “AUDITOR” 
The process of compromise continued until Mr DM Brown, SAP member for Three 
Rivers, moved the following proposal as a new subsection after Section 98(1) and one 
which clearly put the Four Societies in a dominant position:  
 
“Every auditor appointed in terms of the preceding sub-section shall be a 
member of the Cape Society of Accountants and Auditors, the Natal Society of 
Accountants, the Transvaal Society of Accountants or the Society of 
Accountants and Auditors in the Orange Free State unless the Minister approves 
in writing of the appointment of a person who is not such a member: Provided 
that nothing in this sub-section contained shall be deemed to prevent any person 
who at the commencement of this Act holds office as auditor to any company 
from being re-elected as such auditor” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1926: 
1104). 
 
Brown pointed out that in the auditing of public companies in Australia and many 
American States, auditors needed the approval of a responsible person and 
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representative of the Government (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1926: 1104). He 
continued by saying that the societies mentioned in the amendment had been in 
existence for many years and had been examining and training their members to “equal 
anything in the world” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1926: 1105). He noted, with 
regret, that while the auditing profession had a solid reputation, there were companies 
who were “not so particular about the class of person they [appointed]” as auditors 
(USA, Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1926: 1105). 
 
The Minister stated that Section 238 of the Bill described an auditor “as a person 
publicly practising as an auditor or accountant” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1927: 
1105). He believed that was sufficient otherwise it would place a heavy burden on his 
Department in approving appointments. He also believed the shareholders had the right 
to appoint the auditor of their company. This attempt at self-interest was thus quickly 
neutralised by Roos, no doubt aware of the probable Government policy of 
“inclusiveness” in this matter. 
 
The Minister was supported by Major GB van Zyl, SAP member for Cape Town 
(Harbour), who said the definition had been considered by the Select Committee “and 
under the circumstances [was] the best definition to meet all parties” (USA, HA 
Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1927: 1106). Mr J Christie, Labour member for Langlaagte, hit the 
bull’s-eye and pointed out that Brown’s suggestion would exclude many capable men 
as they were not registered auditors and 
 
“would open up the whole question of a Union Act [i.e. a single, national piece 
of legislation] for registered accountants again … If the accountants in the 
future, if they get a Union Act, justify the confidence that will be placed in 
them, the definition of ‘auditor’ would apply only to persons registered under 
the Union Act; but until that comes to pass I feel we would do a great injustice 
to many of the Cape firms who are auditing today” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 
1/3/1926: 1106). 
 
Brown believed Van Zyl to be misinformed and set about putting him right:  
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“There is an incorporated society in Cape Town, but it has no Act of Parliament. 
The position is this – it is the same examination to get into the Cape and the 
Orange Free State Society as it is to get into the Transvaal and Natal ones. The 
difference is that in the Transvaal and Natal no person can practice as an 
accountant and auditor unless he is a member of the Transvaal or the Natal 
Society. In the Cape the qualification is the same for admission, and no man is 
admitted today except by examination” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 1/3/1926: 
1106). 
 
Brown concluded by saying that 
 
“Anybody [could] pay £10 in the Orange Free State and the Cape and practise 
as a ‘public accountant’. The words ‘public accountant’ mean £10. That may 
not be the dictionary meaning, but that is the practical meaning. The Minister’s 
profession is one of the most barred in the world” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 
1/3/1926: 1106). 
 
In a display of humour, the Minister of Justice replied: “That is why they are called 
barristers”. Brown retorted that he was not punning and withdrew the amendment with 
the committee’s assent. The issue of who or what constituted an auditor remained 
contentious as the Companies Act of 1926 contained minimal definition. It was the 
privately sponsored Designation Act of 1927 which conferred the status upon the four 
Provincial Societies of “Chartered Accountant (South Africa)”. Companies seeking an 
audit would be sure to consider the new chartered accountants – and what they 
understood by this designation – as their choice. There was no compulsory requirement 
to choose a CA. 
 
ISSUE 8: TAXATION 
The Minister began the proceedings on 24 March 1926 with a technical request to 
discharge the order so that the Bill could be “recommitted under Standing Order 174 
for the purpose of considering a clause imposing taxation” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 
24/3/1926: 1936). The request was seconded and the Minister’s request agreed upon; 
the House moved into Committee and dealt with the tax issues, principally the 
imposition of an annual company licence fee, paid at the rate of 5 shillings for each £1 
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000 or part thereof of subscribed capital. Inflated capital accounts were thus penalised. 
Failure to pay the licence fee resulted in the payment of an additional 10% of the cost 
of the licence for every month or part thereof that the company was in default. The 
Minister explained that the fee would result in a single fee across the Union as the Cape 
and Natal up to this time charged double the licence fee while the Transvaal and the 
Orange Free State charged nothing. This new section was agreed to and finally 
appeared in the Act in Section 228. 
 
ISSUE 9: FINALISING THE BILL 
The process of finalising the Companies Bill continued with the Minister introducing a 
number of new subsections dealing with debentures “to make a provision that has 
always appeared in the Cape Act [of 1892]” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 29/3/1926: 
2048). A number of minor adjustments were made before the amendments were put and 
agreed upon. 
 
With regard to Section 99 and the powers and duties of auditors, Duncan moved a new 
subsection which would require auditors at the annual general meeting to report upon 
the remuneration directors received from the company. A century later, the King Code 
requires extensive disclosure of all amounts paid to directors. Duncan explained that the 
remuneration packages for such individuals were often structured to include the use of a 
house or car or some other privilege which the auditors often found difficult to 
quantify. He acknowledged the difficulties the auditors experienced in obtaining an 
exact value, but pointed out the actual benefits received could be listed. The 
amendment was seconded by Mr W Rocky, SAP member for Parktown. The Minister 
declared that the information could be provided without being made generally public 
and that the shareholders should have the information as it was not available on the 
balance sheet. The amendment was put and agreed upon and became Section 99(5) in 
the Act (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 6, 29/3/1926: 2049). 
 
The Bill was read for a third time on 20 April 1926 without debate (USA, HA Debates, 
Vol. 7, 20/4/1926: 2578) and it proceeded to the Senate. It was returned with 
amendments from the Senate to the House of Assembly, which met on 26 May. Most of 
the amendments were of a minor nature but Pearce’s amendment – which had dealt 
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with the controversial disclosure of shares sold for cash, vendors’ shares and the like– 
was omitted by the Senate, one of the few times in 1926 that it exercised this power. 
 
Mr C Pearce, Labour member for Liesbeek, the section’s originator stood up and 
lamented the Senate’s decision. He drew a parallel between Britain’s subsidised coal 
industry which was faltering due to “watered” capital and the South African mining 
industry which he believed to be close to a similar situation. He declared: “Large 
numbers of the gold mines have their capital watered to the extent of 200 to 300 
percent. How is it that the millionaires have been created? It has been by the 
manipulation of shares” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 7, 26/5/1926: 4195). 
 
The Minister then stood up to reply and pointed out that, despite the feelings of the 
House, the Senate was “bitterly opposed to this section” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 7, 
26/5/1926: 4196) and that there was no chance of passing it. In order to preserve the 
Bill, the Minister urged the House to accept the Senate amendment “in order to pass a 
very useful bit of work, the foundation of which was laid years ago”. The House agreed 
and the section was omitted but the Bill went forward as the Union Companies Act, No. 
46, 1926. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Companies Act of 1926 is a piece of Pact legislation often overshadowed by the 
Government’s extensive programme of social legislation, economic development and 
the drive towards autonomy from Britain. Nevertheless, it was an important Act which 
anticipated the growth in the economy and companies, while providing for their 
orderly, uniform and regulated disclosure of financial probity – or lack of it. Users of 
audited financial statements produced in terms of the Act could do so with reasonable 
confidence. Also, as Langhout (1961: 5) points out, “It was undoubtedly the passing of 
the Companies Act, 1926, which gave great impetus to the profession”. It is interesting 
to note that Langhout referred here to the “profession” and not the Four Societies in 
isolation. As well as the compulsory audit of companies, subsequent legislation added 
banks, building societies, cooperative societies, insurance companies and pension funds 
to the list of statutory audits, with the overall objective of regulation. 
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The 1926 Act was experimental in that it sought to impose upon South Africa a system 
which worked at the metropolitan centre but less so on the periphery of empire. In time, 
the 1948 Millin Company Law Amendment Enquiry Commission reported the need  
 
“for the immediate preparation and enactment of a consolidating Bill to put into 
orderly and scientific shape the disorderly and unwieldy mass of legislation 
constituted by the Act of 1926 [and] the numerous additions which have been 
superimposed on it” (Millin, 1948, 11). 
 
From the perspective of the accounting profession, the need for all companies to be 
audited represented a major business opportunity, and the Four Societies were not slow 
in capitalising upon it. The Companies Act was enacted in June 1926; eight months 
later, on 1 February 1927, the Charted Accountants Bill was placed before the House of 
Assembly by representatives of these Societies. The use of the CA(SA) designation 
would give them an advantage. 
 
But with opportunity came the paramount need right up to the 1980s for the audit to 
“bring to light any error or fraud which the auditor can and should discover by 
exercising reasonable care and skill” (Langhout, 1961: 5). In the context of 1926, 
Dicksee (1933: 97) listed the main procedures arising in the audit of a limited company 
which did not occur in the audit of a private firm (i.e. not a company) as follows:  
 
(a) The audit of share capital and debenture accounts; 
(b) The audit of dividend and interest accounts; 
(c) Compliance with the various statutory requirements; 
(d) Compliance with the Memorandum of Articles of Association, general Statutory 
Provisions and Acts of Parliament; and 
(e) The statutory meeting and audit duties in connection therewith. 
 
Even for a private company, the duties in terms of the 1926 Act were also onerous and 
included:  
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1. Keeping a register of members at the registered office, with the prescribed 
particulars (sec. 25). 
2. Framing an annual list of members and annual summary, and transmission to the 
Registrar of four copies within thirty days after the annual meeting, together with a 
certificate by the secretary or a director that the company has not since the date of 
the last return, or, in case of a first return, since the date of incorporation, issued any 
invitation to the public to subscribe for shares or debentures; and, if the 
shareholders exceed fifty, that the excess consists wholly of persons who, under sec. 
104, are to be excluded in reckoning the number of fifty. Penalty for default, £5 a 
day, payable by directors and officers as well as the company (sec. 26). 
3. Keeping register of members, duly posted to date, at the registered office, and 
liability to furnish extracts from register (sec. 30). 
4. Having a registered office (sec. 57). 
5. Publication of name of company at registered office, on the company’s seal (if any) 
and on all notices, advertisements, documents etc. (sec. 58). 
6. Holding statutory meeting (sec. 60); Gardner v Iredale (1912) 1 Ch. 700). 
7. Transmission of statutory report (sec. 60). 
8. Holding annual general meeting (sec. 59). 
9. Convening extraordinary general meeting on requisition of one-tenth of the 
shareholders (sec. 61). 
10. Keeping minutes of all general and directors or managers’ meetings, in either 
English or Dutch (sec. 66). 
11. Keeping register of directors, managers, and secretary at registered office, with 
prescribed particulars, and making return to the Registrar in quadruplicate (sec. 70). 
12. Keeping register of allotments at registered office, and transmission to Registrar of 
return of allotments in quadruplicate within two months after allotment – subject to 
relief being granted by the Court (sec. 85). 
13. Stating sums paid as commission on shares or debentures in balance-sheet (sec. 87). 
14. Issuing share certificates or debentures within two months of allotment, transfer etc. 
(sec. 89). 
15. Keeping books and accounts of all transactions, in English or Dutch (sec. 90). 
16. Keeping register of mortgages and debentures at registered office (secs 91–92). 
17. Appointment of auditors at annual general meeting (sec. 98). 
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18. Duty to carry on business with at least two members (sec. 101). 
(Source: Nathan 1927: 5–6) 
 
In terms of institutional economics analysis, the 1926 Act represents property rights in 
that the CA designation was awarded for its use by a small but qualified minority and 
enforced by “political decision-making” (North, 1990: 48). In both the case of 
Parliament and the Four Societies, what North calls “incremental gain” (North, 1990: 
49) depends on the “relative bargaining power” of the parties involved. It could be 
argued that while Parliament had absolute control, the passage of the 1926 Act allowed 
for a significant advantage for accountants going into the future. In essence, change 
occurred slowly at the edge, where two forces interact, better known as the margin 
(North, 1990: 49). 
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CHAPTER 10: THE CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS 
DESIGNATION (PRIVATE) BILL OF 1927 
 
 [Dates given to indicate the rapidity of Parliament’s response.] 
 
 Introduction: Politics and Economics: 1924–9  
o The Black Issue 
o The Growth of Trade Unions 
o Industrial Development (1925–9) 
 Table 10.1: Growth of Manufacturing Industry (1924–9) 
 Table 10.2: Gross Domestic Product by Kinds of Economic Activity 
(1911–40) 
 The Chartered Accountants’ Designation (Private) Bill of 1927 
 The Select Committee (17/2/27–8/3/1927) 
 Before the Select Committee (28/2/27–1/2/1927) 
o NS Wood 
o GE D’Arcy Orpen 
 The Issue of Articles and the Exclusion of the London Association (2–4/3/1927) 
 The Impact of Labour: Harsh Criticism of and Strong Defence for Articles 
(4/3/1927) 
 The Transvaal Society in 1927: An Analysis of a Successful Practitioner Society  
 Rules of the Game: Waterston Replaces Christie (4/3/1927) 
 The Bill before the House: March–May 1927 (8/3/1927) 
 The Pearce Agreement (1/4/1927) 
o Table 10.3: The Impact of Pearce’s Agreement 
 Response in the House to the Agreement (1/4/1927) 
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 Labour’s Concerns (3/5/1927) 
o Table 10.4: Motion to Report Progress and Sit Again 
o Table 10.5: Pearce Moved That The Question Be Put 
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o Table 10.6: Motion Amended by Oost’s Language Issue: Clause 
Subsequently Amended: Alexander Calls for A Division on Section 1 of The 
Act 
 Rayburn’s Bombshell (3/5/1927) 
 The House Reconvenes: Rayburn’s Amendment Again (6/5/1927) 
 Waterston’s Summation of the Issues (6/5/1927) 
 Alexander’s Issues 
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 The Third Reading – and a Personal Attack (13/5/1927) 
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CHAPTER 10: THE CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS 
DESIGNATION (PRIVATE) BILL OF 1927 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: POLITICS AND ECONOMICS: 1924–9 
 
THE BLACK ISSUE 
In the Pact Cabinet of 1924, Hertzog chose the portfolio of Native Affairs, a post he 
had held in the first Union Government until relieved of it by Botha in 1912. Hertzog 
was a segregationist who linked the idea of reserves for Blacks with the idea that White 
labour took prioritisation and this was to be enforced by means of an industrial colour 
bar. In July 1926, Hertzog presented three Bills to Parliament – the Native Land Act 
Amendment Bill, a Union Native Council Bill and a Representation of Natives in 
Parliament Bill. The intention of the first Bill was to encourage Blacks to purchase land 
– instead of Parliament making a grant of it – close to areas already held by Blacks. The 
second Bill provided for the establishment of a Council of 50 Blacks – 35 of whom 
were to be elected – and was intended to replace the nominated Native Conference 
established by Smuts in 1920. The third Bill’s intention was to remove Blacks from the 
Cape electoral roll and to give those in the four Provinces of the Union seven White 
representatives in the House of Assembly. These representatives were entitled to vote 
only on measures dealing with Blacks. Although Hertzog tried to enlist the support of 
the South African Party in voting for these Bills, Smuts refused to allow this. In 1927, 
the Bills were sent to a select committee, but it reported too late for them to be 
considered by Parliament before the session ended (Davenport and Saunders, 2000: 
309). 
 
With regard to the three pieces of legislation sent to Select Committee in 1927, the 
Representation of Natives in Parliament Bill found support amongst neither National 
Party supporters nor Smuts, who favoured a “high, uniform, non-racial franchise, 
backed by a civilisation test” (Davenport and Saunders, 2000: 310). As a result, the Bill 
failed on its third reading in the House of Assembly. Hertzog dropped the Native 
Council Bill before the 1929 election and followed Smuts’ advice to establish councils 
under the Native Affairs Act of 1920 and to get them functioning properly before 
considering a general council. The Native Land Act Amendment Bill was also 
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withdrawn. Nevertheless, Hertzog was persuaded by Tielman Roos, his Minister of 
Justice and key man in the passage of the Companies Act, to contest the forthcoming 
1929 election on the basis of a “white South Africa” (Walker, 1957: 625). 
 
In the interim, Parliament had enacted a Native Administration Act which granted wide 
powers to the Governor-General over Blacks and their lands in all Provinces except the 
Cape. In 1929, the Act was amended to include Black workers throughout the Union 
under a system of pass laws. Prior to this, the 1926 Mines and Works Amendment Act 
limited the ability of mine management to replace White labour with Black labour. 
 
In a sense, these measures were the other side of the coin which dealt with White labour 
and made it a political force in the changed political environment after the General 
Election of 1924 (Feinstein, 2007: 111). This is clearly indicated in the debates in the 
House of Assembly in the period 1924–7 when Labourites like Waterston and Rayburn 
made an impact, much to the discomfort of SAP members like Close, the member for 
Rondebosch. The Labour Party’s impact was short-lived in that their support base was 
narrow – simply comprising English-speaking White labourers. The General Election 
of 1929 saw the Labour Party trimmed from 18 seats to five (Davenport and Saunders, 
2000: 710). 
 
Further, the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1930 and the Native Service Contract Act of 
1932 sought to prevent the loss of Black labour on farms. This was an important 
measure as agriculture, until the Depression of the 1930s, contributed more to gross 
domestic product and employed more people than gold mining (Feinstein, 2007: 107). 
The Union Statistics digest produced by the Bureau of Census and Statistics in 1960 
listed the total number of people employed in gold mining in 1930 as 236 305 of whom 
22 895 were White (Union Statistics, 1960: G5). The equivalent figure for agriculture 
was 749 197 people of whom 184 811 were White (Union Statistics, 1960: G3). In both 
instances, the overwhelming majority was Black, indicating their critical importance to 
the economy. 
 
THE GROWTH OF TRADE UNIONS 
On the economic front, the first years of the Pact Government saw an increase in South 
Africa’s prosperity. Good rains in 1925 coupled with the discovery of platinum in the 
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Transvaal and substantial diamond fields in Lichtenburg and Alexander Bay enhanced 
the status of the new administration (Breitenbach et al., 1974: 346). The reality was a 
little different as a result of events such as the growth of the Industrial and Commercial 
Workers’ Union (ICU). By 1925, it could claim a nationwide membership of 50 000, 
most of them Blacks (Walker, 1957: 622). In addition, other Black trade unions 
multiplied on the Rand, and this early period of trade unionism became chaotic with the 
ICU stumbling from crisis to crisis. 
 
In White politics, the National Labour Council, comprising hard-line socialists, 
expelled nine of the 18 Labour members of Parliament from that Council, including 
Creswell who had brokered the pact with Hertzog and had been rewarded with a 
cabinet post. Any united Labour response to issues in Parliament was unlikely, as 
evidenced by the voting patterns for the Designation Bill debate. This event occurred at 
the same time the ICU was attempting to resolve a strike by Blacks employed at a state 
veterinary centre near Pretoria. While the Cabinet was scheduled to consider a response 
to the strike, Walter Madeley, a Labour member of the Cabinet and a supporter of the 
National Labour Council, met with an ICU delegation. This was not approved by the 
cabinet, wary of any form of trade unionism. Hertzog used his Nationalist majority to 
reshuffle the cabinet and sack Madeley (Davenport, 1987: 298). 
 
The Labour component of the Pact Government was clearly split between hard-liners 
and moderates, with the Communist Party element ultimately exchanging its White 
support for that of Black workers (Walker, 1957: 624). These events, coupled with the 
Government’s failure to secure the passage of the Representation of Natives in 
Parliament Bill, heightened the Pact Government’s fear of the “black peril” and led to 
the National Party’s growing segregationist vision against the South African Party’s 
belief in “letting the situation develop” (Breitenbach et al., 1974: 359). 
 
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT: 1925–9 
In economic terms, the period 1925–9 was marked by a Government policy to increase 
industrial development. In 1924–5, the economy was driven by fundamental consumer 
industries, such as the processing of food, beverages and tobacco as well as heavier 
industries producing chemicals and metalwork mainly for the mines (Feinstein, 2005: 
115–6). The development of heavy industry was needed. 
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As Nattrass has pointed out (1990: 166), increases in output result from a greater input 
of the factors of production, a better utilisation of these factors or a satisfactory mix of 
the two. She demonstrated that in the period 1919–76 there were significant inputs of 
labour and capital into manufacturing in South Africa and that of the total annual 
growth in capital in this period, 75 per cent was ploughed into new employment 
creation while 25 per cent was invested in more effective methods of production. But in 
the period 1919–46, all new investment was allocated to “capital widening” – that is: 
the greater use of production methods then employed – i.e. “more of the same”. 
 
One further point needs to be emphasised. Much of the production from the new 
factories was based upon imported raw materials rather than the beneficiation of South 
African materials. As Hobart Houghton has pointed out (1976: 122), the reasons for this 
were the small size of the South African market, the application of capital widening 
techniques and various technical issues. The exception to this trend was the 
establishment in 1928 of the South African Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation 
(ISCOR) as a direct result of the Government’s involvement in the process after 1924. 
The iron and steel works were created to utilise South Africa’s large reserves of coal 
and iron ore. 
 
In such a progressive economic environment, audited financial statements were 
necessary to secure loan finance and – critically – investment. 
 
Another factor behind the Government’s policy of industrial growth was its realisation 
that only in the creation of new jobs could the Poor White problem have any chance of 
a solution. With the growth of more sophisticated industries, employment opportunities 
could be reserved for whites as manufacturing would need greater percentages of 
skilled and semi-skilled workers than the mines (Feinstein, 2005: 118). 
 
Other reasons that influenced the Government’s policy were a desire to reduce the 
power of foreign-owned mining companies on national grounds, a determination to 
achieve a fully independent South Africa, and a realistic understanding that the mines 
would eventually deplete the mineral resources mined. In such a situation, other 
streams of revenue and means of employment were needed (Feinstein, 2005: 118). 
 
 328 
 
The method used by the Government to achieve quick industrialisation was through a 
revived tariff protectionism aimed at import substitution and implemented through the 
Customs Tariff Act of 1925. Far from being a primitive instrument, the Act carefully 
avoided an increase in duty on capital goods or materials needed in mining, agriculture 
or the nascent manufacturing industries but there was an unfortunate “knock-on” effect 
in indirect costs arising from tariffs applied (Feinstein, 2005: 119). But overall, the 
results achieved were encouraging. 
 
The Act also provided for a revived Board of Trade and Industries with additional 
power to protect secondary industries and implement the political policies of job 
reservation (Feinstein, 2005: 119). As a result of these efforts, manufacturing increased 
as illustrated by the following tables:  
 
TABLE 10.1 
GROWTH OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY, 1924–9 
 
 1924–5 1928–9 Increase between 1925 and 
1929 
% 
Number of establishments 
Number of workers:  
   All races (thousands) 
   Whites only (thousands) 
   Others (thousands) 
Value of gross output (R millions) 
Value of net output (R millions) 
6 009 
 
115 
41 
74 
115 
49 
6 238 
 
141 
54 
87 
161 
67 
4 
 
22 
32 
18 
39 
37 
Source: Union Statistics (1960: L3); and Hobart Houghton (1976: 122). 
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TABLE 10.2 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY KINDS OF ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY 1911–40 (R MILLIONS) 
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Total 
1911 
1920 
1925 
1930 
1935 
1940 
62.3 
122 
107 
78 
93 
120 
83.9 
109 
84 
95 
133 
203 
11.4 
40 
41 
51 
73 
114 
2.2 
8 
9 
10 
14 
18 
2.7 
6 
7 
11 
15 
23 
28.6 
53 
58 
62 
73 
94 
37.9 
86 
78 
82 
92 
136 
8.5 
15 
15 
15 
24 
30 
 
42 
41 
46 
50 
104 
 
80 
89 
103 
113 
145 
 
562 
530 
554 
680 
989 
Source: Breitenbach et al., 1974: 446. 
 
THE CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS’ DESIGNATION (PRIVATE) BILL OF 1927 
The last recorded entry in the Union of South Africa Debates in the House of Assembly 
for the South African Society of Accountants (Private) Bill is dated 9 June 1925. On 
that date, the House supported a motion by the Hon. CR Swart, National Party member 
for Ladybrand and member of the Bill’s Select Committee, to suspend the debate on the 
Bill to the next session of Parliament “at the same stage as that at which the 
proceedings are now suspended” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 4, 9/6/1925: 4213). With the 
imminent departure of Close, Swart assumed the role of spokesman of the Four 
Societies. 
 
During the intervening period, Swart agreed to attempt to amend the Bill so as to meet 
its opponents’ criticisms or to present a new Bill. Neither happened before the next 
session of Parliament and the Bill faded into obscurity. According to Hay, Labour 
member for Pretoria West, the Bill’s promoters “abandoned” it in 1927 because of the 
opposition it aroused (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 8, 1/4/1927: 2148). It is not difficult to 
determine why Hay came to this conclusion – the opposition to the Bill had been strong 
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and the promoting Societies were not prepared to surrender the two significant points 
that caused most of the friction:  
 
 that of reopening the Transvaal and Natal membership registers to allow in all 
practising accountants, as was proposed for the Cape and Orange Free State; and 
 the other being a period of 18 months articled service with a registered and 
practising member of the Society. Both points were backed by practical reasons. 
 
The Transvaal and Natal Societies had been in existence for a long period of time, both 
established by statute and both had longstanding entry requirements comprising 
examinations and a period of articles. They had also begun to receive recognition for 
their display of professionalism and believed reopening the registers would not only 
jeopardise that status but would also be unfair to those members who had qualified in 
accordance with the set standards since 1909. With regard to tutelage, a period of 
supervised practical experience was (and still is in 2013) deemed necessary so as to 
orientate the trainee in the workings of the office of a practising accountant. 
 
In addition to the above reasons for the disappearance of the 1924 Bill, a more practical 
reason existed for the abandonment of the Bill, that being the presentation to the House 
of Assembly on 1 February 1927 of the Chartered Accountants’ Designation (Private) 
Bill which was passed by the examiners on 3 February as having complied with the 
House’s Standing Rules (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 8, 3/2/1927: 48).  
 
The Bill was brought up and introduced by Swart on 8 February 1927, and read for the 
first time (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 8, 8/2/1927: 144). As it was a private Bill, the next 
stage was to submit it to a select committee of the House (Kilpin, 1946: 22). This was 
proposed by Swart on 15 February when the Bill came up a second time and agreed to 
by the House. As the Bill was to be opposed, the Speaker notified the House on 17 
February that the Committee “would meet as on an opposed private Bill” (USA, HA 
Debates, Vol. 8, 17/2/1927: 408). The opponents of the Bill were the:  
 
1. Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (1880); 
2. Institute of Accountants and Actuaries in Glasgow (1855); 
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3. Society of Accountants in Edinburgh (1854); 
4. Society of Accountants in Aberdeen (1867) and 
5. Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland (1888). 
 
All had been incorporated by Royal Charter in the United Kingdom and their members 
were entitled to call themselves Chartered Accountants and to use the designation “CA” 
and their concern was that this entitlement would be infringed and confusion would 
result (SC5, 1927, Appendices B–C: iii–v). 
 
There is strong circumstantial evidence to suggest that the Designation Bill was a 
“quick fix”. Under the successive administrations of Botha, Smuts and Hertzog, the 
Union had achieved peace within its borders, regulated labour, especially on the mines, 
and was developing both infrastructure and the economy. The Companies Act was an 
important element in the growth process. It was a complex piece of legislation requiring 
competent practitioners to both implement and audit. Small practitioners were unlikely 
to have the resources to audit anything but the smallest of clients. However, the Four 
Societies were established Union-wide and since 1919 had been active in developing 
the South African profession. They were also unpopular with certain sectors of the 
profession – like Government accountants – whom they had refused admission to the 
proposed new society to be established in terms of the Accountants Bill of 1924. 
 
South Africa would soon be able to challenge the British on their political status. The 
issue of the precise constitutional nature of Britain’s standing vis-à-vis its Dominions, 
was of importance to South Africa with its tradition of Afrikaner secessionism. The 
matter was raised by Hertzog at the Imperial Conference in London in 1926 and gained 
support from Ireland and Canada, disinterest from New Zealand and Newfoundland, 
and agreement from Australia’s premier, SM Bruce (Breitenbach et al., 1974: 352). 
When the British Secretary of State in India, Lord Birkenhead, supported Hertzog’s 
proposal to define the status of Dominions, a committee under a former British Prime 
Minister, Lord Balfour, was established to consider the matter. The subsequent Balfour 
Declaration detailed a number of key principles, the most important being that Britain 
and the Dominions were autonomous and equal within the Empire. There was no 
subordination of any of the participants in any element of domestic or foreign affairs, 
but there was a unity in a common allegiance to the King and a voluntary association in 
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a Commonwealth of Nations (Breitenbach et al., 1974: 353). The 1924 Bill had failed 
but it highlighted the following:  
 
1. the designation “CA(SA)” had been thoroughly debated when the 1924 
Accountants Bill had been on the table and had wide South African support, the 
main issue being who in South Africa could use it; 
 
2. the main opponents in 1927 were, de jure, the five United Kingdom societies (listed 
above) but also, de facto, the South African Labour Party which espoused the cause 
of the White worker, whether a blaster on the mines or an accountant in a 
Government office. In this way, they often did not have the support of their Pact 
allies – the National Party – who were more concerned with the Poor White 
problem, the mines and the development of the country’s industrial infrastructure. 
Neither group of opponents was particularly popular with members of the House: 
the chartered societies because of their perceived support for British imperialism 
and Labour for its perceived radicalism; and 
 
3. there had been indications, such as voting patterns in the House, that members of 
both the SAP and National Party tacitly supported the Four Societies in their quest 
for a unified profession, but were constrained in their support for the current 
proposal by the need to ensure potential members of the new society (and voters) 
were not treated unfairly. 
 
This thesis suggests the Four Societies found an alternative route to achieve their goal 
of paramountcy within the profession. The conclusion was probably that, if a unified 
society could not be established in time to service the Companies Act, a well respected 
and proven designation judiciously applied could. What follows is a narrative of key 
proceedings with analysis of specific issues as they impact upon the profession and its 
concerns. While Hertzog’s segregationist policies may not have impacted directly upon 
White accountants, they were (and remain) central to South African history and the 
milieu in which the profession functioned. 
 
  
 333 
 
THE SELECT COMMITTEE 
The Select Committee to consider the Designation Bill was convened formally on 17 
February 1927 with five members, including Dr H Reitz as Chair. Reitz, National Party 
member for the North East Rand, would later introduce two Private Member’s Bills in 
1935 and 1936 dealing with the registration of accountants, probably at the request of 
the Institute of Accountants’ of South Africa. Neither would succeed. The other 
members of the Committee were Rood, Christie, Moffat and Major Richards. The latter 
two were members of the SAP, while Christie was Labour and Rood was a Nationalist. 
Any vote along Party lines or the Pact would see the SAP in the minority. The first 
proper meeting of the Committee was on 25 February and it would meet on a further 
seven occasions, six of them concerned with accepting evidence and interviewing 
witnesses. The last meeting was on 8 March. Formal opposition to the Bill was led by 
the now familiar figure of Advocate Mars appearing for the opponents to the Bill. Mars 
was instructed by the old firm of Fairbridge, Arderne and Lawton (SC5, 1927, 
Proceedings: x). 
 
The equally familiar figure of the Parliamentary Agent – Mr Walker of the firm of 
Walker, Lewis and Le Roux – appeared for the Bill’s promoters, these being the four 
accounting Societies who had promoted the failed Bills of 1913 and 1924. Of all the 
dramatis personae present before this Committee, Walker alone had experience of the 
issues stretching back to 1913 in which, moreover, he had appeared for the opponents 
of the Accountants (Private) Bill of that year. A petition in opposition to the Bill had 
also been lodged by another familiar figure – AS Hooper, Associate of the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. 
 
It was the simple contention of the opponents to the Bill that the use of the designation 
without the qualification “South Africa” or “SA” infringed the rights of those 
accounting societies in the United Kingdom which had been incorporated by Royal 
Charter and were thus already legally entitled to the use of “chartered accountant” or its 
abbreviation “CA”. 
 
The four South African Provincial Societies were the promoters of the Bill and sought a 
simple boon from Parliament – the use of the designation and its abbreviation, CA(SA). 
Their petition went on to seek the provision of a fine of £50 for those using the 
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designation “Chartered Accountant (South Africa)” or its abbreviation, either alone or 
in combination with other words, unless such people could prove membership of one of 
the Four Societies, or a society incorporated by Royal Charter or legislative enactment, 
membership of which was accepted for admission to the four South African Societies. 
The Select Committee’s final recommendation was to support the Societies’ request, 
this after careful consideration was given to the points of view of all those who 
appeared before the Committee. Understandably, much of the time was spent in 
investigating the term “chartered accountant”, a topic which had been aired in the 
debate on the 1924 Bill. 
 
BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE 
There was one substantive issue before the Committee: the South African use of the 
designation “chartered accountant” which was largely resolved by the addition of “SA” 
to denote South Africa as the accountant’s place of training. 
 
Two other issues arose in the course of the debate for which there was no immediate 
solution: service under articles and the position of unqualified accountants – 
particularly, municipal and Government accountants. 
 
Much of the material presented to the Committee was a repeat of what had been 
presented in the debate on the Accountants Bill. This was necessary as the issue was 
being considered in its own right. The Committee interviewed eight people in the 
period 25 February to 8 March. Most supported the aims of the Bill. 
 
NS WOOD 
Before the Committee, and in support of the Bill, NS Wood – a public accountant 
practising in Cape Town – described the term as “generic” in that it could apply to 
many accountants but opined that to the public it meant that “the holder of it [was] a 
qualified practising accountant, a public accountant of high qualification” (SC5, 1927: 
Q128). Therein lay the crux of the matter. 
 
Wood pointed out that without the designation, South Africans were professionally at a 
significant disadvantage in the eyes of the public when compared to their British 
counterparts. This disadvantage could be neutralised, he believed, by the use of the 
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designation “chartered accountant”. When asked whether some other title would 
achieve the objective of putting the South African qualification squarely in the public 
eye, Wood answered simply: “Another title [would] not give it to us” (SC5, 1927: 
Q189). There was a precedent for this; earlier in the proceedings, Wood had informed 
the Committee that there were “ten separate and distinct bodies of chartered 
accountants in Canada incorporated by legislative enactment” (SC5, 1927: Q101). 
When asked whether any Canadians had been accepted into the South African 
Societies, Wood replied none had applied and if anyone did “we should have to look 
into their qualifications and see exactly what the standard [was]” (SC5, 1927: Q176). 
 
GE D’ARCY ORPEN 
After Wood, the Committee interviewed Mr GE D’Arcy Orpen, the managing director 
of Syfrets Trust Co. Ltd in Cape Town and a fellow of the English Society of 
Accountants and Auditors which had been incorporated in 1885 under licence from the 
English Board of Trade (SC5, 1927: Q201). Orpen had been an accountant in the Cape 
since 1901 and possessed a wealth of local information. He stated, for example, that the 
Bills of 1913 and 1924 had been costly exercises for the promoting Societies; the Cape 
Society’s share had been between £5 000 – 6 000 (SC5, 1927: Q201). He also put the 
Designation Bill in a nutshell and added weight to the idea of the Designation Bill as a 
“Plan B” and a “quick fix” when he stated:  
 
“The present measure abandons the idea of a single body incorporated by 
Statute and does not seek to impose the principle of compulsory registration as a 
condition of practising the occupation of an accountant. It is concerned simply 
with the provision of a suitable title for the members of the promoting societies 
and its restriction in use to their members” (SC5, 1927: Q201). 
 
In general, Orpen agreed with the aims of the promoters of the Bill and put his view 
clearly when he stated:  
 
“The promoters of the Bill have no desire to refuse the overseas chartered men 
equality of opportunity to practise in South Africa, but they feel that there is a 
great principle at stake. The principle aims at procuring for South Africans and 
their descendants whose qualifications are decided by standards in no wise 
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inferior to those of overseas practitioners, an equality at the very least in South 
Africa with such practitioners in the rewards open to the profession. This is 
sought by the Bill” (SC5, 1927: Q201). 
 
With reference to an English journal called the Chartered Accountants’ Journal, Orpen 
quoted facts produced therein that while 75% of “large firms” in the United Kingdom 
required chartered accountants to audit their entities, 95% of companies incorporated in 
South Africa “insist by their articles or resolutions of shareholders that chartered 
accountants must be [their] auditors” (SC5, 1927: Q201). How these facts were derived 
and how many foreign companies incorporated elsewhere were excluded is not 
detailed. But the point made was that auditors were considered necessary. 
 
Orpen also made reference to the fact that the Pact Government of 1924–9 supported 
the industrialisation of the South African economy which, in turn, intended to stimulate 
foreign investment in industries other than mines. He stated:  
 
“These people overseas have it in their minds that the “Chartered Accountant” 
is the man who is qualified out here and those starting business here naturally 
prefer to employ a chartered accountant to a man who carries on his business 
under a designation they do not understand” (SC5, 1927: Q254). 
 
THE ISSUE OF ARTICLES AND THE EXCLUSION OF THE LONDON 
ASSOCIATION 
Matters which generated heat during the proceedings of the Committee were the hoary 
annuals: the status of the non-chartered accounting societies in South Africa and 
municipal and Government accountants. Before the Committee, on 4 March, JDH 
Lang, the Registrar of the Transvaal Society of Accountants, put the case. The Societies 
had no quarrel with such organisations as the London Association of Accountants, but 
were “at variance with their means of admitting members. They do not make it a 
condition that [prior] service should be with a public accountant” (SC5, 1927: Q411). 
 
As detailed in earlier Chapters, from the 1924 Bill onwards, the four South African 
Societies made public their firmness on the issue of a period of articles of clerkship 
being served under the aegis of a practising member of one of the Four Societies. In 
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1927, the period of service for articles was four years; non-articled clerks were 
expected to serve six years (SC5, 1927: Q79). In certain United Kingdom societies, a 
premium was charged to accept a young man as an articled clerk (SC5, 1927: Q364). 
This was not the case in South Africa. In his evidence before the Committee on 2 
March, HCOS Mockford, a member of the Transvaal Society, stated this and that in 
their first year articled clerks earned £5 a month. Depending upon their ability after 
that, they could earn as much as £15 a month (SC5, 1927: Q365–6). These amounts 
were available in the Transvaal; wages in the other Provinces were probably smaller. 
As a point of reference, in 1913 the Accountants Bill of that year envisaged an entrance 
and subscription fee of 5 guineas to the proposed new Society. In 1926, the London 
Association charged £33 to admit an associate member to their society (SC5, 1927: 
Q443). There was a clear impasse – the Four Societies would only yield finally to 
legislation in 1951. 
 
THE IMPACT OF LABOUR: HARSH CRITICISM OF AND STRONG DEFENCE 
FOR ARTICLES 
The impact of Labour on the Accountants Bill of 1924 was significant. By highlighting 
the plight of the ordinary accountant excluded from the benefits of the Bill, the Labour 
MPs highlighted its selectivity and potential unfairness. The process could not easily 
stand the glare of popular opinion. Undoubtedly Labour tried it again with the 
Designation Bill – and failed due to a combined SAP/Nationalist vote, often leaving 
Labour isolated on the floor of the House. Also, Pearce, Labour member for Liesbeek, 
was not above voting independently of his party fellows. 
 
At the meeting on 4 March, Waterston, the Labour member for Brakpan and a 
replacement for Christie – also a member of the Labour Party – on the Committee – put 
it bluntly to Lang: “the only useful purpose [articles] will serve is that it will enable 
your Society to create a close preserve, and enable you, as it were, to control 
competition” (SC5, 1927: Q458). Predictably, Lang denied this and stated the purpose 
of articles was to ensure clerks received a proper training and were properly qualified 
when “launched on the public” (SC5, 1927: Q459). 
 
Waterston was not to be deterred and hit the bull’s-eye with the point that while articles 
were recognised as a prerequisite for entry into one of the Four Societies, and hence to 
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the coveted designation “chartered accountant”, this put the Societies “in a position to 
decide how many young South Africans shall be trained for the profession in this 
country and how many shall not be trained” (SC5, 1927: Q460). Again, Lang disputed 
this fact, but the reality was that articles placed a restriction upon the ability of non-
chartered accountants to recruit clerks and this was to be a continuing unresolved 
matter in the debate around Pocock’s Bill of 1938. This was a crucial issue in a growing 
economy and its need for skilled manpower. 
 
Waterston continued by asking whether accounting experience gained in “a concern 
carrying on in a big way” would be better than “in the office of a small accountant 
doing very little” (SC5, 1927: Q465). To this Lang answered that in such a situation, 
the clerk would gain “greater practical experience in a particular branch but not in 
accounting generally” (SC5, 1927: Q466). The profession remained adamant – it would 
train the clerks. As Lang put it: “We reckon that is the only way we know of to indicate 
that they are properly qualified” (SC5, 1927: Q481). 
 
Waterston was unrelenting in his questioning. He asked Lang if when the Transvaal 
Ordinance was passed some of their founding members, admitted to the resulting 
Transvaal Society, were insufficiently qualified. Lang admitted this had been the case 
(SC5, 1927: Q493). Waterston, playing devil’s advocate, pointed out that “in those days 
you were making a new start, [and the object of the Society] was not to hurt anyone 
who was making a livelihood at that time … your object being that later on, of course, 
you would raise the status of your profession” (SC5, 1927: Q499–501). Lang agreed the 
implication being it could be done again in a new start to the profession. New Zealand 
was an example where this had happened and was now “coming right”. 
 
Waterston then turned the focus of his questioning to the London Association, pointing 
out the inherent contradiction in Lang’s stand – that while London Association 
members were perceived not to have the same standard of qualification as those of the 
chartered societies, there had been a time when members of the emerging South 
African Societies were in a similar position. Again, the implication was clear – perhaps 
the Designation Bill offered a similar opportunity: this time to achieve a thorough 
unification of the profession. Lang remained unconvinced and it was later pointed out 
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that neither the New Zealand nor the Canadian Societies accepted London Association 
certificates as sufficient for membership of their Societies (SC5, 1927: Q646–53). 
 
Undoubtedly, the Societies objected to what they perceived to be low standards in the 
London Association. This had been an issue in 1924 as well. While being interviewed 
by the Committee on 2 March, James Douglas, a Scottish Chartered Accountant and a 
member of the Cape Society for 22 years, stated that he believed the London 
Association did “a good deal of good” by giving its young men the opportunity to pass 
examinations. But the fact that they did not serve a period of apprenticeship meant for 
Douglas that “we are going to put a body of men on the public and represent them to be 
what they are not” (SC5, 1927: Q387). Like Lang, Douglas was adamant – London 
Association members who sought admission to the Cape Society needed “to comply 
with our rules, that is, service in an accountant’s office and examination” (SC5, 1927: 
Q390). In support of this, and in an oblique reference to the Designation Bill, Douglas 
pointed out that in his office he had articled clerks who were passing the examinations 
set by the South African Society. 
 
“If Cape Town was in Edinburgh these men would be chartered accountants 
when they had finished their training; it is just a question of geographical 
difference. I am a chartered accountant myself, and they are taking any 
examination we put before them, but because my office is not in Edinburgh they 
become “Certified Accountants (Cape)” instead of “Chartered Accountants” ” 
(SC5, 1927: Q393). 
 
The meaning in Douglas’ comments was that the Four Societies were producing good 
accountants able to compete with the best the United Kingdom could provide, but the 
South Africans needed a designation which would do justice to that fact, and the 
London Association would not. 
 
Douglas’ evidence was supported by that of GE D’Arcy Orpen who made two points. 
Firstly, the audit of registered companies in India could only be performed by those 
licenced to do so by its Government and the Government only issued licences to 
candidates who had passed examinations and served an apprenticeship “to one of the 
few practising accountants chosen by the Government” (SC5, 1927: Q201). The 
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requirement for articles was thus common elsewhere and a critical one at that. And, 
secondly, it underlined the importance of a period of articles, which meant, in turn, that 
members of the London Association as well as members of the South African Public 
Services who had not served articles could not be admitted to the Societies nor benefit 
from the designation. The Four Societies had a record which indicated their methods 
worked. 
 
THE TRANSVAAL SOCIETY IN 1927: AN ANALYSIS OF A SUCCESSFUL 
PRACTITIONER SOCIETY 
The Transvaal was the oldest and biggest accounting society in South Africa, an 
understandable fact given its location in the mineral-rich province. It was ready for the 
next step – the award of the designation. 
 
On 2 March the Committee interviewed the President of the Transvaal Society of 
Accountants, Mr R Hemphill, who produced numerous facts designed to inform and 
impress the Committee. The Society’s membership in 1927 stood at 449, 196 of them 
new on the register since the Society had been formed in 1904. Hemphill broke down 
the new membership as follows:  
 
100 examined by the Society itself 
15 from the affiliated South African Societies 
30 from the Chartered Societies 
50 from the Incorporated Society in England 
1 from an “approved Australian Society” 
196 in total. 
(SC5, 1927: Q269). 
 
(The number of Incorporateds is interesting, given the shabby treatment they were 
given over inclusion in the 1924 Bill. Clearly their use had declined with the 
profession’s growing sophistication.) 
 
Other facts were equally impressive by the standards of the day. In 1915, the Transvaal 
Society had been influential in the creation of a Faculty of Commerce at the University 
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of the Witwatersrand. In the period 1915–20, the Society had spent £3 000 in 
supporting this development as well as a similar initiative at the fledgling Transvaal 
University College in Pretoria. Members of the Society had been instrumental in 
devising the yearly examinations in accounting and auditing. Hemphill pointed out, 
“All the professors and lecturers in accounting are members of the Society, and what is 
more, are so by examination and training” (SC5, 1927: Q269). He stated that most of 
the students, who passed, entered careers in commerce and the Civil Service. The 
Transvaal Society thus made a positive contribution to the community in which it 
functioned. 
 
Hemphill continued by stating that in the past, the Society had, at considerable cost, 
compiled, published and distributed legal decisions affecting the profession while, at a 
conservative estimate, it had spent £1 500 in its 22 years of existence investigating 
alleged bad conduct on behalf of its members. In addition, he revealed that the 
Society’s involvement in the two failed attempts at putting the private bills through 
Parliament had cost it £2 000. 
 
Hemphill estimated that, since 1904, the Society had generated about £30 000 in 
revenue from subscription fees and other sources, and of this, about £20 000 had been 
spent in the administration and the running of examinations. “My point is this, that we 
have spent two-thirds of our income in minding our own business as it were and we 
have spent the other third in doing some good for the profession generally outside” 
(SC5, 1927: Q272). 
 
Hemphill listed other pertinent details. The Society had “framed a syllabus of 
examination” in respect of the intermediate and final levels. With regard to the former 
examination, the society had examined 247 candidates, 54% of whom had passed. At 
the final level, 255 had been examined and 41% had passed of whom six, for some 
reason, had not joined the Society (SC5, 1927: Q272). 
 
The Society had introduced “articles of service” in South Africa and, to date, had 
registered 180 individuals, 72 sets of articles being current with “at least 50 other young 
fellows who are qualifying through the University” [before signing articles] (SC5, 
1927: Q272). Hemphill then outlined the examination process in South Africa which, 
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since 1919, had been conducted through the General Examining Board. The Board 
comprised one member from each Province and all examinations were moderated under 
its supervision to ensure a uniform standard. 
 
“These standards compared with similar examinations of other accounting 
institutions are ranked high. The candidates’ answers are marked by both the 
internal and external examiners and in any dispute the Board is the final arbiter” 
(SC5, 1927: 272). 
 
Hemphill pointed out that the Societies’ system of examination had been devised “with 
the help of overseas Chartered and Incorporated men and I am glad to say that even 
today we have got their help” (SC5, 1927: 272). 
 
RULES OF THE GAME: WATERSTON REPLACES CHRISTIE 
Impressive as the Transvaal Society’s record of service was, the case of opponent or 
proponent could always be strengthened through careful use of technicalities in the 
process. As demonstrated in the analysis of the 1913 and 1924 Bills, both opponents 
and proponents sought advantage through Parliament as the supreme arbiter of law. In 
both cases, the rules of Parliament were used to best advantage without breaking them. 
Through such means, parties to a case sought advantage. At least one member of the 
Select Committee – Christie, the Labour member for Langlaagte – was a proponent of 
the defunct 1924 South African Society of Accountants (Private) Bill. He left the 
Committee on 4 March shortly before the Committee reported to the House and was 
replaced by the doughty opponent of that Bill, Waterston, the Labour member for 
Brakpan. This would create a technical problem and an opportunity for Waterston to 
filibuster within the rules. Christie had attempted to prevent the late applicants wishing 
to give evidence in opposition to the Bill from doing so, but all his colleagues on the 
Committee disagreed and voted against such an approach, undoubtedly wishing the 
proceedings to be as inclusive as possible so as to ensure a result perceived to be 
legitimate (SC5, 1927, Proceedings: viii). It is not clear whether this disagreement is 
what led to Christie’s departure from the Committee. His replacement, however, was 
more sympathetic to the opponents of the Bill. 
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On Waterston’s second day on the Committee, 7 March, it resolved that its Chairman 
report to the House and seek leave to amend the Bill’s Preamble by adding to the end of 
the Preamble a phrase with the words “shall be a punishable offence” in connection 
with the unauthorised use of the designation “Chartered Accountant (SA)” or any 
abbreviations thereof. The reason for this was that while the phrase had been included 
in the published notices of the objects of the Bill, it had not been included in the 
Preamble. Waterston sought a ruling as to whether he, as a new member of the 
Committee, could vote in Committee on an amendment to the Preamble, the reason 
being that, as a replacement, he had not heard all prior evidence put to that Committee 
(SC5, 1927, Proceedings: xiii). This point of order had the potential to slow 
proceedings. 
 
The Chairman, Dr H Reitz, sought a ruling from the Speaker of the House on the same 
day, as well as attending a meeting of the House to bring up a special report to seek its 
permission to amend the Bill’s Preamble in line with the published notices. This was 
granted. The following day, 8 March, Reitz laid before the Select Committee the 
Speaker’s ruling that:  
 
1. In terms of Standing Order No. 51 of both Union and British Parliaments, no 
member could vote on any question arising without having “duly heard and 
attended to the evidence relating thereto” (SC5, 1927, Proceedings: xiv); 
 
2. In the Cape and Union Parliaments members replacing others on select 
committees had always recorded their vote on the question “that the Preamble 
stand part of the Bill” and there had been no objection; and 
 
3. The House expected members to vote and there could be no objection to a 
member so doing “after he had made himself fully acquainted with the 
evidence” (SC5, 1927, Proceedings: xiv). 
 
Thereafter, the Select Committee debated the amendment to the Preamble and voted 
upon it, with Waterston being the only one against. The Committee then debated and 
voted upon a number of minor but consequential amendments to the Bill. In these 
proceedings, Waterston was consistently in opposition, even to the final vote where 
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Waterston’s attempt to slow the Bill’s progress having failed, “the Chairman reported 
the Bill with amendments and specially the amendments in the Preamble” (SC5, 1927, 
Proceedings: xvi).  
 
THE BILL BEFORE THE HOUSE: MARCH-MAY 1927 
The Select Committee completed its task on 8 March. On 11 March 1927, Reitz 
brought up to the House the amended Bill and Preamble and it was booked to be read a 
second time on 18 March. It only came up on 1 April. 
 
Swart moved to have the Bill read a second time and outlined its history pointing out 
that the Bill would be particularly advantageous for young South Africans who, in the 
past, had had to go overseas to acquire the title of Chartered Accountant. He further 
pointed out that it had not been the Select Committee’s aim to antagonise the Chartered 
Societies in England, Scotland and Wales, and amendments had been made to satisfy 
them. “They are, therefore, not opposing us because they admit that the four Societies 
of the Cape, Natal, Transvaal and the Orange Free State which are mentioned in the Bill 
have the same grade of qualification as they themselves” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 8, 
1/4/1927: 2143). 
 
THE PEARCE AGREEMENT  
Swart then made mention of the fact that the present Select Committee had not heard 
some opponents of the Bill who had previously given evidence before the Select 
Committee of 1924. They had then followed the acceptable parliamentary procedure of 
petitioning the House directly and Mr Pearce, the Labour member for Liesbeek, had 
taken up their cause in a Member’s Bill. He had done something similar in 1925 with 
the Accountants Bill. Such an action could delay or even derail the Designation Bill. 
This had resulted in negotiations and a settlement had been reached, the details of 
which could not be incorporated in the Bill because they had not been covered in the 
Preamble and time was short. A written agreement had been drawn up to the 
satisfaction of Pearce and he had withdrawn his Member’s Bill. In the agreement, the 
Bill’s promoters agreed “to embrace all accountants who [were] qualified in the Union” 
(USA, HA Debates, Vol. 8, 1/4/1927: 2145). Thus, a serious obstacle to the Bill had 
been withdrawn. 
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Pearce then entered the debate and supported the Bill. He pointed out, argumentatively, 
that while the private Bill did not “embody democratic ideas of legislation, the Public 
Bill introduced by [Pearce] embodie[d] the principle that all accountants should have an 
opportunity to qualify” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 8, 1/4/1927: 2145). Despite the fact 
that some considered the agreement to have no status because it was not embodied in 
the Bill, he urged its acceptance as the agreement was binding and the promoters would 
honour it in word and in spirit. Details of the “Pearce Agreement” were as follows. 
 
The Cape Society, acting on behalf of the Four Societies would consider applications 
from two classes of accountants.  
 
Class I: 
Applicants who “by affidavit or otherwise” could show that they were 
(a) “of good character”; 
(b) practicing as professional accountants at the date of application to the Cape Society; 
(c) in such practice continuously in the 10 years immediately prior to their application; 
and 
(d) people whose main business was that of professional public accountants who kept 
offices and placed their services at the disposal of the public in return for fees, “but 
not solely at the disposal of any one individual person, firm, corporation, 
government or public body” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 8, 1/4/1927: 2146). 
 
Class II: 
These were applicants who could satisfy (a) and (b) above but whose period of practice 
within the meaning of (c) had been less than 10 but not less than five years. They would 
need to satisfy the Cape Society that they possessed an adequate practical knowledge of 
accountancy and auditing (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 8, 1/4/1927: 2146). A notable 
exclusion in both classes was prior success in accounting examinations. 
 
Another important aspect of the Agreement was that those ineligible for membership of 
either the Natal or Transvaal Societies in terms of the legislation in force there, could 
apply to the Cape Society under either of the Classes 
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“so long as they are able to show that they are, and have been doing as, 
independent principals in either the Transvaal or Natal provinces the work 
which the professional public accountant, as defined in condition (d) …, has 
been doing in either of the other two provinces” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 8, 
1/4/1927: 2147). 
 
Given the tight control exercised over the profession in Natal and Transvaal, few 
applicants could be expected under this concession. 
 
For both classes, a written application supported by a fee of 5 guineas was needed 
(USA, HA Debates, Vol. 8, 1/4/1927: 2146–7). An Appeal Board was established to 
consider the cases of any rejected applicants and comprised, finally, of a judge of the 
Supreme Court, a nominee of the University of Cape Town and a nominee of the 
promoting Provincial Societies, other than the Cape Society. 
 
The admission period was to be six months from the date the Bill passed and all cases 
were to be decided within nine months of that date. The following is a summary of 
numbers involved. 
 
TABLE 10.3 
THE IMPACT OF PEARCE’S AGREEMENT 
 Class I Class II Total % 
Accepted 
Not accepted 
42 
127 
24 
52 
66 
179 
26.9 
73.1 
Applicants (Total) 169 76 245 100 
Allowed in on appeal 12 17 29 11.8 
Source: Commission, 1934: 8. 
 
In all, 95 (66 + 29) applicants – or 38.8% of the number who applied – were permitted 
registration via this route. While few individuals profited from the Agreement, the 
results of the process need to be considered in context. In 1924, the total number of 
practising accountants in the Union who were members of the Four Societies was 
approximately 554 (SC7, 1924: Q1430). As this number would not have changed 
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significantly in the period 1924–7, roughly 649 (554 + 95) individuals stood to benefit 
from the statutory award of the designation “chartered accountant” in 1927. Of these, 
95 – or 14.6% – originated from a non-Provincial Society source. As a comparison, 
New Zealand approved 2 166 applicants in 1909 (Graham, 1960: 26) while in Australia, 
the membership in 1928 was 688 (Graham, 1978: 134). 
 
Against this figure, Union Statistics for “Type of Ownership – Manufacturing” (1960: 
L2), in the period 1927–8, listed 1 412 registered companies in this sector alone. 
Clearly a shortage of auditors existed. In South Africa, in 1926, the White male 
population stood at 956 918 (Union Statistics, 1960: A3). 
 
In exchange for this final result of the Agreement, the Four Societies had achieved two 
important objectives:  
 
(i) the avoidance of a flood of potentially poorly qualified accountants and auditors 
from the public and private sectors into the kind of profession envisaged by the 
Societies, and, consequently 
 
(ii) the retention in South Africa of the value inherent in the designation “chartered 
accountant”. 
 
In comparison, New Zealand accepted 2 327 applicants into their accounting society 
and admitted 2 116, a take up of 91% out of a population of just under one million in 
1908 (Graham, 1960: 27). In South Africa, the equivalent White population was about 
5.5 million (Union Statistics, 1960: A3). While absolute comparisons are difficult to 
sustain, the data above suggests exceptionally high South African admission criteria 
and unrealistically low standards in New Zealand. The solution was clearly in the 
middle and probably belongs to the Australian Royal Charter of 1928 and the process 
that achieved it. 
 
RESPONSE IN THE HOUSE TO THE AGREEMENT 
The response was mixed. Hay, the Labour member for Pretoria West, supported the 
Agreement as “a very fair compromise” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 8, 1/4/1927: 2148). 
He pointed out that if the Bill did not go through, the chartered accountants from 
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overseas would be the winners “because we would be preserving to them almost a 
monopoly, not a legal monopoly, but still practically a monopoly” (USA, HA Debates, 
Vol. 8, 1/4/1927: 2148). The designation put a registered South African chartered 
accountant on an equality with others and he exhorted his colleagues “in the interests of 
South Africans, in the interests of the very men whose welfare they have at heart, to 
consent to this Bill and to accept the agreement which members of South African 
Societies of our own people are prepared to adopt” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 8, 
1/4/1927: 2148). 
 
Alexander, the SAP member for Cape Town (Hanover Street), pointed out that the Bill 
was going to be passed on the basis of a letter to Pearce. The letter had no legal 
significance to the Bill as it could not bind Parliament. He suggested that the letter 
could also be repudiated by general meetings of the four Provincial Societies but this 
could not happen if the letter was included as part of the enacted legislation. He thought 
it a dangerous precedent, and, as the Agreement had only been made recently, it was 
unknown throughout South Africa. He continued that there had been “intense 
antagonism” between members and non-members of the Societies concerned and “this 
was an arrangement to admit such people” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 9, 1/4/1927: 2151). 
In co-opting those most voluble, their opposition was neutralised. He concluded that the 
letter needed to be incorporated into the Bill, and that if it could not be done 
immediately, the Bill needed to be held over. Mr JP Mostert, National Party member 
for Namaqualand, stated that he could not accept the Agreement as it might be rejected 
by the members of the Societies involved. He also pointed out that local accountants 
doing the work of accountants in cooperative societies in the rural areas would need to 
be replaced by chartered accountants from the urban areas at great expense. 
 
The debate was losing focus. 
 
The Minister of Finance, Mr NC Havenga, entered it and firstly stated there was a 
general consensus of opinion over the Bill’s main principle – the protection of highly 
qualified South Africans who needed to be accorded the same status as certain overseas 
societies. He also referred to the ongoing opposition of those who were excluded by 
legislation in Natal and the Transvaal from membership of these two provincial 
Societies and whose supporters in Parliament wanted “to open the door and allow them 
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to be admitted” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 8, 1/4/1925: 2153) and were thus keen to kill 
the Bill in a show of solidarity. He reasoned that this was wrong as such individuals had 
“everything to gain and nothing to lose by accepting the Bill” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 
8, 1/4/1927: 2153). Killing it would benefit no one. 
 
Secondly, with regard to the Agreement, Havenga pointed out that the House was 
dealing with honourable men who had given an undertaking. If that were not the case, 
the Government would “take action and deal with the matter by legislation afterwards” 
(USA, HA Debates, Vol. 8, 1/4/1927: 2153). As things stood, qualified men had no 
cause for concern as their interests were being protected. He also noted that he could 
understand the promoters’ unwillingness to incorporate the agreement into the Bill as it 
would lower the Societies’ status in the eyes of people overseas. He gave assurance that 
it was also reasonable for these Societies, in both their own and the country’s interest, 
to admit only qualified men with experience, thereby ensuring a high standard, and to 
object to having the door opened to unqualified men. The Minister stated his support 
for the Bill and hoped the House would support it as well. This was a clear statement of 
the Government’s interest in the Bill. 
 
As the debate had ended, the Bill was read a second time. Thereafter, Swart attempted 
moving the House into Committee but when Alexander objected, the Committee stage 
was postponed to 8 April. 
 
THE HOUSE-IN-COMMITTEE 
The House-in-Committee only met on 3 May 1927 to debate Section 1 of the Bill which 
awarded the designation. Alexander repeated his objection to the fact that the Pearce 
Agreement had not been incorporated into the Bill and the fact that a “large number of 
men” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 9, 3/5/1927: 3083), such as public servants and 
accountants practising for less than five years, would still be excluded. His objection 
was noted but not debated. 
 
LANGUAGE ISSUES 
In a response to growing Afrikaner nationalism that must have been obvious in the 
House, Mr Oost, National Party member for Pretoria (North), moved to change the 
word “getjaarterder” (chartered), an Anglicism “and not on the list of words of the 
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South African Academy”, to the better Afrikaans word “geoktrooieerde”. This move 
was clearly intended to enhance an Afrikaner culture in the House. He continued that 
the error arose as a probable result of bills written in English being translated into 
Afrikaans (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 9, 3/5/1927: 3084). 
 
JSF Pretorius, National Party member for Fordsburg, supported Oost in the matter of 
the word. This was also at the time of the Flag Crisis (Davenport, 1987: 289) and 
emotions were running high. 
 
The issue of the flag created an uproar in public opinion when, in 1925, a Bill was 
introduced into Parliament to establish the principle of a distinctly South African flag. 
Intense opposition resulted in consideration of the Bill being postponed until 1927. The 
main point of friction was whether the whole Union Jack should be kept or whether “a 
clean flag” without the Union Jack, or parts of it, should be adopted (Breitenbach et al., 
1974: 356). A committee was called and different designs were suggested, and a 
Government design was put to Parliament but failed to elicit support. In October 1927, 
it seemed the Government would force through its design at a special joint session of 
both Houses. The country was in near chaos with threats of secession in Natal. The 
Governor-General, the Earl of Athlone, called upon the leaders of the Government and 
opposition, Hertzog and Smuts, to compromise. They decided to have two flags, the 
Union Jack and a national flag of three horizontal bars of orange, white and blue with 
small copies, on the white bar, of the Union Jack placed horizontally on the left, the 
Transvaal Republic vierkleur set horizontally on the right with the Orange Free State 
flag positioned vertically in the centre. The Union Jack was to be flown only together 
with the national flag and only on Government buildings or other places as specified by 
the Government (Breitenbach et al., 1974: 356–7). 
 
The national flag was first flown in South Africa on 31 May 1928, the eighteenth 
anniversary of Union, and passions receded. But the matter indicated the strength of 
pro-British sentiment in the Union. 
 
In one of those abrupt changes of direction that characterised debates in the House, 
DM Brown, SAP member for Three Rivers, pointed out that  
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“the word ‘chartered’ applied to engineers and architects and when you get the 
word ‘chartered’ in front of a title it is a designation which means not that he is 
a better man, but that he has had training and carries the hallmark” (USA, HA 
Debates, Vol. 9, 3/5/1927: 3086).  
 
Mr Rood, National Party member for Barberton, and a member of the Select Committee 
that had considered the Designation Bill, supported Oost’s language change and said it 
was a small matter which should not be used to wreck the Bill. He then urged the 
House-in-Committee to think of young South Africans who, when qualified, could 
compete with the best from overseas. He pointed out that the promoting Societies had 
conceded as much as they could and given their word through an Agreement and no 
one had the right to doubt their word. In addition, a board of appeal could consider the 
cases of those who considered they had been wrongly excluded. 
 
Heyns, National Party member for Middelburg, in another change of direction, asked 
why the Government had not introduced the Bill. Rood responded unsatisfactorily by 
stating that anything introduced as a private bill could be as much for the greater good 
of the country as public bills, pointing out that the Designation Bill had not been 
opposed by the Government (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 9, 3/5/1927: 3087). This is a key 
statement as it gives weight to the idea of the Act as a “quick fix” so the Companies 
Act would have a pool of capable auditors to implement its provisions. 
 
Mr Jagger, South African Party member for Cape Town (Central), admitted to being 
astonished “that hon[ourable] members, who claim to be plattelanders, should oppose a 
Bill of this kind because the measure is entirely in favour of young South Africans” 
(USA, HA Debates, Vol. 9, 3/5/1927: 3088). Previously they had needed to go overseas 
to be trained as CAs. He reiterated that the Pearce Agreement opened an avenue for 
them (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 9, 3/5/1927: 3089). 
 
LABOUR’S CONCERNS 
Rayburn, Labour member for Durban (Umbilo), seized the opportunity and brought up 
the plight of public servants whose experience made them better accountants than some 
of those who would benefit under the proposed Bill with the designation “chartered 
accountant”. In so doing, he ignited the last drive by Labour on the issue. 
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Stuttaford, South African Party member for Newlands, pointed out that, in terms of the 
Pearce Agreement, the “Societies [had] given the right to entry to practically every 
deserving case” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 9, 3/5/1927: 3091). He continued that in the 
appeal board established by the Agreement, the Societies were in minority and nothing 
could be fairer. With regard to the case of public servants, they could still be members 
of other societies and use titles such as “incorporated accountant”. Stuttaford pointed 
out that in the United Kingdom few – if any – civil and municipal officials were 
entitled to use the designation of “chartered accountant”. In any case, the kind of 
accountancy practised by civil officials was of a “highly specialised kind” (USA, HA 
Debates, Vol. 9, 3/5/1927: 3092). 
 
Mostert, National Party member for Namaqualand, still had reservations about the fact 
that the Agreement was outside of the Bill. Clearly, many members were concerned 
about the unusual nature of the Agreement, particularly because: 
 
 it stood outside the Bill; and 
 the Speaker had been neither approached for a ruling on the legal acceptability 
of the Agreement, nor (consequently) had any been given. 
 
The Minister of Finance again stated the Bill did not deal with “the admission of certain 
classes in the country. All it does is to remove certain difficulties under which young 
South Africans suffer in comparison with people from overseas” (USA, HA Debates, 
Vol. 9, 3/5/1927: 3093). A member interjected, saying only the uitlanders (i.e. British 
immigrants) would benefit if the Bill was not passed, a potentially inciting remark but 
one which did not draw censure from the Speaker. 
 
Ignoring the remark, Giovanetti, the SAP member for Pretoria (East), stated that the 
designation was the crux of the issue as it “put a ring fence round these people who are 
going to call themselves chartered accountants” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 9, 3/5/1927: 
3094) while public officials – like the chief accountant of the railway who dealt with 
£30 million a year – were excluded. He then moved that the Chairman report progress 
and ask leave to sit again – that is: end the current debate. This was defeated by 52 
votes to 18 whereupon Oost’s language amendment was put to the vote and carried by 
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50 votes to 19. Alexander then called for a vote upon Section 1. Close, SAP member 
for Rondebosch, on a point of order and with a touch of levity, queried whether Mr 
Alexander had, in terms of the rules, risen from his seat when calling for the latter vote. 
The Chairman said “the hon[ourable] member did rise, if only by a couple of inches” 
(USA, HA Debates, Vol. 9, 3/5/1927: 3091). The section was passed by 47 votes to 11 
(USA, HA Debates, Vol. 9, 3/5/1927: 3097). The extent of support for the Bill is 
indicated by the overwhelming vote of 81% in favour of the amended section. What is 
also notable is the fact that the vote was not party driven, the Noes included party die-
hards like Rayburn, JP Mostert and JSF Pretorius, the latter two being members of the 
National Party. Rayburn was, of course, a Labourite and was far from finished as an 
active supporter of the excluded. 
 
The three votes are analysed as follows:  
 
TABLE 10.4 
MOTION TO REPORT PROGRESS AND SIT AGAIN 
 
Ayes – 18 
NP Boshoff, LJ NP Pretorius, JSF 
LP Brown, G SAP Pretorius, NJ 
NP De Villiers, AIE NP Raubenheimer, IVW 
SAP Giovanetti, CW LP Rayburn, G 
SAP Heatlie, CB LP Snow, WJ 
NP Heyns, JD NP Steytler, LJ 
NP Keyter, JG NP Van Heerden, IP 
NP Moll, HH NP Van Zyl, JJM 
Tellers: Alexander, M (SAP), Mostert, JP (NP) 
 
Noes – 52 
LP Allen, J NP * Malan, DF 
SAP Anderson, HEK SAP Marwick, JS 
SAP Ballantine, R SAP Miller, AM 
NP Basson, PN SAP Moffat, L 
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NP Bergh, PA LP Mullineux, J 
NP Brink, GF NP Naudé, AS 
NP Brits, GP NP Naudé, JF 
SAP  Brown, DM SAP Nel, OR 
SAP Buirski, E SAP Nieuwenhuize, J 
NP Cilliers, AA SAP O’Brien, WJ 
SAP Close, RW NP Oost, H 
NP Conradie, DG SAP Payn, AOB 
NP De Villiers, PC LP Pearce, C 
NP De Wet, SD SAP Richards, GR 
NP Du Toit, FJ SAP Rockey, W 
SAP Harris, D NP Rood, WH 
NP * Havenga, NC SAP Sephton, CAA 
LP Hay, GA SAP Smartt, TW 
NP Hugo, D SAP Struben, RH 
SAP Jagger, JW SAP Stuttaford, R 
NP * Kemp, JCG NP Swart, CR 
SAP Lennox, FJ NP Terreblanche, PJ 
NP Le Roux, SP NP Van Broekhuizen, HD 
SAP Louw, JP SAP Van Heerden, GC 
SAP Macintosh, W NP Wessels, JB 
Tellers: Van Zyl, GB (SAP), Vermooten, OS (NP) 
* = Cabinet Minister 
VOTE TALLIES: 
 Ayes % Noes % Total % 
NP = National Party 11 61% 23 44% 34 49% 
LP = Labour Party 3 17% 4 8% 7 10% 
SAP = South African Party 4 22% 25 48% 29 41% 
I = Independents       
 18 100% 52 100% 70 100% 
Source: USA, HA Debates, Vol. 9, 3/5/1927: 3096. 
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TABLE 10.5 
PEARCE MOVED THAT THE QUESTION BE PUT 
 
Ayes – 50 
SAP Anderson, HEK SAP Marwick, JS 
SAP Ballantine, R SAP Miller, AM 
NP Basson, PN SAP Moffat, L 
NP Brits, GP NP Moll, HH 
SAP Brown, DM LP Mullineux, J 
SAP Buirski, E NP Naudé, AS 
NP Cilliers, AA SAP Nel, OR 
SAP Close, RW SAP O’Brien, WJ 
NP Conradie, DG NP Oost, H 
NP Conradie, JH SAP Payn, AOB 
NP De Villiers, PC LP Pearce, C 
NP De Wet, SD SAP Richards, GR 
NP Du Toit, FJ SAP Rockey, W 
SAP Harris, D NP Rood, WH 
NP * Havenga, NC SAP Sephton, CAA 
LP Hay, GA SAP Smartt, TW 
NP Hugo, D SAP Struben, RH 
SAP Jagger, JW SAP Stuttaford, R 
SAP Krige, CJ NP Swart, CR 
SAP Lennox, FJ NP Terreblanche, PJ 
NP Le Roux, SP NP Van Broekhuizen, HD 
SAP Louw, JP SAP Van Heerden, GC 
SAP Macintosh, W NP Van Heerden, IP 
NP * Malan, DF NP Van Zyl, JJM 
Tellers: Van Zyl, GB (SAP), Vermooten, OS (NP) 
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Noes – 19 
LP Allen, J NP Mostert, JP 
LP Barlow, AG SAP Nieuwenhuize, J 
NP Boshoff, LJ NP Pretorius, JSF 
LP Brown, G SAP Pretorius, NJ 
NP De Villiers, AIE NP Raubenheimer, IVW 
SAP Gilson, LD LP Rayburn, G 
SAP Giovanetti, CW LP Snow, WJ 
SAP Heatlie, CB NP Steytler, LJ 
NP Heyns, JD   
Tellers: Alexander, M (SAP), Naudé, JF (NP) 
 
* = Cabinet Minister 
VOTE TALLIES: 
 Ayes % Noes % Total % 
NP = National Party 22 44% 8 42% 30 43% 
LP = Labour Party 3 6% 5 26% 8 12% 
SAP = South African Party 25 50% 6 32% 31 45% 
I = Independents       
 50 100% 19 100% 69 100% 
Source: USA, HA Debates, Vol. 9, 3/5/1927: 3096. 
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TABLE 10.6  
(See above paragraph headed “House-in-Committee”) 
MOTION AMENDED BY OOST’S LANGUAGE ISSUE: 
CLAUSE SUBSEQUENTLY AMENDED: 
ALEXANDER CALLS FOR A DIVISION ON SECTION 1 OF THE ACT 
 
Ayes – 47 
LP Allen, J NP * Malan, DF 
SAP Ballantine, R SAP Miller, AM 
NP Basson, PN SAP Moffat, L 
NP Boshoff, LJ LP Mullineux, J 
NP Brits, GP NP Naudé, AS 
SAP Brown, DM SAP Nel, OR 
SAP Buirski, E SAP Nieuwenhuize, J 
NP Cilliers, AA SAP O’Brien, WJ 
SAP Close, RW NP Oost, H 
NP Conradie, DG LP Pearce, C 
NP Conradie, JH SAP Richards, GR 
NP De Villiers, PC SAP Rockey, W 
NP De Wet, SD NP Rood, WH 
NP Du Toit, FJ SAP Smartt, TW 
SAP Harris, D SAP Struben, RH 
NP * Havenga, NC SAP Stuttaford, R 
LP Hay, GA NP Swart, CR 
NP Hugo, D NP Terreblanche, PJ 
SAP Jagger, JW NP Van Broekhuizen, HD 
SAP Krige, CJ SAP Van Heerden, GC 
SAP Lennox, FJ NP Van Heerden, IP 
SAP Louw, JP NP Van Zyl, JJM 
SAP Macintosh, W   
Tellers: Van Zyl, GB (SAP), Vermooten, OS (NP) 
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Noes – 11 
SAP Giovanetti, CW SAP Pretorius, NJ 
SAP Heatlie, CB NP Raubenheimer, IVW 
NP Heyns, JD LP Rayburn, G 
NP Mostert, JP LP Snow, WJ 
NP Pretorius, JSF   
Tellers: Alexander, M (SAP), De Villiers, AIE (NP) 
 
* = Cabinet Minister 
VOTE TALLIES: 
 Ayes % Noes % Total % 
NP = National Party 21 45% 5 46% 26 45% 
LP = Labour Party 4 8% 2 18% 6 10% 
SAP = South African Party 22 47% 4 36% 26 45% 
I = Independents       
 47 100% 11 100% 58 100% 
Source: USA, HA Debates, Vol. 9, 3/5/1927: 3097. 
 
RAYBURN’S BOMBSHELL 
The debate continued. Rayburn then dropped a bombshell and moved to have included 
in the Bill an amendment to allow competent officials employed by the Government, 
the railways and harbours, and provincial and local authorities to be admitted to one of 
the four Provincial Societies. He pointed out that “this amendment provides that the 
Bill shall not operate until the Minister is satisfied provision has been made by the 
Societies to admit these men” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 9, 3/5/1927: 3097). The effect 
of this proposal would be to nullify the Pearce Agreement as well as all progress to date 
and would appeal to many who were concerned about the legitimacy of the Pearce 
agreement. 
 
Swart queried whether the amendment was in order, seeing it had not been included in 
the Preamble. The Chairman ruled that, according to practice, the Preamble could be 
altered. Rayburn was supported by AIE de Villiers, National Party member for 
Witbank, who produced a letter from the Public Servants Association (SA) and the 
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South African Association of Municipal Employees which stated that the Bill, if 
adopted, would confer powers upon the Four Societies similar to those contained in the 
clauses of the Bills of 1913 and 1924, but cleverly concealed (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 
9, 3/5/1927: 3098). In essence, the civil servants were correct and it was up to the Bill’s 
proponents and supporters to put out the fire before it became a blaze of poor publicity. 
 
The above two Associations further opposed the Bill on the grounds that it created a 
distinction “between those who are members of the Societies promoting the Bill and 
those who are not members, to the detriment of the latter” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 9, 
3/5/1927: 3099). This was particularly true of public servants who had no way of 
meeting the requirements, as to practical experience, without incurring great costs. The 
authors of the letter pointed out that the objects of the designation were not defined and, 
should the Bill pass, a consolidated constitution and rules would be needed to govern 
the designation. They stated, 
 
“the Transvaal Society of Accountants has in the main been responsible for the 
promotion of the private Bills submitted to Parliament; in 1913 and 1924 they 
refused to consider any compromise allowing an applicant to write the final 
examination without previously serving a period with a practising accountant, 
and it is logical to assume that the policy of the Transvaal Society is the more 
likely to be the policy of the consolidated body with the proposed designation of 
CA(SA)” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 9, 3/5/1927: 3099). 
 
Taking up the opportunity to air another longstanding issue, the letter stated that young 
men who had taken their Bachelor of Commerce degree and who, as a result, “would 
have had to pass a much higher test of efficiency in accountancy than [was] required for 
[early] members of the promoting societies” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 9, 3/5/1927: 
3101) were still denied entry to these Societies because they had not completed articles. 
They were thus unable to sit for the final examination. As a result, their chances of 
promotion were limited. These young men could be found in the large commercial 
houses, the banks, the Public Service and local government. The letter recommended 
that such people be allowed to sit for examination, ideally without serving articles. 
They nevertheless agreed that a period of service was necessary and that such period 
should be not less than five years. In essence, Rayburn had made a tactical blunder in 
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putting so many issues forward at once; the system was geared to making one decision 
at a time and in a specific order. 
 
J Allen, Labour member for Springs, supported some of the points made in the letter 
and lamented the fact that the public servants had not been given the opportunity to 
give evidence to the Select Committee. But he stated that those who had adopted the 
Public Service as a career “have no right and they cannot expect that they should be 
able to come out on a pension and compete with those who have built up their own 
business” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 9, 3/5/1927: 3102). He was, however, concerned 
with municipal servants whose security of tenure was not as certain as that of public 
servants due to the fact that they served at the pleasure of their councils. For the sake of 
these people, he supported Rayburn’s amendment. 
 
Alexander also expressed support for the amendment, pointing out that the Auditor-
General was similarly excluded. He pointed out that, in South Africa, there was no 
single qualifying examination for a South African Chartered Accountant but that 
everyone who fell within the ambit of the Bill would be given the new designation of 
“Chartered Accountant”. He did not object to the title being conferred upon those who 
had shown a high degree of competency but this should include the public servants. 
 
Mostert stated that the amendment needed to be studied and moved that the Chair 
should report progress. This motion was defeated by 34 votes to 10. The House was 
then asked if it wished to consider Rayburn’s amendment and this was agreed to by 36 
votes to 10. Upon considering the amendment, on 4 May, the Chair ruled that as fewer 
than 10 members supported the vote on the amendment, it was negatived. The list of 
Noes for this final vote and their party affiliation is instructive:  
 
Alexander, M – South African Party 
Allen, J – Labour 
De Villiers, AIE – National Party 
Giovanetti CW– South African Party 
Heyns, JD – National Party 
Pretorius, JSF – National Party 
Mostert, JP – National Party 
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Rayburn, G – Labour 
Snow, WJ – Labour 
 
The party break-down was as follows:  
 
Labour   3 
National Party  4 
SAP   2 
TOTAL:  9 
 
NJ Pretorius did not vote at this last hurdle (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 9, 4/5/1927: 
3105). 
 
Out of a potential total of 135 (Davenport, 1987: 586) members in the House of 
Assembly, only nine supported Rayburn’s amendment and seven of these belonged to 
the Labour-National Party Pact. As these members were voting their conscience, this 
supports a premise that the Government, if not actively supporting the Bill, at least was 
not opposed to it. A respected and stable accounting profession would do much to 
underpin a successful process of industrialisation. 
 
The House resumed (i.e. came out of Committee) and the Bill with amendments was 
reported. Swart moved that the amendments be considered then but, as AIE De Villiers 
objected, consideration was adjourned until 6 May. 
 
THE HOUSE RECONVENES: RAYBURN’S AMENDMENT AGAIN 
The House reconvened on 6 May 1927 to consider the Chartered Accountants’ 
Designation (Private) Bill, as amended by the Committee-of-the-Whole-House. 
Rayburn again moved the amendment which had been negatived in Committee on 3 
May. His reason was that members had been tired and hungry when the amendment 
was proposed. Close responded with a witty “we were fed up” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 
9, 6/5/1927: 3255) to which Rayburn replied: “we are often fed up with the 
hon[ourable] member for Rondebosch [Mr Close] as are many members in the Public 
Service who are perfectly competent to be members of the Society of Accountants” 
(USA, HA Debates, Vol. 9, 6/5/1927: 3255). 
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On 6 May, Rayburn hit upon one of the less obvious motivating factors that lay behind 
the struggle of the civil and municipal officials to be included under the auspices of the 
Bill. He stated:  
 
“public servants feel that they have the right to be considered up with their own 
colleagues in their own field otherwise they will be regarded as belonging to a 
lower class. I have been in both public and municipal service and the men in 
these services resent anything which marks them off as being inferior to men 
doing similar work in private employment. Town councils are likely to be 
imbued with the idea the only men who can fit positions are men with the 
designation of Chartered Accountants” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 9, 6/5/1927: 32 
55). 
 
Clearly, the idea of class was an element in the process, with those excluded from the 
ambit of the Bill believing their exclusion, in part, originated from a perception of their 
“place” in society. The taut, and sometimes acerbic, interplay in the House between 
Close and members of the Labour Party, particular Rayburn, has its possible origins in 
this sense of class. 
 
WATERSTON’S SUMMATION OF THE ISSUES 
The Labour member for Brakpan, Waterston, entered the debate and summarised it to 
date, noting the promoters had tried in 1924 to pass a Bill which had met stubborn 
opposition. To prevent this from happening again, an agreement had been reached 
which, while not included in the Designation Bill, had the force of an Act of 
Parliament. The agreement had been one of compromise. Previously the promoters had 
wanted initially to accept men who had been in practice for 10 years and were not older 
than 50 years. The period in practice was later reduced to five years and the age limit 
removed. With regard to municipal employees, Waterston pointed out that when he had 
met recently with civil and municipal representations, he had informed them he had 
been in favour originally of including town clerks in the process. But the municipal 
employees wanted every man in their accountancy departments to have the right to 
become a chartered accountant by completing 10 years’ acceptable service and passing 
a final examination. 
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The counter argument was that civil and municipal employees had made their career 
decision and no injustice had been done to them. But if the door was to be opened to 
civil and municipal servants then it needed to be open to “every man engaged in a[n] 
[accounting] clerical capacity throughout the length and breadth of South Africa” 
(USA, HA Debates, Vol. 9, 6/5/1927: 3257). The best way to handle this situation 
would be to introduce a new Bill at a subsequent session of Parliament. Waterston 
believed that the House was at the parting of the ways. If the Bill passed, young South 
Africans could qualify in their homeland. But if the designation was “too cheap, then it 
will not be worth the paper it is written on” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 9, 6/5/1927: 3258) 
as the community would rate it low in comparison with the English and Scottish 
qualifications. In this case, it would be better to scrap the Designation Bill. In making 
these comments, Waterston showed a level of understanding far from that evidenced by 
his party colleague, Rayburn. Again, his careful analysis supports the premise that the 
Bill was debated on lines of conscience and not party. 
 
ALEXANDER’S ISSUES 
Alexander picked up the debate and moved, as a further amendment, to include all 
“competent accountants in actual bona fide practice at the date of commencement of 
this Act” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 9, 6/5/1927: 3258). He stated that he supported 
Rayburn’s amendment, but wanted to add “a further class of person”. He was still 
concerned about the Pearce Agreement not being part of the Bill as well as those whom 
it excluded, these being accountants with less than five years of practice. In response to 
a query from the floor as to where the line was to be drawn, Alexander declared “at 
competency” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 9, 6/5/1927: 3259). He also objected to the fact 
that other accounting societies had no representation on the Appeal Board and queried 
whether a period of articles and an examination would similarly apply to “overseas 
men” who made application for membership of one of the promoting Societies. He 
believed if the above did not apply, then the argument of protecting South Africans 
from “overseas men” made no sense. He also believed that a grading scheme could 
meet many of the objections, the grades being: five years’ experience for an associate, 
10 years for a fellow, and a fellowship for the award of the designation chartered 
accountant. Anyone bona fide in practice at the commencement of the Act would be 
entitled to register, but would not have the title until they had the necessary experience 
(USA, HA Debates, Vol. 9, 6/5/1927: 3260). Alexander concluded that in the past with 
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similar, new legislation, the principle in the House had been to protect the men 
practising at the time. 
 
Alexander’s stance was supported by JSF Pretorius who believed that while certain 
people were protected, others were sacrificed. He pointed out that commercial entities 
like banks might in future require a chartered accountant to sign off on municipal 
accounts presented to the bank. This could mean possible dismissal for unqualified 
municipal officials. For example, he queried the fate of unqualified accountants in 
small towns who presently audited the books for rural businesses. The businesses 
would also incur extra expense in obtaining the services of urban based, qualified 
accountants (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 9, 6/5/1927: 3261). 
 
The debate was again losing focus. 
 
The Minister of Finance intervened at this point and stated that while the House had 
already accepted the principles of a designation bill, members were proposing 
amendments which would allow other classes of people to be admitted. While this was 
laudable, the House needed to make provision in another way as the Pearce Agreement 
established a finite method of operation. 
 
WJ Snow, Labour member for Salt River, declared his support for the amendment and 
pointed out that public accountants would, by accident almost, acquire through the Bill 
something their equals and betters in municipal and Civil Service were denied. Should 
municipal accountants then advertise for posts to be filled by chartered accountants, 
those in service already would be passed over. This would make for “a close preserve 
and exclude a man who has the same merits, but who, by accident, has not worked for 
outside firms” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 9, 6/5/1927: 3263). He also pointed out that 
English Chartered Accountants were admitted as full members in the South African 
Societies without having qualified in the Union as was required of young South 
Africans. 
 
VOTING RAYBURN’S AMENDMENT 
While Alexander’s amendment was agreed to, Rayburn’s was defeated by a vote of 57 
to 24. The nine members who had previously supported the amendment defeated on 4 
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May did so again. A number of prominent figures appeared in the final debates over the 
Designation Bill of 1927. They were:  
 
 
Kentridge, M – Labour 
Madeley, W – Labour and also Minister of Posts and Public Works 
Sephton, CAA – South African Party 
Strachan, TG – Labour 
 
Amongst those opposing the amendment were five cabinet ministers – Havenga 
(Finance), Kemp (Agriculture), CW Malan (Railways and Harbours), DF Malan 
(Interior Education and Public Health) and Roos (Justice). Other notables in opposition 
included Close, Barlow (the Labour member for Bloemfontein North), Pearce, Deneys 
Reitz (SAP Member for Bloemfontein South), Dr Hjalmar Reitz (National Party 
member for the North East Rand) and Waterston. 
 
Thereafter, Oost’s “geoktrooieerde” was approved as was a consequent change to the 
Preamble. When Swart moved for the Bill to be read a third time, De Villiers’ objection 
deferred it to 13 May (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 9, 6/5/1927: 3265). 
 
THE THIRD READING – AND A PERSONAL ATTACK 
On that Friday, the House did indeed meet and Swart, National Party member for 
Ladybrand, moved for the Bill to be read a third time. JSF Pretorius, National Party 
member for Fordsburg, moved a minor amendment to replace “now” with the phrase 
“this day six months” in the Bill’s Preamble, possibly to delay its effective 
implementation, and again stated that in his opinion, the Bill was unfair. With 
unconscious irony, he said similar Bills had been put by Close to Parliament when the 
South African Party was in office without success but it was apparent the Nationalist 
Party would now allow this Bill to be passed (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 9, 13/5/1927: 
3571). What Pretorius failed to understand was the link between the successful 
industrialisation being pursued by Hertzog, a competent accounting profession, and the 
new Companies Act. Mostert, National Party member for Namaqualand, seconded the 
amendment but again opposed the idea of an agreement outside of the Bill. In a thinly 
veiled reference to Swart, he then stated: 
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“one can expect nothing else from the hon[ourable] member who introduced the 
Bill. He is a townsman and a lawyer and not in sympathy with the countryside 
and his constituents who sent him here. He may be in touch with a few 
accountants, but not with his constituents. He does not go on the principle that 
he must serve his constituents because he does as he pleases when once they 
have sent him here” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 9, 13/5/1927: 3571). 
 
The Speaker rebuked him for his personal attacks, for which Mostert duly apologised 
but again stated the Pearce Agreement needed to be incorporated in the Bill. 
 
DM Brown, South African Party member for Three Rivers, took umbrage at Mostert’s 
attack upon the Bill’s introducer – CR Swart, National Party member for Ladybrand, 
stating, 
 
“this system of attacking a man personally because you disagree with him is one 
Parliament wants to be above. The hon[ourable] member has mistaken his place 
and should be in the village pub to make such an attack. No doubt the 
hon[ourable] member thinks he is honest, but there are different standards of 
honesty. There is such a thing as honesty even in politicians and the 
hon[ourable] member who introduced the Bill belongs to that group. The 
hon[ourable] member who attacked him belongs to the other group” (USA, HA 
Debates, Vol. 9, 13/5/1927: 3572). 
 
CONCLUSION 
AIE de Villiers, National Party member for Witbank, raised a hoary chestnut again and 
reiterated his opposition to an agreement outside of the Bill. He got no further as Swart 
then indicated the conclusion of the session by thanking the Bill’s supporters in the 
House as well as the Minister of Finance and summarised the key points of the debate. 
He regretted that time had prevented him from “a chance of removing many of the 
misrepresentations in connection with this matter” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 9, 
13/5/1927: 3573) and while he noted Mostert’s comments, he considered it beneath him 
to answer. With regard to the Pearce Agreement, he stated that it was too late to include 
it into the Bill, but that this was undesirable “because it would lower the status of our 
Chartered Accountants as against those of other countries and would create the 
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impression that we had not yet advanced so far as they thought” (USA, Debates, Vol. 9, 
13/5/1927: 3574). As to the Agreement itself, the Minister of Finance had assured the 
House that the Government would ensure it was met, but noted that the promoters were 
“men of honour”. With regard to including public and municipal employees, he pointed 
out that the Agreement only made “provision for persons who make accountants’ work 
their life’s work and whose profession it is today”. He asked why special provision was 
needed for public servants, pointing out that to do so would mean ultimate entry of 
others from insurance and large business houses. These kinds of accountants and retired 
public servants could continue in their jobs under any title except the one protected by 
the Bill. 
 
As to criticism that the Bill created barriers, Swart believed this was not so as it 
provided for qualified men to assume a designation just as a Bachelor of Arts graduate 
was entitled to the designation BA. The passage of the Bill would give young South 
Africans the chance to obtain the highest accounting qualification in the country 
without the need and expense of acquiring it overseas. Such people would “fully 
appreciate that they had been given the right over against [sic] foreigners which they 
did not have before” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 9, 13/5/1927: 3575). 
 
In a display of using the rules to sidestep an inconveniently proposed amendment, the 
question was then put that the word “now” proposed to be omitted by Pretorius at the 
beginning of the session stand part of the motion to read the Bill a third time. As there 
were less than 10 votes against this motion, the Speaker declared the question affirmed 
and JSF Pretorius’ amendment was dropped. The members who opposed the motion 
were the “usual suspects” of AIE de Villiers, Giovanetti, Heyns, Mostert and JSF 
Pretorius. The motion to read the Bill a third time was put and agreed to, and the Bill 
was subsequently read. 
 
Thereafter it was referred to the Senate for consideration where the major change was 
to strengthen the wording around the illegality of the unauthorised use of the 
designation (SSA Debates, 4/1927: 27/5/1927: 374–5). 
 
The speed with which the Bill was finalised is noteworthy. The House concluded the 
third reading on 13 May 1927, the Senate its deliberations on 20 May. The House 
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considered and agreed to the Senate’s amendment on 31 May. The Governor-General, 
on behalf of the King, assented to the Bill on 8 June 1927. As the Bill had first been 
presented to the House on 1 February, the whole process had taken just over four 
months. This is in strong contrast to the prolonged and ultimately unsuccessful 
consideration of the 1924 Accountants Bill. 
 
It is also an indication of how important the Bill was and how quickly it needed to be 
put into effect. Admittedly, it was a short Act – less than three pages long – but it 
encompassed issues of commercial power, professionalism, fairness and determination. 
All these issues – to some degree – were inherited by the Four Societies, together with 
the power to award of the designation “CA(SA)”. 
 
The following observation hits the bull’s-eye:  
 
“Once our Bill bears the signature of His Majesty the King (through the medium 
of His Excellency the Governor General) our title to the designation ‘Chartered’ 
is inferior to none” (SAAHC, TSA, Minutes of Special General Meeting, 16 
June 1926: 334–7, Minute Numbers 4–8). 
 
In terms of North’s theory of institutional economics, Parliament had granted an 
enforceable property right which could be “self-enforcing when it pays parties [to it] to 
live up to them – that is: in terms of the costliness of measuring and enforcing 
agreements, the benefits of living up to contracts will exceed the cost [of not doing so]” 
(North, 1990: 54–5). 
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CHAPTER 11: BECALMED: THE ACCOUNTANCY COMMISSION OF 1934 
 
 
SOUTH AFRICA: 1929–34 
After the successful passage of the Designation Act in 1927, the stir created by the 
South African accountancy profession abated as the world slipped into the Depression 
of 1929–34. 
 
In South Africa as elsewhere, people sought to survive as best they could. For the Four 
Societies, who had scored a significant commercial coup with the Designation Bill, the 
setback was significant. While it is impossible to quantify their loss of business, the 
data per the new company graph prepared by the Registrar of Companies in 1948 for 
the Millin Commission on Company Law Amendment (UG69, 1948) gives some idea, 
given that all companies needed to be audited and the fewer the companies, the fewer 
the audits. 
 
TABLE 11.1 
REGISTRATION OF COMPANIES AND THEIR CAPITAL, 1927–34 
 
Year Approximate number of 
companies registered 
per year 
Approximate capital 
registered per company 
Rands (in millions) 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
500 
700 
900 
600 
700 
450 
700 
1 000 
13 
17 
17 
14 
15 
9 
12 
29 
 Source: Millin Commission, 1947–8. 
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The Commission’s Report neglected to provide critical information of the number of 
companies deregistered or abandoned in the period 1927–34. Had this information been 
available, it would have been possible to calculate the net number of companies on the 
companies’ register. The nadir was reached in 1932, with 1934 signalling a strong 
recovery and, with it, the advent of an Accountancy Commission and a new political 
dispensation. 
 
1929 
The 1929 election saw the National Party win 78 out of the available 148 seats, 15 more 
than previously, thus securing an outright majority. The SAP gained an increase of 
eight seats to give a total of 61 in Parliament. The Labour Party’s results reflected its 
divided nature. The Creswellite faction won five seats compared to its National Council 
rival’s total of three. The Independents acquired their now almost customary one seat 
(Davenport and Saunders, 2000: 312, 710). 
 
While the Nationalists had a majority in the House of Assembly, Hertzog nevertheless 
appointed two Creswell-Labourites to his new cabinet – Creswell to the Defence and 
Labour portfolios, and HW Sampson to Posts and Telegraphs, thereby securing their 
support. Hayes, Waterston and Rayburn were not returned. The year 1929 was also the 
first since the enactment of the Senate Act in 1926 in which Hertzog could rely on the 
support of the Senate (Breitenbach et al., 1974: 363). 
 
The collapse of Wall Street in New York, one of the most important financial markets 
in the world, saw the start of the global Great Depression of 1929–34 and hard times for 
millions throughout the world. The value of diamond exports from South Africa fell 
from £16.5 million in 1928 to £1.4 million in 1934 and while wool exports remained 
consistent in terms of weight, its price fell from 17 pence per unit of weight in 1927–8 
to 4 pence in 1931–2. The devaluation of their currencies by Britain and Australia 
meant the unadjusted South African currency was nearly double its Australian 
equivalent. This situation made it impossible for South African wool growers to 
compete internationally (Davenport and Saunders, 2000: 317) and companies went 
bankrupt. The unemployment rate increased quickly and, in addition, drought ravaged 
the rural areas of South Africa. Supported by many economists, the Minister of 
Finance, NC Havenga, refused to follow the British lead in September 1931 to leave the 
 372 
 
gold standard but 25 other nations did. As AB Lumby (1983: 209) points out, South 
Africa was the world’s greatest gold producer. It was natural for the Government “to 
resist [a] depreciation in terms of gold”. 
 
Hobart Houghton argued that gold and diamonds together “brought about an economic 
revolution in the sub continent” (1976: 11) which was ongoing. Certainly, an analysis 
of the working profit per pound sterling (£) per ton of ore milled shows a figure of 0.89 
per cent in the period of 1933–4 – the darkest days of the Depression compared to 0.71 
per cent in the period 1935–9 (Feinstein, 2007: 106). Working costs changed as a result 
of mine management’s attempts to reduce costs, especially wages, while revenue 
shifted in response to international demand. As Feinstein concluded (2005: 106), the 
market for gold was unlimited. Despite plunging gold prices, South Africa had a hedge. 
Everything mined could be sold, providing the mines operated efficiently and hence 
profitably. This meant costs had to be rigorously contained and in the process the 
industry became increasingly skilled and expensive in mining gold from great depths 
and extracting it from low grade ore. 
 
In internal politics, two points are important. The first is that in 1930 all White women, 
who were South African citizens over the age of 21, were given the vote, while White 
men in the Cape and Natal, who previously did not have the vote due to poor financial 
and educational standards, were enfranchised in 1931. This increased the number of 
White voters (Breitenbach et al., 1974: 363) while reducing the value of the Black vote 
in the Cape (Davenport and Saunders, 2000: 319). Whether the new voters would 
support the SAP or the Nationalists was a moot point. 
 
The second point is that while it was Government policy to improve the circumstances 
of Poor Whites, it took little notice of the impact of the Great Depression upon other 
races. There was little understanding of the extent to which Blacks had become 
integrated into South Africa’s rapidly industrialised economy (as previously discussed 
in Chapter 10). The prevailing wisdom of the day was that if they lost their urban 
employment, Blacks could return to their rural homes and a subsistence economy 
(Wilson, Thompson et al., 1971: 32). 
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The effect of the Depression upon employment in South Africa is illustrated by the 
comparatives in the following table. All line items are negative except for 
establishments and White workers, both of which show an increase. 
 
TABLE 11.2 
COMPARISON OF EMPLOYMENT FIGURES, 1929–33 
 
 1929–30 1932–3 Change: 1930–3 
Number of establishments 
Number of workers:  
   All races (thousands) 
   Whites only (thousands) 
   Others (thousands) 
Value of gross output (R millions) 
Value of net output (R millions) 
6 472 
 
142 
55 
87 
157 
68 
6 543 
 
133 
57 
76 
135 
61 
+1% 
 
−6% 
+4% 
−12% 
−14% 
−10% 
Source: Hobart Houghton, 1976: 125. 
 
The increase in White employment during this period was the result of the 
Government’s policy of replacing Black with White labour and thereafter keeping the 
manufacturing sector as a White monopoly. This is illustrated in the following table:  
 
TABLE 11.3 
SA RAILWAYS AND HARBOURS: 1924–34: EMPLOYMENT FIGURES 
 
Year White Non-White [sic] 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
39 024 
47 224 
52 249 
54 579 
56 833 
58 562 
58 306 
55 164 
52 930 
49 665 
50 775 
47 157 
45 148 
44 965 
40 177 
37 939 
41 533 
42 245 
39 635 
33 357 
27 988 
30 399 
Source: Union Statistics, 1960: G15. 
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The above table shows the effect of Pact’s Labour policy until 1929; thereafter the 
Depression takes its toll. 
 
In the period 1924–9, White jobs with SA Railways and Harbours increased by 49.9%,1 
in the same period non-Whites’ jobs decreased by 11.9%,2 suggesting that non-Whites 
not only lost jobs but additional jobs were also created for whites. This conclusion 
should be tempered by an investigation of the non-White employment figures for 1929 
and 1930 which show a temporary increase rather than a decrease. An analysis of 
1929–34 shows a slowdown to 86% of filled posts for Whites (100% = 1929) and 73% 
for non-Whites (100% = 1929). This suggests that non-Whites bore the brunt of South 
Africa’s joblessness. 
 
RECOVERY 
The South African Government was unable to solve the country’s economic problems 
as long as it remained linked to the gold standard and others did not. A number of 
initiatives to solve these problems – such as currency exchange controls, increased 
taxation, retrenchment in the Public Service and concessions won by Havenga for 
South African goods in Commonwealth markets at an Imperial Economic Conference 
in 1932 – were unsuccessful. Then two things happened: Strauss of the SAP won a by-
election in a safe Government seat in Germiston; and Hertzog’s former Justice 
Minister, Tielman Roos, publically called for the abandonment of the gold standard and 
a new Government. Early 1932 saw the nadir with Union revenue collections bottoming 
out at R55.5 million against a 1929 high of R61 million (Coleman et al., 1983: 211). 
The timing of these events was bad for the Nationalists. Hertzog had finally to accept 
the removal of South Africa from the gold standard in December 1932. In so doing, he 
lost a large part of the National Party’s conservative rural support (Davenport and 
                                                          
1 
 
58 512 − 39 024
39 024
= 49.9% 
 
 
2 
 
41 533 − 47 157
47 157
= −11.9% 
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Saunders, 2000: 318–9) but the Union experienced noticeable improvement in its 
economic situation. 
 
The devaluation of the South African currency led to a boom period for the gold mines. 
The recovery of the gold mining industry had a knock-on effect in the manufacturing 
industry. As Hobart Houghton has pointed out (1976: 125), between 1932 and 1939 
gross and net economic outputs more than doubled and employment increased by 77% 
as indicated by the following table:  
 
TABLE 11.4 
COMPARISON OF EMPLOYMENT FIGURES, 1932–9 
 
 1932–3 1938–9 Change 
Number of establishments 
Number of workers:  
 All races (thousands) 
 Whites only (thousands) 
 Others (thousands) 
Value of gross output (R 
millions) 
Value of net output (R millions) 
6 453 
 
133 
57 
76 
135 
 
61 
8 614 
 
236 
93 
143 
281 
 
128 
+32% 
 
+77% 
+63% 
+88% 
+108% 
 
+110% 
Source: Hobart Houghton, 1976: 125. 
 
However, AB Lumby (1983: 219) points out that industrial development was dependent 
on gold mining and that in the 1930s, South Africa remained reliant on “a narrowly 
based economy”. 
 
O’Meara (1983: 40–8) has detailed Roos’ significant impact on breaking the economic 
logjam and Hertzog’s independent power, ultimately transforming Afrikaner 
Nationalism to one based on capital, ideology and legalised exploitation – that is: 
volkskapitalisme. 
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Frankel’s 1944 analysis of the growth in income in the Union in the period 1932–9 led 
to much the same conclusion, except he concentrated on the “operation of international 
trade” and its stimulus to capital investment in the mines financed by both domestic 
savings, created by the recovery, and foreign capital. This situation was clearly 
sensitive to fluctuation of the price of gold (Quoted in Horwitz, 1967: 238–40). 
 
THE POLITICAL SITUATION 
In the political arena, Roos and Smuts as “outs” tried to find a mutual political 
understanding but failed to do so. Hertzog knew an election was due by 1934, and 
realised the Depression had reduced his support internally, but externally was another 
matter. The enactment of the Statute of Westminster in the British Parliament, 
formalising the Balfour Declaration was a success for Hertzog and emphasised the idea 
that Britain was not the Afrikaner enemy as in the past (Davenport and Saunders, 2000: 
319–20).  
 
The idea of a political unification or “hereniging” of the Afrikaner, apart since 1912 
when Hertzog broke away from Botha and Smuts’ South African Party (SAP) to form 
his National Party (NP), became popular at this time. Where Roos failed, Hertzog 
succeeded. The coalition between Hertzog’s NP and Smuts’ SAP contributed towards a 
resolution of the Great Depression crisis in South Africa. Coalition was endorsed in the 
election of 1933 by a huge majority (Breitenbach et al., 1974: 367). Coalition thereafter 
led to the Fusion of the NP and the SAP to form the “United South African National 
Party”, commonly called the “United Party”, with Hertzog as Prime Minister and Smuts 
as his Deputy. In this way, political unification of moderate Afrikaners had been 
achieved by the end of 1934. The extreme Afrikaner nationalists supported Malan’s 
breakaway earlier that year to form the Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party or Purified 
National Party (Breitenbach et al., 1974: 368).  
 
As the British Parliament could repeal any of its acts, Hertzog guided the Status Act 
and the Royal Executive Functions and Seals Act through the South African Parliament 
in 1934. The former acknowledged the legality of the Statute of Westminster in South 
Africa but recognised the Union Parliament as the only sovereign legislative authority 
in and over South Africa – British legislation would only be valid in South Africa if 
passed by the Union Parliament. The latter Act vested executive power in South Africa 
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in the King, acting on the advice of his South African Ministers, or in his 
representative, the Governor-General (Breitenbach et al., 1974: 354; and Davenport, 
1987: 289). 
 
The growth of South Africa’s autonomous position had been acknowledged informally 
before 1934 by events such as the establishment of a branch of the Royal Mint in 
Pretoria in 1923 while, in 1929, the Union appointed its first ambassadors: to Rome, 
Washington and The Hague (Breitenbach et al., 1974: 355). 
 
As a result of the growth of the opposition, in February 1933 Hertzog announced a 
coalition between the SAP and the Hertzog Nationalists. In essence, Smuts would serve 
under Hertzog, the cabinet would comprise six members of each party and their 
cooperation would be directed by a “plan” dealing with key issues, such as the unitary 
nature of the constitution, bilingualism, a White labour policy, the “native problem” 
and a sound economic policy (Davenport and Saunders, 2000: 320). 
 
THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 1933 AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE UNITED 
PARTY 
In May 1933, the coalition was tested in an early General Election and was returned 
with 136 seats (61 SAP and 75 National Party) out of a total of 150. There were an 
uncharacteristic 10 Independent seats – indicating a degree of uncertainty in the 
electorate – as well as four Labour-National Council members (Davenport and 
Saunders, 2000: 710). Smuts became the Minister of Justice and Deputy Prime 
Minister. Hertzog resumed the post of Prime Minister and took the foreign affairs 
portfolio while NC Havenga returned to Finance and was instrumental in the 
appointment of the Accountancy Commission of 1934. There was an increase in the 
popularity of the two parties and in June 1934 several local branches of two parties in 
the Transvaal merged of their own accord (Breitenbach et al., 1974: 368). But when the 
National Party’s federal council approved Fusion with the SAPS in October of that 
year, the influential DF Malan indicated his mistrust of Smuts. 
 
Malan was a former minister of religion and former member of the Pact Cabinet of 
1924 where he was Minister of the Interior. He was also the Cape leader of the National 
Party. As a result many Cape Nationalists, with others from the Transvaal and Orange 
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Free State, split from Hertzog’s Nationalists – 19 MPs, in all – to establish the 
Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party (Purified National Party).  
 
As with the Nationalists, so too with some English speakers in the SAP. They rejected 
the Fusion of the two parties as they did not trust Hertzog and left to join a group of 
Natal separatists to form the British Dominion Party. But neither split could prevent the 
inevitable and in December 1934 the National and South African Parties fused to 
become the United Party (as mentioned above) (Breitenbach et al., 1974: 368). 
 
It was in this climate of growing political maturity and economic recovery that the four 
South African Societies met with delegates of the South African branches of the 
Incorporated Society in Cape Town in 1932. In a step which represented another along 
the path of unification of the profession in South Africa, the Incorporated Society – the 
persistent opponents of the Four Societies – agreed that it would no longer set separate 
examinations for its members but would accept, as appropriate, examinations set by the 
Societies’ General Examining Board. In addition, the Incorporated Society agreed not 
to register articled clerks independently of the four South African Societies (Lockley, 
2001: 5–6). 
 
FORMATION OF THE ACCOUNTING COMMISSION 
With the economy on the road to recovery and political stability assured by the move to 
fuse the two strongest parties in Parliament, Havenga, the Minister of Finance, put in 
motion the formation of a Commission to determine the advisability of unifying the 
accountancy profession under a single representative body which would control the 
profession and maintain a register of its members. The Commission was constituted by 
the Governor-General on 23 October 1934, formally commissioned on 2 November 
1934 and commenced its investigations on 5 November 1934. The formal, final Fusion 
of the South African and National Parties occurred on 5 December 1934 (Breitenbach 
et al., 1974: 368). The Commission comprised four Commissioners in addition to the 
chairman: 
Advocate Roberts, Chairman; 
Messrs Anderson and Du Toit; 
Professor Harold Galbraith; and 
PV Pocock, a United Party member of Parliament for Pretoria (Central).  
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Pocock would later attempt to introduce an Accountancy Bill into Parliament in 1938 
after the Commission’s recommendations came to naught. Not much information is 
available about Pocock. The South African Who’s Who for 1936 merely described him 
as the [SAP] “MP representing Pretoria Central”. The Who’s Who of 1951 gives a fuller 
sketch of Professor HG Galbraith. A Scottish CA and a CA(SA) as a result of his 
membership in, and presidency (1931–7) of, the Cape Society of Accountants and 
Auditors, Galbraith had been a Professor of Accounting at the University of Cape Town 
(1921–36) and a partner in the firm of Douglas, MacKelvic, Galbraith and Co. He was 
thus influential in the profession, with links to academe.  
 
The creation of the Commission in late 1934 was the second time in that year that the 
issue of the accountancy profession had been considered by Parliament. At the 
beginning of 1934, Dr Hjalmar Reitz had introduced an inconsequential Private 
Member’s Bill into the 1934 Parliamentary Session but it failed at its first reading. The 
origins of this Bill are vague but it is interesting in that it anticipated the appointment of 
the Commission and what it meant. (UG49, 1935: 8). The Designation Act of 1927 had 
been a “quick fix” by the Nationalist Government in anticipation of the industrial 
expansion it planned. The 1934 idea of registering the members of the accounting 
profession in terms of an Act of Parliament – as with the doctors, architects and 
pharmacists – had been shelved, not abandoned. With the return to prosperity and a 
new United Party Government in 1934, the accountants came under the spotlight. The 
timing of the Commission is interesting: political Fusion occurred in December 1934 
and the Commission was constituted a month earlier in November. Having probably 
anticipated a political Fusion, Havenga wanted the Commission up and functioning 
before it could become an inevitable focus of renewed controversy. 
 
THE FUNCTIONS AND FUNCTIONING OF THE COMMISSION 
The Commission functioned in much the same way as a select committee. Its terms of 
reference were, however, wider and not constrained to a particular Bill or its contents. 
Its purpose was to deal with general principles underpinning some public activity, 
which, if shown to be advisable and necessary to the public good, would then lead to a 
consideration as how the principles should be implemented in practical terms. As its 
terms of reference were broad, “the profession of accountancy” (UG49, 1935) being 
interpreted in the widest sense, representations were made to it from a wide range of 
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sources. To achieve this coverage, the Commission placed advertisements in 
newspapers throughout the Union, informing the public of its terms of reference and 
calling for written evidence which individuals wished to place before the Commission 
and which they could support verbally at the Commission’s public hearings. It also 
advertised the dates and times of its public hearings – 17 of them held between 6 
November 1934 and 25 January 1935 over five venues: Pretoria, Johannesburg, 
Durban, Bloemfontein and Cape Town. 
 
The Commission was painstaking and thorough in its procedures, taking evidence from 
individuals representing 16 organised bodies and various Government posts represented 
by 51 individuals. The 16 organised bodies included the four South African Societies, 
two branches of the Society of Incorporated Accountants and Auditors in South Africa, 
the Chartered (SA) and Incorporated Accountants Students Society, the University of 
the Witwatersrand, the Public Servants’ Association, the Institute of Municipal 
Treasurers and Accountants (UG49, 1935: 5) and the London Association whose 
President, Maddox, had taken a strong stand against the Four Societies’ exclusionism, 
in 1924. Many of these entities no longer exist or have metamorphosed into others with 
the passage of time. Amongst the Government representatives were the Registrar of 
Companies, the Commissioner for Inland Revenue, the Controller and Auditor-General 
and the Masters of the Supreme Courts of the Transvaal, Natal and Orange Free State 
Provincial Divisions. A scrutiny of the names of the 51 individuals interviewed by the 
Commission reveals an interesting fact – few if any of them had been involved in the 
Private Bill of 1924 and fewer still had been concerned with the Private Bill of 1913. 
One explanation is obvious – the previous participants in the process had retired or died 
as the process of unification had already extended over 21 years, their positions being 
filled by younger men. While the dramatis personae had changed with the passing 
years, the issues remained the same – qualified vs non-qualified, compulsory 
membership, articles, past “wrongs” and future “rights”, by-laws, a provisional Board 
etc. 
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THE COMMISSION’S REPORT 
At the end of January 1935, the Commission produced its Report. The Report 
comprised four chapters, respectively dealing with the Historical Background, General 
Conclusions on Registration, Method of Control and Consideration of Special Claims 
and Machinery required to implement the Commission’s recommendations. The Report 
noted that there were three possible avenues of approach to the situation. 
 
The first was to accept the “diversity of practice” (UG49, 1935: 9) as it existed in the 
four provinces. This diversity arose as a result of the principle of registration being 
firmly entrenched in the Transvaal and Natal but not in the Cape nor the Orange Free 
State. The Designation Act of 1927 had not changed this particular state of affairs. 
 
The second was to repeal the registration laws in the Transvaal and Natal and open the 
profession there to anyone claiming to be a public accountant, whether qualified or not,  
 
And, finally, the creation of a unified system throughout the Union by introducing 
compulsory registration of accountants in the Cape and the Orange Free State. 
 
The Commission believed, as did all its witnesses, that the first option could not be 
supported and that the public interest in the Union could best be served by “a strong 
disciplined profession of accountancy, with a standard of integrity and reliability equal 
to that of the other learned professions” (UG49, 1935: 9). The Transvaal and Natal 
Societies stated that, despite some claims to the contrary, their registration processes in 
the early 20th Century had been successful and that they would resist any repeal of their 
respective founding legislation (UG49, 1935: 15). With regard to the third option, the 
Commission did not support a system of complete centralisation, preferring to allow 
each provincial society a degree of independence in matters such as routine 
administration. The Commission believed that this approach was in line “with the 
constitutional framework of the Union” (UG49, 1935: 9) and pointed out that the 
majority of organisations and individuals interviewed supported some form of 
registration. 
 
Significant amongst the minority opposition was the position taken by the Cape Society 
of Accountants and Auditors, a member of the group of four Provincial Societies 
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instrumental in bringing forward the Bills of 1913 and 1924 as well as the Designation 
Act of 1927. The Commission referred to them jointly as the South African Chartered 
Societies. The Cape Society feared universal registration would lead to a lowering of 
the status of the South African chartered accountant designation as a result of an initial 
minimal entry level to facilitate a generous registration process. The Society believed 
this was an important consideration given “the volume of money controlled from 
abroad which [was] invested in commercial and industrial enterprises in South Africa” 
(UG49, 1935: 10). 
 
The impression is that the Cape Society, having won the coveted designation “CA(SA)” 
and weathered a period of difficulty during the Depression, wished to be left to profit 
from its success. Clearly its partner Societies exerted influence, however, as the 
Commissioners noted that, despite its official stance, the Cape Society understood the 
“desirability of uniformity and the need of limitation of all audits required by statute to 
properly qualified accountants” (UG49, 1935: 11) – a reference to the requirements of 
the new Companies Act. Consequently, the Society supported the scheme outlined by 
the other three Provincial Societies. This scheme envisaged a central controlling body, 
similar to that in the Medical, Dental and Pharmacy Act, with significant concessions to 
non-chartered accountants, such as representation upon a central board which would be 
able to judge claims for registration. 
 
The two South African branches of the Society of Incorporated Accountants and 
Auditors had different points of view. The North Branch believed in an “open door” 
approach coupled with the preservation of the status of the South African Chartered 
Societies and the assurance that control would be in the hands of the profession. The 
Western Branch supported the Cape Society’s view that registration should be 
voluntary with each society the “master in its own house” (UG49, 1935: 11). It was 
believed that the South African Chartered Societies should be given a sole right to audit 
where public money or departments were concerned. Both South African Branches of 
the Incorporated Society, however, agreed that some sort of registration was necessary, 
providing it would leave the South African Chartered Societies free to control their own 
affairs (UG49, 1935: 11). 
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THE ISSUE OF COMPULSORY REGISTRATION 
The arguments advanced against registration were numerous. In the United Kingdom, 
an investigation there by a Board of Trade Committee in 1930 had concluded that a 
central register of the accounting profession was not desirable. Another point presented 
was that, in the interests of fairness, all practising accountants would need to be taken 
in and unqualified men would, in the process be given a status they did not deserve. 
This had been the experience in the Transvaal and Natal after their enactments of 1904 
and 1908 respectively (UG49, 1935: 12). There was also a very real concern that any 
process of registration would not achieve immediate finality as periodic public agitation 
in the future might persuade the Government of the day to reopen the register to 
unqualified people. The furore surrounding the 1924 Bill and the Transvaal and Natal 
registers supported this point of view. The non-chartered accountant lobby was 
vociferous, and constant in its hostility at not being included in the Designation Act of 
1927 through the supportive Pearce Agreement. Much of the antagonism had been 
directed at the Cape Society (UG49, 1935: 11) because of the advantageous position 
this voluntary Society had achieved through its close contact with the other three 
Provincial Societies. 
 
It was also put forward that the public should be allowed to choose those they believed 
best suited to do their auditing and accounting work but it was claimed that South 
African chartered accountants already performed 75 per cent of the “important auditing 
and accountancy work” (UG49, 1935: 12). This is probably accurate as the new 
Companies Act required qualified auditors to perform company audits and the CA(SA) 
designation added to their credibility. 
 
The Commissioners reviewed these arguments against registration and responded to 
them as follows:  
 
(i) The British Board of Trade had had a number of concerns about compulsory 
registration, the first being that there was very little public demand in the United 
Kingdom for the registration of accountants. This was coupled with the belief 
that the restriction of the practice of accounting to a narrow, specialised 
monopoly would not only see an increase in fees charged by accountants, but 
the exclusion of those involved in the “practice only in its minor branches and 
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to clients who need minor accounting services only” (UG49, 1935: 13). In 
response, the Commission believed it was possible to obviate the above 
concerns by, for example, recognising bookkeepers as a distinct branch in the 
profession with their own register, “possibly of a voluntary character” (UG49, 
1935: 13). Such a policy could be considered in the future and after the 
Commission had completed its primary task. 
 
(ii) With regard to a perceived public call for compulsory registration of 
accountants in South Africa, the Commission sought the opinions of senior civil 
servants, such as the Controller and Auditor-General and the Chambers of 
Commerce of Pretoria and Durban. While all agreed that compulsory 
registration would be in the public interest, evidence received from outside the 
profession did not indicate overwhelming public demand for compulsory 
registration. It was rather, “in the opinion of your Commission, of a kind to 
reinforce the conclusion that a case for registration [had] been made out” 
(UG49, 1935: 13). With considerable insight, the Commission noted that the 
organisation of the profession of accountancy was “hardly a question upon 
which an informed public opinion is likely to be clearly and strongly 
manifested” (UG49, 1935: 14). 
 
(iii) The Commission noted that the problem of giving statutory recognition to 
unqualified people had been experienced whenever a profession was established 
in law for the first time and ascribed this to the greater “interests of efficiency, 
discipline and the protection of the public” (UG49, 1935: 14). It believed a view 
needed to be taken of “some sacrifice of immediate professional interests” in 
anticipation of stability in the long run. The Commission noted that this had 
been done in the Transvaal and Natal as well as via the Pearce Agreement 
which had moderated the Designation Act of 1927. It believed that this had been 
a reasonable tactic used by the accounting profession in the past and would be 
so again, also pointing out that it would probably only apply to a small number 
of semi-qualified people in public practice. However, the Commission 
specifically stated that such individuals should not be “admitted to chartered 
rank” (UG49, 1935: 14) and this principle was later to be confirmed in the Act 
of 1951 at Section 23. The Commission also noted that in return for this 
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latitude, any arrangements made for the registration should be considered final 
with no future calls for the register to be reopened. The Commission appears not 
to have included these enlightened principles in its final recommendations 
which contained a limited acceptance of “other” qualifications. 
 
REGISTERED AUDITORS ONLY? 
The Commission pointed out that a suggestion had been made that instead of a register 
of accountants entitled to practise in the Union, there should be a register of auditors 
able to be appointed to perform statutory audits as required by legislation, such as the 
Companies Act and the Building Societies Act. Non-audit work usually performed by 
such professional auditors would then be available to others. The Commission noted 
that the proposal would make it easier for the State to regulate the profession, it being 
argued that, firstly, the audit and certification of financial statements was an easily 
definable part of an accountant’s duties and, secondly, that it was the “only audit 
function with which the State [needed] to concern itself” (UG49, 1935: 15). This is an 
interesting comment in the light of the fact that the new South African Companies Act 
71 of 2008, as amended, has reduced the previous requirement – that all companies be 
audited – to public and state-owned companies (Act 71, 2008: s90), and to public-
interest-scored companies, in terms of Companies Regulations 26–9 (2011). Clearly the 
State, in 2008, perceived a blanket audit requirement for all companies as contained in 
the Companies Acts of 1926 and 1973, to be unnecessary. There is no restriction upon 
private companies seeking a voluntary audit. 
 
The 1934 Commission noted that the proposal to restrict auditors to audit work alone 
did not consider the need for a qualified, ethical body of accountants to serve the public 
interest as had been achieved by the formalisation and registration of the medical and 
legal professions. With acuity, the Commission noted that the “work of a public 
accountant [had] become of increasing complexity and importance in the life of a 
modern civilised community, and there [were] indications that the work [might] in the 
future become an even more essential part in efficient economic organisation” (UG49, 
1935: 15–6). 
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THE REGISTER 
The Commission’s final decisions were not to accept the proposal to register auditors 
only and to provide for legislation for the compulsory registration of accountants in the 
Union. While noting the need to recognise the rights of those actually making a living 
through accountancy, the Commission did not believe registration could be extended to 
“unqualified persons”. The register thus consisted of the following people (UG49, 
1934: 16):  
 
(i) all members of the South African Societies as defined by the Designation Act of 
1927; 
(ii) those in the Cape and Orange Free State bona fide in practice as public 
accountants in 1934 with a Government Licence; 
(iii) “a limited number of those who satisfy the Provisional Board” of the standard of 
their professional qualifications, both theoretical and practical. (The 
Commission’s report was quite specific that the experience required was that 
“gained in a practising accountant’s office” (UG49, 1935: 16), thus throwing its 
weight behind a period of articles.) 
(iv) foreigners with overseas qualifications equal to those of South African chartered 
accountants and in possession of a pass in a special examination on South 
African law. 
 
The Commission made a number of other recommendations, principally that (UG49, 
1935: 16):  
 
(i) all accountants enrolled in the register should be known formally as Registered 
Accountants and Auditors (a term used in the 1951 Act and used until the 
promulgation of its replacement by the Auditing Profession Act, No. 26 of 
2005); 
(ii) once the enrolment process had been completed, no one would be permitted to 
practise as a public accountant and auditor unless they had qualified as 
chartered accountants and been admitted to one of the four South African 
Chartered Societies; 
(iii) a mechanism be implemented to allow non-chartered “Registered Accountants 
and Auditors” to qualify as chartered accountants. 
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The Commission recommended that non-chartered accountants be admitted by the 
proposed new board to one of the four South African Chartered Societies providing 
they had (UG49, 1935: 19):  
 
(i) passed both the Board’s intermediate and final examinations or some other 
acceptable examination; 
(ii) nine [sic] years practical experience in the office of a public practising 
accountant – no reason was given for this extensive period even though a 
maximum of six years was required from non-articled clerks; 
(iii) complied with any requirements of the Society concerned. 
 
The implication is that having met all the above requirements, the individual concerned 
would be admitted to the status of a CA(SA). 
 
“FEELINGS RUNNING HIGH” 
 
SPECIAL CLAIMS 
Chapter Three of the Commission’s Report dealt with special claims. In this respect, the 
Commission made a strong recommendation that both the organisation that would 
conduct the enrolment to the register and the body charged with admitting non-
chartered accountants, contain representatives from outside the profession. This was 
due to the fact that witnesses before the Commission did not want the four South 
African Chartered Societies to dominate proceedings, a residue from the hard 
politicking of 1924–5. The Commission reported that “feelings clearly have been 
running high in some quarters as a result of the past controversies about the correct 
solution of the problems now under consideration” (UG49, 1935: 16). 
 
As indicated by the analysis of the Act of 1951, this principle of representation from 
outside the profession maintained its relevance through the years from 1934 and was 
incorporated in the 1951 Act. In 1934, the recommendation was for a provisional board 
of three members, two nominated by the Minister of Finance and one nominee of the 
Societies with a later more permanent accountancy board comprising a balanced mix of 
the Minister’s nominee and representatives of the Societies and Universities. Again, 
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while these recommendations were ultimately incorporated in the 1951 Act, they were 
broadened in that Act. 
 
The Commission envisaged this board as being responsible for all matters which 
concerned the profession, with the exception of “domestic affairs” which it believed, in 
the spirit of provincial independence fostered by the Act of Union, needed to be vested 
in the Councils of the Chartered Societies. As to what was covered by the phrase 
“domestic affairs”, the Commission did not specify, but in this recognition lay the seeds 
of the future South African Institute of Chartered Accountants. 
 
At this juncture, the Commission reported that it had needed to investigate allegations 
made by some witnesses. Up to this point of its report, the Commission’s language had 
been mild and workman-like, but the use of the word “allegations” gives some idea of 
the emotions that lay beneath and clearly complicated the Commission’s work. 
 
The Designation Act had created animosity amongst those accountants who had not 
benefitted from its provisions. 
 
In particular the representative of the Institute of Accountants of South Africa Ltd felt 
aggrieved and, before the Commission, declared that the South African Chartered 
Societies had broken the Pearce Agreement by failing to admit all covered by its 
provisions. The Commission’s investigations underlined the fact that the Agreement 
had been “carried out with scrupulous fairness” (UG49, 1935: 17) and while there had 
been instances of hardship for those not covered by the Agreement, the Commission 
did not believe such cases necessitated further relief for those unqualified by 
examination and experience (UG49, 1935: 17). 
 
The Institute’s representative further accused the South African Chartered Societies of 
creating an examination with too high a standard. The Commission had a contrary 
view. It underlined the principle that the Four Societies had striven to maintain since 
the first attempt in 1913 when it reported that these Societies 
 
“[had] reached and maintained a professional status of a high order comparable 
to the best societies overseas and that any measure failing to recognise this fact 
 389 
 
or tending in any way to lower that status would be contrary to the interests of 
the public and the profession” (UG49, 1935: 17). 
 
When the London Association and the Corporation of Accountants (Glasgow) proposed 
that they too were entitled to the designation “Chartered Accountant (South Africa)”, 
the Commission ruled that since 1927 the designation had become recognised both in 
South Africa and elsewhere and could not be extended as no other South African 
society had reached “a standard entitling it to recognition on an equal footing” with the 
four covered by the Designation Act. The Commission concluded that their formal 
recognition of accountants of other societies should only be upon the basis of an 
individual’s qualifications and not as a result of membership of a society (UG49, 1935: 
17). 
 
The exclusion was an unfortunate part of the Designation Act, having engendered hard 
feelings and long memories that would be one reason why the Government did not take 
up the Commission’s recommendations in 1935. 
 
CONCESSIONS 
With regard to qualifications, the Commission accepted evidence laid before it that 
there were accountants who, while not members of one of the Four Societies, were 
nevertheless already sufficiently qualified and experienced to be included on the 
proposed register. A special provision would be needed to allow this (UG49, 1935: 18). 
Within six months of the proposed Act coming into effect, the provisional board would 
be empowered to register persons who, firstly, had passed a final examination set by a 
professional accountants society and of “a sufficiently high standard” (UG49, 1935: 
18), and secondly, had completed five years’ practical experience of “a sufficiently 
varied and satisfactory nature” in either the office of a public practising accountant or 
the accountancy office of the applicant himself. The emphasis on public accountants as 
distinct from accountants in the Public Service was clear as was the Commission’s 
intention to avoid the destructive debate about this aspect that had ultimately derailed 
the 1924 Bill. The concession was intended “to be strictly limited” so as “to remove 
any possibility of the reproach” that qualified South Africans had been debarred from 
the register (UG49, 1935: 18).  
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The Commission left it for the provisional board to determine what constituted 
“sufficient qualification” but gave guidance in that it recommended the final 
examinations conducted by the London Association of Accountants and the 
Corporation of Accountants. The use of these entities’ examinations was in the nature 
of an olive branch. With regard to experience, the Commission was very specific – 
experience obtained in “a commercial or industrial office, or as an accountant or auditor 
in a Government department or municipal office or in a Bank or similar entity, should 
not be recognised” (UG49, 1935: 18). The Commission was also clear as to one group 
it intended to benefit – those in practice in the Transvaal or Natal who carried on a 
business “on an appreciable scale in the various branches of accountancy work, even 
though [they were] prevented by provincial law from calling [themselves] accountants 
or from certifying a balance sheet in such province” (UG49, 1935: 18). 
 
In this, the Commission hoped to lay to rest, finally, one source of animosity: those 
who had not, for some reason, been registered or able to register under the Transvaal 
Ordinance of 1904 or the Natal Act of 1908 but still remained in practice in 1934. 
There would have been few alive from that period to benefit from this belated 
registration concession and the Commission would have known this; cynically 
speaking, this would have been a cheap concession. 
 
PUBLIC SERVANTS 
The Commission noted that the Public Servants’ Association had applied for special 
concessions but these had been refused on the basis that no case had been made for 
practical training in the Public Service. The Commission further noted that the 1924 
Bill at Section 19 had allowed a concession in the form of 18 months’ practical 
experience in the office of an accountant in public practice but did not mention the 
essential impracticality of the concession – few could afford 18 months away from their 
normal employment. It ruled practical experience gained outside the accounting 
profession as too narrow in scope and recommended the admission criteria set for 
entrance to the four South African Societies should, in the future, be the minimum for 
all future admission to the register (UG49, 1935: 19). 
 
With regard to public servants, the Commission noted further that such individuals 
could improve their qualifications – and hence their status – by completing the degree 
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of Bachelor of Commerce but recommended that key units within the Public Service – 
such as the Treasury, and the Control and Audit division – should actively recruit 
people who had already qualified as chartered accountants. This of course meant the 
civils’ careers could thereby be blocked by outside-trained people. 
 
The case of Municipal Treasurers drew special attention. The Commission saw no point 
in creating statutory bodies for specialised accountancy bodies like Municipal 
Treasurers and Costing and Statistical Accountants, believing instead that voluntary 
societies could equally exercise a beneficial role. The only persons to be subject to 
statute should be accountants and auditors in public practice (UG49, 1935: 19). 
 
ANNUAL FEES AND THE EMPLOYMENT OF ARTICLED CLERKS 
The Commission pointed out that it had been guided by the principle of not interfering 
with the “control of the profession by statute” more than was considered necessary – 
the issue of the quantum of annual and entrance fees being in the hands of the 
Chartered Societies themselves. Accordingly, no recommendations were made 
regarding the salaries paid to articled clerks or their number, or premiums paid by such 
clerks (the latter practice does not appear to be widespread in South Africa). While the 
Commission was of the opinion that discipline regarding fee payment should be left to 
the Societies, it noted that the proposed provisional board would need to provide for the 
discipline of non-chartered accountant Registered Accountants and Auditors (UG49, 
1935: 20). 
 
In the matter of discipline the Commission was completely out of step with the 
previous Bills and the subsequent Act of 1951, all of which prescribed disciplinary 
structures as well as lists of what constituted unacceptable behaviour subject to 
disciplinary sanction. 
 
The question of who should have the right to employ articled clerks drew an interesting 
response from the Commission when it declared its intention over time to see the 
phasing out of the classification “non-chartered accountant Registered Accountants and 
Auditors” (i.e. individuals who had been clerks but not articled clerks) and that, as a 
group, they should not be “perpetuated more than [was] absolutely necessary” (UG49, 
1935: 20). The Commission recommended that, in the future only accountants in public 
 392 
 
practice, who were members of the South African Chartered Societies, be permitted to 
have articled clerks, noting that the Councils of these Societies screened members’ 
applications to take on such clerks to ensure they were afforded “sufficient experience 
and adequate practical training” (UG49, 1935: 20). In its draft Act, the Commission 
detailed the regulation of matters relating to articled clerks. 
 
THE SOCIETIES AND THE UNIVERSITIES 
The respective interactions of the Transvaal and Cape Societies with the Universities of 
the Witwatersrand and Cape Town were emphasised by the Commission, particularly 
the fact that the two Societies made grants to these universities to provide lectures to 
the articled clerks, thereby enhancing the training and knowledge of such individuals. 
Before the Commission, the University of the Witwatersrand made two 
recommendations, firstly that there should be an official check upon unqualified 
correspondence schools through more cooperation between the Societies and, secondly, 
a central examinations board to be established with representation from it and the 
University of Cape Town. The Commission was unable to make a recommendation 
regarding the correspondence schools without further investigation, but supported the 
idea of a central examinations board. However, it believed that not only the two 
mentioned Universities should have representation as there were other Universities 
within the Union which needed to be considered as well – an inclusive rather than 
exclusive approach (UG49, 1935: 21). 
 
THE COMMISSION’S DRAFT ACT 
The core of the Commission’s work was contained in Chapter Four of its report 
entitled, almost laconically, as “machinery”, by which was meant a draft Act 
incorporating all recommendations as how to implement them. 
 
An analysis of this 1934 draft and a comparison of it to the 1913 and 1924 Bills, on the 
one hand, and the 1951 Act, on the other, reveals some interesting perspectives. Like 
the 1951 Act which drew upon the Report, the 1934 draft exhibited a style of legal 
draughtsmanship noticeably different and more modern when compared to the earlier 
Bills. These later pieces of legislation contained no preambles but only a brief 
statement of the legislation’s intended purpose; they also contained a section of 
definitions of key words. While neither the 1934 nor 1951 Bills defined “audit”, both 
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defined “public practice” and “society” in almost the exact same words – “society” 
meaning one of the four South African Chartered Societies (UG49, 1935: 21). 
 
Unlike all the other prior pieces of legislation, the draft Act of 1934 prescribed a 
provisional board of only three members, two appointed by the Minister of Finance – 
one, an advocate of not less than 10 years’ standing, to act as the Chairman – and one 
appointed by the Societies (UG49, 1935: 22). In comparison, the 1913 Bill proposed a 
provisional council of 11 comprised entirely of appointees of the Societies. The 
subsequent outcry caused the Societies to modify the 1924 proposal slightly by the 
inclusion to the proposed council of the Union’s Auditor-General and a nominee of the 
Minister of the Interior from amongst those practising accountancy but who were not 
members of one of the Four Societies. A further nominee from the Orange Free State 
increased the Societies’ already sizeable membership on this council to 12. Between 
1925 and 1934, the cabinet responsibility for the development of an accountancy Act 
moved from the Minister of the Interior to the Minister of Finance as Cabinet 
responsibilities were shifted. 
 
In a move of some significance the 1951 Act ignored the idea of a provisional board 
council and opted instead for a board that would accept full responsibility from the start 
of the process with no need to pass on authority to a more permanent structure later. In 
addition, the 1951 Act allowed for a more representative membership on the board with 
no one group achieving an outright majority through membership alone (Statutes, 51 of 
1951: 3). 
 
As with the other pieces of legislation, the 1934 draft allowed for a register to be 
opened so as to enrol qualifying candidates, the period allowed for such enrolment 
being six months. This time period was to be incorporated in the 1951 Act whereas the 
two previous Bills had stipulated a period of 12 months. 
 
The analysis of the qualification of those eligible for registration in terms of the 1951 
Act indicates a reasonably broad base; those of the 1934 draft and the previous Bills 
were limited and mainly restricted to members of the Four Societies and their articled 
clerks. The proposed 1935 registration was to be Union-wide but an individual’s 
enrolment was in respect “of one Province only” (UG49, 1935: 25). This meant that 
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anyone who wished to practice Union-wide needed to become a member of the Society 
in each province in which he practised. This was a potentially clumsy requirement and 
out of step with ideas of the public good; it also reflected a provincial rather than 
national perspective. The draft included three more categories of eligibility (UG49, 
1935: 23): 
 
 Firstly, those articled clerks, who, on 31 March 1935, were registered with an 
organised body of accountants other than one of the Four Societies, who had also 
registered that status with the provisional board within three months of the draft 
Act’s passage and who subsequently completed the requirements for admission to a 
Society. 
 
 Secondly, those who had passed a final professional examination approved of by 
the provisional Board as well as completing five years of practical experience in a 
public accountant’s office and similarly approved of by the Board. 
 
 And thirdly, the 1934 draft extended admission to those who, in the opinion of the 
provisional board, had been in practice as a public accountant at any time in 1934 
and held the licence to prove it. Given the Commission’s stated position regarding 
the lack of equivalency between accounting experience in public and municipal 
service with that in public practice, it was not surprising that the 1924 concession to 
those in these services – of the acceptability of a continuous period of 18 months’ 
experience in the office of a practising member of one of the Four Societies (AB, 
1924: s19) – was not repeated. 
 
THE ACCOUNTANCY BOARD 
The 1934 draft envisaged the provisional board completing its task in six months and 
thereafter transferring responsibility to an accountancy board comprising, finally, of 
one member appointed by the Minister of Finance, one each by the Four Societies and 
two members appointed by the South African universities’ Vice-Chancellors’ 
Committee from among the members of their respective Faculties of Commerce 
(UG49, 1935: 23). The draft also allowed the Minister to appoint to the Board a 
nominee of the Rhodesia Society of Accountants. 
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Two points are immediately apparent: the Societies were given a potential majority on 
this board as the Rhodesian was likely to support the Four Societies or remain neutral. 
The Rhodesians had a long association with them but had not chosen to give evidence 
or in fact to attend proceedings (UG49, 1935: Annexure 1). And secondly, the role of 
universities in the education of accountants was officially recognised. The link between 
profession and academe is still strongly apparent in 2013, but allowing the Societies a 
potential majority on the board was a retrograde step harking back to the Bills of 1913 
and 1924 and clearly out of step with the wishes and views of others involved in 
finding an equitable solution to the vexed question of registering accountants in public 
practice. Clearly, as wide an incorporation of accountants as possible was needed, not a 
narrow self-interested admission. The former principle prevailed in the Act of 1951 and 
its absence in the 1934 draft is probably one reason why the Commission’s 
recommendations were not taken up and its report ended in the archives like the Bills of 
1913 and 1924 had done. On the positive side, a number of issues – such as articles of 
clerkship – had been resolved and would assist in the development of the 1951 Act. In 
many respects, 1934 represented a watershed between the old and the new, as detailed 
below. 
 
The duties of the Accountancy Board included maintaining the register of members, 
regulating articles of clerkship, considering applications for membership by individual 
members of bodies of organised accountants outside the Union, conducting 
examinations of candidates for registration and laying down rules as to what constituted 
unprofessional conduct (UG49, 1935: 24). A comparison of these duties with those 
listed in Section 21 of the 1951 Act reveal a marked similarity. Portions of the 
Commission’s recommendations were thus deemed acceptable in 1951. The 1951 Act 
departed from the 1934 draft in one significant area – that of financing the board’s 
activities. The draft 1935 Act foresaw the board being financed through examination 
fees, admission fees and annual subscriptions with any shortfall being met by levies on 
the Four Societies in proportion to their membership. A surplus in any one year would 
be carried forward to the following year (UG49, 1935: 24). The weakness in this 
approach is apparent – self-funding and self-regulation do not make for easy 
bedfellows, despite the fact that the Minister in the 1934 draft needed to approve any 
regulations framed to give effect to the board’s duties. The 1951 Act was silent upon 
the funding of the board beyond the income it could generate. In reality, the State came 
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to allocate an annual grant to it, a state of affairs which is essential today to the 
functioning of the IRBA. The IRBA’s Annual Report for 2010 lists Government grants 
of R22 million (IRBA, Annual Report, 2010: 66) or 36% of the disclosed revenue of 
R60.6 million. The comparative figures for 2011 and 2012 are R29 million (IRBA, 
Annual Report, 2011: 76) or 43% of the disclosed revenue of R67 million, and R34 
million, or 44% of R77 million (IRBA, Annual Report, 2012: 71). 
 
BY-LAWS 
While the Commission had a philosophy of allowing the Four Societies administrative 
control at the local level, the draft Act nevertheless legislated by-laws for the Societies 
to enable them to function uniformly at that level. Amongst these were the fixing of 
annual and other fees, regulating the membership and functioning of the council of a 
Society as well as its powers and duties. All by-laws were to be passed at the Societies’ 
general meetings and were subject to the approval of the Minister of Finance. As the 
1951 Act was less concerned with the internal functioning of the Societies and more 
with the regulation of the profession as a whole, a list of by-laws for the Societies was 
not included in that Act. This is also true of the Bills of 1913 and 1924 which envisaged 
a strong centralised board responsible for its own by-laws (1913: s33; 1924: s36). The 
1913 Bill envisaged the Minister of the Interior approving any changes to the by-laws 
via an announcement in the Union Gazette with the Governor-General’s approval after 
notices had been placed in newspapers in each of the four Provinces and allowing for 
comment to be lodged within 90 days of their publication. 
 
ARTICLES OF CLERKSHIP 
A topic formally introduced in the 1934 draft was that of articles, an indication of the 
growing importance in South Africa of this aspect of the profession, as the issue had 
not been considered of significance for it to be included in the Bill of 1913 and to a 
lesser extent 1924. The 1935 draft made the completion of a period of five years’ 
articles mandatory for admission as a Registered Accountant and Auditor (UG49, 1935: 
25). Provision was made for exemption by way of acceptable “practical training and 
experience” outside the Union or completion of a university degree. Admission to the 
status of articled clerk was dependent upon the production of a birth certificate, 
evidence as to the applicant’s being a “fit and proper person” as well as proof of having 
successfully passed the matriculation examination of the Joint Matriculation Board. 
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Clerks were to be articled to Registered Accountants and Auditors who had been given 
written permission to do so by the Society of the Province in which the articles were to 
be served. Articles were only valid if registered with that Society. In addition, the 
Registered Accountant and Auditor was to be a member of that Society in good 
standing and, in that Society’s opinion, able to provide practical training which was 
“sufficiently extensive and intensive” (UG49, 1935: 26). The Society was required to 
notify the Accounting Board of all articles it had concluded and the Board, in turn, was 
required to keep a register of all articles entered into. 
 
The significance of the above is that the Societies effectively controlled the whole 
process with the Accountancy Board reduced to simply keeping a register of 
information provided to it. The net effect of these arrangements was twofold – firstly 
the proposed Accountancy Board lacked visible authority and, to outsiders, the 
Commission appeared to be unduly favouring the four provincial Societies. The 1951 
Act placed the whole process of registering articles firmly in the central hands of the 
Public Accountants and Auditors’ Board, thereby enhancing the independence of the 
process as well as of its undisputed authority in the matter. 
 
EXAMINATIONS 
With regard to examinations, the 1935 draft Act placed these unambiguously in the 
hands of the Accountancy Board, replacing the South African Societies General 
Examining Board with its own Accountants Admission Examination comprising the 
Intermediate and Final Examinations in Accountancy. This was a little out of line with 
the 1951 Act which, while acknowledging its Board’s primacy in the examination 
process, allowed it to “make arrangements for such examinations or any part thereof to 
be conducted on its behalf by any part thereof by any one or more universities or 
institutions approved by the Minister” (Act 51, 1951: s25(3)). 
 
ADMISSION: A CONCESSION 
In a logical progression from articles to examinations and then admissions, the draft 
Act dealt with admission criteria to the Societies, these being successful completion of 
both the practical articles and the theoretical examination. Of importance here is the 
concession granted to Registered Accountants and Auditors of good character, having 
passed both the Intermediate and Final components of the examination process, but 
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who had not completed formal articles – instead having completed not less than nine 
years’ practical service in the office of a publically practising accountant (UG49, 1935: 
26) (see also UG49, 1935: 19). The draft proposed that such individuals be admitted to 
the Society to which application had been made. The implication of this proposal was 
that the individuals concerned would be entitled to the designation CA(SA). The Bills 
of 1913 and 1924 contained similar provisions which were clearly designed to 
ameliorate the condition of qualified individuals who nonetheless lacked the formal 
recognition of service that articles would have conferred. The 1951 Act also contained 
a similar provision but reduced the period of non-articled service to six years (Act 51, 
1951: s29). 
 
DISCIPLINE AND PROFESSIONAL BEHAVIOUR 
It is in the field of discipline that the Commission’s recommendations became 
significantly unworkable, despite the fact that the underlying principles were sound. 
The draft Act proposed that those Registered Accountants and Auditors who were 
members of the Four Societies be subject to the discipline of those Societies while all 
others registered with the board would be subject to its disciplinary authority (UG49, 
1935: 27). Such a system was open to accusations of unequal treatment. In terms of the 
1913 and 1924 Bills, this dual split in authority was not contemplated, their proposed 
Societies retaining full control over the power to discipline members for improper 
conduct. This was also the case in the 1951 Act which stated unequivocally at Section 
27(1) 
 
“The board shall be responsible for the discipline and control of persons 
registered as accountants and auditors under this Act … and impose … any 
punishment prescribed”. 
 
The draft 1935 Act allowed the councils of the Four Societies and the provisional board 
to investigate alleged misconduct within their own spheres and impose such penalties 
as they saw fit, including prohibition of practise, removal from the register and the 
advertising of these facts in the Union Gazette. The councils and the Board were 
empowered to summon members to attend enquiry committees – the summons used 
were to be set out, as far as possible, in the form used in the Third Schedule to the 
Medical, Dental and Pharmacy Act, 1928 (UG49, 1935: 29). In the Union period after 
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1961, other professions were legalising their existence and functioning through 
Parliament and uniformity of administration was a goal. 
 
As with the Bills of 1913 and 1924, the draft Act affirmed the individual’s right to take 
the matter to the Supreme Court but required the individual so doing to put up £100 as 
security “to cover any costs awarded against him” (UG49, 1935: 27). 
 
The Act of 1951 at Section 28 sought to keep its disciplinary powers “in-house” as far 
as possible and detailed a process of enquiry into allegations of misconduct. In terms of 
this section of the Act, the board could impose a maximum penalty of £50. More 
stringent punishment was available to it in terms of Section 21(g) of the Act – that is: 
the removal of an individual from the register or suspension from practice. The 
sophistication of the 1951 disciplinary procedure has its roots in the 1935 draft Act and 
the following aspects were detailed in the draft wherein the Board was empowered 
 
 to take evidence, summon witnesses and require the production of documents 
etc., 
 to summons before it the attendance of any member via registered letter “in the 
same manner as it would be served if it were a subpoena issued by a 
magistrate’s court”, 
 to bind the person summoned to obey, attend and provide evidence. Failure to 
do this was in itself an offence which attracted a fine of £25 (UG49, 1935: 29). 
 
The 1951 Act, the Bills of 1913 and 1924 and the draft Act of 1935 all contained a 
section detailing offences and there is great similarity in the misdemeanours listed. 
Engagement in public practice without prior registration was anticipated to be a 
common offence but the draft Act was at pains to point out that this prohibition did not 
apply to those describing themselves as “accountants” and employed exclusively at a 
salary or those honorary auditors of clubs, institutions or societies who performed their 
task but did not receive a fee for their work. 
 
A new idea, introduced by the draft Act – which was carried over into the 1951 Act – 
was the prohibition on the sharing of profits or practising in partnership with those who 
 400 
 
were not registered in terms of the legislation. Of interest is the fact that the 1924 Bill 
introduced aspects of ethical behaviour that were carried over into the 1934 draft 
(UG49, 1935: 29). Both contained a prohibition upon a registered accountant from 
paying, directly or indirectly, a commission for accountancy work or for inducing 
others to provide such work. In the 1924 Bill, this also extended to “secretly accepting” 
any share of the profit from “the professional work of a solicitor, broker, auctioneer, or 
other principal or agent, not being his partner” (AB, 1924: s23(g)). In addition, this Bill 
– as did the draft 1935 Act – prohibited an accountant from “advertising his 
profession”. As to what constituted “advertising”, this was left to future boards and 
later became a significant concern to the profession as, in RDC Jackson’s words (1983: 
1), “a highly contentious and complex topic”. 
 
While the prohibitions on giving commissions and advertising did not find their way 
into the original 1951 Act, that of performing accountancy work in connection with 
anything subject to litigation on condition that payment was only received upon a 
successful conclusion to that litigation, did. However, a general “catch all” prevented 
the accountant from sharing profits from practice with non-registered accountants 
(1951: s30(1)(c)). To the historian these elements are important as they indicate a level 
of ethical behaviour that the profession sought to instil in its members. Indeed, some of 
these were later transferred from the legislation to a Code of Professional Conduct 
which nevertheless retained the power to institute disciplinary action to back it. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Accountancy Profession Commission of 1934 produced a draft Act that was 
seriously flawed in many respects, particularly in its separate handling of chartered and 
non-chartered registered members. In essence, the Commission failed to grasp the nettle 
of a single uniform registration and had given the Four Societies too great a prominence 
in the proposed structure than perhaps they deserved. In fact, Dr Hjalmar Reitz 
commented in the House of Assembly, in March 1936, when introducing his 
Accountants Bill:  
 
“It must be evident to anyone who reads the report of the Commission that the 
big four have had it all their own way with that Commission. That was to be 
expected because of the members of the big four, namely the Chairman of the 
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Cape Chartered Society, Professor Galbraith, was actually on that Commission” 
(USA, Vol. 26, 28/3/1936: 2102). 
 
From Reitz’s comments, Galbraith appears to have been one of the main authors of the 
Commission’s Report. 
 
In some ways, the Commission’s work indicates a degree of understanding that was 
lacking in the Bills of 1913 and 1924. Of equal significance is the fact that all 
succeeding formal attempts – culminating in the success of 1951 – borrowed from the 
Commission’s draft Act. In that sense, the Commission pointed the way for future 
development. It also led to the final realisation in certain circles that all accountants in 
the Union needed to be registered in a uniform manner across all four Provinces. 
 
While the Government – in the form of its Minister of Finance, NC Havenga – had 
been instrumental in the creation of the Commission and the Commission had been 
prompt in fulfilling its task, its recommendations were not implemented by that 
Government. It is significant that despite the Commission’s recommendations, the 
Government in 1935 chose not to introduce legislation along the lines suggested, 
perhaps concerned not to alienate an important sector of the electorate in a period of 
Afrikaner resurgence. Fusion was in its infancy and the economy was pulling out of the 
Depression. Locksley attributed this reluctance to act to “opposition from certain 
bodies” (2001: 6) but did not go into specifics. An analysis of the Minutes of the Select 
Committee on Pocock’s Private Member’s Bill gives some answers and these are dealt 
with in the next Chapter. Two more participants emerged before the outbreak of war in 
Europe in September 1939 – Dr Hjalmar Reitz, who tried in 1934 and 1936 but whose 
attempts did not even get to the Select Committee stage, and Pocock, whose attempt 
made it into Select Committee and a second reading but whose impact was dissipated 
by the gathering storm clouds in Europe. There is evidence to suggest that Reitz was 
acting on behalf of the Institute of Accountants of South Africa in presenting his Bills 
(USA Vol. 26, May 1936: 2853; 2860). This Institute had been overlooked by the 
Commission in its bid for membership and, as detailed in the next Chapter, made a 
considerable effort to oppose Pocock’s Bill of 1938. This persistence paid off and the 
Institute’s members became part of the few to achieve automatic registration of their 
organisation in the 1951 Act (Act 51, 1951: s23(3)). 
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In terms of North’s theory of institutional economics, the Commission of 1934 and 
Reitz’s attempts in 1934–6 to put through a registration Bill failed because Parliament 
and the ruling party of the day saw no immediate benefit in pursuing a contentious Bill 
at that point. North notes that “different constituent groups have different opportunity 
costs and bargaining power with the ruler [and] different bargains result” (North, 1990, 
48–9). Alternatively, there may be no bargaining at all, as in the period 1934–45, and 
the status quo simply remains. 
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CHAPTER 12: POCOCK’S BILL OF 1938–40 
 
 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY 
The period 1934–8 in South Africa saw political consolidation and, as demonstrated by 
Wilson and Thompson et al., the beginning of 
 
“a long period of almost uninterrupted prosperity [where] between 1933 and 
1965 the real national product grew at an average rate of about 5 per cent. With 
population increasing at about 2.3 percent, there was an average rise of over 
2 percent per annum in per capita incomes” (Wilson and Thompson et al., 
1971: 32). 
 
Not only were there great advances in mining techniques but also an expansion in 
manufacturing industries and diversification with new industries established and old 
ones overhauled. 
 
These authors believe the five years between 1933–8 were fundamentally important “in 
the ‘take off’ into sustained economic growth” (Wilson and Thompson et al., 1971: 32) 
with an increase in gross national product of 70% and a minimal increase in the cost of 
living. This growth was created, in part, by large investments of foreign capital and an 
increase in domestic savings (Wilson and Thompson et al., 1971: 33). 
 
Gold mining led the economic recovery and the high gold price made it possible to 
reopen unprofitable mines. As the mines began to create wealth, so did other sectors in 
the economy, while the demand for foodstuffs and manufactured goods also increased. 
The next table shows the average annual exports of South African products, from 
1930–49. Gold led the way and by 1930, mine shafts reaching depths of 4000–5000 
feet were common (Feinstein, 2005: 101). 
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TABLE 12.1 
ANNUAL AVERAGE EXPORTS OF SOUTH AFRICAN PRODUCTS, 1930–49 
 
 Agricultural 
and 
pastoral 
products 
Diamonds Other 
products 
Gold 
and 
specie 
Total Gold and 
specie as 
percentage 
of total 
 (£ million) 
1930–4 
1935–9 
1940–4 
1945–9 
16.5 
22.1 
19.9 
52.1 
3.2 
2.8 
4.6 
11.2 
4.1 
5.7 
22.7 
32.7 
53.7 
80.4 
86.5 
135.4 
77.5 
111.0 
133.7 
231.4 
69.3 
72.4 
64.7 
58.5 
Source: Feinstein (2005), and Union Statistics: N4 and N5. 
 
A drought in 1937–8 prevented farmers from taking full advantage of the recovery and 
this resulted in a reduction in agricultural employment (Wilson and Thompson et al., 
1971: 33). But other sectors of the economy saw an increase in employment figures. In 
the mining industry, employment grew from 308 000 people in 1932 to 475 000 in 
1939 (Wilson and Thompson et al., 1971: 34), while in manufacturing, construction, 
electricity, and water, there was an increase from 101 000 people in 1932 to 331 000 in 
1939 (Wilson and Thompson et al., 1971: 34). The railways, important to the Union’s 
transport and communication infrastructure, increased employment from 86 000 to 
123 000 and between 1932–9 and 100 000 White workers were employed in this sector. 
The Poor White problem, which had haunted the Union since its creation in 1910, 
disappeared (Wilson and Thompson et al., 1971: 34). 
 
The economic condition of Blacks also improved during this period, but not enough to 
solve their poverty. In 1932, a Native Economic Commission reported that in the Black 
reserves, poverty and overcrowding were usual and that poor farming techniques 
resulted in widespread soil erosion and the impoverishment of the land (Wilson and 
Thompson et al., 1971: 35). The result was the movement of Blacks into urban areas in 
search of employment and, when coupled with the migration of Blacks from 
neighbouring states into the Union, led to a reduction in the level of wages and 
 406 
 
hampered any real increase in wages, despite the expanding economy (Wilson and 
Thompson et al., 1971: 35). 
 
The ownership and capacity of the land was, and had been, an issue for the Union since 
1913. The Report of the Natives Land Commission, 1913–6 shows that 48.6% of the 
“native” [sic] population lived on reserves (UG19, 1916). Research at the University of 
Natal (Feinstein, 2005: 71) has shown that, in 1936, South Africa’s population was 
about 9.6 million, of whom 6.6 million were Black – 3 million or 50% of whom lived 
on the reserves. Further research (Feinstein, 2005: 71) has shown that, in 1936, 1.4 
million Blacks (21%) worked in towns and the mines while a further 2.2 million (33%) 
worked on farms. Movement away from the reserves to towns and mines was a reality 
for many Blacks. But unlike their Poor White counterparts, there was no social policy 
to assist them. 
 
A further element in the growing success of the Union’s economy in the 1930s was the 
increasing participation of Afrikaners at the highest levels in the economy. Many of 
these were University graduates. As O’Meara (1983: 205) has shown, in the period 
1938–9, a total of 40 Afrikaner credit institutions controlled funds to the value of 
£27 million. Ten years later the number of Afrikaner credit firms had risen to 68 and 
controlled funds worth £74.4 million. Business and commerce, by 1940, were no longer 
the sole preserve of English speakers. 
 
At the outbreak of war in 1939, the South African economy was stronger and more 
diverse than it had been in 1914. In addition, the British lack of shipping capacity 
coupled with the difficulty of importing goods through the Suez Canal and across the 
Atlantic, due to U-boat activity in those waters, gave an opportunity to South Africa’s 
manufacturers which they grasped. The value of their output increased by 116% in the 
period 1939–45, but a negative factor was inflation, with the retail price index 
increasing by 32% in the same period (Wilson and Thompson et al., 1971: 36). 
However, as Feinstein (2005, 128) points out, economic growth was built on the 
shifting sands of political inequality, rural poverty, pass laws, compounds, low wages, 
low-productivity and low-efficiency which mitigated against the expansion of 
secondary industry. As he also points out, so long as the economy was dominated by 
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agriculture and mining, these weaknesses could be ignored by a self-interested White 
political majority. 
 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL SITUATION 
The period 1933–8 saw the rise of Afrikaner nationalism which climaxed in December 
1938 with the laying of the foundation stone of the Voortrekker Monument outside 
Pretoria and celebrations to mark the centenaries of the Great Trek away from British 
colonial influences and the Battle of Blood River – the Boer victory over Zulu power in 
the interior. Two months earlier, the Ossewabrandwag had been formed as a cultural 
organisation to publicise the Afrikaner and republican ideals (Breitenbach et al., 1973: 
378). These characteristics became associated with Malan’s National Party. 
 
While they were unlikely to lose the 1938 election, rifts appeared in the Smuts-Hertzog 
alliance. Although Hertzog had little sympathy for Afrikaner republicanism – having 
accepted the constitutional guarantees of South African independence and its links to 
the British Crown – he made a poorly considered statement that while “God Save the 
King” was not South Africa’s national anthem, Die Stem might become so (Breitenbach 
et al., 1974: 379). In turn, many of Smuts’ followers had found it difficult to accept 
Hertzog’s view on racial matters. Nevertheless, in the election of 1938, the United 
Party won 111 seats in the House of Assembly; Malan’s Purified National Party took 
27; the Dominion Party, eight; and Labour (National Council), three. In addition, there 
were four Independents, three of whom were appointed in terms of the Representation 
of Natives Act, 1936. Malan’s results highlighted the growing sense of Afrikaner 
cultural and national feeling. Unopposed in Smithfield in 1933, Hertzog found his 1929 
majority of 1301 votes reduced to 526 votes in 1938 (Breitenbach et al., 1974: 308), 
(Davenport, 1987: 586). 
 
The Fusion Government ended with Britain’s declaration of war on Germany on 
3 September 1939. From as early as 1935, Hertzog had stated that Britain could not rely 
automatically upon South African support should there be a war with Germany. Smuts 
disagreed. 
 
The situation climaxed when a special session of Parliament was called on 2 September 
1939 to extend the life of the Senate beyond its expiry date of 5 September 1939. At a 
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Cabinet meeting before the parliamentary session, Hertzog underlined the need for 
neutrality, Smuts urged support for Britain should war break out and was supported by 
six of the 11 cabinet ministers present. The matter was taken to Parliament and Smuts 
won with 80 votes to Hertzog’s 67 (Davenport, 1987 328). Hertzog’s appeal to the 
Governor-General, Sir Patrick Duncan, to dissolve Parliament was refused for two 
reasons – firstly, a viable administration could be formed from Smuts’ support; and 
secondly, an election on the question of a European war could result in public unrest – 
as had happened in 1914. Hertzog resigned, Duncan called Smuts to form a 
Government and a coalition resulted as the Labour and Dominion Parties were included 
in Smuts’ cabinet. Malan’s Nationalists supported Hertzog, now without a Cabinet post, 
and Fusion ended with the country divided into two parts along language lines, as in 
1914 (Davenport and Saunders, 2000: 343). 
 
THE NEXT ATTEMPT 
Four years after the Commission presented its Report on the accountancy profession 
and just over a year before war broke out in Europe, one of the Commission’s members 
attempted to rescue the Report from obscurity. PV Pocock had been the only Member 
of Parliament (SAP) appointed to the Commission and, clearly, had been disappointed 
at the Government’s lack of response to it. On 2 August 1938, the House of Assembly 
gave him permission to introduce his “Bill to provide for the registration, qualification, 
designation and control of accountants and auditors and for matters incidental thereto” 
(AB, 1938: 1). The Bill was brought up and read a first time, the second reading being 
scheduled for 12 August. 
 
On that day, Pocock moved – as an unopposed motion – that the Bill be referred to a 
select committee “for enquiry and report, the committee to have power to take evidence 
and call for papers and to bring up an amended bill” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 32, 
12/8/1938: 891). The motion passed and on 17 August the Speaker of the House 
reported that the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders had appointed a select 
committee of seven members of whom Pocock was one (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 32, 
17/8/1938: 1033). The other members are presented in the following table. 
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TABLE 12.2 
SELECT COMMITTEE, “POCOCK’S BILL” 
 
Name of Member Party Affiliation Constituency Length of Service 
Broome, FN 
De Kock, AS 
Hirsch, JG 
Hooper, EC 
Pocock, PV 
Trollip, AE 
Warren, SE 
United Party 
United Party 
United Party 
Dominion Party 
United Party 
United Party 
National Party 
Pietermaritzburg 
North-Rand 
Port Elizabeth 
Durban (Berea) 
Pretoria-Central 
Brakpan 
Swellendam 
1938–9 
1938–43 
1933–43 
1938–43 
1929–58 
1938–53 
1938–53 
Sources: USA, HA Debates, VOL. 32, 12/8/1938: 891; and Parliamentary Register, 
1910–1961. 
 
The Committee was thus solidly Government oriented and met for the first time on 
Monday 22 August, appointing Hirsch as its Chairman. 
 
THE BILL 
Pocock’s 1938 Bill was, in almost every aspect, a repeat of the Commission’s draft Act 
of 1934 and even the paragraphing remained the same. Between these two dates, the 
original draft had been subject to close scrutiny by a legal draughtsman to prevent 
ambiguity and careless language as far as possible as well as consolidating it as Union 
legislation. For example, Pocock’s Bill introduced the requirement of Union residence 
for those seeking admission to the board’s register of members (AB, 1938: s11(a)v). 
This stipulation was not in the Commission’s draft Act but it should be noted that 
Pocock’s Bill affirmed the principles of the public good established in the 
Commission’s draft. For example, in terms of Section 30 of both Pocock’s Bill and the 
Commission’s draft Act, the board could exempt non-Union accountants from serving 
Union articles or passing Union examinations providing they had done so satisfactorily 
outside the Union. But should they wish to practice in the Union, they were required to 
pass an examination on South African law so that they could understand and apply it. 
Again, Pocock’s Bill – under the heading “Functions” – sought to regulate the number 
of articled clerks allocated to any one member together with their registration and 
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transfer (AB, 1938: s14(1)(b)). A modified Section 16 (“Accounts”) in Pocock’s Bill 
required the board to complete three further tasks:  
 
1. to provide an annual balance sheet together with the revenue and expenditure 
account; 
2. to have their accounts audited; and 
3. to allow any registered accountant and auditor to inspect the accounts and 
auditor’s report in the offices of the board. 
 
This was an interesting amendment and was meant to enhance the accountability of the 
board in the exercise of its fiduciary duties. All Four Societies were to be provided 
copies of the above documents as they were expected to make up any shortfall in 
revenue over expenditure. 
 
An amendment to the by-laws governing the transfer of members between Societies 
catered for the administrative considerations of resignation and readmission of 
members together with the issue of certificates of membership. The ability of members 
to rely upon each other was indicated in Pocock’s Bill under the section entitled 
“unprofessional conduct”. The offence described was that of an accountant declaring 
work to be his when this was not the case; the new caveat provided that the paragraph 
did “not apply to services performed by one registered accountant on behalf of another” 
(AB, 1938: s38(b)). 
 
Of equal importance, the Bill at Section 37(5) followed the Commission (UG49, 1935: 
28) in allowing South African registered accountants and auditors to share profits and 
practise in partnership with firms who carried on a business in the Union under a title 
which included the names of a non-Union firm of public accountants. In these ways, the 
Commission and Pocock sought three objectives:  
 
1. to allay the fears of foreign accountants – particularly the British chartered 
accountants about discriminatory practises against their members,  
2. to preserve a valuable pool of skilled professionals, and 
3. to reassure foreign investors against insular practices. 
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THE SELECT COMMITTEE 
The Select Committee on the Subject of the Accountancy Bill met on four occasions in 
1938 – on 22 and 31 August, and 8 and 19 September. During the latter two sessions, 
the Committee took evidence from two groups: the Four Societies who supported the 
Bill, and the three organisations in opposition to it; the Institute of Accountants of 
South Africa, the Corporation of Accountants and the London Association of Certified 
Accountants – formerly the London Association before a 1933 name change. Of 
importance are the following facts:  
 
1. the Accountancy Profession Commission had taken evidence from 16 organised 
bodies, 13 of them being accounting bodies of one sort or another. By the time 
of Pocock’s Select Committee in 1938, this had been reduced to seven willing 
to give evidence. This is probably an indication that the weaker organisations or 
those concerned with public servants – such as the Public Servants’ Association, 
and the Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants – had realised that 
they were ineligible for registration in terms of the proposed legislation and 
desisted from further attempts to gain admission – alternatively, the Bill did not 
have any widespread recognition or authority to attract participation; and  
 
2. the Public Accountants and Auditors Act of 1951 recognised – as eligible for 
automatic registration – the members of the Four Societies and four other 
organisations, only one from the period of the Select Committee of 1938, that 
being the Institute of Accountants of South Africa. By 1951, of the other two 
organisations present in 1938, the Corporation of Accountants had dropped out 
of the race and the London Association of Certified Accountants had 
amalgamated in 1939 with the Scottish Corporation of Accountants to form the 
ACCA – the Association of Certified and Corporate Accountants. The ACCA 
was awarded a Royal Charter in 1974. 
 
The remaining three organisations recognised by the 1951 Act were the South African 
branches of two English Societies – the Society of Incorporated Accountants and 
Auditors and the Association of Certified and Corporate Accountants – and the South 
African Association of Practising Accountants. The rise and fall of some of these 
societies through the period covered by this thesis indicates the tenuous position they 
 412 
 
held in South Africa and compares badly with the longevity and stable nature of the 
Four Societies. Similarity in name and frequent name changes complicated matters. 
 
OPPONENTS OF THE BILL 
The evidence produced by the opponents to Pocock’s Bill on 8 September 1938 
comprised, in the main, a review of past events, beginning with the Chartered 
Accountants’ Designation (Private) Act of 1927. A representative of the Institute of 
Accountants of South Africa, Mr M Stephen, stated that, before the passage of the 1927 
Designation Act, the Four Societies had stated that students and practising accountants 
wishing to qualify for admission to the chartered societies “would be given every 
opportunity to do so” (SC12, 1938: Q2). This was supported by the 1927 Select 
Committee’s Report where various members of the Four Societies had stated this fact. 
The evidence of JDH Lang in 1927, for example, confirmed that non-chartered 
accountants who qualified for admission could do so through the two voluntary 
Societies in the Cape and Orange Free State, thereby avoiding the more strenuous 
requirements of the two statutory Societies in Natal and the Transvaal (SC5, 1927: 
Q517). Stephen’s perception was that “this avenue has been discarded and evaded” 
(SC12, 1938: Q3) through the Chartered Societies amending their by-laws to require 
the successful completion of articles of clerkship under a member in public practice in 
South Africa or the same period under a public accountant outside of South Africa. The 
Societies had been consistent in this. Stephen either misunderstood or was 
misinterpreting that the net effect of this was to prevent South Africans – other than 
those trained by the Four Societies – from gaining admission to the chartered bodies 
while leaving the door open to overseas qualified accountants. This was essentially 
correct – the designation gave the Societies an advantage. 
 
A further concern was the shortcomings of the Pearce Agreement which had allowed 
two groups admission to the South African Chartered Societies – Class I dealing with 
those with five years’ experience in sole practice and who passed an examination and 
Class II, those with 10 years’ practice with no examination. Stephen accurately 
described this Agreement as “the price paid by the Chartered Societies to get what they 
wanted” (SC12, 1938: Q5). He believed, as many others probably did, that the 
Societies’ amendment of their by-laws reduced the impact of the Agreement, which, in 
any case, “did not achieve or purport to achieve registration, and it did not require or 
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insist on other accountants becoming chartered accountants (SA) in order to prevent 
their rights being taken away” (SC12, 1938: Q5). Stephen’s analysis was not quite 
accurate, but he was correct in believing the Agreement achieved little. The 
inaccuracies would later earn Stephen censure from Hirsch. 
 
OPPONENTS IN AGREEMENT 
Stephen pointed out that a conference between the Institute of Accountants, the 
Corporation of Accountants and the London Association of Certified Accountants had 
settled their differences and provided a united front for discussion with the Four 
Societies. The Chartered Societies had not embraced the idea with any enthusiasm. 
Stephen’s belief was that “all they propose to do is to dominate and, if possible 
annihilate [the other societies]” (SC12, 1938: Q8). This was unacceptable to the other 
societies who were dissatisfied with the status quo. 
 
STEPHEN’S PROPOSAL 
Stephen suggested a seven-point solution to the impasse in a modification of the 
Commission’s draft Act as follows (SC12, 1938: Q10–1):  
 
(i) a modified final examination for admission to the chartered societies for the 
members of the societies he represented; 
(ii) a 10-year period of continuous public practise to grant automatic admission into 
the chartered societies; 
(iii) overseas London and Corporation accountants who had qualified there by 
examination to be required to write an examination in South African law only; 
(iv) protection of existing articled clerks and agreement that future clerks would be 
trained by chartered accountants only. This would include those covered in (i) 
and (ii) above as trainers until all had worked through the system; 
(v) current London and Corporation students to be entitled to write the CA final 
examinations seven years after being registered as students in South Africa; 
(vi) greater representation on the Accountancy Board; and 
(vii) all members of the London, Corporation and Institute resident in South Africa to 
go on the register automatically (but not necessarily as chartered accountants). 
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With regard to the above proposals, Stephen estimated an immediate increase of 125 
new chartered accountants would be the result, compared to the current membership of 
the chartered societies of 1 200 (SC12, 1938: Q11). He concluded: “Therefore when 
one looks at the thing, it is a small number of persons who will be affected by the 
amendment” (SC12, 1938: Q11). The proposal appeared reasonable. 
 
Stephen believed that the Institute’s Bills introduced by Reitz in 1934 and 1936 had 
forced the Four Societies to support Pocock’s Bill of 1938. He concluded:  
 
“They did not actually want it but it was because of their being forced to do this 
that they felt they themselves would take up the matter of the Bill suggested by 
the Accounting Commission … The Government is, we understand, prepared to 
put through a Bill if it is satisfied that it is an agreed measure. With this end in 
view we have submitted the amendments we desire to have made to the present 
Bill. The CAs know that the Bill cannot become law unless the other side has 
had some say in connection with the matter and a settlement arrived at” (SC12, 
1938: Q13). 
 
The fact that the Reitz Bills failed early in the process does not support this view. The 
Societies were probably more concerned with the solidly United Party Select 
Committee, compared to the sole parliamentarian on the 1934 Commission, Pocock. 
 
RICHMAN’S PROPOSALS 
While Stephen spoke for the opponents to the Bill responding to the Committee’s call 
for evidence, the South African representative of the Corporation of Accountants 
nevertheless placed before the Select Committee his organisation’s memorandum of 
evidence. The representative, Mr Richman, detailed four main areas of concern that 
affected all opponents equally.  
 
(a) As it stood, the law entitled the Corporation’s members to practise as 
accountants in the Cape and Orange Free State. If the Bill became law, this 
would be illegal. 
(b) Members of the Corporation were to be treated individually and not admitted en 
bloc as with the chartered societies. 
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(c) The Bill prevented members of the Corporation from having clerks articled to 
them, which, at present, they were entitled to have. 
(d) South African student members of the Corporation not articled would lose the 
opportunity of becoming qualified accountants. 
 
To resolve the situation, Richman produced a set of proposals very similar to the ones 
presented by Stephen earlier in the proceedings. Richman pursued no separate agenda 
and the opponents’ unity was preserved (SC12, 1938: Q15–6). 
 
A second representative of the Corporation, T Reay, pointed out that the Designation 
Act of 1927 was a private act of Parliament and not a qualifying act. As such, it 
conferred a right upon members of the Four Societies that they did not previously have 
in terms of common law. In strict interpretation, this did not entitle the chartered 
societies to “represent the hallmark of the profession” (SC12, 1938: Q17) as there were 
other equally qualified accountants outside the scope of the Designation Act. Reay 
believed the situation had been exacerbated as a result of the Commission’s perceived 
treatment of the South African chartered societies as privileged bodies. 
 
Stephen agreed and described Pocock’s Bill as “a Bill of discrimination from beginning 
to end. We are not objecting to there being discrimination but we object to the extent of 
the discrimination between the chartered societies and ourselves” (SC12, 1938: Q21). 
 
ANW Thompson, Stephen’s colleague on the Institute and a representative of the 
opposition to the Bill, laid before the Select Committee a 13-point list of the “principal 
discriminations in the Bill between chartered and non-chartered accountants” (SC12, 
1938: Q22). The most important points were that: 
 
 the opponents to the Bill, as an organised group, had no representation on either the 
Provisional Board nor the Accountancy Board; 
 all members of the chartered societies could register at any time, but members of 
other organised bodies needed to register within six months of the Bill’s passage; 
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 the chartered societies would not only continue while other organised bodies would 
cease to exist upon registration, but they would also be given the right to control 
their own affairs and discipline their members; and 
 only chartered accountants could have clerks articled to them and could control 
their registration. 
 
This latter point was important as it placed the non-chartered societies at a disadvantage 
“in competing with chartered accountants who [were] favoured with that privilege 
which implies good service from qualifying clerks at low wages and sometimes even 
premiums in addition” (SC12, 1938: Q23). There were thus common elements in the 
stance of the Bill’s opponents; what is obvious is the number of points of disagreement. 
Even with the best will in the world, agreement was unlikely without substantial 
compromise by all concerned. 
 
SUPPORTERS OF THE BILL 
The Committee only met again on Monday 19 September 1938, a full 11 days after the 
opponents of the Bill had presented their evidence. At this meeting, the delegation of 
the Four Societies was led by HG Galbraith, President of the Cape Society, and GEL 
Horne, Secretary of the Natal Society. Horne stated that the Four Societies were 
unanimous in supporting the Bill, with the “exception of one or two minor points” 
(SC12, 1938: Q24) to which they proposed amendments, known colloquially as “The 
19 September changes”. 
 
The first amendment proposed was to Section 17 of the Bill dealing with by-laws, (AB, 
1938: 8). The proposal was that only members of their Societies, who had, at the time 
of application, paid all fees and subscriptions due, should be admitted. The second 
amendment proposed was related to the first and stated that members who had not paid 
subscriptions due within six months of falling due, should be removed from the 
register. A member of the Select Committee, Trollip, commented that the Societies 
should be permitted to make their own by-laws to deal with such situations, a comment 
which represented a satisfactory solution to the Societies. The proposals of Stephen and 
Richman were largely ignored. 
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THE COMMITTEE’S BIAS 
The Chairman, Hirsch, pointed out that the Bill had not made provision for those 
potential members who had completed articles or the final examination but at the time 
of the Bill’s passage, were not members of a Society. He proposed a suitable 
amendment to Section 28 of the Bill (AB, 1938: 12). In so doing, and by ignoring the 
concerns of the Bill’s opponents, he indicated his and the Committee’s preference for 
the Bill and, by implication, that of the Four Societies. A further point that concerned 
the Chairman was the fact that the register would generally allow registration only in 
one Province of the Union. Unqualified persons could thus choose to be registered in 
Natal or the Transvaal to the detriment of the existing rights of members in the statutory 
closed Societies in those Provinces. He proposed an amendment in which the Province 
of registration for such unqualified persons be the one in which they were licensed in 
1937. This would automatically exclude them from Natal and the Transvaal where, to 
practise as accountants, they would have needed to be a member of the appropriate 
Society. Hirsch concluded: “Qualified persons, on the other hand, [would] be allowed 
to practise in which-ever province they may choose” (SC12, 1938: 28). No licences 
were issued in these Provinces anyway – they were governed by statute. Thus, instead 
of finding common ground, it seems the Committee actively sought to support the 
position of the Four Societies to the detriment of their opponents. 
 
A further problem foreseen by the Committee was to do with Section 19 of the Bill 
(AB, 1938: 10) which required an accountant practising in more than one Province to 
be a member of each Province’s Society. The Committee emphasised a key fact in the 
ongoing saga: “We have been led to understand that Parliament has set its face against 
legislating for a public profession by making the right to practise contingent upon 
membership of a private society” (SC12, 1938: Q28). 
 
This is an important principle and one which Parliament had adhered to in various ways 
since 1913, that being that rights given to one body of professionals should not, as far 
as was possible, be at the expense of others. Thus, the Committee proposed an 
amendment whereby unqualified people would still be subject to the inter-provincial 
restrictions while others – that is: qualified men – would no longer be required to be 
members of each Society in each Province in which they practised and would fall under 
the direct control of the Accountancy Board. 
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THE MAY 1936 MEETING 
As a prelude to Galbraith presenting the evidence of the Four Societies, the Chairman 
of the Select Committee, Hirsch, pointed out that the requests of the opponents of the 
Bill had been carefully considered but the Committee “could not voluntarily make the 
concessions for which they asked” (SC12, 1938: Q30). Galbraith, for the Four 
Societies, took up the story and pointed out that a meeting in Johannesburg as far back 
as May 1936 had failed to break the impasse. Pocock’s Bill had thus been developed on 
the basis of unresolved controversy and with little chance of majority support, despite 
the fact that the Government “was anxious for agreement between the different 
societies” (SC12, 1938: Q31). 
 
But, a member of the Select Committee, Warren, pointed out that failure to meet the 
Bill’s opponents and discuss the issues would “be held against us and possibly retard 
the passage of the Bill through the House” (SC12, 1938: Q31). However, Galbraith 
reverted to the old argument that by admitting unqualified people, the standard of the 
CA designation would be reduced. His next comment was revealing in the light of 
Sections 23 and 29 of the 1951 Act. He stated, “We have no objection to these other 
people practising as registered accountants, but we want to keep up the standard of 
chartered accountants SA and not leave it” (SC12, 1938: Q32). It thus seemed possible 
to have a non-chartered, qualified accountant. 
 
It was pointed out that at the 1936 meeting, the Four Societies had dealt with only the 
Institute of Accountants of South Africa in the Cape. Subsequent to 1936, the Institute 
had brought in two overseas bodies – the Corporation of Glasgow and the London 
Association of Accountants. 
 
The final issue dealt with was the potential for the Minister of Finance to turn down the 
nominees of the Four Societies to the Accountancy Board. The Societies wanted the 
Minister to be prohibited from doing this. The Chairman indicated that this was 
unlikely. It was clear that there were wide differences of opinion and that compromise 
was elusive if not impossible. This was underlined when the Chairman of the 
Committee declared the demands of Stephen and the Institute of Accountants to be a 
“complete travesty of the recommendations of the Government Commission of 1934” 
(SC12, 1938: Q36). 
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PARLIAMENT PROROGUED: 1938 
At this point, the Select Committee’s deliberations were ended by the imminent 
prorogation of Parliament at the end of the 1938 session. The Chairman of the 
Committee was obliged to report on 19 September to the House of Assembly that this 
event, and the short time allowed to the Committee to conduct its investigation, had 
made it impossible “to complete a full and comprehensive enquiry into the subject of 
the Accountancy Bill referred to it” (SC12, 1938: Q1). Accordingly, the Committee 
submitted the evidence it had gathered and recommended it be discharged at the end of 
the current session of Parliament and reappointed at the next session to complete the 
enquiry and submit an amended Bill. Before the session ended, the Committee 
suggested that the proponents and opponents of the Bill meet in the interim period to 
reach agreement (SC8, 1939, Appendix B: ii). This had been tried, in 1924–5 with the 
Accountants Bill, with no success. 
 
THE 1939 PARLIAMENTARY SESSION 
At the beginning of the 1939 session of Parliament in February, Pocock moved that the 
Accountancy Bill be proceeded with at the stage it had been left in September 1938. 
The House agreed to this (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 33, 7/2/1939: 42) and on 9 February 
the Speaker declared that the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders had confirmed 
the same membership as for the earlier Select Committee (USA, HA Debates Vol. 33, 
9/2/1939: 129). 
 
THE 1939 SELECT COMMITTEE 
The 1939 Select Committee on the Subject of Accountancy Bill met on seven occasions 
between 13 February and 30 March. The Committee interviewed no one but accepted 
more written evidence from a variety of sources. Some of it, like the Transvaal 
Society’s submission of 8 March, had the potential for creating more problems rather 
than solving them. The Transvaal proposed that overseas firms of accountants be 
prohibited from practising in the Union (SC8, 1939: Q8). This Society, on occasion, 
proved obstructive. Before the Select Committee of 1938, Galbraith alluded to the fact 
that, at the May 1936 conference with the Institute of Accountants, agreement had been 
reached with support from three of the Four Societies. Horne, the Secretary of the Natal 
Society of Accountants, pointed out that the Transvaal had been the dissenting Society 
at that conference but that it accounted for one half of the total membership of the Four 
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Societies. Thus, the others believed it necessary to “bow to the superior numbers of the 
Transvaal Society” (SC12, 1938: Q31). 
 
HORNE’S LETTER 
A written submission to the 1939 Select Committee was made on behalf of the Four 
Societies by Horne, the Secretary of the Natal Society of Accountants and dated 
25 January 1939. In it, he reported on a further meeting on 30 November 1938 between 
representatives of the Four Societies and those opposing the Bill, namely the Institute 
of Accountants of South Africa, the Corporation of Accountants and the London 
Association of Certified Accountants (SC8, 1939, Appendix B: i). 
 
It is clear from a scrutiny of the 1938 and 1939 minutes of the Select Committee that 
Parliament required a large compromise solution to the question of a unified 
accountancy profession. It is also clear that some of those in the Societies, particularly 
those in the Transvaal Society, hoped for an arrangement which suited their interests 
the best. In this environment, compromise was difficult and this is confirmed by the 
opening statement in Horne’s letter: “it had hitherto been felt that a conference between 
the Societies and the opposing bodies would be fruitless because the whole basis of the 
demands of the opposing bodies was such that they would not be acceptable to the 
Societies” (SC8, 1939, Appendix B: ii). He pointed out that whatever the outcome of 
that meeting, the Societies’ representatives believed its results would be helpful to the 
Select Committee in its deliberations. 
 
Horne’s letter detailed that the Societies could not support the “wholesale admission” to 
the Societies of their opponents’ members as this would affect “the rights and interests 
of the profession as constituted under the registration laws of the Transvaal and Natal” 
(SC8, 1939, Appendix B: iii). Some points had already been conceded by the Societies, 
such as doing away with the proposed compulsory registration with a Society of those 
who, in the future, qualified for admission to the register. Other points were dismissed 
as spurious, such as the beliefs that the Societies wished “to extinguish the opposing 
bodies” (SC8, 1939, Appendix B: iii) or that the designation “chartered accountant” 
was to become the only one in use in South Africa. 
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CONCESSIONS 
Horne’s letter detailed the areas where the Societies were prepared to consider 
concessions; these being in the:  
 
(a) provision for members of the opposing bodies to take articled clerks; 
(b) reduction of the period of nine years’ practical experience required by Section 
29 of Pocock’s Bill (AB, 1938: 12) for registered accountants to qualify for 
admission to a Society together with the elimination of the need to take the 
intermediate examination; 
(c) consideration of a common fee payable by both chartered accountants and 
registered accountants. 
 
While the concessions were minimal, the members of the opposing bodies agreed to 
discuss these matters subject to two stipulations:  
 
(i) all their members needed to be benefited equally by an agreement; and 
(ii) all their existing members needed to be admitted to the Societies either by 
passing a modified examination or by completing a period of practice (SC8, 
1939, Appendix B: v). 
 
In his submission to the Select Committee, Horne recorded that the Societies could not 
agree to the above stipulations for a number of reasons, the main one being the hoary 
perennial – that it would be unfair to those members of the Societies who had entered 
them by means of the stipulated route – that is: articles and examination. It would also 
infringe the legal rights of the two Societies established by statute – Natal and the 
Transvaal. Indeed, it would lead to the condonation of the activities of the opposing 
societies’ members who had practised in these two provinces in breach of the law 
which restricted such activities to the members of the two Provincial Societies. 
 
Horne pointed out that the proposed Bill at Section 11 (AB, 1938: 5) allowed qualified 
members of their opponents’ societies to register with the new board and to practise as 
registered accountants and auditors. Finally, Horne pointed out that the sudden 
admission of unqualified people into the South African Societies would harm the 
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position of its existing members in their competition with qualified members of 
overseas Societies whose status had remained undiluted. 
 
In response, representatives of the opposing societies pointed out that “they did not 
covet the designation of the Societies” (SC8, 1939, Appendix B: vi), but as the Bill 
only recognised the Four Societies, their opponents believed they could only achieve 
“the protection to which they felt they were entitled by becoming members of the 
Societies” (SC8, 1939, Appendix B: vi). If the Bill was changed to give this protection, 
the opposing societies would drop entry for their members to the Four Societies as a 
condition. 
 
Horne declared that, after much debate, agreement was not achieved. This was reported 
to the Select Committee together with the Societies’ support of the Bill, subject to the 
minor changes they had suggested at the Committee meeting of 19 September 1938 
(“The 19 September changes”). 
 
STEPHEN’S LETTER 
A copy of Horne’s letter of 25 January 1939 was made available to Stephen in his 
position as representative of the opposing parties. Stephen’s response to this letter to 
the Select Committee was dated 3 March 1939 and it was not encouraging. He pointed 
out that it had been agreed at the beginning of the meeting that everything discussed at 
the meeting would “not be used in any way by either side for the purpose of furthering 
its claims or with the object of affecting the findings of the Select Committee” (SC8, 
1939, Appendix C: viii). As a result of this agreement, the opposing bodies believed 
that both sides were “honour bound to treat the whole of the negotiations and 
proceedings, in so far as they [related] to the merits of the case as entirely confidential” 
(SC8, 1939, Appendix C: viii). Stephen then provided an analysis of the Societies’ 
Report of 25 January to the Select Committee and detailed items in that Report where 
he believed confidentiality had been breached. He contended that the Committee should 
ignore certain sections of the Report as they were in the “nature of propaganda in 
support of the Societies’ claims” (SC8, 1939, Appendix C: ix). 
 
Stephen added that the Societies’ Report was not a complete record but neither would 
this be provided by the opposing bodies as this would compromise their undertaking to 
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the agreement. The fact that the agreement had been fatally compromised seems to 
have by-passed Stephen, or possibly – and more likely – he was using the agreement to 
generate uncertainty for he contended there had been a broad acceptance “for the 
maintenance of the status quo of all the existing bodies of organised accountants 
represented at the meeting” (SC8, 1939, Appendix C: ix) as a broad basis for the 
amendment of the Bill. 
 
Stephen then listed the points of agreement he believed had been achieved between the 
two groups of accountants, the most important being the:  
 
1. admission to the register of all members of the three non-chartered societies – 
the Institute of Accountants, the Corporation of Accountants and the London 
Association of Certified Accountants – who lived in South Africa;  
 
2. proportional representation of the three non-chartered societies on the 
Provisional and Accountancy Boards; 
 
3. allowance of all members to employ articled clerks “with the permission of the 
local chartered society, with right of appeal to the Accountancy Board” (SC8, 
1939, Appendix C: x); 
 
4. elimination of the intermediate examination for members together with a 
reduction in their practical experience from nine to six years; 
 
5. recognition that only the Accountancy Board could remove individuals from the 
register; 
 
6. the recognition of the continuity of the three non-chartered societies after the 
registration process (SC8, 1939, Appendix C: ix–x). 
 
Stephen qualified the admission of the members of the societies be represented by 
saying they did not want “wholesale admission” to the chartered Societies, but rather 
gradual admission, the result of which process he acknowledged “would be to secure 
finality in the profession” (SC8, 1939, Appendix C: x). It was clear that if the Bill 
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passed as it was, then its opponents would be split in two groups – practising and non-
practising members – with the former being admitted to the register. Eventually, their 
numbers would dwindle away as the Bill would prevent that supply of new members to 
the opposing societies needed for their continued existence. It was equally clear that the 
chartered Societies would continue to exist beyond the register. 
 
Stephen took exception to the contention that members of the Societies possessed 
qualifications superior to those of the opposing bodies, and pointed out that it was a 
known fact that many of the Societies’ members had not qualified by examination or 
articles. In conclusion, Stephen stated that while no complete agreement had been 
made, he believed – incredibly – most contentious issues had been resolved, leaving the 
“student difficulty alone [as standing] in the way of a settlement” (SC8, 1939, 
Appendix C: xii). This student issue arose as the opponents to Pocock’s Bill pointed out 
that no mention was made of registered students who were being trained in South 
Africa and the fact that not all such students were articled clerks. The Bill at Section 21 
(AB, 1938: 10) made it very clear that the successful completion of articles was a 
necessary future prerequisite for admission to the register as a registered accountant and 
auditor. As the Bill stood, the opposing bodies thus reaffirmed their opposition to it. 
 
As the representative of the Societies, Horne was given a copy of Stephen’s letter. His 
response dated 8 March 1939 was short – no acceptable plan resulted from the meeting 
between the opposing bodies and the Societies, despite Stephen’s belief. Horne 
concluded: “No indication was given nor was it intended to be understood that the 
points discussed were acceptable to the delegates of the Societies” (SC8, 1939, 
Schedule E: xv). 
 
CHANCERS: THE ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTANTS 
An impasse had resulted again and into it another contender appeared – the Association 
of International Accountants, London. While acknowledging that they were of 
“comparatively recent formation”, this body announced its support for the opponents of 
the Bill and demanded equal treatment with them in “any legislation affecting 
accountants in South Africa” (SC8, 1939, Appendix D: xiii). This Association based its 
claim upon a membership of 139 accountants in South Africa and an admission process 
which included examinations, and enjoyed “a considerable status in [England] as an 
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examining body of repute” (SC8, 1939, Appendix D: xiii). As an inducement, this 
Association offered a reciprocal concession whereby qualified South African 
accountants could have their South African membership recognised for the purpose of 
practising in England, subject to their passing examination on English law and income 
tax. It is unlikely their application was taken seriously at this late stage of proceedings, 
given the Committee had first met on 12 August 1938. 
 
The Select Committee of 1939 accepted written evidence but called no one to be 
interviewed. While it was clear that no immediate resolution of the differences between 
the Societies and the opposing bodies was possible, the Committee, at its meeting on 8 
March, resolved nevertheless that legislation was necessary “to provide for the 
registration, qualification, designation and control of accountants” (SC8, 1939: viii). 
Thus, the Bill needed to be completed and presented to the House of Assembly. This 
task was completed in five further meetings in the period 15–30 March, but the 
Proceedings of the Select Committee record no actual details of the exact nature of the 
changes to the Bill made by it in response to the evidence put forward. However, it is a 
fair assumption that, based upon the tone of the previous Select Committee in 1938, 
any revisions to Pocock’s Bill would favour the chartered Societies rather than the 
opposing bodies. This, too, had been the attitude apparent in the recommendations 
made by the Accountancy Commission of 1934. In this, however, it was commonly 
accepted that the Societies were good at what they did. 
 
The Select Committee’s last meeting was on 30 March, where it was agreed that the 
Chairman would report the amended Bill to the House of Assembly. This was done 
without delay on the same day. The Bill was read a first time with a second reading set 
for 14 April. 
 
It had become obvious during the course of the proceedings of the Select Committee of 
1938 and 1939 that the Coalition Government of Smuts and Hertzog wanted a 
compromise Accountancy Bill which met the needs and desires of accountants defined 
in the broadest sense. Not only was this politically desirable but it also made good 
sense in that the rancour that had built up since 1913 would be dissipated, allowing the 
profession to forge ahead without the baggage of a contentious past. 
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Another set of facts was also apparent. The Select Committee’s timing was poor – not 
that it had any control over external events. The first Select Committee’s report in 
September 1938 coincided with the Sudetenland crisis in Central Europe which had 
resulted in the Munich Conference between the British Prime Minister, Neville 
Chamberlain, and the German dictator, Adolf Hitler. The Committee’s second report 
was dated March 1939, and coincided with Germany’s unprovoked and unilateral 
takeover of what remained of Czechoslovakia by its declaration of a German 
Protectorate over Bohemia and Moravia. 
 
Both events overshadowed Parliament’s concern about the Accountancy Bill and, 
indeed, by August 1939, it was apparent that a war in Europe would split the Fusion 
Government. This indeed happened early in September when the House voted for war 
but a national crisis was averted when the Governor-General refused to dissolve 
Parliament, accepted Hertzog’s resignation and asked Smuts to form a Government. 
Parliament’s activities continued, but South Africa’s attention was drawn elsewhere and 
Pocock’s Bill began to fade into the background. 
 
FIRST AND SECOND READINGS 
Pocock introduced his Accountancy Bill for its final reading on 23 January 1940 with a 
second reading on 2 February. At the latter reading Pocock, gave a brief history of the 
process since 1913 as well as an overview of the Bill. Two points are of interest. 
 
Firstly, Pocock stated he had been asked to introduce the Bill developed by the 
Accounting Commission of 1934 because “the Minister of Finance felt that it would not 
be right for the Government to introduce a Bill” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 37, 2/2/1940: 
798). There is no detail as to what was not “right” – possibly the alienation of an 
influential segment of the electorate. And secondly, he revealed that strong opposition 
to the Bill had been exhibited by “certain outside societies [that] were not recognised 
Societies in the Union of South Africa in the same form and degree as the chartered 
societies” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 37, 2/2/1940: 798). It is possible that the 
Government was wary of this opposition and was using Pocock’s Bill as a stalking 
horse to gauge the strength of that opposition. It was also a way in which to avoid 
antagonising potential voters. The General Election of May 1938 had seen the 
emergence of a strong United Party with 111 seats out of a total of 150 seats 
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(Breitenbach et al., 1974: 360) and the final relegation of the Labour Party to the side-
lines of politics with just three seats. It had won eight seats in the 1929 election and 
four in 1933. At its zenith, in 1924, the Labour Party had held 17 seats, and as a result 
of its Pact with the Nationalists, had an impact beyond its numbers in Parliament. For 
the proponents of the Accountancy Bill, this meant the character of its opposition had 
changed from members and outright opponents like Hay, Rayburn and Waterston to a 
new generation of Parliamentarians who were not necessarily in total opposition to the 
Bill but were concerned at the divisions the issue created. Hooper, the Dominion Party 
member for Durban (Berea), put the issue in a nutshell when he stated, 
 
“it is not an agreed measure, and … every possible step has not been taken to 
secure an agreed measure. I think we are dealing with the rights of a large 
number of individuals, and when we are doing that we should walk very warily. 
We have in two of our provinces in the accountancy profession a privileged 
class and we must agree that it is desirable that all should be placed on the same 
footing” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 37, 2/2/1940: 802). 
 
In an oblique reference to the war, Hooper lamented that the Bill had been brought 
forward when all were “so pre-occupied with other important issues” (USA, HA 
Debates, Vol. 37, 2/2/1940: 803). 
 
Pocock was of the opinion that whatever rights practising accountants had at the date of 
the Bill’s passage would be retained by them and that the changes would only apply to 
future applicants (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 37, 2/2/1940: 800). With reference to the 
economy, he pointed out:  
 
“We have tried to strengthen the position of accountants which will prove of 
great value in carrying out the commercial laws of this country [and] … with a 
full knowledge of these laws to deal with the many practical difficulties which 
are daily encountered in business” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 37, 2/2/1940: 801). 
 
Pocock summarised one of the main points of the Bill as the registration of all 
practising accountants in the Union, whether chartered or not, subject to the conditions 
set out in Section 11 of the Bill. This Section required either membership of one of the 
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South African Chartered Societies or proof of bona fide activity as a practising public 
accountant with a valid licence. Other points included the following. 
 
 Accountants – other than members of the Chartered Societies – would be restricted 
to practising in their province of permanent residence. This effectively closed off 
Natal and the Transvaal. 
 A provisional board of three – one each representing the Chartered Societies, the 
non-chartered societies, and the Minister’s nominee – would initiate and control the 
registration process and then hand the resulting structure to an appointed 
accountancy board. 
 This latter board would control the profession, the holding of examinations and 
disciplinary matters. 
 By-laws would need to be approved by the Minister of Finance who would also 
appoint an independent member of the permanent board. 
 Other appointees would comprise two representing the University of South Africa 
and one from each of the four Chartered Societies. (The latter allocation is 
questionable as Pocock stated “the Accountancy Board will consist of four 
representatives”, presumably in total, otherwise the Societies would dominate the 
Board (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 37, 2/2/1940: 799).) 
 
The Bill addressed the issue of articled clerks, restricting their service in future to 
chartered accountants. Those currently in the service of non-chartered accountants 
would be permitted to complete articles and write the necessary qualifying 
examinations. In terms of Section 28 of the Bill, those accountants who had never 
completed articles but had nine years’ practical experience in the office of a practising 
accountant could, upon the successful completion of the qualifying examination, gain 
admission to a Chartered Society. 
 
In terms of Section 35, those applicants who believed a hardship had been inflicted 
upon them, would have the right of appeal to the Provincial Division of the Supreme 
Court, a standard inclusion since the 1913 Bill and a cumbersome one. Section 36 dealt 
with offences while Section 37 dealt with unprofessional conduct. Of interest is the fact 
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that they were dealt with separately in the Bill (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 37, 2/2/1940: 
800). 
 
Pocock commented at the end:  
 
“I want to emphasise in this brief review of the Bill that I have been particularly 
careful to see that whatever rights persons at present practising have, that those 
rights are preserved with this qualification that in future only those accountants 
who are members of chartered societies will be able to take on articled clerks” 
(USA, HA Debates, Vol. 37, 2/2/1940: 801). 
 
THE HOUSE-IN-COMMITTEE 
The Bill passed the second reading and was scheduled to go before the House-in-
Committee on 9 February. 
 
In the end, the House went into Committee on 23 February and began the long and 
arduous process of considering the detail carefully and amending the Bill as 
appropriate. The Committee agreed, for example, to allow all registered auditors the 
right to employ articled clerks (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 37, 23/2/1940: 2169) and 
allowed the Minister of Finance greater freedom of choice in the appointment of his 
nominee to the provincial board (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 37, 22/2/1940: 2170). On the 
issue of registration of non-practising members of the Institute of Accountants of South 
Africa, proposed by Hooper (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 37, 23/2/1940: 2172), who held 
salaried posts and might never practice but should not be deprived, the process stalled. 
Shortly before this, Pocock had proposed to permit registration for all practising public 
accountants in the Cape and the Orange Free State prior to 1 January 1940 – who were 
in such practice prior to 1 January 1939 and in possession of an accountant’s licence. 
Hooper’s proposal infringed the process in two ways – it ignored the established 
principle that the test of membership was public practice (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 37, 
23/2/1940: 2173) and it gave preferential treatment to one group. 
 
Hooper pointed out that the concession would not be “a very important thing” as those 
benefitting from it would not acquire the designation as a result (USA, HA Debates, 
Vol. 37, 23/1/1940: 2176). To this, Pocock responded that the concession would open 
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“the door too wide” as it would need to be applied to all the members of the societies in 
opposition, including those not in actual practice, but who were merely working in an 
accountant’s office. Such a flood would make the Bill unworkable (USA, HA Debates, 
Vol. 37, 23/2/1940: 2177). The debate thereafter lost cohesion as old arguments were 
rehashed. Haywood, Nationalist Party member for Bloemfontein (South), warned 
Pocock that vested rights were being interfered with and should he not accept the 
amendment, he would “not get the Bill passed, for we shall then be compelled to put 
forward other amendments and fight him”. The Institute of Accountants had 130 
members (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 37, 23/2/1940: 2181). 
 
Davis, United Party member for Pretoria (City), pointed out that the main difference 
between the Chartered Societies and the Institute of Accountants of South Africa was 
that the former insisted upon a period of articles as a prerequisite for qualification 
(USA, HA Debates, Vol. 37, 23/2/1940: 8121). He believed that members of the 
Institute whose rights were recognised by the Bill could “consider themselves 
extremely fortunate, because, in fact, they are only qualified bookkeepers” (USA, HA 
Debates, Vol. 37, 23/2/1940: 2182). He continued by saying that if the Bill did more 
than recognise practising members of the Institute as public accountants, the object of 
the Bill to place the profession on as sound a basis as in the Transvaal, Natal and 
“England” [sic] would be nullified. 
 
Warren, National Party member for Swellendam, agreed and added that those 
accountants who opposed the Bill harmed “their own profession and prevented it from 
obtaining a higher status in society because some of them are not allowed to use that 
title” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 37, 23/2/1940: 2183). 
 
The Minister of Finance, NC Havenga, entered the debate and appealed to members of 
the House to be guided by the recommendations of the 1934 Commission and the 
Select Committee. In his opinion, the Bill did justice to all interests and provided that 
“we no longer allow the public being exposed to the danger and risk of accountants and 
auditors who are not properly qualified” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 37, 23/2/1940: 2185). 
This was a clear confirmation of Government interest. 
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This appeal was ignored by Serfontein, Nationalist Party member for Boshof, who 
feared a monopoly was being perpetrated, and by Van Nierop, National Party member 
for Mossel Bay, who believed the Institute’s members were – at worst – being 
deliberately excluded, (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 37, 23/2/1940: 2187) or – at best – 
being subjected to a system with “classes of people with different status and different 
benefits” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 37, 23/2/1940: 2192). He proposed that, under the 
circumstances, the Minister should introduce the Bill “so that the House can go into the 
whole question” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 37, 23/2/1940: 2192). 
 
The debate drew to a close and the House focused upon voting Hooper’s original 
amendment which was defeated by 33 votes to 24. Apart from Hooper, who 
understandably voted in favour, his amendment was supported by Van Nierop and 
Serfontein. Those in opposition included Havenga and JH Hofmeyr, United Party 
member for Johannesburg (North). An analysis of the votes reveals that those in 
support of the amendment comprised 11 members of the National Party, three from the 
Dominion Party and 10 from the United Party, 24 in total. Those in opposition to the 
amendment, numbered: one member of the Nationalist Party, Warren; two Native 
Representatives, Hemming and Molteno; two members of the Dominion Party; and 28 
from the United Party – 33 in total (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 37, 23/2/1940: 2194). 
There was thus significant Government support for the Bill as 25% of the United 
Party’s parliamentary membership of 111 supported Pocock. 
 
The process continued but, as it was getting late, members were leaving the House. 
This reduced the opposition’s ability to push its amendments. However, a plea by 
Hemming, the Native Representative for the Transkei, to limit the number of articled 
clerks employed to three per registered accountant was not agreed to by Pocock. While 
Hemming was concerned about the exploitation of clerks by employers expecting too 
much of them, Pocock reasoned that a limitation of numbers of articled clerks would 
cause problems for employers and articles afforded training opportunities (USA, HA 
Debates, Vol. 37, 23/2/1940: 2199). Skilled people were important to the economy. 
 
Hemming’s proposal was supported by both Van Nierop and Marwick, Dominion Party 
member for Illovo (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 37, 23/2/1940: 2204). Pocock agreed that 
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the House should decide and it agreed to Hemming’s proposed amendment to permit 
registered accountants to have only three articled clerks at any time. 
 
Geldenhuys, Nationalist Party member for Prieska, brought up the issue of bilingualism 
in the examination process and the fact that candidates were required to request the 
paper in the language of their choice. These were sensitive issues in 1940 as the War 
had divided the White population. He stated, “we want equality in every respect. This is 
not a question of obstruction, but a great principle is at stake” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 
37, 23/2/1940: 2201). Pocock stated he supported the practical idea of different venues 
for the two languages, but that expecting each candidate to answer in both languages 
was problematic. He asked that this aspect of the Bill be accepted and if there were 
problems, to have them “put right at a future stage” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 37, 
23/2/1940: 2202). Booysen, Nationalist Party member for Namaqualand, took 
exception and called it “a definite evasion of bilingualism” and stated that if “the 
position were the other way round, and it should be laid down that everything had to be 
put in Afrikaans – what a noise we would hear from members opposite [who] are 
abusing our tolerance more and more. The question of equal language rights is at stake 
here” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 37, 23/2/1940: 2203). 
 
Van Nierop supported Geldenhuys’ amendment and commented that everyone needed 
to be encouraged to be bilingual. Pocock responded by saying the House needed to 
decide, while Trollip, the United Party member for Brakpan, suggested all examination 
papers should be set in both official languages (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 37, 23/2/1940: 
2206). Geldenhuys was appreciative of both Trollip and Pocock’s positive response but 
wondered whether Trollip’s proposal “will really meet the point I am endeavouring to 
bring before the House”. Nevertheless, he was prepared to accept the amendment if 
Pocock would agree to a revision being considered at the report stage if necessary. 
Pocock agreed (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 37, 23/2/1940: 2207). 
 
Thereafter the Chair reported progress and requested the House’s permission to sit 
again. This was agreed to and the House was scheduled to resume in Committee on 1 
March. It never did and after Parliament was prorogued on 14 May 1940, the 
Accountancy Bill was dropped as the country began to organise for a major war. On 1 
March 1940, for example, the House was concerned with petrol prices and possible 
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petrol rationing due to “the loss at sea of certain tankers” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 37, 
23/2/1940: 2605). During a debate on security issues the day before, Dr DF Malan, 
leader of the official opposition in Parliament, accused Smuts of being an admirer of 
Hitler’s. Smuts replied the House was full of such people who wanted “the Nazi system 
adopted” in the Union. Smuts anticipated the security measures proposed would 
“contribute to our preserving the rights of self-government and parliamentary 
government” (USA, HA Debates, Vol. 37, 28/2/1940: 2603). Only in 1945 would the 
issue of a united profession be reconsidered and reenergised, and the catalyst, again, 
was the Four Societies (Puttick and Van Esch, 2007: 5). 
 
Pocock’s Bill was important for two main reasons; firstly, its draughtsmanship showed 
a modernity more akin to the 1951 Act than the Bill of 1913 and indicated the distance 
the profession had travelled. In other respects, such as restrictions on admissions 
criteria, the thinking of 1913 remained. And secondly, the principle finally had been 
established by Havenga – one-time Cabinet Minister – of the need for the conferencing 
of interested parties to achieve compromise and a broad consensus behind any Bill. No 
longer would the chartered societies call the tune. 
 
The next round would be orchestrated by the National Government which after nearly 
26 years of uncertainty as to the extent that they should play in the process, finally took 
charge. Certain features in this period of uncertainty were common to all stages; for 
example, articles of clerkship served under an experienced practitioner were found to 
be a constant. While some criticised the practice of articles as being “cheap labour”, the 
reality was that the practice had value in training accountants. This was true in 1913 
and remains true in 2013 where articled clerks are known as trainee accountants. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Pocock’s Bill of 1938–40 failed for the reasons applicable to its predecessors – that is: 
lack of support at the centre. However, in Pocock’s case, there was one unusual element 
– South Africa’s entry into World War II in September 1939. 
 
Once the fighting stopped, a new political power emerged in South Africa with both the 
will and ability to force through the creation of a Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ 
Board to oversee accountants in public practice. 
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Verhoef (2011: 28) proffers the following quote from Government correspondence in 
support:  
 
“the Treasury wishes to announce that it had been decided that a Bill should be 
introduced into Parliament in the near future to provide for the registration, 
qualification, designation and control of Accountants and Auditors and for 
related matters”. 
 
This directive reflects the determination on the part of the new Nationalist government 
to resolve the issue of accountants and their registration once and for all through the 
sheer force of their political will.   
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CHAPTER 13: EPILOGUE AGAIN 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This detailed study of the origins of the Public Accountants and Auditors’ Board 
(PAAB) ends in February 1940 with Pocock’s Accountancy Bill still before Parliament. 
The blitzkrieg that the Germans unleashed on Europe in May 1940 introduced their 
opponents to total war and in the hurly-burly of the South African response, the Bill 
and the issues it represented were relegated to the background until an allied victory 
was achieved in 1945. In that year, the four South African chartered societies came 
together in a conference to consider the future of the profession and established the 
Joint Council of the Societies of Chartered Accountants of South Africa (Lockley, 
2001: 7). This action represented the first step in a new process which would end in 
June 1951 with the enactment of the Public Accountants and Auditors Act with 
1 November 1951 set as the implementation date (Lockley, 2001: 7). 
 
How this was achieved is not within the scope of this thesis, but Puttick and Van Esch 
(2007: 6) suggest the Nationalist Government of the day forcibly intervened to achieve 
the desired and long delayed result of statutory uniformity within the profession – some 
38 years after the Accountants Bill of 1913 was introduced. Verhoef’s (2011: 29) recent 
research has supported this point of view. 
 
The purpose of this epilogue is to consider whether the early functioning of the PAAB 
met its professional expectations, and to determine whether the questions asked in 
Chapter 1 have been answered. Also, concluding remarks will give a brief overview of 
what has emerged from this study. In particular, consideration will be given to the 
peculiar political and economic circumstances in South Africa which prolonged the 
creation of a professional society. 
 
HAVENGA AND THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS AND AUDITORS’ BOARD 
The tasks expected of the new Board were couched in two types of language: the dry 
legalese of the 1951 Act; and the more elegant prose spoken by the then Minister of 
Finance, HC Havenga, at the Board’s inaugural meeting on 25 October 1951. Havenga 
had first served in this capacity in the Pact Government of 1924 and also in the Fusion 
Cabinet of 1933, resigning in 1940. He had been an instrumental force behind the 
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Accountancy Commission of 1934, Pocock’s Bill of 1938 and the process after 1945, 
and was one of a small group of people who still had first-hand knowledge and 
experience of the miscarried South African Society of Accountants (Private) Bill of 
1924–5. 
 
At this point, it is appropriate to reflect briefly upon the life and career of Nicolaas 
Christiaan Havenga, born in 1882. He was in his early forties when the second 
Accountants Bill failed in Parliament in 1924–5. His credentials to that point were 
impressive. He had served with distinction in the Boer forces in the Anglo-Boer War 
and seemingly bore no animosity to English-speaking South Africans. He soon became 
enamoured with Hertzog’s idea of “South Africa First” (Dictionary of South African 
Biography, 1981: 216) and remained true to the man and the ideology he espoused until 
the 1940s when, with reluctance, he transferred his support to Malan and the Purified 
Nationalists (Davenport, 1987: 317–8). Both Hertzog and Malan entrusted him with the 
key portfolio of Finance and, in the Pact Government, Havenga was instrumental in 
providing the financial environment which encouraged South Africa’s industrialisation. 
With the onset of the Great Depression, he navigated the economy through the 
maelström – even though it meant eventually shedding the Gold Standard. 
 
Towards the end of the Depression, coalition with Smuts and the SAP seemed a 
political necessity and Havenga became a key negotiator between Hertzog and Smuts. 
When coalition moved to Fusion and the United Party, Havenga retained the position of 
Minister of Finance and again was instrumental in maintaining a sound economy 
towards the end of the 1930s (Dictionary of South African Biography, 1981: 218). 
When the United Party split over the issue of neutrality in World War II, Havenga 
followed Hertzog into the political wilderness. With Hertzog’s death, Havenga saw the 
only way to beat Smuts was through a united Afrikanerdom. After considerable in-
fighting, Malan’s Herenigde Nasionale Party emerged the victor, both internally within 
Die Volk (Afrikanerdom), and externally against the United Party in the 1948 election. 
Havenga was once again in the familiar role of Minister of Finance. His economic 
direction was sound and earned him international approval (Dictionary of South 
African Biography, 1981: 220–1). 
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It was Havenga, in his last incarnation as Minister of Finance, who finally resolved the 
thorny issue of Accountants’ Registration in the 1951 Act. It had been a long journey 
since 1924. 
 
The Act established the Board as a body corporate and empowered it to perform all acts 
necessary to carry out its duties as specified in the Act (Statutes). These duties included 
registration of members, regulation of the system of articles of clerkship, the conduct of 
examinations for admission to the register and a general oversight of the profession and 
its professional behaviour. 
 
REPORTABLE IRREGULARITY: A TOOL FOR INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS? 
It was left to Havenga to vocalise the Board’s social and economic context when he 
pointed out that the enactment represented Parliament’s “recognition of the principle 
that an auditor owes a duty not only to his client but also to the public” (Manual of 
Information, 1991: 1–3). He then referred to the mechanism in the Act at Section 26(3) 
by which it was hoped this goal would be achieved and stated: 
 
“Although it is not claimed that the provisions of this sub-section will give 
complete protection to the interests and local and overseas investors, advantages 
as yet unseen will undoubtedly accrue from the recognition of the principle 
embodied in that sub-section. It provides, namely, that the auditor should, if his 
client fails to satisfy him, report material irregularities to a statutory body, the 
Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ Board” (Manual of Information, 1991: 1–3). 
 
The reality was different and a failure in the Act to define “material irregularity” or the 
steps needed to resolve it to the satisfaction of the Board rendered it the subject of 
numerous legal interpretations over the years. An unreferenced file entitled “Material 
Irregularity Opinions” accessed with permission in the PAAB offices on 22 April 2005, 
listed 15 legal opinions obtained in the period 11 August 1958 – 19 December 2003 on 
various aspects of a “material irregularity”. It is of interest to note that no such section 
was included in the Australian Charter nor New Zealand Act. 
 
In the debates surrounding the 1951 Act, considerable unease was expressed about the 
consequences of Section 26(3). As Verhoef notes, “The argument was that Section 
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26(3) infringed on the professional conduct and confidentiality between the 
professional auditor and the client” (Verhoef, 2011: 38). 
 
As detailed in Chapter 1, the transformation of “material irregularity” into “reportable 
irregularity” in the Auditing Profession Act of 2006, resulted in similar concerns being 
expressed. Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.  
 
In addition, a vigorous debate was, on occasion, carried on through the pages of the 
profession’s journal, The South African Chartered Accountant. In the December 1963 
issue, Advocate PMA Hunt, a Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of the 
Witwatersrand, posed the question: “Material Irregularities: Watchdog or 
Witchdoctor?”. He came to the conclusion that the state imposed onerous duties upon 
auditors which would be appropriate if they were full-time, paid civil servants and that 
the phrase “material irregularity” should be replaced with “any infringement of 
statutory or common law”. 
 
Given this uncertainty, it was not unusual for practitioners to approach the PAAB for 
assistance. At a Board meeting on 10 August 1954, the Chair alluded to this practice as 
well as the Executive Committee’s response that it was not the function of the Board to 
assist practitioners in the conduct of their practices by advising them whether, in given 
circumstances, a material irregularity had occurred or not” (PAAB Archives, Board 
Vol. 2: B230). A debate then ensued and it was pointed out that the PAAB was “not 
acting in a judicial capacity in these cases. It was merely the vehicle for the 
transmission of cases to the Attorney-General, who decided if a prosecution was 
warranted”. Another point of view was that as it was one of the Board’s duties to raise 
the standard of the profession in the Union, practitioners should be given guidance as to 
what constituted “sound accounting practice” (B230). The Chair cautioned that in 
giving such advice, the Board would be obliged to interpret “material irregularity”. 
Professor Steenkamp, a member of the Board, was of the belief that legal opinions 
would “not be very helpful” as they dealt with legal aspects when the issue was “largely 
an accounting issue” (PAAB Archives, Board Vol. 2: B231). 
 
The Board agreed not to seek a legal opinion. In due course, the Board would not only 
seek legal advice on numerous occasions but also issue a series of circulars for the 
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information of practitioners dealing with a very specific irregularity arising from a 
situation where a client was trading in a situation where its liabilities exceeded its 
assets. In this situation, creditors were clearly at risk. The practitioner’s responsibilities 
were detailed in circulars B3/1967, B1/1968 and B2/1975, which were all withdrawn to 
allow for the introduction of B1/1991 (Manual of Information, 1991: G General 
Circulars). Circulars B1/1982, B3/1982, B2/1984 and B2/1987 were all withdrawn with 
the introduction of Circular B3/1991. These former dealt with various aspects of 
material irregularities. 
 
From this brief overview, it is apparent that the concept of “material irregularity” 
proved troublesome to apply. In an unpublished 1976 Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit 
thesis, the author, FJ Vermaak, worked out that in the period 1953–75, a total of 1146 
instances of material irregularity were reported to the PAAB. He classified them as 
follows. 
 
TABLE 13.1 
MATERIAL IRREGULARITIES, 1953–75  
[translated from the original Afrikaans – see Appendix 6.] 
 
  Total 
instances 
Withdrawn by auditors at a later date 
 
Shareholders prosecuted the director in a civil suit 
 
Satisfactorily rectified at a later date, before or after action taken 
by an authority to whom the incident was referred by the Board 
 
Found by the Board or the authority delegated by the Board, that 
the incident definitely did not comprise a material irregularity 
 
No action taken to prosecute 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
1 
 
 
37 
 
 
12 
 
624 
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Companies deregistered 
 
Various authorities refused to take action  
Attorney-General chose not to prosecute  
- no reason given 
- could not trace the guilty parties 
- insufficient evidence for successful prosecution 
- could not take action before the company was placed under 
judicial management 
 
Admission of guilt paid by company managers or by the 
company itself 
 
Prosecutions brought 
 
Still being investigated 
 
Unresolved 
 
 
 
 
 
 
105 
8 
6 
 
3 
124 
 
13 
 
 
 
 
 
122 
 
 
16 
 
64 
 
117 
 
13 
_____ 
1 146 
Source: Vermaak, 1976: 159–60. 
 
As indicated by the above table, no steps were taken to investigate 624 reported cases, a 
significant 54% of all cases detailed by Vermaak who detailed the reasons as follows. 
 
“In only 591 incidents, did the Board file papers and not take action, because 
the auditors reported that the companies carried on business while insolvent, 
and previous experience in this regard has shown that action could not be taken 
against the companies at that point. 
 
In the other 33 incidents, the companies were already under judicial 
management (3 incidents), in liquidation (9 incidents) or placed in liquidation 
later (21 incidents). It is the duty of the judicial managers and liquidators to take 
action in such incidents where material irregularities allegedly appeared. The 
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Board has consequently made sure that the relevant officials are aware of the 
alleged material irregularities” (Vermaak, 1976: 162–3 [translated from the 
original Afrikaans. See Appendix 6.]).  
 
However, Vermaak admitted that he did not have access to all the relevant detail and 
that the results of his research were necessarily tentative. 
 
While the concept of material irregularity failed, probably as a result of allowing 
individual auditors to decide what was “material” and “irregular” in a set of accounts, 
the new Accounting Profession Act (Act 26 of 2005) recognised this weakness. The 
solution adopted was to give auditors no choice. As soon as a transgression fitted a 
template of requirements given in the definition of “reportable irregularity” in the Act, 
the auditor had no choice but to report it immediately to the professional regulator, 
IRBA (APA, 2005: s45). Failure to do so exposed the auditor to a maximum sentence 
of 10 years (APA, 2005: s52). This was perceived to be particularly harsh by some 
members of the profession as convicted murderers on occasion received similar 
sentences. Clearly, the economy took first place. The current IRBA Annual Report for 
2013 shows the following in its “Significant Feature Summary”. 
 
TABLE 13.2 
REPORTABLE IRREGULARITIES, 2009–13 
 
Reportable Irregularities 
(RIs) received 
2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 
Total RIs received (first reports) 
Second reports – continuing 
Second reports – not continuing 
Second reports – did not exist 
Second reports – other 
710 
459 
247 
3 
1 
814 
491 
312 
11 
0 
806 
468 
328 
7 
3 
1108 
674 
340 
11 
83 
1125 
669 
407 
22 
27 
 
From a review of the information given, reportable irregularities have declined in the 
last five years from 1125 reported cases to 710 – a decrease of nearly 63%. This would 
also suggest that one element of institutional economics is at play here. Instead of the 
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organisation (auditing firms) influencing the representative body (Parliament), the 
reverse has in fact happened. By conceiving of and implementing the concept of 
“reportable irregularities”, Parliament has enhanced its authority as well as its ability to 
directly influence the profession. This is important: whereas pre-2005, the auditor was 
loath to report a client (and possible friend) and thus put his independence at risk, with 
the passage of the new Act, the choice became one of a friend and client or 10 years in 
prison. Under threat of duress, independence became enforceable. 
 
In conclusion, as North points out, “writing history [usually means] constructing a 
coherent story of some facet of the human condition” (North, 1990: 131). He continues 
that for history writing to be good, it needs to be consistent, logical, and written within 
the framework of evidence deduced and theory applied. Including institutions in the 
story improves it. 
 
Institutional economics is a complex of knowledge and theoretical applications which 
have been touched upon in this thesis. This is in keeping with the thesis’ minor goal 
outlined in Chapter 1 of determining whether institutional economics can be applied to 
the creation of the regulatory body – the Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ Board. The 
evidence obtained suggests this is possible: more work needs to be done upon this 
topic. 
 
EXCO – THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD IN OPERATION 
In terms of the 1951 Act, the Board – as the in situ regulatory body created by 
Parliament – was entitled to establish committees to assist it. The general principle was 
that the Board could assign as much of its power as it deemed appropriate to 
committees, but did not divest itself of such powers and could amend or repeal any 
decision made by such committees; Section 6 of the 1956 Public Accountants’ and 
Auditors’ Amendment Act abolished the Board’s power to amend or repeal committee 
decisions concerning individuals and examination passes, registration and disciplinary 
action. 
 
At its meeting of 13–4 February 1952, the Board agreed to assign to a newly 
established Executive Committee the following powers: 
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1. the appointment of staff and the incurring of expenses; 
2. the registration of accountants who qualified; 
3. the admission to articles of clerks and the regulation of their service; 
4. the investigation of the contravention of the Act by non-public accountants and 
auditors and the implementation of appropriate action; 
5. the recovery of debt; and 
6. the granting of permission to registered members to publish articles in the press 
under their own names. 
(PAAB Archives, B22: 13–4/1/1952) 
 
Powers 4 and 6 are interesting and reflect the two sides of the same coin: the first, to 
protect the fledgling body from interlopers; and the second moves towards the creation 
of a national profile through publications. 
 
The question arises: why create an Executive Committee? And the answer is a 
straightforward matter of practicality. With a composition of six members – including 
the Chairman of the Board (Manual of Information, 1991: 2–7) – consensus was more 
easily achieved as was flexibility of meeting times. These are important criteria when 
one considers the original Board comprised 15 members (Act 51, 1951: 53) and was 
required to meet at least twice a year (Act 51, 1951: s7(1)). The fledgling Board, in the 
early days, met frequently. In the memorable year of 1953, there are eight meetings of 
the Board recorded compared to three in 1952. Some of the 1953 meetings extended 
over three days (PAAB Archives, Board Vol. 1: B75–B183) as the Board held some of 
its meetings in provincial capitals other than Johannesburg to indicate its commitment 
to being a Union-wide – and hence national – regulator entity. 
 
TOPICS DISCUSSED BY THE NEW INSTITUTION 
A wide range of topics were discussed, some rather trivial while others were of 
importance. In these early years, too, minutes were taken almost verbatim so while the 
detail is voluminous it is of such a nature that it adds colour to the early picture of the 
functioning of the Board. 
 
A report to the Minister of Finance, dated 18 March 1953, detailed the Board’s 
activities for 1952 (PAAB Archives, Board Vol. 1, Attachment to 4–5/2/1953, B75–
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B92). Amongst the topics reported upon were the draft regulations prescribing what 
constituted unprofessional conduct, the composition of the Disciplinary Committee, the 
syllabus of the Board’s examination and a list of more foreign societies whose status 
was recognised to be equal to that demanded by the profession in the Union. The 
societies were: 
 
 The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, 
 The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland, 
 The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland 
 The Society of Incorporated Accountants and Auditors, 
 The Association of Certified and Corporate Accountants, 
 The Rhodesia Society of Accountants, 
 The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, and 
 The American Institute of Accountants. 
 
Of these, only the examinations of the Institutes of England and Wales, and Scotland 
were considered to be of a sufficiently high standard while only articled service in the 
Institutes of England and Wales, Scotland and Ireland was considered sufficient to 
support an application for exemption from service under articles in South Africa. 
Finally, the Board recognised the final qualifying examinations of the Institutes of 
England and Wales, and Scotland, and the Society of Incorporated Accountants and 
Auditors. 
 
While the inclusion of the UK Chartered Societies on the status list is understandable, 
that of the Incorporated Accountants and Auditors as well as the Association of 
Certified and Corporate Accountants is only partially explained by the fact that the 
members of their South African branches were accorded exempt status from articles 
and examination in terms of Section 23(3) of the 1951 Act. The reason for this lies in 
the period 1946–51, when a consensus was being hammered out, and is beyond the 
scope of this work. In 1958, three associations of accountants party to the 1951 Act 
(Act 1951: 23(8)(b)) ceased to exist. They were the Association of Certified and 
Corporate Accountants, the Association of Practising Accountants of South Africa 
(formerly the American Institute of Accountants) and the three local branches of the 
 446 
 
Society of Incorporated Accountants. Most of their practising members were absorbed 
into the South African Chartered Societies while the representation that they nominated 
to the Board fell away, reducing its membership to 14 (Lockley, 2001: 11). Their 
demise is probably attributable to the lack of members and the greater attractiveness of 
membership with the chartered societies. Of interest, too, and needing explanation, is 
the fact that the Institute of Accountants of South Africa did not appear on any of the 
above lists, despite being included in Section 23(2) of the Act of 1951. What is clear is 
the fact that the situation was fluid. At a meeting of the Board on 16 February 1954 
(PAAB Archives, Board Vol. 1: B193–B196), a submission was considered from the 
Association of Certified and Corporate Accountants to have its final examination and 
articles of clerkship recognised by the PAAB. The Board debated the issue at length. 
Professor Hock, member of the Board, was of the opinion that “the type of paper and 
the examination paper were a better indication [of that paper’s work] than of the 
standard of marking” (B194). He believed the Association’s paper on partnership 
accounts to be “not of a very high standard”. 
 
AW Bennell, the Secretary of the South African Branch of the Association, was 
thereafter interviewed and pointed out that the Association in the United Kingdom had 
been the subject of a Parliamentary Select Committee in 1930 and it had concluded the 
Association’s examinations were on a par with the England and Wales Institute. He 
agreed to provide the Board with details of the Association’s method of marking, 
especially the extent to which errors of principle were penalised, together with copies 
of actual exam papers set over the last five years and of the syllabi prescribed. The 
information would be referred to the Examination for Consideration and 
recommendation to the Board. 
 
At its meeting on 10 August 1954, and upon the recommendation of the Examination 
Committee, the Board adhered “to its previous decision to the effect that the 
Association’s Final Examination is not considered to be up to the required standard” 
(PAAB Archives, Board Vol. 1: B217). The Chair declined to give reasons for the 
decision but agreed to provide the Association with copies of the Board’s papers and 
syllabi so that they could determine the standard required. 
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Further debate ensued and a general principle was established with regard to similar 
requests whereby 
 
“in future, [if] the examinations of a particular body are accepted, they be accepted 
only in relation to members of that body who had passed the examinations in the 
papers set for those dates, the consideration of which had resulted in the Board’s 
decision to recognise the examinations, or who had passed at subsequent diets, 
provided that – 
 
(a) the Board’s decision shall be subject to reconsideration at any time; and 
 
(b) this resolution shall apply only in respect of the examinations of those bodies 
whose requests for recognition of its examinations are approved only after 
reconsideration of a previous decision not to recognise such examinations” 
(PAAB Archives, Board Vol. 1: B220). 
 
With regard to the Association’s request for recognition of service under its articles of 
clerkship, the Board noted the fact that the Association did not require service under 
articles of membership, but agreed to recognise service under articles by persons who 
had served them with the Association outside the Union. 
 
In pursuit of its educational mandate, the Board made available £1 783 to the 
Universities of the Witwatersrand, Pretoria, Natal and Cape Town while its 
accumulated funds at year-end amounted to £11 971, as audited by Messrs Chas, 
Hewitt and Co. 
 
The Board also dealt with extraordinary issues, such as the theft of examination scripts 
from a moderator’s car before they had been marked. This occasioned an emergency 
meeting of the Board on 17 June 1953 (PAAB Archives, Board Vol. 1: B122–3). The 
solution arrived at reflects careful thought. Those whose marks for their other papers 
written in the session indicated no possibility of passing – despite the most favourable 
outcome of the lost script – would be failed. Those who narrowly failed the other 
examinations in the session would be allowed to rewrite the lost paper, and if passed, 
their overall position would be re-evaluated by the Board (B123). All other candidates 
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retained credit for other subjects passed during the session but would be required to 
write the lost paper at another examination session with costs met by the Board. 
 
The first meeting of the Executive Committee was on 25 and 26 October 1951 and was 
chaired by its first Chairman, Kenneth Lamont Smith, Senior Partner of Deloitte, 
Plender, Griffiths, Annan and Co. and was given the distinction of being issued with the 
first Certificate of Registration (Lockley, 2001: 11). Lamont Smith was to give many 
years of service to the PAAB. At this first meeting, spread over two days, 
administrative affairs predominated – rules for the conduct of business, the type of 
letterhead and telegraphic address, the format of articles of clerkship forms and the 
remuneration and allowances payable to members of the Board and the Registration 
Advisory Committee – and were all discussed (PAAB Archives, Exco Vol. 1: E1–2). 
 
In conclusion, and on the basis of an examination of the PAAB Archives, the evidence 
suggests strongly that: 
 
 the PAAB quickly established itself as the accountants’ regulator; and 
 proved itself to be highly effective in the administration of the duties assigned to 
it in the Act of 1951.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In Chapter 1, four questions were asked, namely: 
 
 Why did it take nearly 40 years to register accountants? 
 What was the impact on the process of the Companies Act of 1926 and the 
Chartered Accountants’ Designation (Private) Act of 1927? 
 How did the prevailing environment impact upon the process of the unification 
of the accounting profession? 
 And finally, who were the “winners” and “losers” in the process to 1940? 
 
This thesis has demonstrated that in answering one of the questions above, the answer 
to the remaining questions becomes more apparent, such is the integrated nature of 
accounting events in the period 1913–40. For example, gold on the Rand played a 
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significant role in causing the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War. The Peace of 1902, and 
Milner’s social experiment (Davenport, 1987: 222–8) in overseeing the recovery of the 
former Boer Republics, saw the passage of legislation such as the Transvaal Ordinance 
of 1904. One reason for this Ordinance was to provide for an environment of 
accounting rectitude against which an acceptable economic recovery could result. 
 
The Ordinance gave statutory clout to an already powerful Transvaal Society of 
Accountants and thus a further advantage in any attempt in the post-Union period to 
unify the accounting profession. The same was also true of the Natal Society, created 
by the Natal legislature shortly before Union. 
 
The political and economic environments, too, played their parts. As Verhoef (2011: 
32) has shown: until 1945, governments of the day were reluctant to force any solution 
on the accountants. In fact, by allowing the passage of the Chartered Accountants’ 
Designation (Private) Act of 1927, the Pact Government ensured that the new 
Companies Act of 1926 would be serviced by qualified accountants. These Acts were 
important in Hertzog’s drive to industrialisation, and as this thesis has demonstrated, 
both Acts were passed with little opposition. But it should be noted that the designation 
CA(SA) for the individuals covered by the Designation Act gave them essentially what 
they wanted – a closed society – with very little incentive to accept unification. 
 
As has been shown, these impediments did not exist in the New Zealand and Australian 
moves towards unifying their respective accounting societies. 
 
As for the losers: the public and civil servants lost nothing. Theirs was sheltered 
employment and they practised a form of State accounting which was different to the 
Commercial accounting practised by chartered accountants. Also, the evidence suggests 
that civil servants wished to have an alternative form of employment in the light of 
Herzog’s “Afrikanerisation”. There is also evidence to suggest that the new Labourites 
in Parliament during the Pact interlude seized upon the concern of the civil servants and 
used it as a cause célèbre to embarrass their opponents. 
 
The real losers in the period 1913–40 were the small accounting firms, with limited 
resources and few clients, who nevertheless managed a competent service and earned a 
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reasonable living. The New Zealand Act and the Australian Charter accommodated 
such people. With the passage of time, these smaller accounting firms passed out of the 
system and were replaced by those who had only known a regulated profession. 
 
Those future South African Chartered Accountants who were born in 1951, would, in 
2013, on the verge of retirement, have a vague residual knowledge of the Public 
Accountants’ and Auditors’ Act No. 51 of 1951. They would have been in their early 
40s when this Act was repealed.  
 
In Sellar and Yeatman’s immortal phrase, they would probably have believed at this 
last stage of their lives, that the 1951 Act was, after all, “a good thing” (Sellar and 
Yeatman, 1930: 12). At least, it no longer regulated their professional lives. Like the 
eternal school boy, these accountants would, on being questioned, probably be 
inaccurate in their remembrance of the Act’s detail. Sellar and Yeatman base their book 
on a parody of English history teaching which involved memorising facts in the period 
1930–45, and they promise that their book contains “all the history you can remember” 
(1930: 4). 
 
As Purdue (1997: 1) points out, this potentially humorous characteristic; that is: a faulty 
memory, and a confused interpretation of related facts, has its dark side – “It exposes 
the thinness of so many of the concepts and devices of historical writing”. 
 
As noted in the Introduction, North has stated that “history matters” (1990: vii). What 
matters as well is a reasoned and reasonable interpretation of the facts. The 1951 Act 
was not repealed in 1991 because it was a bad act, but because the PAAB needed to 
respond to new technologies, legal and economic demands, and new challenges. 
Similarly, the 1991 Act was superseded in 2005 by the Auditing Profession Act. While 
change is a constant, each of the 1951, 1991 and 2005 Acts sought to register, regulate 
and reinforce the auditing profession as an important element in safeguarding a swiftly 
moving South African economy.  
 
In this environment, the “rules of the game” – that is: actions that need to be taken 
against some predetermined and widely accepted criteria – are important. As Alan J 
Richardson (1989) points out in his article on “Canada’s Accounting Elite: 1880–
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1930”, professions have won privileged positions and legislative recognition for their 
professions – to such an extent that some have described them as “private interest 
governments” (Richardson, 1989: 1). A process of change brought these professions to 
this position. The quid pro quo has two elements: firstly, that these professions “serve 
the public interest” (1989: 1). Here Richardson argues that the idea of public interest 
means that individuals should have access to professional assistance. This assistance, in 
turn, is limited to those aspects of the profession in which the practitioner is technically 
competent. The highest possible standards are thus achieved. And secondly, the 
profession should be open to all members of society able to acquire the necessary skills. 
As shown in this thesis, the Four Societies were adept at applying the rules. However, 
the one rule they consistently opposed was that of the individual with moderate or no 
qualification being admitted to the accounting profession. To this end, the Four 
Societies withdrew support for the 1924 Bill and let it flounder. Ultimately, however, 
the concept of a profession open to all predominated. In the post-1945 period, 
Parliament focused on the plight of the “little man” and universal acceptance of those 
with skills. With the 1951 Act, this was achieved. The process reflected Hertzog’s 1912 
cri de coeur of “South Africa First.” 
 
Hertzog’s ideas became the bedrock of the new profession. It is fitting that the ruling 
parties’ messenger to the first meeting of the Board in 1951 was Hertzog’s faithful 
supporter, Havenga. 
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APPENDIX 1:  
A DESCRIPTION OF THE UNION PARLIAMENT’S PROCEDURES, TAKEN 
LARGELY FROM KILPIN’S PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURES (1946) 
 
The passage of a private bill through the South African Parliament in the early to mid- 
20th Century (see Appendix 2) was detailed in a set of clear, if sometimes tedious, 
procedures which began with drafting the contents of the Bill. This initial step needed 
unambiguous language so that the intentions of the Bill’s promoters were understood 
not only by Parliament which had to pass the Bill, but also by those to be subject to it, 
as well as the courts which would have to interpret and enforce it. The complexity of 
the process made it necessary for the promoters of private legislation to appoint 
professional parliamentary agents to guide the legislation through that process. Such 
agents were usually advocates “of at least five years standing” (Kilpin, 1946: 17). 
 
(i) ADVERTISEMENTS 
Within the time period October to November of a year, the next step in the process was 
to publish a statement of the Bill’s general objectives (as well as those whom it 
affected) (Kilpin, 1946: 20) in the Union Gazette and English and Afrikaans 
newspapers in the four provinces. At the same time the above publication was made, 
the parliamentary agent sent printed copies of the Bill to the Clerk of the House of 
Assembly who then sent copies to the Prime Minister’s Office. 
 
The purpose of the above procedure was to ensure that when Parliament met in January 
of the following year, those in opposition to the Bill were fully informed, as was the 
Government, who might also wish to oppose the Bill on public grounds. In the latter 
case, the Bill was described as “an opposed private bill” (Kilpin, 1946: 20). 
 
(ii) PETITIONS IN SUPPORT 
A private bill needed to be presented by petition to the House of Assembly by a 
member of that House acting for the promoters. The promoters chose this person with 
the assistance of their parliamentary agent. The petition was signed by the promoters 
and the parliamentary agent and, with a certified copy of the Bill, everything was sent 
to the Clerk of the House of Assembly (Kilpin, 1946: 20). 
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Before presenting the petition to the House, the petitioners needed to send the Bill to 
the Speaker for approval. Once this had been given, the promoters needed to present it 
to the House within a period of 40 days of the opening of the Parliamentary session. 
The petition was also a statement that House rules had been met and that due notice of 
the promoters’ intentions had been given to the public through advertisements. The 
statement was confirmed by the Examiners – that is: the Parliamentary Draftsman and 
the Chairman of Committees. The method of confirmation used was to request the 
parliamentary agent to provide documentary evidence, such as newspaper clippings of 
the public statements made. At this point of the process, the parliamentary agent needed 
to pay a fee to Parliament for services rendered by its officials to date and to give a 
written guarantee, together with such security deemed necessary by the Clerk of the 
House, to pay all expenses associated with the Bill’s passage. Once the Examiners were 
satisfied as to the evidence and payment, the member charged with the Bill rose in the 
House and gave notice for leave to present the Bill for a first reading. A date was set for 
this reading (Kilpin, 1946: 21). 
 
On the chosen day, the Speaker called upon the member in charge of the Bill to “move 
the motion” (Kilpin, 1946: 22). The speaker then called for the motion to be seconded 
and, upon receiving this, asked “that the Bill be now read in first time” (Kilpin, 1946: 
22). When the House dealt with a private bill, this question was usually agreed without 
discussion. The reason for this was the Parliamentary practice of referring private bills 
to a select committee which was required to examine it in detail, interviewing interested 
parties who wanted to give evidence. As a matter of unwritten understanding, select 
committees needed to consider both public as well as private interests (Kilpin, 1946: 
27). 
 
(iii) FIRST READING 
The first reading of the Bill entailed the Clerk at the Table of the House reading its 
short title to the House, thereby confirming the House’s intention to consider the Bill. 
Thereafter the member of the House responsible for the Bill moved a date for the Bill to 
be sent to the Select Committee (Kilpin, 1946: 22). After the first reading, private bills 
were usually sent to a select committee. Here the committee could change the 
principles embodied in the Bill and submit a new Bill to the House. This was not 
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possible after the second reading; at this reading, the Bill’s principles were agreed and 
were thus fixed (Kilpin, 1946: 9). 
 
(iv) PETITIONS IN OPPOSITION 
A petition in opposition to the Bill needed to be presented by a member of the House 
within three sitting days of the Bill’s first reading. Such a petition was drafted by a 
parliamentary agent employed by the Bill’s opponents, and it had to detail the reasons 
for their opposition to the Bill. In addition, the opponent’s agent needed to provide a 
certified copy of the petition for the promoters of the Bill, pay a fee and also include a 
written guarantee, with such security as necessary, to the effect that all costs associated 
with the opposition would be met by him. The member who presented the petition in 
opposition to the House then also moved its referral to the Select Committee (Kilpin, 
1946: 23). 
 
(v) REFERRAL TO SELECT COMMITTEE 
Once the House had referred the Bill to a select committee, the Standing Rules and 
Orders Committee, chaired by the Speaker, considered the Select Committee’s 
membership. A personal financial interest in the Bill, or that of members’ constituents, 
was required to be disclosed and meant automatic exclusion from the selection 
committee (Kilpin, 1946: 23). 
 
The Standing Rules and Orders Committee appointed the Select Committee’s chair on 
the basis of experience and legal knowledge. As the chair had both a deliberative and a 
casting vote in the case of a private bill, the Select Committee was usually made up of 
an odd number of members so as to reduce the need for the chair to use a casting vote 
(Kilpin, 1946: 23). This added to the chair’s objectivity. A number of other safeguards 
were in place to ensure the impartiality of the Select Committee, principally that no 
member of the House could “act as attorney, agent or counsel” (Kilpin, 1946: 24) 
before the committee. Also, all members of the committee needed to attend every 
meeting, unless given a leave of absence by the Speaker. 
 
Without such permission, a committee missing more than one member could not 
conduct its business. It was understood that in order to prevent any attempt to delay the 
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process, select committees on opposed bills met daily until their business was complete 
(Kilpin, 1946: 24). 
 
Once the Select Committee’s membership had been chosen and the House informed of 
this by the Speaker, three sitting days needed to pass before the committee first met. 
This was to allow the chair of the committee, the parliamentary agents for the 
promoters and opponents of the Bill and the Clerk of the House to meet and to decide 
upon a date and time for the committee’s first meeting. 
 
At the first meeting, the members of the Select Committee sat at a curved table in the 
committee room. The chair sat in the centre of the curve with the committee clerk next 
to him. The clerk initiated the proceedings by reading the Order of the House which 
constituted the committee. Thereafter, the members signed a disclaimer of interest in 
the Bill. The promoters and opponents, together with their legal counsel and agents, 
were then allowed into the room to sit at tables set between the two ends of the curve. 
The witnesses and other interested parties sat behind them (Kilpin, 1946: 25). 
 
The clerk then read the petition of the promoters and that of their opponents to the 
assembled group and the chair informed those assembled that the committee would 
listen to the parties to the Bill and then determine whether the assertions contained in 
the preamble to the Bill had been “proved” – that is: adequately detailed in the Bill. In 
this period, most private bills began with a statement – or preamble – of the Bill’s 
specific objectives together with an explanation as to why legislation was needed “on 
each of the more important subjects dealt with in the clauses of the bill” (Kilpin, 1946: 
25). The clerk read the preamble and afterwards the chair asked the promoters’ counsel 
or their parliamentary agent – where there was no counsel – to present the case for the 
Bill and to call any witnesses in support of its preamble. 
 
When called to present evidence, witnesses for the promoters took up the seat next to 
their counsel or parliamentary agent and answered such questions as were put to them. 
Thereafter, counsel for the Bill’s opponents was permitted to cross-examine the 
witnesses. The counsel for the promoters was allowed a re-examination of the witnesses 
and a final re-examination was allowed to counsel for the opponents to the Bill. During 
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this process, counsel were only allowed to ask questions that related to the assertions 
contained in the preamble to the Bill. 
 
Once the promoters had presented their case, counsel for the Bill’s opponents or their 
parliamentary agent could be heard against the preamble and present such witnesses as 
considered necessary. As with counsel for the promoters, the opponents’ counsel could 
only ask questions relevant to the assertions contained in the preamble (Kilpin, 1946: 
25–6). Throughout the proceedings, the chair and members of the committee were 
entitled to question the witnesses. In the case of private bills, they could not call 
witnesses to give evidence; this was the prerogative of the parliamentary agents (Kilpin, 
1946: 25). 
 
Once both sides of the argument had been heard and all witnesses examined, the room 
was cleared so that the committee could decide in private as to whether the ‘preamble 
[had] been proved, i.e. that the promoters [had] established a case for the bill’ (Kilpin, 
1946: 26). Once a decision had been made, the parties to the Bill were called back to 
the committee room to be informed as to the committee’s decision. Where the question 
was “negatived” (Kilpin, 1946: 26) by the committee – that is: the promoters had not 
established a case for the Bill – the chair reported this to the House and the Bill was 
dropped. Where the Bill was “affirmed”, the Select Committee then considered it in 
detail. When the committee had made such amendments to the Bill as it believed 
necessary, these were reported to the House (Kilpin, 1946: 26). 
 
In the case of an unopposed private bill, the process was simpler in that there was no 
formal petition of opposition to the Bill nor hostile witnesses. The Select Committee 
could then ask the promoters’ representatives to prove the assertions in the Bill to its 
satisfaction. 
 
(vi) SECOND READING 
The next step in the process was for the printed Bill to be brought before the House for 
its second reading. On the day set to consider the Bill, and after the clerk had read the 
Order of the Day, the Speaker called upon the member of the House responsible for the 
Bill to move its second reading. This usually took the form of an explanation by the 
member as to the necessity for the Bill and the reasons for its introduction. In terms of 
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parliamentary procedure, no seconder was needed for the motion as, in fixing the date 
for the second reading, the House had agreed to consider the Bill. The ensuing debate 
then decided whether the Bill should be read a second time with the Speaker ensuring 
the application of the rule of relevant comment in the proceedings. The Speaker usually 
interpreted this rule widely (Kilpin, 1946: 7). 
 
The debate centred mainly upon the Bill’s principles and the result was one of three 
choices – accept, reject or lay aside the Bill. The last of these was an amendment of the 
motion for a second reading and called for the Bill to be read “this day six months” 
(Kilpin, 1946: 8). Such a proposal, if accepted, “killed” the Bill as it was often 
impossible to have it read before the current session of Parliament ended. The result 
was that the Bill ended in limbo and was eventually dropped. Where the proposal to 
read the Bill a second time was only “negatived” (Kilpin, 1946: 8), the Bill could be put 
to a later reading within the current session and it remained “in the game”. 
 
When the second reading was complete, the Speaker instructed the Clerk at the Table to 
record the Bill’s short title and thereafter asked the member in charge of the Bill “What 
day for Committee?”; that is: “Committee of the Whole House” (Kilpin, 1946: 9). 
 
(vii) THE HOUSE-IN-COMMITTEE 
At the House-in-Committee stage of the process, the actual detail in the Bill was 
considered and changes made to its clauses or sections. In this, the Committee was 
guided by the report of the Select Committee. This Committee was constituted in a 
small ceremony which underlay the principles of parliamentary procedure. After the 
order putting the House in Committee was read, the Speaker asked if he should “now 
leave the Chair” (Kilpin, 1946: 10). This question was put formally and agreed. The 
Chair of Committees then took a seat at the Table of the House and announced that the 
Bill could now be considered. 
 
Each clause was then considered separately, and all sections of the Bill could be 
examined in detail. The role of the Chair was critical in guiding the debate and in 
ensuring the split in responsibilities was maintained: the House debated the principles 
of a Bill while the House-in-Committee dealt with its details. 
 
 458 
 
In particular, the Chair needed to be vigilant that changes made “on an ‘instruction’ 
from the House” (Kilpin, 1946: 11) did not bring in new and important principles into a 
bill that were not intended. The Chair also needed to be careful not to allow 
amendments to the Bill which weakened the principles agreed to by the House and 
could also disallow amendments which were the same as others previously confirmed. 
The Chair of Committee thus had an important role to play. 
 
It is important to note that the House-in-Committee could neither kill a bill (Kilpin, 
1946: 11) nor withdraw a private bill. In the latter case, the Bill remained “the property 
of the promoters” (Kilpin, 1946: 27) and only they could withdraw the Bill. While the 
Committee could “negative every clause” (Kilpin, 1946: 11), the House, at the report 
stage of a bill, could still reverse such actions. Also, motions “that the Chairman leave 
the Chair” or “that the Chairman report progress”, indicated the Committee’s desire to 
discontinue debate on the matter. But if successful, the motions resulted in the Bill 
being “dropped” – though it could still be “revived” later, should the House so require 
(Kilpin, 1946: 11). 
 
Once all clauses had been examined and the debate ended, the Chair enquired of the 
private member in charge of the Bill: “Does the Honourable Member move?” (Kilpin, 
1946: 12). A positive response required the Chair to move that he “report” the Bill. The 
Speaker of the House was then called and informed of the Committee’s decision. If the 
Bill was reported without amendments, the Speaker asked “what day for Third 
Reading?” Where a bill was forwarded with amendments, his question was “what day 
for Report stage?” When the day had been fixed, the House-in-Committee became the 
House of Assembly once again and the session closed. The bill was reprinted and 
detailed the amendments made (Kilpin, 1946: 12). 
 
(viii) REPORT ON THE BILL 
At the report stage, the House approved or rejected the amendments made to the Bill, or 
considered further amendments where the appropriate notice had been given. At this 
point in the process, the House considered the Bill as a whole and not clause by clause. 
The Speaker, back in the chair, detailed the changes made. Such changes could be 
amended and no notice was needed but new amendments needed proper notice to be 
given. Where amendments were proposed which should have been made in committee 
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on the order of the House, such an amendment needed to be sent back to the Committee 
of the Whole House for consideration. In addition, the whole bill or sections of it could 
be returned to that Committee for further debate. Such a move was usually made by a 
motion to do so or as an insert “that the amendments be now considered” to the initial 
motion to start the proceedings. When the House had considered all amendments, the 
Speaker asked “that the Bill as amended be adopted” and after a positive response, the 
date of the third reading was set (Kilpin, 1946: 12–3). 
 
(ix) THIRD READING 
At the third reading, the House considered the final amended and printed bill to decide 
whether it could be passed into law. When the motion “that the Bill be now read a 
Third Time” was proposed, it was possible for members to propose an amendment to 
the effect that it be read “this day six months”. This happened where there were 
important reasons why the Bill should not be passed. While verbal changes and changes 
to the title were within the power of the House at this point, any important amendments 
needed to be sent back to the Committee of the Whole House for consideration (Kilpin, 
1946: 13). 
 
Once the third reading had been completed successfully, the role of the House of 
Assembly was almost complete. At the Speaker’s request, a copy of the Bill was 
endorsed by the Clerk of the House as having “passed”. It was then taken by a Clerk of 
the Table, together with the reports of the Examiners and Select Committee, to the 
Senate where they were accepted by the Clerk of the Senate (Kilpin, 1946: 13–4). 
 
(x) TO THE SENATE 
The Senate had the power to accept, reject, lay aside the Bill or suggest amendments to 
it, and could also refer it to its own Select Committee. If the Senate passed a bill, a 
message was sent to the House of Assembly. No message was sent where the Senate 
rejected a bill. Where the Senate passed a bill with amendments, the Bill was reprinted 
to show these amendments as well as the original text and sent back to the House of 
Assembly for consideration, either at once or at some future date. The House could 
consider the amendments itself or send them to a Committee of the Whole House. In 
either case, the principle applied was that whatever both Houses had agreed could not 
be amended, thus keeping the debate to the issues raised (Kilpin, 1946: 14). 
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Once all issues had been resolved in both Houses of Parliament, the next step was to 
obtain the King’s Assent. A copy of the Bill, endorsed by both the Speaker of the 
House of Assembly and the President of the Senate, was sent to the Prime Minister’s 
Office for onward despatch to the Governor-General for his approval (Kilpin, 1946: 
15). 
 
(xi) THE KING’S ASSENT 
As the King’s representative, the Governor-General could do one of three things:  
 
1. assent to the Bill; 
2. withhold his assent; or 
3. return it to the House of Assembly for amendment.  
 
Options 2 and 3 were rarely chosen. Once the Governor-General assented to the Bill, he 
signed the certified copy received from the Speaker, and sent it back via the Prime 
Minister’s Office to the Clerk of the House of Assembly. The Clerk then forwarded this 
Act of Parliament to the Registrar of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court “in 
order that it [was] enrolled of record” (Kilpin, 1946: 15). Both Houses of Parliament 
were formally informed of this fact and the Act became effective either on the date 
stipulated in the Act, or, if there was no such date, then on the day it was published in 
the Union Gazette. 
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APPENDIX 2:  
A SUMMARY OF THE PARLIAMENTARY STAGES FOR A PRIVATE BILL 
 
Parliament in Recess 
 
1. In October and November, the parliamentary agent placed notices of the private 
Bill in the Union Gazette and newspapers. 
2. By the last day of November, the agent lodged copies of the private bill with the 
Clerk of the House of Assembly who forwarded copies to the Prime Minister’s 
Office. 
 
Parliament in Session 
 
1. Within the first 40 days of the beginning of the Session, the promoter of the Bill 
petitioned for leave to introduce the Bill. 
2. The Bill was sent to the Examiners for consideration. 
3. The Examiners’ Report was laid on the Table of the House ‘with all convenient 
speed’. 
4. On receipt of favourable report, notice of motion for leave to introduce the Bill 
was given and the agent guaranteed costs associated with the process of having 
the Bill introduced and considered by Parliament. 
5. First Reading of the Bill. Thereafter, petitions in opposition needed to be 
presented within three sitting days. 
6. Notice of motion to refer the Bill to a select committee on the Bill. 
7. Within two days of (6) above, meeting of Standing Rules and Orders Committee 
to consider the membership of the select committee took place. 
8. After three days of announcement of the membership of the select committee, 
first meeting of this committee took place. 
9. Report of the select committee to the House of Assembly. 
10. Notice of motion to refer the Bill to a second reading. 
11. Second Reading of the Bill. 
12. Notice of motion to refer the Bill to the Committee of the Whole House. 
13. Report to House and notice of motion to refer the Bill to a third reading. 
14. Third Reading of the Bill. 
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15. Despatch of the Bill to Senate for concurrence. 
16. Senate either concurs, amends or rejects the Bill. 
17. Amended bill sent back to House for further debate. 
18. Senate notified of House’s reconsideration. 
19. Bill to Governor-General for King’s Assent. 
20. Signed Bill returned to House. 
21. Clerk of the House sent to the Registrar of the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court to be enrolled. 
22. Act becomes effective on the date stipulated in the Act of when published in the 
Union Gazette. 
 
(Source: Kilpin, 1946: 168) 
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APPENDIX 3: 
THE SOUTH SEA BUBBLE 
 
The facts of the South Sea Bubble are as follows. An English company known as the 
South Sea Company was formed in 1711 with the intention of taking on the 
Government’s short-term debt and converting it into a permanent debt at a fixed 
interest. In return, the Government guaranteed the company an interest of 6% on the 
debt transferred together with a trade monopoly with the Spanish colonies in South 
America (Cowie, 1969: 242). 
 
When this proved unprofitable, the directors of the company led by a John Blunt 
proposed a scheme to take over most of the Government’s national debt, then 
amounting to £50 million (Cowles, 1960: 82). In this, Blunt had been influenced by a 
similar scheme engineered by one John Law in France with the Mississippi Company 
and a monopoly on developing the French possession of Louisiana in North America 
(Carswell, 1961: 84–7). 
 
Blunt’s scheme was uncomplicated in its initial design. In return for the debt, the South 
Sea Company assumed from the Government, it would issue stock in the company, but 
the exact details were left deliberately vague (Cowie, 1969: 243). If the market price of 
Company stock was greater than its issue price, the difference would be available for 
resale as stock. This was to be an important factor in creating the Bubble. 
 
The Government debt, to be taken on, amounted to about £30 million, split into £15 
million of redeemable debt and £15 million of irredeemable, or fixed, debt. The latter 
debt was in the form of long fixed-term annuities purchased by individuals as a source 
of income and became another important factor as the Bubble developed. The annuities 
were to run for a variety of periods but the Government chose to value them at a limited 
number of uniform periods so that in some instances their actual value was higher than 
their calculated value (Carswell, 1961: 104). 
 
Public attention, already guaranteed by the large sums of money involved, was further 
piqued when the Bank of England made a counter offer for the right to offer its stock to 
holders of the national debt. Blunt’s amended scheme won the day, however, and the 
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game was on (Carswell, 1969: 113). The annuitants were under no obligation to 
exchange their irredeemables to stock in the South Sea Company so the strategy 
adopted was to see how high its stock could be driven so as to induce the annuitants to 
convert. 
 
But there were flaws in the scheme. The company needed to sell a minimum of 75 000 
shares at £300 each simply to cover the redeemable debt of £15 million and pay a 
premium of £7½ million to the Government. To service the debt taken on would require 
just under £1 million, assuming an interest rate of 4%. There was thus little working 
capital to expand the business and generate separate revenue streams. In addition, the 
political dynamics of the day had required a considerable outlay of cash to buy 
patronage at the highest levels of Government and Parliament to ensure support of the 
passage of the proposed scheme through the English Parliament. To some, the flaws in 
the scheme were obvious. With more sense than most in the affair, one contemporary 
pamphleteer wrote:  
 
“The rise of the stock above the true capital will be only imaginary; that one 
added to one, by any rules of vulgar arithmetic, will never make three and a 
half; and that consequently all the fictitious value must be a loss to some person 
or other, first or last: that the only way to prevent it to oneself, must be to sell 
out betimes, and so let the Devil take the hindmost” (Cowles, 1960: 94). 
 
The whole process was accompanied by exaggerated rumours of the profits to be 
earned by the trade with South America and it initiated a frenzy of speculation and the 
promotion of a variety of far-fetched and bizarre schemes, nicknamed “bubbles”. One 
such “bubble” advertised the establishment of a company “for carrying on an 
undertaking of Great Advantage but no one to know what it is” (Cowles, 1960: 126). 
The Government was concerned and passed the Bubble Act in June 1720 (repealed in 
1825) which required all joint-stock companies to have a Royal Charter. This restriction 
limited the formation of new joint stock companies until 1844 when the Joint Stock 
Companies Act made such companies generally acceptable again (Chatfield, 1977: 70). 
Ironically, the grant of a Charter to the South Sea Company boosted its attraction. The 
Company’s share price rose from £128 in January, 1720 to £550 at the end of May and 
peaked at almost £1 000 at the beginning of August (Cowie, 1969: 243). The 
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momentum could not be sustained and the price began to fall after that date. In August, 
too, the company’s liquidity problem became critical. The down-turn changed into a 
run to sell the rapidly depreciating stock with panic and chaos as inevitable 
consequences. By the end of September, the value of a share was down to £150 and 
thousands of individuals were ruined. Parliament was recalled in December and an 
investigation revealed the widespread bribery. Many important people involved in the 
scheme escaped punishment, but most of the directors of the company had their assets 
sequestrated (Cowles, 1960: 172). 
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APPENDIX 5: 
COST OF THE 1924 ACCOUNTANTS BILL TO THE FOUR SOCIETIES 
 
The Registrar 
The Transvaal Society of Accountants 
P O Box 2995 
Johannesburg 
South African Society of Accountants (Private Bill) 
 
Total cost till the 30th June: 
Parliamentary Agents Account   £2 256 7s 0d 
Expenses incurred by the promoting Societies £ 686 15s 1d 
Interest on advances by Societies   £ 53 6s 0d 
Total       £2 996 8s 1d 
 
Different Societies contributions: 
Cape Society of Accountants    £1 714 17s 9d 
Plus interest      £ 53 6s 0d 
       £1 768 3s 9d 
 
Transvaal Society of Accountants   £ 668 2s 8d 
Plus interest      £ 9 12s 11d 
       £ 667 15s 7d 
 
Natal Society of Accountants    £ 309 1s 8d 
Plus interest      £ 4 4s 8d 
       £ 313 6s 4d 
 
OFS Society of Accountants    £ 232 16s 0d 
Plus interest      £ 4 6s 0d 
       £ 237 2s 5d 
 
Total       £2 996 8s 1d 
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When an estimate of likely cost was obtained it was not anticipated that there would be 
much, if any, opposition and the sum of £2 000 was the basis upon which the costs 
were calculated. 
 
Source: SAAHC, TSA, Minutes 19 August 1924: 190, Minute Number 12. 
 
 469 
 
APPENDIX 6: 
ORIGINAL AFRIKAANS SOURCES 
QUOTED IN TRANSLATION IN CHAPTER 13 
 
TABLE 13.1 
MATERIAL IRREGULARITIES, 1953–75 
 
  Aantal 
gevalle 
Teruggetrek deur ouditeurs op 'n later datum 
 
Aandeelhouers vervolg die direkteur in ’n siviele saak 
 
Bevredigend reggestel op ’n later datum, voor of na optrede deur 
’n instansie na wie die geval verwys is deur die Raad 
 
Deur die Raad of die instansie na wie verwys [is] deur die Raad, 
beslis dat die geval nie ’n wesentlike onreëlmatigheid is nie 
 
Geen optrede tot gevolg nie 
 
Maatskappye gederegistreer 
 
Optrede deur verskeie instansies geweier 
 
Prokureur-Generaal stel geen vervolging in nie 
- geen rede aangedui 
- kan nie die skuldige partye opspoor nie 
- getuienis onvoldoende vir suksesvolle vervolging 
- kan nie optree voor die maatskappy onder geregtelike bestuur  
 geplaas word nie 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
105 
8 
6 
 
3 
3 
 
1 
 
 
37 
 
 
12 
 
624 
 
124 
 
13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
122 
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Skulderkenning betaal deur die persone in beheer en/of die 
maatskappy 
 
Vervolgings ingestel 
 
Word nog ondersoek 
 
Onverklaar 
 
 
 
16 
 
64 
 
117 
 
13 
_____ 
1 146 
Source: Vermaak, 1976: 159–60. 
 
Vermaak, quoted in Chapter 13 (original Afrikaans): 
“In 591 gevalle het die Raad slegs die stukke geliasseer en nie opgetree nie, daar die 
ouditeure berig het dat die maatskappye handel dryf terwyl dit insolvent is, en vorige 
ervaring in die verband getoon het dat daar nie op daardie stadium teen die 
maatskappye opgetree kan word nie. 
 
In die ander 33 gevalle was die maatskappye reeds onder geregtelike bestuur (3 
gevalle), in likwidasie (9 gevalle) of is later in likwidasie geplaas (21 gevalle). 
Dit is die plig van die geregtelike bestuurders en likwidateurs om op te tree 
waar daar in sulke gevalle beweerde wesentlike onreëlmatighede voorgekom 
het. Die Raad het hulle dus net self daarvan vergewis dat die betrokke 
amptenare bewus is van die beweerde wesentlike onreëlmatighede” (Vermaak, 
1976: 162–3). 
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APPENDIX 7: 
BASIC DETAILS OF THE FOUR PROVINCIAL SOCIETIES 
 
1. Transvaal Society of Accountants 
 (Est. August 1904) 
 Name changed to: 
 Transvaal Society of Chartered Accountants 
 (February 1970) 
 Society liquidated/wound up 
 (1994–6) 
 
2. Natal Society of Accountants 
 (Est. 1909) 
 Name changed to: 
 Natal Society of Chartered Accountants 
 (February 1970) 
 Name changed to: 
 Kwazulu-Natal Society of Chartered Accountants 
 (March 1995) 
 
3. Society of Accountants in Cape Colony 
 (Incorporated 1907) 
 Name changed to: 
 Cape Society of Accountants and Auditors  
 (in 1920) 
 Name changed to: 
 Cape Society of Chartered Accountants (CSA) 
 (in 1967) 
 Merged with  
 Chartered Accountants Western Cape Regional Association (CAWCRA) 
 (Est. 1979) 
 and name changed to: 
 Western Cape Society of Chartered Accountants 
 (in 1996) 
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4. Society of Accountants and Auditors in the Orange River Colony 
 (Est. 1907) 
 Name changed to: 
 Society of Accountants and Auditors in the Orange Free State 
 (in 1910) 
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APPENDIX 8: 
A BRIEF SURVEY OF SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS, 1910–51 
 
In many countries, history is a saga of opportunities gained and opportunities lost. In 
South Africa’s case, the opportunities gained were those endowed by its abundant 
deposits of diamonds, gold and other minerals; the opportunity lost was the failure to 
use the tremendous mineral wealth generated by mining to create an equitable society 
for all its peoples. Successive White governments failed in this respect as they did not 
recognise a growing population’s land hunger and passed the cruel Land Act of 1913. 
But two Anglo-Boer Wars – the first, a short-lived affair in 1880; the second, a full-
blown modern war covering nearly four years, from 1899–1902, created a long-lived 
animosity between English and Afrikaans speakers. Much of the political activity in 
South Africa in the 20th Century was tainted by memories of this second conflict. 
 
South African history is thus complex and it is not the intention to get involved in that 
complexity. The methodology used in this Appendix is to outline political change 
through a basic analysis of the shifting allegiance in the 11 parliamentary elections held 
in the period 1910–53. In summary, they were:  
 
Date of General 
Election 
Victor Number of 
parliamentary 
seats available 
Number of  
parliamentary seats 
taken by victor 
September 1910 Amalgamation of 
three pre-Union 
governing parties 1 
121 66 (54.5%) 
October 1915 South African  
Party  
Unionist Party 
130 54 (41.5%) 
 
40 (30.7%) 
March 1920 South African  
Party 
Unionist Party 
134 41 (30.5%) 
  
25 (18.6%) 
February 1921 South African 
Party 2 
134 77 (57.4%) 
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June 1924 National Party 3 
Labour Party 
135 63 (46.6%) 
17 (12.5%) 
June 1929 National Party 
Labour Party 
148 77 (52%) 
8 (0.54%) 
May 1933 Coalition 4 150 144 (96%) 
May 1938 United Party 5 150 111 (74%) 
July 1943 United Party 6 150 89 (59%) 
May 1948 National Party 7 
Afrikaner Party 
150 70 (46.6%) 
9 (0.06%) 
April 1953 National Party 156 94 (60%) 
 
FOOTNOTES: 
1 Evolutionary elements of future South African Party which comprised both 
moderate Afrikaans and English South Africans under the leadership of the 
former Boer Generals Botha and Smuts. 
South African Party (Cape Colony) 
Orangia Unie (Orange Free State) 
 
2 South African Party (under Smuts’ leadership) amalgamated with the English-
speaking Unionist Party in 1920. 
 
3 The former Boer General JBM Hertzog’s National Party (founded in 1912 as 
the Afrikaner nationalist opposition to the SAP) entered into a Pact with 
Creswell’s English-speaking Labour Party to act in concert. The Pact 
Government lasted from 1924–33. 
 
4 Coalition between Hertzog’s Nationalist Party and Smuts’ South African Party. 
This unusual political grouping was the direct result of the Great Depression. 
 
5 The Coalition of the National Party and the South African Party fused to form a 
new party, the United South African National Party. In so doing, it shed right-
wing fundamentalists of both Afrikaans- and English-speaking South Africans. 
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In 1934, DF Malan became the leader of the Purified National Party, the party 
of “exclusive Afrikaner nationalism” (Saunders and Southey, 1998: 121). 
 
6 With the outbreak of World War II, the question of neutrality or participation 
split the United Party and left Smuts as leader after Hertzog’s resignation. For 
the duration of the war, Smuts was supported by the English-speaking 
Dominion and Labour parties. Havenga, former Finance Minister and supporter 
of Hertzog, formed the Afrikaner Party as an alternative to Malan’s Purified 
National Party. 
 
7 Afrikaner nationalism triumphed in the 1948 election and took effective control 
of the Government. Apartheid was their official creed. Havenga’s Afrikaner 
Party supported Malan in the elections, giving a narrow margin in the election. 
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GLOSSARY OF NON-ENGLISH WORDS AND PHRASES  
 
ab initio – at the beginning 
bewaarplaatsen – technical legal term 
for the surface land leased to mining 
companies, beneath which the mining 
takes place 
blitzkrieg – fast-moving and violent 
military campaign 
bona fide – genuine or trustworthy 
bywoners – tenant farmers 
cause célèbre – controversy 
caveat – warning 
Christelike Nasionale Onderwys – 
Christian National Education 
cri de coeur – passionate appeal 
de facto – in reality (whether lawful or 
not) 
de jure – according to law 
de novo – from the beginning 
denouement – final resolution 
Die Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut – “The 
Afrikaans Commerce Institute”; a major 
chamber of commerce 
Die Stem – a song associated with 
Afrikaner nationalism, ultimately 
replacing “God Save the Queen” as the 
South African national anthem 
Die Volk – the Afrikaner people as a 
nation 
dramatis personae – the main players 
en bloc – all together 
et al. – and others 
ex officio – by virtue of office 
fait accompli – an irreversible state or 
action 
Federale Mynbou – Afrikaner finance 
corporation (initially for mining) 
Federale Volksbeleggings – Afrikaner 
investment company 
geoktrooieerde – chartered 
Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party – Purified 
National Party 
getjaarterder – chartered (informal) 
hereniging – reunion 
Herenigde Nasionale Party – Reunited 
National Party 
impasse – insurmountable obstacle 
in situ – in position 
kaffir – highly pejorative and racist 
term for a Black person in South Africa 
laissez-aller – unconstrained 
maelström – turbulence 
Ossewabrandwag – “Ox-wagon 
Sentinel”; an Afrikaner organisation of 
Nazi sympathisers fiercely opposed to 
South African participation in World 
War II 
per annum – each year 
per capita – per person 
platteland – the South African 
countryside 
plattelanders – rural Afrikaners 
plus ça change, plus c’est la même 
chose – the more things change, the 
more they stay the same 
quid pro quo – given in exchange 
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quora – pl. of quorum: the fixed 
number of members of a body whose 
presence is necessary for its 
transactions to be valid 
sic – as it stands 
status quo – the existing state of affairs 
Taalbond – see Zuid-Afrikaanse 
Taalbond 
uitlanders – British immigrants to the 
SA mines (derogatory) 
verbatim – word for word 
via media – middle way / compromise 
vice versa – the other way around 
vierkleur – the four-coloured flag of the 
old Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek 
vis-à-vis – in relation to 
Volksraad – the Parliament of the old 
Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek; also the 
Afrikaans term for the South African 
House of Assembly 
volkskapitalisme – Afrikaner nationalist 
interpretation of capitalism 
Volkskas – a commercial bank for 
Afrikaners 
Voortrekkers – Cape Dutch farmers 
who left the Cape in the 1830s–40s to 
settle in the South African hinterland 
away from British colonial rule 
Zuid-Afrikaanse Taalbond  – an 
organisation dedicated to the fostering 
and preservation of Afrikaner language 
 
